GYANTSE
[BY HENRY NEWMAN]
Gyantse Plain lies at the intersection of four great valleys running
almost at right angles to one another. In the north-eastern corner there
emerge two gigantic ridges of sandstone. On one is built the jong, and
on the other the monastery. The town fringes the base of the jong, and
creeps into the hollow between the two ridges. The plain, about six
miles by ten, is cultivated almost to the last inch, if we except a few
stony patches here and there. There are, I believe, thirty-three
villages in the plain. These are built in the midst of groves of poplar
and willow. At one time, no doubt, the waters from the four valleys
united to form a lake. Now they have found an outlet, and flow
peacefully down Shigatze way. High up on the cold mountains one sees the
cold bleached walls of the Seven Monasteries, some of them perched on
almost inaccessible cliffs, whence they look sternly down on the warmth
and prosperity below.
For centuries the Gyantse folk had lived self-contained and happy,
practising their simple arts of agriculture, and but dimly aware of any
world outside their own. Then one day there marched into their midst a
column of British troops--white-faced Englishmen, dark, lithe Gurkhas,
great, solemn, bearded Sikhs--and it was borne in upon the wondering
Gyantse men that beyond their frontiers there existed great nations--so
great, indeed, that they ventured to dispute on equal terms with the
awful personage who ruled from Lhasa. It is true that from time to time
there must have passed through Gyantse rumours of war on the distant
frontier. The armies that we defeated at Guru and in the Red Idol Gorge
had camped at Gyantse on their way to and fro. Gyantse saw and wondered
at the haste of Lhasa despatch-riders. But I question whether any
Gyantse man realized that events, great and shattering in his world,
were impending when the British column rounded the corner of Naini
Valley.
At first we were received without hostility, or even suspicion. The
ruined jong, uninhabited save for a few droning Lamas, was surrendered
as soon as we asked for it. A clump of buildings in a large grove near
the river was rented without demur--though at a price--to the
Commission. And when the country-people found that there was a sale for
their produce, they flocked to the camp to sell. The entry of the
British troops made no difference to the peace of Gyantse till the
Lamas of Lhasa embarked on the fatal policy of levying more troops in
Lhasa, Shigatze, and far-away Kham, and sending them down to fight. Then
there entered the peaceful valley all the horrors of war--dead and
maimed men in the streets and houses, burning villages, death and
destruction of all kinds. Gyantse Plain and the town became scenes of
desolation. To the British army in India war, unfortunately, is nothing
new, but one can imagine what an upheaval this business of which I am
about to write meant to people who for generations had lived in peace.
The incidents connected with the arrival of the mission with its escort
at Gyantse need not be described in detail. On the day of arrival we
camped in the midst of some fallow fields about two miles from the jong.
The same afternoon a Chinese official, who called himself 'General' Ma,
came into camp with the news that the jong was unoccupied, and that the
local Tibetans did not propose to offer any resistance. The next morning
we took quiet possession of the jong, placing two companies of Pioneers
in garrison. The General with a small escort visited the monastery
behind the fort, and was received with friendliness by the venerable
Abbot. Neither the villagers nor the towns-people showed any signs of
resentment at our presence. The Jongpen actively interested himself in
the question of procuring an official residence for Colonel Younghusband
and the members of the mission. There were reports of the Dalai Lama's
representatives coming in haste to treat. Altogether the outlook was so
promising that nobody was surprised when, after a stay of a week,
General Macdonald, bearing in mind the difficulty of procuring supplies
for the whole force, announced his intention of returning to Chumbi with
the larger portion of the escort, leaving a sufficient guard with the
mission.
The guard left behind consisted of four companies of the 32nd Pioneers,
under Colonel Brander; four companies of the 8th Gurkhas, under Major
Row; the 1st Mounted Infantry, under Captain Ottley; and the machine-gun
section of the Norfolks, under Lieutenant Hadow. Mention should also be
made of the two 7-pounder mountain-guns attached to the 8th Gurkhas,
under the command of Captain Luke.
