VI.

"It is true," quoth I, "but since it is thy profession to explicate the

causes of hidden things, and to unfold the reasons which are covered

with darkness, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare what conclusion thou

drawest from these things, for this miracle troubleth me above all

others." Then she smiling a little said: "Thou invitest me to a matter

which is most hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently

declared; for it is such that, one doubt being taken away, innumerable

others, like the heads of Hydra, succeed, neither will they have any end

unless a man repress them with the most lively fire of his mind. For in

this matter are wont to be handled these questions: of the simplicity of

Providence; of the course of Fate; of sudden chances; of God's knowledge

and predestination, and of free will; which how weighty they are, thou

thyself discerneth. But because it is part of thy cure to know these

things also, though the time be short, yet we will endeavour to touch

them briefly. But if the sweetness of verse delight thee, thou must

forbear this pleasure for a while, until I propose unto thee some few

arguments." "As it pleaseth thee," quoth I.

Then taking as it were a new beginning, she discoursed in this manner:

"The generation of all things, and all the proceedings of mutable

natures, and whatsoever is moved in any sort, take their causes, order,

and forms from the stability of the Divine mind. This, placed in the

castle of its own simplicity, hath determined manifold ways for doing

things; which ways being considered in the purity of God's

understanding, are named Providence, but being referred to those things

which He moveth and disposeth, they are by the ancients called Fate. The

diversity of which will easily appear if we weigh the force of both. For

Providence is the very Divine reason itself, seated in the highest

Prince, which disposeth all things. But Fate is a disposition inherent

in changeable things, by which Providence connecteth all things in their

due order. For Providence embraceth all things together, though diverse,

though infinite; but Fate putteth every particular thing into motion

being distributed by places, forms, and time; so that this unfolding of

temporal order being united into the foresight of God's mind is

Providence, and the same uniting, being digested and unfolded in time,

is called Fate. Which although they be diverse yet the one dependeth on

the other. For fatal order proceedeth from the simplicity of Providence.

For as a workman conceiving the form of anything in his mind taketh his

work in hand, and executeth by order of time that which he had simply

and in a moment foreseen, so God by His Providence disposeth whatsoever

is to be done with simplicity and stability, and by Fate effecteth by

manifold ways and in the order of time those very things which He

disposeth. Wherefore, whether Fate be exercised by the subordination of

certain Divine spirits to Providence, or this fatal web be woven by a

soul or by the service of all nature, or by the heavenly motions of the

stars, by angelical virtue, or by diabolical industry, or by some or all

of these, that certainly is manifest that Providence is an immoveable

and simple form of those things which are to be done, and Fate a

moveable connexion and temporal order of those things which the Divine

simplicity hath disposed to be done. So that all that is under Fate is

also subject to Providence, to which also Fate itself obeyeth. But some

things which are placed under Providence are above the course of Fate.

And they are those things which nigh to the first Divinity, being stable

and fixed, exceed the order of fatal mobility. For as of orbs which turn

about the same centre, the inmost draweth nigh to the simplicity of the

midst, and is as it were the hinge of the rest, which are placed without

it, about which they are turned, and the outmost, wheeled with a greater

compass, by how much it departeth from the middle indivisibility of the

centre, is so much the more extended into larger spaces, but that which

is joined and coupled to that middle approacheth to simplicity, and

ceaseth to spread and flow abroad, in like manner that which departeth

farthest from the first mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of

Fate, and everything is so much the freer from Fate, by how much it

draweth nigh to the hinge of all things. And if it sticketh to the

stability of the Sovereign mind, free from motion, it surpasseth also

the necessity of Fate. Wherefore in what sort discourse of reason is

compared to pure understanding, that which is produced to that which is,

time to eternity, a circle to the centre, such is the course of moveable

Fate to the stable simplicity of Providence. That course moveth the

heaven and stars, tempereth the elements one with another, and

transformeth them by mutual changing. The same reneweth all rising and

dying things by like proceeding of fruits and seeds. This comprehendeth

also the actions and fortunes of men by an unloosable connexion of

causes, which since it proceeds from the principles of unmovable

Providence, the causes also must needs be immutable. For in this manner

things are best governed, if the simplicity which remaineth in the

Divine mind produceth an inflexible order of causes, and this order

restraineth with its own immutability things otherwise mutable, and

which would have a confused course. Whereof it ensueth that though all

things seem confused and disordered to you, who are not able to consider

this order, notwithstanding all things are disposed by their own proper

measure directing them to good. For there is nothing which is done for

the love of evil, even by the wicked themselves: whom, as hath been

abundantly proved, lewd error carrieth away while they are seeking after

that which is good, so far is it that order proceeding from the hinge of

the Sovereign Goodness should avert any from his first beginning.

