GYANTSE--_continued_
[BY HENRY NEWMAN]
On the afternoon of the day on which the house was taken we were
provided with a new excitement--continuous firing was heard to the rear
of the post about a mile away. Captain Ottley galloped out with his
mounted infantry, and was only just in time to save a party of his men
who were coming up from Kangma with the letter-bags. These Sikhs--eight
in number--were riding along the edge of the river, when they were met
by a fusillade from a number of the enemy concealed amongst sedges on
the opposite bank. Before the Sikhs could take cover, one man was
killed, three wounded, and seven out of the eight horses shot down. The
remaining men showed rare courage. They carried their wounded comrades
under cover of a ditch, untied and brought to the same place the
letter-bags, and then lay down and returned the fire of the enemy. The
Tibetans, however, were beginning to creep round, and the ammunition of
the Sikhs was running low, when Captain Ottley dashed up to the rescue.
Without waiting to consider how many of the enemy might be hiding in the
sedge, Ottley took his twenty men splashing through the river. Nearly
300 Tibetans bolted out in all directions like rabbits from a cover. The
mounted infantry, shooting and smiting, chased them to the very edge of
the plain. On reaching hilly ground the enemy, who must have lost about
fifty of their number, began to turn, having doubtless realized that
they were running before a handful of men. At the same time shots were
fired from villages, previously thought unoccupied, on Ottley's left,
and a body of matchlock men were seen running up to reinforce from a
large village on the Lhasa road. Under these conditions it would have
been madness to continue the fight, and Ottley cleverly and skilfully
withdrew without having lost a single man. In the meanwhile a company of
Pioneers had brought in the men wounded in the attack on the postal
riders.
This affair was even more significant than the occupation by the enemy
of the position taken by the Gurkhas in the early morning. It showed
that the Tibetan General had at last conceived a plan for cutting off
our line of communications. This was a rude shock. It implied that the
enemy had received reinforcements which were to be utilized for
offensive warfare of the kind most to be feared by an invader. We knew
that so long as our ammunition lasted there was absolutely no danger of
the post being captured. But an enemy on the lines would certainly
cause the greatest annoyance to, and might even cut off, our convoys. As
it would be very difficult to get messages through, apprehensions as to
our safety would be excited in the outer world. Further, General
Macdonald's arrangements for the relief of the mission would have to be
considerably modified if he were obliged to fight his way through to us.
With the same prompt decision that marked his action with regard to the
gathering on the Karo la, Colonel Brander determined on the very next
day to clear the villages found occupied by the mounted infantry. As far
as could be discovered, the villages were five in number, all on the
right bank of the river, and occupying a position which could be roughly
outlined as an equilateral triangle. Captain Ottley was sent round to
the rear of the villages to cut off the retreat of the enemy; Captain
Luke took his two mountain-guns, under cover of the right bank of the
river, to a position whence he could support the infantry attack, if
necessary, by shell fire. Two companies of Pioneers with one in reserve
were sent forward to the attack.
The first objective was two villages forming the base of the triangle of
which I have spoken. The troops advanced cautiously, widely extended,
but both villages were found deserted. They were set on fire. Then
Captain Hodgson with a company went forward to the village forming the
apex of the triangle. He came under a flanking fire from the villages
on the left, and had one man severely wounded. The houses in front
seemed to be unoccupied, and our right might have been swung round to
face this fire; but Colonel Brander was determined to do the work
thoroughly, and Hodgson was directed to move on and burn the village
ahead of him before changing front. The troops accordingly took no
notice of the flanking fire, and moved on till they were under the walls
of the two houses of which the village was composed.
Suddenly fire was opened on our soldiers from the upper windows of the
two houses. All the doors were found blocked with bricks and stones. Two
Sikhs dropped, and for the moment it seemed as if we would lose heavily.
But Lieutenant Gurdon with half a dozen men rushed up with a box of
explosives, and blew a breach in the wall. Two of the party helping to
lay the fuse were killed by shots fired from a loophole a few feet
above. Captain Hodgson was the first man through the breach. He was
confronted by a swordsman, who cut hard just as Hodgson fired his
revolver. The man fell dead, but Hodgson received a severe wound on the
wrist. But this was the only man who stood after the explosion. About
thirty others in the village rushed to the roofs of the houses, jumped
off, and fled to the left. They came, however, under a very heavy fire
as they were running away, and the majority dropped.
