Seeing, therefore, as hath been showed, all that is known is not
comprehended by its own nature but by the power of him which
comprehendeth it, let us see now, as much as we may, what is the state
of the divine substance that we may also know what His knowledge is.
Wherefore it is the common judgment of all that live by reason that God
is everlasting, and therefore let us consider what eternity is. For this
declareth unto us both the divine nature and knowledge. Eternity
therefore is a perfect possession altogether of an endless life, which
is more manifest by the comparison of temporal things, for whatsoever
liveth in time, that being present proceedeth from times past to times
to come, and there is nothing placed in time which can embrace all the
space of its life at once. But it hath not yet attained to-morrow and
hath lost yesterday. And you live no more in this day's life than in
that movable and transitory moment. Wherefore, whatsoever suffereth the
condition of time, although, as Aristotle thought of the world, it never
began nor were ever to end, and its life did endure with infinite time,
yet it is not such that it ought to be called everlasting. For it doth
not comprehend and embrace all the space of its life together, though
that life be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to
come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fulness of
an endless life together, to which neither any part to come is absent,
nor of that which is past hath escaped, is worthy to be accounted
everlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in itself,
it may always be present to itself, and have an infinity of movable time
present to it. Wherefore they are deceived who, hearing that Plato
thought that this world had neither beginning of time nor should ever
have any end, think that by this means the created world should be
coeternal with the Creator. For it is one thing to be carried through an
endless life, which Plato attributed to the world, another thing to
embrace the whole presence of an endless life together, which is
manifestly proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to seem more
ancient than the things created, by the quantity of time, but rather by
the simplicity of His divine nature. For that infinite motion of
temporal things imitateth the present state of the unmovable life, and
since it cannot express nor equal it, it falleth from immobility to
motion, and from the simplicity of presence, it decreaseth to an
infinite quantity of future and past, and since it cannot possess
together all the fulness of its life, by never leaving to be in some
sort, it seemeth to emulate in part that which it cannot fully obtain
and express, tying itself to this small presence of this short and swift
moment, which because it carrieth a certain image of that abiding
presence, whosoever hath it, seemeth to be. But because it could not
stay it undertook an infinite journey of time, and so it came to pass
that it continued that life by going whose plenitude it could not
comprehend by staying. Wherefore, if we will give things their right
names, following Plato, let us say that God is everlasting and the world
perpetual. Wherefore, since every judgment comprehendeth those things
which are subject unto it, according to its own nature, and God hath
always an everlasting and present state, His knowledge also surpassing
all motions of time, remaineth in the simplicity of His presence, and
comprehending the infinite spaces of that which is past and to come,
considereth all things in His simple knowledge as though they were now
in doing. So that, if thou wilt weigh His foreknowledge with which He
discerneth all things, thou wilt more rightly esteem it to be the
knowledge of a never fading instant than a foreknowledge as of a thing
to come. For which cause it is not called praevidence or foresight, but
rather providence, because, placed far from inferior things, it
overlooketh all things, as it were, from the highest top of things. Why,
therefore, wilt thou have those things necessary which are illustrated
by the divine light, since that not even men make not those things
necessary which they see? For doth thy sight impose any necessity upon
those things which thou seest present?" "No." "But the present instant
of men may well be compared to that of God in this: that as you see some
things in your temporal instant, so He beholdeth all things in His
eternal present. Wherefore this divine foreknowledge doth not change the
nature and propriety of things, and it beholdeth them such in His
presence as they will after come to be, neither doth He confound the
judgment of things, and with one sight of His mind He discerneth as well
those things which shall happen necessarily as otherwise. As you, when
at one time you see a man walking upon the earth and the sun rising in
heaven, although they be both seen at once, yet you discern and judge
that the one is voluntary, and the other necessary, so likewise the
divine sight beholding all things disturbeth not the quality of things
which to Him are present, but in respect of time are yet to come. And so
this is not an opinion but rather a knowledge grounded upon truth, when
He knoweth that such a thing shall be, which likewise He is not ignorant
that it hath no necessity of being. Here if thou sayest that cannot
choose but happen which God seeth shall happen, and that which cannot
choose but happen, must be of necessity, and so tiest me to this name of
necessity, I will grant that it is a most solid truth, but whereof
scarce any but a contemplator of divinity is capable. For I will answer
that the same thing is necessary when it is referred to the Divine
knowledge; but when it is weighed in its own nature that it seemeth
altogether free and absolute. For there be two necessities: the one
simple, as that it is necessary for all men to be mortal; the other
conditional, as if thou knowest that any man walketh, he must needs
walk. For what a man knoweth cannot be otherwise than it is known. But
this conditional draweth not with it that simple or absolute necessity.