Before the General left for Chumbi he decided to evacuate the jong. The
grounds on which this decision was come to were that the whole place was
in a ruinous and dangerous condition, the surroundings were insanitary,
there was only one building fit for human habitation, the water-supply
was bad and deficient, and there seemed to be no prospect of further
hostilities. Besides, from the military point of view there was some
risk in splitting up the small guard to be left behind between the jong
and the mission post. However, the precaution was taken of further
dismantling the jong. The gateways and such portions as seemed capable
of lending themselves to defence were blown up.
The house, or, rather, group of houses, rented by Colonel Younghusband
for the mission was situated about 100 yards from a well-made stone
bridge over the river. A beautiful grove, mostly of willow, extended
behind the post along the banks of the river to a distance of about 500
yards. The jong lay about 1,800 yards to the right front. There were two
houses in the intervening space, built amongst fields of iris and
barley. Small groups of trees were dotted here and there. Altogether,
the post was located in a spot as pleasant as one could hope to find in
Tibet.
For some days before the General left, all the troops were engaged in
putting the post in a state of defence. It was found that the force to
be left behind could be easily located within the perimeter of a wall
built round the group of houses. There was no room, however, for 200
mules and their drivers, needed for convoy purposes. These were placed
in a kind of hornwork thrown out to the right front.
After the departure of the General we resigned ourselves to what we
conceived would be a monotonous stay at Gyantse of two or three months,
pending the signing of the treaty. The people continued to be perfectly
friendly. A market was established outside the post, to which
practically the whole bazaar from Gyantse town was removed. We were able
to buy in the market, very cheap, the famous Gyantse carpets, for which
enormous prices are demanded at Darjeeling and elsewhere in India.
Unarmed officers wandered freely about Gyantse town, and the monks of
Palkhor Choide, the monastery behind the fort, willingly conducted
parties over the most sacred spots. They even readily sold some of the
images before the altars, and the silk screens which shrouded the forms
of the gigantic Buddhas. I mention these facts about the carpets and
images because, when hereafter they adorned Simla and Darjeeling
drawing-rooms, unkind people began to say that British officers had
wantonly looted Palkhor Choide, one of the most famous monasteries in
Tibet.
A little shooting was to be had, and officers wandered about the plain,
gun in hand, bringing home mountain-hare--a queer little beast with a
blue rump--duck, and pigeon. Occasionally an excursion up one of the
side valleys would result in the shooting of a burhel or of a Tibetan
gazelle. The country-people met with were all perfectly friendly.
Another feature of those first few peaceful days at Gyantse was the
eagerness with which the Tibetans availed themselves of the skilled
medical attendance with the mission. At first only one or two men
wounded at the Red Idol Gorge were brought in, but the skill of Captain
Walton, Indian Medical Service, soon began to be noised abroad, and
every morning the little outdoor dispensary was crowded with sufferers
of all kinds.
But during the last week in May reports began to reach Colonel
Younghusband that, so far from attempting to enter into negociations,
the Lhasa Government was levying an army in Kham, and that already five
or six hundred men were camped on the other side of the Karo la, and
were busily engaged in building a wall. Lieutenant Hodgson with a small
force was sent to reconnoitre. He came back with the news that the wall
was already built, stretching from one side of the valley to the other,
and that there were several thousand well-armed men behind it. Both
Colonel Younghusband and Colonel Brander considered it highly necessary
that this gathering should be immediately dispersed, for it is a
principle in Indian frontier warfare to strike quickly at any tribal
assembly, in order to prevent it growing into dangerous proportions. The
possibly exciting effect the force on the Karo la might have on the
inhabitants of Gyantse had particularly to be considered. Accordingly,
on May 3 Colonel Brander led the major portion of the Gyantse garrison
towards the Karo la, leaving behind as a guard to the post two companies
of Gurkhas, a company of the 32nd Pioneers, and a few mounted infantry,
all under the command of Major Murray.