Preparations were now made for taking the remaining village. This was
protected by a high loopholed embankment, which sheltered about five or
six hundred of the enemy. The Pioneers had just extended, and were
advancing, when someone who happened to be looking at the jong through
his glasses suddenly uttered a loud exclamation. Turning round, we all
saw a dense stream of men, several thousands in number, forming up at
the base of the rock, evidently with the intention of rushing the
mission post whilst the majority of the garrison and the guns were
engaged elsewhere. Colonel Brander immediately gave the order for the
whole force to retire into the post at the double. The withdrawal was
effected before the Tibetans made their contemplated rush, but we all
felt that it was rather a narrow shave.
Troops were to have gone out again the next day to clear the village we
had left untaken, but the mounted infantry reconnoitring in the morning
reported that the enemy had fled, and that the lines of communication
were again clear.
On the succeeding day a large convoy and reinforcements under Major
Peterson, 32nd Pioneers, came safely through. The additional troops
included a section of No. 7 (British) Mountain Battery, under Captain
Easton; one and a half companies of Sappers and Miners, under Captain
Shepherd and Lieutenant Garstin; and another company of the 32nd
Pioneers. Major Peterson reported that his convoy had come under a
heavy fire from the village and monastery of Naini. This monastery lies
about seven miles from Gyantse in an opening of the valley just before
the road turns into Gyantse Plain. It holds about 5,000 monks. When the
column first passed by it, the monks were extremely friendly, bringing
out presents of butter and eggs, and readily selling flour and meat. The
monastery is surrounded by a wall thirty feet high, and at least ten
feet thick. The buildings inside are also solidly built of stone.
Altogether the position was a very difficult one to tackle, but Colonel
Brander, following his usual policy, decided that the enemy must be
turned out of it at all costs. Accordingly, on the 24th a column, which
included Captain Easton's two guns, marched out to Naini. But the
monastery and the group of buildings outside it were found absolutely
deserted. The walls were far too heavy and strong to be destroyed by a
small force, which had to return before nightfall, but Captain Shepherd
blew up the four towers at the corners and a portion of the hall in
which the Buddhas were enthroned.
The 27th provided a new excitement. About 1,000 yards to the right of
the post stood what was known as the Palla House, the residence of a
Tibetan nobleman of great wealth. The building consisted of a large
double-storied house, surrounded by a series of smaller buildings, each
within a courtyard of its own. During the night the Tibetans in the jong
built a covered way extending about half the distance between the jong
and Palla. In the morning the latter place was seen to be swarming with
men, busily occupied in erecting defences, making loopholes, and
generally engaged in work of a menacing character. The enemy could less
be tolerated in Palla than in the Gurkha outpost, for fire from the
former would have taken us absolutely in the flank, and the garrison was
not strong enough to provide the labour necessary for building an
entirely new series of traverses.
That very night Colonel Brander detailed the troops that were to take
Palla by assault at dawn. The storming-party was composed of three
companies of the 32nd under Major Peterson, assisted by the Sappers and
Miners with explosives under Captain Shepherd. Our four mountain-guns,
the 7-pounders under Captain Luke, and the 10-pounders under Captain
Easton, escorted by a company of Gurkhas, were detailed to occupy a
position on a ridge which overlooked Palla. The troops fell in at two in
the morning. The night was pitch-dark, but with such care were the
operations conducted that the troops had made a long détour, and got
into their respective positions before dawn, without an alarm being
raised.
Daylight was just breaking when Captain Shepherd crept up to the wall of
the house on the extreme left, where it was believed the majority of the
enemy were located, and laid his explosives. A tremendous explosion
followed, the whole side of the house falling in. A minute afterwards,
and Palla was alarmed and firing furiously all round, and even up in the
air. The jong also awoke, and from that time till the village was
finally ours poured a continuous storm of bullets into Palla, regardless
whether friend or foe was hit. Our guns on the ridge did their best to
quiet the jong, but without much effect. Against Tibetan walls, provided
as they are with head cover, our experience showed shrapnel to be almost
entirely useless.
