IX.

"Let it suffice that we have hitherto discovered the form of false

felicity, which if thou hast plainly seen, order now requireth that we

show thee in what true happiness consisteth." "I see," quoth I, "that

neither sufficiency by riches, nor power by kingdoms, nor respect by

dignities, nor renown by glory, nor joy can be gotten by pleasures."

"Hast thou also understood the causes why it is so?" "Methink I have a

little glimpse of them, but I had rather thou wouldst declare them more

plainly."

"The reason is manifest, for that which is simple and undivided of

itself, is divided by men's error, and is translated from true and

perfect to false and unperfect. Thinkest thou that which needeth

nothing, to stand in need of power?" "No," quoth I. "Thou sayest well,

for if any power in any respect be weak, in this it must necessarily

stand in need of the help of others." "It is true," quoth I. "Wherefore

sufficiency and power have one and the same nature." "So it seemeth."

"Now thinkest thou, that which is of this sort ought to be despised, or

rather that it is worthy to be respected above all other things?" "There

can be no doubt of this," quoth I. "Let us add respect then to

sufficiency and power, so that we judge these three to be one." "We must

add it if we confess the truth."

"What now," quoth she, "thinkest thou this to be obscure and base, or

rather most excellent and famous? Consider whether that which thou hast

granted to want nothing, to be most potent, and most worthy of honour,

may seem to want fame, which it cannot yield itself, and for that cause

be in some respect more abject." "I must needs confess," quoth I, "that,

being what it is, this is also most famous." "Consequently then we must

acknowledge that fame differeth nothing from the former three." "We must

so," quoth I. "Wherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can perform

all things by its own power, which is famous and respected, is it not

manifest that it is also most pleasant?" To which I answered: "How such

a man should fall into any grief, I can by no means imagine. Wherefore

if that which we have said hitherto be true, we must needs confess that

he is most joyful and content." "And by the same reason it followeth

that sufficiency, power, fame, respect, pleasure have indeed divers

names, but differ not in substance." "It followeth indeed," quoth I.

"This then, which is one and simple by nature, man's wickedness

divideth, and while he endeavoureth to obtain part of that which hath no

parts, he neither getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole, which he

seeketh not after." "How is this?" quoth I. "He who seeketh after

riches," quoth she, "to avoid want, taketh no thought for power, he had

rather be base and obscure, he depriveth himself even of many natural

pleasures that he may not lose the money which he hath gotten. But by

this means he attaineth not to sufficiency, whom power forsaketh, whom

trouble molesteth, whom baseness maketh abject, whom obscurity

overwhelmeth. Again, he that only desireth power, consumeth wealth,

despiseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not

potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For

sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and

being not able to rid himself, ceaseth to be powerful, which was the

only thing he aimed at. The like discourse may be made of honours,

glory, pleasures. For since every one of these things is the same with

the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest obtaineth

not that which he desireth." "What then?" quoth I. "If one should desire

to have them all together, he should wish for the sum of happiness, but

shall he find it in these things which we have showed cannot perform

what they promise?" "No," quoth I. "Wherefore we must by no means seek

for happiness in these things which are thought to afford the several

portions of that which is to be desired." "I confess it," quoth I, "and

nothing can be more true than this." "Now then," quoth she, "thou hast

both the form and causes of false felicity; cast but the eyes of thy

mind on the contrary, and thou shalt presently espy true happiness,

which we promised to show thee." "This," quoth I, "is evident, even to

him that is blind, and thou showedst it a little before, while thou

endeavouredst to lay open the causes of the false. For, if I be not

deceived, that is true and perfect happiness which maketh a man

sufficient, potent, respected, famous, joyful. And that thou mayest know

that I understood thee aright, that which can truly perform any one of

these because they are all one, I acknowledge to be full and perfect

happiness." "O my scholar, I think thee happy by having this opinion, if

thou addest this also." "What?" quoth I. "Dost thou imagine that there

is any mortal or frail thing which can cause this happy estate?" "I do

not," quoth I, "and that hath been so proved by thee, that more cannot

be desired." "Wherefore these things seem to afford men the images of

the true good, or certain unperfect goods, but they cannot give them the

true and perfect good itself." "I am of the same mind," quoth I. "Now

then, since thou knowest wherein true happiness consisteth, and what

have only a false show of it, it remaineth that thou shouldst learn

where thou mayest seek for this which is true." "This is that," quoth I,

"which I have long earnestly expected." "But since, as Plato teacheth

(in Timaeus),[132] we must implore God's assistance even in our least

affairs, what, thinkest thou, must we do now, that we may deserve to

find the seat of that sovereign good?" "We must," quoth I, "invocate the

Father of all things, without whose remembrance no beginning hath a good

foundation." "Thou sayest rightly," quoth she, and withal sung in this

sort.

[132] Cf. _Tim._ 27.

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