II.

Then, for a while looking steadfastly upon the ground, and, as it were,

retiring herself to the most secret seat of her soul, she began in this

manner: "All men's thoughts, which are turmoiled with manifold cares,

take indeed divers courses, but yet endeavour to attain the same end of

happiness, which is that good which, being once obtained, nothing can be

further desired. Which is the chiefest of all goods, and containeth in

itself whatsoever is good, and if it wanted anything it could not be the

chiefest, because there would something remain besides it which might be

wished for. Wherefore, it is manifest that blessedness is an estate

replenished with all that is good. This, as we said, all men endeavour

to obtain by divers ways. For there is naturally ingrafted in men's

minds an earnest desire of that which is truly good; but deceitful error

withdraweth it to that which falsely seemeth such. So that some,

esteeming it their greatest good to want nothing, labour by all means to

abound with riches; others, deeming that to be good which is most

deserving of honour, hunt after preferments, to be respected by their

fellow-citizens. Others think it the greatest felicity to have great

power and authority, and these will either reign themselves or at least

procure to be great with princes. But they who think fame better than

all these, make all speed possible to spread their names far and near,

by achieving some worthy enterprise either in war or peace. Many measure

good by joy and mirth, and their chiefest care is how they may abound

with pleasure. Some interchange the ends and means of these things one

with the other, wanting now riches for the sake of power and pleasure,

now power for the sake of wealth and fame. At these and such other do

men's actions and desires aim, as nobility and popularity, which make

men esteemed; wife and children, which bring pleasure and delight. But

friendship, that most sacred thing, is rather to be attributed to virtue

than to fortune. Other things for the most part are desired either for

power or pleasure. And it is an easy matter to reduce all corporal goods

to the former heads. For strength and greatness give ability; beauty and

swiftness, fame; and health yieldeth pleasure. By all which we

manifestly seek for nothing else but happiness. For that which every man

seeketh most after, is by him esteemed his greatest good. Which is all

one with happiness. Wherefore he esteemeth that estate happy which he

preferreth before all other.

And thus thou hast in a manner seen the form of human felicity--riches,

honour, power, glory, pleasure. Which Epicurus only considering,

consequently took pleasure for his chiefest good, because all the rest

seemed to delight the mind. But I return to the careful thoughts of men,

whose minds, though obscured, yet seek after the greatest good, but like

a drunken man know not the way home. For seem they to err who endeavour

to want nothing? But nothing can cause happiness so much as the

plentiful possession of all that is good, needing the help of none, but

is sufficient of itself. Or do they err who take that which is best to

be likewise most worthy of respect? No. For it is no vile or

contemptible thing which almost all men labour to obtain. Or is not

power to be esteemed good? Why, then, is that to be accounted feeble and

of no force, which manifestly surpasses all other things? Or is fame to

be contemned? But it cannot be ignored that the most excellent is also

most famous. For to what purpose should I say that happiness is not sad

or melancholy, or subject to grief and trouble, when even in smallest

matters we desire that which we delight to have and enjoy? And these be

the things which men desire to obtain, and to this end procure riches,

dignities, kingdoms, glory, and pleasures, because by them they think to

have sufficiency, respect, power, fame, delight, and joy. Wherefore,

that is good which men seek after by divers desires, in which the force

of nature is easily descried, since though there be many and different

opinions, yet they agree in choosing for their end that which is good.

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