A company of Pioneers followed Captain Shepherd into the breach he had
made. But they found themselves only in a small courtyard, with no means
of entering the rest of the village, except over or through high walls
lined by the enemy. All that could be done was to blow in another
breach. The preparations for doing this were attended with a good deal
of danger. Of three men who attempted to rush across the courtyard, two
were killed and the third mortally wounded. However, by creeping along
under cover of the wall, Captain Shepherd and Lieutenant Garstin were
able to lay the guncotton and light the fuse for another explosion. They
were fired at from a distance of a few yards, but escaped being hit by a
miracle. But the second explosion only led into another courtyard, from
which there was also no exit. There was the same fire to be faced from
the next house whilst the needful preparations were being made for
making a third breach.
During the time Shepherd with his gallant lieutenants and equally
gallant sepoys was working his way in from the left, the companies of
Pioneers lining ditches and banks outside Palla were exposed to a
persistent fire from about a hundred of the enemy inside the big
two-storied house mentioned above. The men in this house--all Kham
warriors--seemed to be filled with an extraordinary fury. Many exposed
themselves boldly at the windows, calling to our men to come on. A dozen
or so even climbed to the roof of the house, and danced about thereon in
what seemed frantic derision. There was a Maxim on the ridge with the
mountain-guns, the fire from which put an end to the fantastic display.
Our rifle fire, however, seemed totally unable to check the Tibetan
warriors in the loopholed windows. They kept up a fusillade which made a
rush impossible. Major Peterson finally, with great daring, led a few
men into the dwelling on the extreme right. The escalade was managed by
means of a ruined tree which projected from the wall. But Peterson, like
Shepherd, found himself in a courtyard with high walls which baffled
further progress.
The fight now began to drag. Hours passed without any signal incident.
The Tibetans were greatly elated at the failure of our troops to make
progress. They shouted and yelled, and were encouraged by answering
cheers from the jong. Then about mid-day the jong Commandant conceived
the idea of reinforcing Palla. A dozen men mounted on black mules,
followed by about fifty infantry, suddenly dashed out from the
half-completed covered way mentioned above, and made for the village.
This party was absolutely annihilated. As soon as it emerged from the
covered way it came under the fire, not only of the troops round the
village and on the hill, but of the Maxim on the roof of the
mission-house. In three minutes every single man and mule was down,
except one animal with a broken leg, gazing disconsolately at the body
of its master.
This disaster evidently shook the Tibetans in Palla. Their fire
slackened. Captain Luke on the ridge was then directed to put some
common shell into the roof of the double-storied house. He dropped the
shells exactly where they were wanted, and so disconcerted the enemy
that Shepherd was able to resume his preparations for making a way into
the Tibetan stronghold. But he still had to face an awkward fire, and
the three further breaches he made were attended by the loss of several
men, including Lieutenant Garstin, shot through the head. But the last
explosion led our troops into the big house. Tibetan resistance then
practically ceased. About twenty or thirty men made an attempt to get
away to the jong, but the majority were shot down before they could
reach the covered way.
In this affair our total casualties were twenty-three. In addition to
Lieutenant Garstin, we had seven men killed. The wounded included
Captain O'Connor, R.A., secretary to the mission, and Lieutenant
Mitchell, 32nd Pioneers. The enemy must have lost quite 250 in killed
and wounded. The position at Palla was too important to be abandoned,
and for the rest of the bombardment it was held by a company of Sikhs.
In order to provide free communication both day and night, Captain
Shepherd, with his usual energy, dug a covered way from the post to the
village.
The fight at Palla was the last affair of any importance in which the
garrison was engaged pending the arrival of the relieving force. The
Tibetans had received such a shock that in future they confined
themselves practically to the defensive, if we except five half-hearted
night attacks which were never anywhere near being pushed home. There
were no more attempts to interrupt our lines of communication, though
later on Naini was again occupied as part of the Tibetan scheme for
resisting General Macdonald's advance. The jong Commandant devoted his
energies chiefly to strengthening his already strong position.