But, thou wilt say, what more unjust confusion can there be than that

both adversity and prosperity should happen to the good, and in like

manner both desired and hateful things to the wicked? But are men so

completely wise that whomsoever they judge wicked or honest must needs

be so? How then are their censures contrary one to another, so that to

divers the same men seem worthy of reward and punishment! But let us

grant that some are able to discern the good from the evil. Can they

therefore behold, as is wont to be said of bodies, that inward

complexion of souls? For he that knoweth not the cause may marvel in

like manner why some sound bodies agree better with sweet things and

other with tart; and why some sick men are healed with gentle and some

with sharper physic. But to a physician who knoweth the manner and

temper both of health and sickness this is nothing strange. Now, what is

the health of souls but virtue? What sickness have they but vices? And

who either conserveth goodness or expelleth evils, but God the Ruler and

Governor of men's minds? Who beholding from His high turret of

providence seeth what is fitting for everyone, and applieth that which

He knoweth to be most convenient. Here ariseth that strange wonder of

fatal order, to wit that He that knoweth what is best, doth that which

the ignorant admire. For to touch briefly some few things of the divine

depth, which human reason is able to attain, he whom thou thinketh most

just and most observant of equity, seemeth otherwise in the eyes of

Providence which knoweth all. And our disciple Lucan noteth that the

cause of conquerers pleased the gods, and that of the conquered,

Cato.[158] Wherefore whatsoever thou seest done here against thy

expectation is right order in the things themselves, but a perverse

confusion in thy opinion. But let there be one so well conditioned that

God and men approve and praise him; yet perhaps he is so weak a minded

man, that if he falleth into adversity, he will forsake his innocency,

which was not able to keep him in prosperity. Wherefore God's wise

dispensation spareth him that adversity might make worse, lest he should

suffer to whom difficulties are dangerous.

There is another complete in all virtues, a saint and high to God;

Providence judgeth it a sacrilege to lay affliction on him, insomuch

that she permitteth him not to be troubled so much as with corporal

sickness. For as one that excelleth me saith 'the body of an holy man is

builded of pure ether.'[159] It happeneth often also that the chief

command is given to good men, that wickedness, which otherwise would

overflow all, may be kept down. She mixeth for others sour and sweet

according to the disposition of their souls; she troubles some lest they

should fall to dissolution by long prosperity, others are vexed with

hardships, that they may confirm the forces of their mind with the use

and exercise of patience. Some are too much afraid of that which they

are able to bear. Others make less account than there is cause of that

which they cannot endure. All these she affrayeth with afflictions that

they make trial of themselves. Many have bought the renown of this world

with a glorious death. Some, overcoming all torments, have showed by

their example that virtues cannot be conquered by miseries, which things

how well and orderly they are done, and how much to their good upon whom

they are seen to fall, there can be no doubt. For that sometime

grievous, sometime pleasant things befall in like manner the wicked,

proceedeth from the same causes. And as for adversity no man marvelleth

because all think they deserve ill. Whose punishments do both terrify

others from the like courses, and move them to amend themselves. And

their prosperity is a great argument to the good, what they ought to

judge of this happiness which they see oftentimes bestowed upon the

wicked. In which thing also is to be considered that peradventure some

have so headlong and untoward a disposition, that poverty would rather

make him worse; whose disease is cured by Providence, with giving him

store of money. Another, knowing his own guilty conscience, and

comparing his character with his own estate, is afraid lest the loss of

that should be grievous unto him, the use of which is pleasant.

Wherefore he resolveth to change his customs, and whiles he feareth to

lose his prosperity, he forsaketh wickedness. The increase of honour

undeservedly obtained hath thrown some headlong into their deserved

destruction. Others are permitted to have authority to punish others,

that they may exercise the good and punish the bad. For as there is no

league between virtuous and wicked men, so neither can the wicked agree

among themselves. Why not? Since they disagree within themselves by

reason of their vices which tear their conscience, so that they many

times do that which afterwards they wish undone. From whence that

highest Providence often worketh that wonderful miracle, that evil men

make those which are evil good. For some, considering the injustice done

them by most wicked men, inflamed with hatred of evildoers have returned

to the practice of virtue, procuring to be contrary to them whom they

hate. For it is only a divine strength to which even evil things are

good, when, by using them in due sort, it draweth some good effect out

of them. For a certain order embraceth all things, so that even that

which departeth from the order appointed to it, though it falleth into

another, yet that is order also, lest confused rashness should bear any

sway in the kingdom of Providence. 'But it is hard for me to rehearse

all this as if I were a God.'[160] For it is impossible for any man

either to comprehend by his wit or to explicate in speech all the frame

of God's work. Be it sufficient that we have seen thus much, that God,

the author of all natures, directeth and disposeth all things to

goodness, and while He endeavoureth to retain in His own likeness those

things which He hath produced, He banisheth all evil from the bounds of

His commonwealth, by the course of fatal necessity. So that if thou

considerest the disposition of Providence, thou wilt perceive that evil,

which is thought so to abound upon earth, hath no place left for it at

all. But I see that long since burdened with so weighty a question, and

wearied with my long discourse, thou expectest the delight of verses;

wherefore take a draught, that, being refreshed, thou mayest be able to

go forward.

[158] _Pharsal_. i. 126.

[159] Source unknown.

[160] Homer, _Il._ xii. 176.