I accompanied the Karo la column, and must rely on hearsay as to my
facts with regard to the attack on the mission. We heard about the
attack the night before Colonel Brander drove the Tibetans from their
wall on the Karo la, after a long fight which altered all our previous
conceptions of the fighting qualities of the Tibetans. The courage shown
by the enemy naturally excited apprehension about the safety of the
mission. Colonel Brander did not stay to rest his troops after their day
of arduous fighting, but began his return march next morning, arriving
at Gyantse on the 9th.
The column had been warned that it was likely to be fired on from the
jong if it entered camp by the direct Lhasa road. Accordingly, we
marched in by a circuitous route, moving in under cover of the grove
previously mentioned. The Maxims and guns came into action at the edge
of the grove to cover the baggage. But, though numbers of Tibetans were
seen on the walls of the jong, not a shot was fired.
We then learnt the story of the attack on the post. It appears that the
day after Colonel Brander left for the Karo la (May 3) certain wounded
and sick Tibetans that we had been attending informed the mission that
about 1,000 armed men had come down towards Gyantse from Shigatze, and
were building a wall about twelve miles away. It was added that they
might possibly attack the post if they got to know that the garrison had
been largely depleted. This news seemed to be worth inquiring into, and,
accordingly, next day Major Murray sent some mounted infantry to
reconnoitre up the Shigatze road. The latter returned with the
information that they had gone up the valley some seven or eight miles,
but had found no signs of any enemy.
The very next morning the post was attacked at dawn. It appears that the
Shigatze force, about 1,000 strong, was really engaged in building a
wall twelve miles away. Hearing that very few troops were guarding the
mission, its commander--who, I hear, was none other than Khomba Bombu,
the very man who arrested Sven Hedin's dash to Lhasa--determined to make
a sudden attack on the post. He marched his men during the night, and
about an hour before sunrise had them crouching behind trees and inside
ditches all round the post.
The attack was sudden and simultaneous. A Gurkha sentry had just time to
fire off his rifle before the Tibetans rushed to our walls and had their
muskets through our loopholes. The enemy did not for the moment attempt
to scale, but contented themselves with firing into the post through the
loopholes they had taken. This delay proved fatal to their plans, for it
gave the small garrison time to rise and arm. The brunt of the Tibetan
fire was directed on the courtyard of the house where the tents of the
members of the mission were pitched. Major Murray, who had rushed out of
bed half clad, first directed his attention to this spot. The Sikhs,
emerging from their tents with bandolier and rifle, in extraordinary
costumes, were directed towards the loopholes. Some were sent on the
roof of the mission-house, whence they could enfilade the attackers.
Elsewhere various junior officers had taken command. Captain Luke, who,
owing to sickness, had not gone on with the Karo la column, took charge
of the Gurkhas on the south and west fronts. Lieutenant Franklin, the
medical officer of the 8th Gurkhas, rallied Gurkhas and Pioneers to the
loopholes on the east and north. Lieutenant Lynch, the treasure-chest
officer, who had a guard of about twenty Gurkhas, took his men to the
main gate to the south. There were at this time in hospital about a
dozen Sikhs, who had been badly burnt in a lamentable gunpowder
explosion a few days previously. These men, bandaged and crippled as
they were, rose from their couches, made their painful way to the tops
of the houses, and fired into the enemy below. About a dozen Tibetans
had just begun to scramble over the wall by the time the defenders had
manned the whole position, which was now not only held by fighting men,
but by various members of the mission, including Colonel Younghusband,
who had emerged with revolvers and sporting guns. A few of the enemy got
inside the defences, and were immediately shot down.