The night attacks were all very similar in character, and may be summed
up and dismissed in a paragraph. Generally about midnight, bands of
Tibetans would issue from the jong and take up their position about four
or five hundred yards from the post. Then they would shout wildly, and
fire off their matchlocks and Martini rifles. The troops would
immediately rush to their loopholes, clad in impossible garments, and
wait shivering in the cold, finger on trigger, for the rush that never
came. After shouting and firing for about an hour, the Tibetans would
retire to the jong and our troops creep back to their beds. On no
occasion did the enemy come close enough to be seen in the dark. We
never fired a single shot from the post. Twice, however, the Gurkha
outpost and the Sikhs at Palla were enabled to get in a few volleys at
Tibetans as they slunk past. During the night attacks the jong remained
silent, except on one occasion, when there was so much firing from the
Gurkha outpost that the enemy thought we were about to make a
counter-attack. Every jingal, musket, and rifle in the jong was then
loosed off in any and every direction. We even heard firing in the rear
of the monastery. Although no one was hit in this wild fire, the volume
of it was ominously indicative of the strength in which the jong was
held.
But even more ominous against the day when our troops should be called
upon to take the jong were the defensive preparations mentioned above.
Nearly every morning we found that during the night the enemy had built
up a new wall or covered way somewhere on the jong or about the village
that fringed the base of the rock. When the fortress was fortified as
strongly as Tibetan wit could devise, the jong Commandant began to
fortify and place in a position of defence the villages and monasteries
on his right and left. It was calculated that, from the small monastery
perched on the hills to his left to Tsechen Monastery on a ridge to his
right, the Tibetan General had occupied and fortified a position with
nearly seven miles of front.
Whilst the Tibetans were engaged in making these preparations, our
garrison was busy collecting forage for the enormous number of animals
coming up with the relief column. Our rear being absolutely open, small
parties with mules were able to collect quantities of hay from villages
within a radius of seven miles behind us. It was the fire opened on
these parties when they attempted to push to the right or left of the
jong which first revealed to us the full extent of the defensive
position occupied by the enemy.
On June 6 Colonel Younghusband left the post with a returning convoy, in
order to confer with the General at Chumbi. This convoy was attacked
whilst halting at the entrenched post at Kangma. The enemy in this
instance came down from the Karo la, and it is for this reason that I do
not include the Kangma attack amongst the operations at and around
Gyantse.
It was not till June 15 that we got definite news of the approaching
advance of the relief column. Reinforcements had come up to Chumbi from
India in the interval, and the General was accompanied by the 2nd
Mounted Infantry under Captain Peterson, No. 7 British Mountain Battery
under Major Fuller, a section of No. 30 Native Mountain Battery under
Captain Marindin, four companies of the Royal Fusiliers under Colonel
Cooper, four companies of the 40th Pathans under Colonel Burn, five
companies of the 23rd Pioneers under Colonel Hogge, and the two
remaining companies of the 8th Gurkhas under Colonel Kerr, together with
the usual medical and other details.
The force arrived at Kangma on June 23. On the 25th a party of mounted
infantry from Gyantse met Captain Peterson's mounted infantry
reconnoitring at the monastery of Naini, previously mentioned. Whilst
greetings were being exchanged a sudden fire was opened on our men from
the monastery, which the enemy had apparently occupied and fortified
during the night. The position was apparently held in strength, and the
mounted infantry had no other course except to retire to their
respective camps. Captain Peterson had one man mortally wounded.
On the evening of the 26th the sentries at the mission post saw about
twenty mounted men, followed by two or three hundred infantry, issue
from the rear of the jong and creep up the hills on our left in the
direction of Naini. It was evident that a determined effort was to be
made at the monastery to check the advance of the relief column, which
was expected at Gyantse next day. Colonel Brander came to the conclusion
that he had found an opportunity for catching the Tibetans in a trap.
He determined to send out a force which would block the retreat of the
enemy when they retired before the advance of the relief column.
Accordingly, before dawn four companies of Pioneers, four guns, and the
Maxim gun left the post, and ascended the hills overlooking the
monastery. Captain Ottley's mounted infantry were directed to close the
road leading directly from Gyantse to the monastery.
