Perceivest thou now what followeth of all that we have hitherto said?"
"What?" quoth I. "That," quoth she, "all manner of fortune is good."
"How can that be?" quoth I. "Be attentive," quoth she; "since that all
fortune, be it pleasing or unpleasing, is directed to the reward or
exercise of the good, and to the punishment and direction of the wicked,
it is manifest it is all good, since all is just or profitable." "Thy
reason is very true," quoth I, "and if I consider Providence and Fate,
which thou didst explicate a little before, thy opinion is well
grounded. But if thou pleasest let us account it among those which thou
not long since supposest incredible." "Why?" quoth she. "Because men
commonly use to say and repeat that some have ill fortune." "Shall we,"
quoth she, "frame our speech to the vulgar phrase, lest we seem to have
as it were forsaken the use of human conversation?" "As it pleaseth
thee," quoth I. "Dost thou not think then that that is good which is
profitable?" "Yes," quoth I. "But that fortune which either exerciseth
or correcteth is profitable?" "It is true," quoth I. "It is good then?"
"Why not?" "But this is the estate of them who being either virtuous
strive with adversity, or forsaking vices betake themselves to the way
of virtue." "I cannot deny it," quoth I. "Now, what sayest thou to that
pleasing fortune which is given in reward to the good, doth the common
people account it bad?" "No, but judgeth it exceeding good, as it is
indeed." "And what of the other which, being unpleasing, restraineth the
evil with just punishment, doth not the people think it good?" "Nay,"
quoth I, "they think it the most miserable that can be." "Look then,"
quoth she, "how, following the people's opinion, we have concluded a
very incredible matter." "What?" quoth I. "For it followeth," quoth she,
"out of that which is granted, that all their fortune, whatsoever it be,
who are either in the possession or increase or entrance of virtue, is
good: and theirs, which remain in vices, the worst that may be." "This,"
quoth I, "is true, though none dare say so." "Wherefore," quoth she, "a
wise man must be no more troubled when he is assaulted with adversity,
than a valiant captain dismayed at the sound of an alarum. For
difficulties are the matter by which the one must extend his glory, and
the other increase his wisdom. For which cause virtue is so called,
because it hath sufficient strength to overcome adversity.[162] For
you, that are proficients in virtue, are not come hither to be dissolute
with dainties or to languish in pleasures. You skirmish fiercely with
any fortune, lest either affliction oppress you or prosperity corrupt
you. Stay yourselves strongly in the mean! For whatsoever cometh either
short, or goeth beyond, may well contemn felicity, but will never obtain
any reward of labour. For it is placed in your power to frame to
yourselves what fortune you please. For all that seemeth unsavoury
either exerciseth or correcteth or punisheth.
[162] Boethius shows his independence in adopting for _uirtus_ a
different etymology from that given by Cicero, viz. _uir_ (of. 2
_Tusoul._ xviii.).