Our fire was so heavy and so well directed that it is supposed that not
more than ten minutes elapsed from the time the first shot was fired to
the time the enemy began to withdraw. The withdrawal, however, was only
to the shelter of trees and ditches a few hundred yards away, whence a
long but almost harmless fusillade was kept up on the post. After about
twenty minutes of this firing, Major Murray determined on a rally.
Lieutenant Lynch with his treasure guard dashed out from the south gate.
Some five-and-twenty Tibetans were discovered hiding in a small refuse
hut about fifteen yards from the gate. The furious Gurkhas rushed in
upon them and killed them all, and then dashed on through the long
grove, clearing the enemy in front of them. Returning along the banks of
the river, the same party discovered another body of Tibetans hiding
under the arches of the bridge. Twenty or thirty were shot down, and
about fifteen made prisoners. Similar success attended a rally from the
north-east gate made by Major Murray and Lieutenant Franklin. The enemy
fled howling from their hiding-places towards the town and jong as soon
as they saw our men issue. They were pursued almost to the very walls of
the fort. Indeed, but for the fringe of houses and narrow streets at the
base of the jong, Major Murray would have gone on. The Tibetans,
however, turned as soon as they reached the shelter of walls, and it
would have been madness to attack five or six hundred determined men in
a maze of alleys and passages with only a weak company. Major Murray
accordingly made his way back to the post, picking up a dozen prisoners
_en route_.
In this affair our casualties only amounted to five wounded and two
killed. One hundred and forty dead of the enemy were counted outside
the camp.
During the course of the day Major Murray sent a flag of truce to the
jong with an intimation to the effect that the Tibetans could come out
and bury their dead without fear of molestation. The reply was that we
could bury the dead ourselves without fear of molestation. As it was
impossible to leave all the bodies in the vicinity of the camp, a heavy
and disagreeable task was thrown on the garrison.
Towards sundown the enemy in the jong began to fire into the camp, and
our troops became aware of the unpleasant fact that the Tibetans
possessed jingals, which could easily range from 1,800 to 2,000 yards.
It was also realized that the jong entirely dominated the post; that our
walls and stockades, protection enough against a direct assault from the
plain, were no protection against bullets dropped from a height. So for
the next four days, pending the return of the Karo la column, the little
garrison toiled unceasingly at improving the defences. Traverses were
built, the walls raised in height, the gates strengthened. It was
discovered that the Tibetan fire was heaviest when we attempted to
return it by sniping at figures seen on the jong. Accordingly, pending
the completion of the traverses and other new protective works, Major
Murray forbade any return fire.
Such was the position of affairs when the Karo la column returned. One
of Colonel Brander's first acts, after his weary troops had rested for
an hour or two, was to turn the Maxim on the groups who could be seen
wandering about the jong. They quickly disappeared under cover, but only
to man their jingals. Then began the bombardment of the post, which we
had to endure for nearly seven weeks.
This is the place to speak of the bombardment generally, for it would be
tedious to recapitulate in the form of a diary incidents which, however
exciting at the time, now seem remarkable only for their monotony. It
may be said at once that the bombardment was singularly ineffective.
From first to last only fifteen men in the post were hit. Of these
twelve were either killed or died of the wound. Of course, I exclude the
casualties in the fighting, of which I will presently speak, outside the
post. But the futility of the bombardment must not be entirely put down
to bad marksmanship on the part of the Tibetans. That our losses were
not heavier is largely due to the fact that the garrison laboured
daily--and at first at night also--in erecting protecting walls and
traverses. Practically every tent had a traverse built in front of it.
It was found that the hornwork in which the mules were located came
particularly under fire of the jong. This was pulled down one dark
night, and the mules transferred to a fresh enclosure at the back of the
post. Strong parapets of sand-bags were built on the roofs of the
houses. Every window facing the jong was securely blocked with mud
bricks. It will be realized how considerable was the labour involved in
building the traverses when it is remembered that the jong looked down
into the post. The majority of the walls had to be considerably higher
than the tents themselves. They were mostly built of stakes cut from the
grove, with two feet of earth rammed in between. After the first week or
so the enemy brought to bear on the post several brass cannon, throwing
balls weighing four or five pounds, and travelling with a velocity which
enabled them to penetrate our traverses--when they struck them, for the
majority of shots from the cannon whistled harmlessly over our heads.