Colonel Brander's forces were in position some hours before the mounted
infantry of the relief column appeared in sight. It was discovered that
the enemy not only held the monastery, but some ruined towers on the
hill above, and a cluster of one-storied dwellings in a grove below.
Captain Peterson with his mounted infantry appeared in front of the
monastery at eleven o'clock. He had with him a company of the 40th
Pathans, and his orders were to clear the monastery with this small
force, if the enemy made no signs of a stubborn resistance. Otherwise he
was to await the arrival of more troops with the mountain-guns.
Peterson delivered his attack from the left, having dismounted his
troopers, who, together with the 40th Pathans, were soon very hotly
engaged. The troops came under a heavy fire both from the monastery and
from a ruined tower above it, but advanced most gallantly. When under
the walls of the monastery, they were checked for some time by the
difficulty of finding a way in. In the meanwhile, hearing the heavy
firing, the General and his Staff, followed by Major Fuller's battery
and the rest of the 40th, had hastened up. The battery came into action
against the tower, and the 40th rushed up in support of their comrades.
Colonel Brander's guns and Maxim on the top of the hill were also
brought into play. For nearly an hour a furious cannonade and fusillade
raged. Then the Pathans and Peterson's troopers, circling round the
walls of the monastery, found a ramp up which they could climb. They
swarmed up, and were quickly inside the building. But the Tibetans had
realized that their retreat was cut off, and, instead of making a clean
bolt for it, only retired slowly from room to room and passage to
passage. Two companies of the 23rd were sent up to assist in clearing
the monastery. It proved a perfect warren of dark cells and rooms. The
Tibetan resistance lasted for over two hours. Bands of desperate
swordsmen were found in knots under trap-doors and behind sharp
turnings. They would not surrender, and had to be killed by rifle shots
fired at a distance of a few feet.
While the monastery was being cleared, another fight had developed in
the cluster of dwellings outside it to the right. From this spot Tibetan
riflemen were enfilading our troops held in reserve. The remaining
companies of the 23rd were sent to clear away the enemy. They took three
houses, but could not effect an entrance into the fourth, which was very
strongly barricaded. Lieutenant Turnbull, walking up to a window with a
section, had three men hit in a few seconds. One man fell directly under
the window. Turnbull carried him into safety in the most gallant
fashion. Then the General ordered up the guns, which fired into the
house at a range of a few hundred yards. But not till it was riddled
with great gaping holes made by common shell did the fire from the house
cease.
At about three o'clock the Tibetan resistance had completely died away,
and the column resumed its march towards Gyantse, which was not reached
till dark. But as the transport was making its slow way past Naini,
about half a dozen Tibetans who had remained in hiding in the monastery
and village opened fire on it. The Gurkha rearguard had a troublesome
task in clearing these men out, and lost one man killed.
In this affair at Naini our casualties were six killed and nine wounded,
including Major Lye, 23rd Pioneers, who received a severe sword-cut in
the hand.
The General's camp was pitched about a mile from the mission post, well
out of range of the jong, though our troops whilst crossing the river
came under fire from some of the bigger jingals. The next day was one of
rest, which the troops badly needed after their long march from Chumbi.
The Tibetans in the jong also refrained from firing. On the 29th the
General began the operations intended to culminate in the capture of the
jong. His objective was Tsechen Monastery, on the extreme left. But
before the monastery could be attacked, some twelve fortified villages
between it and the river had to be cleared. It proved a difficult task,
not so much on account of the resistance offered by the enemy--for after
a few idle shots the Tibetans quickly retired on the monastery--as
because of the nature of the ground that had to be traversed. The whole
country was a network of deep irrigation channels and water-cuts, in the
fording and crossing of which the troops got wet to the skin. However,
by four in the afternoon all the villages had been cleared, and the
Fusiliers were lying in a long grove under the right front of the
monastery.