For this is not caused by the nature of the thing, but by the adding a
condition. For no necessity maketh him to go that goeth of his own
accord, although it be necessary that he goeth while he goeth. In like
manner, if providence seeth anything present, that must needs be,
although it hath no necessity of nature. But God beholdeth those future
things, which proceed from free-will, present. These things, therefore,
being referred to the divine sight are necessary by the condition of the
divine knowledge, and, considered by themselves, they lose not absolute
freedom of their own nature. Wherefore doubtless all those things come
to pass which God foreknoweth shall come, but some of them proceed from
free-will, which though they come to pass, yet do not, by coining into
being, lose, since before they came to pass, they might also not have
happened. But what importeth it that they are not necessary, since that
by reason of the condition of the divine knowledge they come to pass in
all respects as if they were necessary? It hath the same import as those
things which I proposed a little before--the sun rising and the man
going. While they are in doing, they cannot choose but be in doing; yet
one of them was necessarily to be before it was, and the other not.
Likewise those things which God hath present, will have doubtless a
being, but some of them proceed from the necessity of things, other from
the power of the doers. And therefore we said not without cause that
these, if they be referred to God's knowledge, are necessary; and if
they be considered by themselves, they are free from the bonds of
necessity. As whatsoever is manifest to senses, if thou referrest it to
reason, is universal; if thou considerest the things themselves, it is
singular or particular. But thou wilt say, 'If it is in my power to
change my purpose, shall I frustrate providence if I chance to alter
those things which she foreknoweth?' I answer that thou mayest indeed
change thy purpose, but because the truth of providence, being present,
seeth that thou canst do so, and whether thou wilt do so or no, and what
thou purposest anew, thou canst not avoid the divine foreknowledge, even
as thou canst not avoid the sight of an eye which is present, although
thou turnest thyself to divers actions by thy free-will.
But yet thou wilt inquire whether God's knowledge shall be changed by
thy disposition, so that when thou wilt now one thing, and now another,
it should also seem to have divers knowledges. No. For God's sight
preventeth all that is to come and recalleth and draweth it to the
presence of His own knowledge; neither doth He vary, as thou imaginest,
now knowing one thing and now another, but in one instant without moving
preventeth and comprehendeth thy mutations. Which presence of
comprehending and seeing all things, God hath not by the event of future
things but by His own simplicity. By which that doubt is also resolved
which thou didst put a little before, that it is an unworthy thing that
our future actions should be said to cause the knowledge of God. For
this force of the divine knowledge comprehending all things with a
present notion appointeth to everything its measure and receiveth
nothing from ensuing accidents. All which being so, the free-will of
mortal men remaineth unviolated, neither are the laws unjust which
propose punishments and rewards to our wills, which are free from all
necessity. There remaineth also a beholder of all things which is God,
who foreseeth all things, and the eternity of His vision, which is
always present, concurreth with the future quality of our actions,
distributing rewards to the good and punishments to the evil. Neither do
we in vain put our hope in God or pray to Him; for if we do this well
and as we ought, we shall not lose our labour or be without effect.
Wherefore fly vices, embrace virtues, possess your minds with worthy
hopes, offer up humble prayers to your highest Prince. There is, if you
will not dissemble, a great necessity of doing well imposed upon you,
since you live in the sight of your Judge, who beholdeth all things."