It was then discovered that not only was Tsechen very strongly held, but
that masses of the enemy were lying behind the rocks on the top of the
ridge, on the summit of which there was a ruined tower, also held by
fifty or sixty men. The General sent two companies of Gurkhas to scale
the ridge from the left, whilst the 40th Pathans were ordered to make a
direct assault on the monastery. A hundred mounted infantry made their
way to the rear to cut off the retreat of the enemy. Fuller and Marindin
with their guns covered the advance of the infantry. Four Maxims were
also brought into action. Our guns made splendid practice on the top of
the ridge, and time and again we could see the enemy bolting from cover.
But with magnificent bravery they would return to oppose the advance of
the Gurkhas creeping round their flank. The guns had presently to cease
fire to enable the Gurkhas to get nearer. A series of desperate little
fights then took place on the top of the ridge, the Tibetans slinging
and throwing stones when they found they could not load their muskets
quickly enough. But as the Gurkhas would not be stopped, the Tibetans
had to move. In the meanwhile the Pathans worked through the monastery
below, only meeting with small resistance from a band of men in one
house. The Tibetans fled in a mass over the right edge of the ridge into
the jaws of the mounted infantry lying in wait below. Slaughter
followed.
It was now quite dark, and the troops made their way back to camp. Next
morning a party went up to Tsechen, found it entirely deserted, and set
fire to it. The taking of the monastery cost us the lives of Captain
Craster, 40th Pathans, and two sepoys. Our wounded numbered ten,
including Captains Bliss and Humphreys, 8th Gurkhas.
On July 1 the General intended assaulting the jong, but in the interval
the jong Commandant sent in a flag of truce. He prayed for an armistice
pending the arrival of three delegates who were posting down from Lhasa
with instructions to make peace. As Colonel Younghusband had been
directed to lose no opportunity of bringing affairs to an end at
Gyantse, the armistice was granted, and two days afterwards the
delegates, all Lamas, were received in open durbar in a large room in
the mission post. Colonel Younghusband, after having satisfied himself
that the delegates possessed proper credentials, made them a speech. He
reviewed the history of the mission, pointing out that we had only come
to Gyantse because of the obstinacy and evasion of the Tibetan
officials, who could easily have treated with us at Khamba Jong and
again at Tuna, had they cared to. We were perfectly willing to come to
terms here, and it rested with the peace delegates whether we went on to
Lhasa or not. Younghusband then informed the delegates that he was
prepared to open negociations on the next day. The delegates were due at
eleven next morning, but they did not put in an appearance till three.
They were then told that as a preliminary they must surrender the jong
by noon on the succeeding day. They demurred a great deal, but the
Commissioner was quite firm, and they went away downcast, with the
assurance that if the jong was not surrendered we should take it by
force. Younghusband, however, added that after the capture of the fort
he was perfectly willing to open negociations again.
Next day, shortly after noon, a signal gun was fired to indicate that
the armistice was at an end, and the General forthwith began his
preparations to storm the formidable hill fortress. The Tibetans had
taken advantage of the armistice to build more walls and sangars. No one
could look at the bristling jong without realizing how difficult was
the task before our troops, and without anxiety as to the outcome of the
assault in killed and wounded. But we all knew that the jong had to be
taken, whatever the cost.
Operations began in the afternoon, the General making a demonstration
against the left face of the jong and Palkhor Choide Monastery. Fuller's
battery took up a position about 1,600 yards from the jong. Five
companies of infantry were extended on either flank. Both the jong and
monastery opened fire on our troops, and we had one man mortally
wounded. The General's intention, however, was only to deceive the
Tibetans into thinking that we intended to assault from that side. As
soon as dusk fell, the troops were withdrawn and preparations made for
the real assault.
The south-eastern face of the rock on which the jong is built is most
precipitous, yet this was exactly the face which the General decided to
storm. His reasons, I imagine, were that the fringe of houses at the
base of the rock was thinnest on this side, and that the very
multiplicity of sangars and walls that the enemy had built prevented
their having the open field of fire necessary to stop a rush. Moreover,
down the middle of the rock ran a deep fissure or cleft, which was
commanded, the General noticed, by no tower or loopholed wall. At two
points, however, the Tibetans had built walls across the fissure. The
first of these the General believed could be breached by our artillery.
Our troops through that could work their way round to either flank, and
so into the heart of the jong.
The plan of operations was very simple. Before dawn three columns were
to rush the fringe of houses at the base. Then was to follow a storm of
artillery fire directed on all the salient points of the jong, after
which our guns were to make a breach in the lower wall across the cleft
up which the storming-party was later on to climb.
The action turned out exactly as was planned, with the exception that
the fighting lasted much longer than was expected, for the Tibetans made
a heroic resistance. The troops were astir shortly after midnight. The
night was very dark, and the necessary deployment of the three columns
took some hours. However, an hour before dawn the troops had begun their
cautious advance, the General and his Staff taking up their position at
Palla. The alarm was not given till our leading files were within twenty
yards of the fringe of houses at the base of the rock. The storm of fire
which then burst from the jong was an alarming indication of the
strength in which it was held. The heavy jingals were all directed on
Palla, and the General and his Staff had many narrow escapes. As on the
previous occasion when the jong bombarded us at night, there were
moments when every building in it seemed outlined in flame.
Of the three columns, only that on the extreme left, Gurkhas under
Major Murray, was able to get in at once. The other two columns were for
the time being checked, so bullet-swept was the open space they had to
cross. From time to time small parties of two or three dashed across in
the dark, and gained the shelter of the walls of the houses in front.
There were barely twenty men and half a dozen officers across when
Captain Shepherd blew in the walls of the house most strongly held. The
storming-party came under a most heavy fire from the jong above. Among
those hit was Lieutenant Gurdon, of the 32nd. He was shot through the
head, and died almost immediately. The breach made by Shepherd was the
point to which most of the men of the centre and right columns made, but
their progress became very slow when daylight appeared and the Tibetans
could see what they were firing at. It was not till nearly nine o'clock
that the whole fringe of houses at the base of the front face of the
rock was in our possession.
Then followed several hours of cannonading and small-arms fire. The
position the troops had now won was commanded almost absolutely from the
jong. It was found impossible to return the Tibetan fire from the roofs
of the houses we had occupied without exposing the troops in an
unnecessary degree, but loopholes were hastily made in the walls of the
rooms below, and the 40th Pathans were sent into a garden on the extreme
right, where some cover was to be had. Colonel Campbell, commanding the
first line, was able to show the enemy that our marksmen were still in a
position to pick off such Tibetans as were rash enough to unduly expose
themselves. In the meanwhile, Luke's guns on the extreme right, Fuller's
battery at Palla, and Marindin's guns at the Gurkha outpost threw a
stream of shrapnel on all parts of the jong.
But it was not till four o'clock in the afternoon that the General
decided that the time had come to make the breach aforementioned. The
reserve companies of Gurkhas and Fusiliers were sent across from Palla
in the face of very heavy jingal and rifle fire, and took cover in the
houses we had occupied. In the meanwhile Fuller was directed to make the
breach. So magnificent was the shooting made by his guns that a dozen
rounds of common shell, planted one below the other, had made a hole
large enough for active men to clamber through. The enemy quickly saw
the purport of the breach. Dozens of men could be distinctly seen
hurrying to the wall above it.
Then the Gurkhas and Fusiliers began their perilous ascent. The nimble
Gurkhas, led by Lieutenant Grant, soon outpaced the Fusiliers, and in
ten brief minutes forty or fifty of them were crouching under the
breach. The Tibetans, finding their fire could not stop us, tore great
stones from the walls and rolled them down the cleft. Dozens of men were
hit and bruised. Presently Grant was through the breach, followed by
fifteen or twenty flushed and shouting men. The breach won, the only
thought of the enemy was flight. They made their way by the back of the
jong into the monastery. By six o'clock every building in the great
fortress was in our possession.
Our casualties in this affair were forty-three--Lieutenant Gurdon and
seven men killed, and twelve officers, including the gallant Grant, and
twenty-three men wounded. These casualties exclude a number of men cut
and bruised with stones.
Next morning the monastery was found deserted. It was reported that the
bulk of the enemy had fled to Dongtse, about ten miles up the Shigatze
road. A column was sent thither, but found the place empty, except for a
very humble and submissive monk.
On the 14th, having waited for over a week in the hope of the peace
delegates putting in an appearance, the force started on its march to
Lhasa.