Practically, we did not return the fire from the jong. All that was done
in this direction was to place one of Lieutenant Hadow's Maxims on the
roof of the house occupied by the mission, and thence to snipe during
the daylight hours at any warriors who showed themselves above the walls
of the jong. Hadow was very patient and persistent with his gun, and
quickly made it clear to the Tibetans that, if we were obliged to keep
under cover, so were they. But our fire from the post was probably as
ineffective as that of the enemy from the jong, for the Tibetans build
walls with extraordinary rapidity. Working mostly at night in order to
avoid the malignant Maxim, the enemy within a few days almost altered
the face of the jong. New walls, traverses, and covered ways seemed to
spring up with the rapidity of mushrooms.
Our life during the siege, if so the bombardment can be called, was
hardly as unpleasant as people might imagine. To begin with, we were
never short of food--that is to say, of Tibetan barley and meat. The
commissariat stock of tea--a necessity in Tibet--also never gave out.
From time to time also convoys and parcel-posts with little luxuries
came through. Again, the longest period for which we were without a
letter-post was eight days. Socially, the relations of the officers with
one another and with the members of the Commission were most harmonious.
I make a point of mentioning this fact, because all those who have had
any experience of sieges, or of similar conditions where small
communities are shut up together in circumstances of hardship and
danger, know how apt the temper is to get on edge, how often small
differences are likely to give rise to bitter animosities. But we had in
the Gyantse garrison men of such vast experience and geniality as
Colonel Brander, of such high culture and attainment as Colonel
Younghusband, Captain O'Connor, and Mr. Perceval Landon--the
correspondent of _The Times_; men whose spirits never failed, and who
found humour in everything, such as Major Row, Captain Luke, Captain
Coleridge, Lieutenant Franklin. Amongst the besieged was Colonel
Waddell, I.M.S., an Orientalist and Sinologist of European fame. Hence,
in some of its aspects the Gyantse siege was almost a delightful
episode. In the later days, when all the outpost fighting occurred, our
spirits were somewhat damped, for we had to mourn brave men killed and
sympathize with others dangerously wounded.
Of course, one of the first questions for consideration when the Karo la
column returned to Gyantse was whether the enemy could or could not be
turned out of the jong. To make a frontal attack on the frowning face
overlooking the post would have been foolhardy, but Colonel Brander
decided to make a reconnaissance to a monastery on the high hills to our
right, whence the jong itself could be overlooked. A subsidiary reason
for visiting this monastery was that it was known to have afforded
shelter to a number of those who had fled from the attack on the post.
The hill was climbed with every military precaution, but only a few old
monks were found in occupation of the buildings. More disappointing was
the fact that an examination through telescopes of the rear of the jong
showed that the Tibetans had been also building indefatigably there. A
strong loopholed wall ran zigzagging up the side of the rock. It was
clear that nothing could be done till the General returned from Chumbi
with more troops and guns.
For more than two weeks our rear remained absolutely open. The post,
carried by mounted infantry, came in and went out regularly. Two large
convoys reached us unopposed. The only danger lay in the fact that
people seen entering or leaving the post came under a heavy fire from
the jong. To minimize risks, departures from the post were always made
before dawn.
During the two weeks streams of men could be seen entering the jong from
both the Shigatze and Lhasa roads. Emboldened by numbers, and also by
our non-aggressive attitude, the enemy began to cast about for means of
taking the post. One of the first steps taken by the Tibetan General in
pursuance of this policy was to occupy during the night a small house
surrounded by trees, lying to our left front, almost midway between the
jong and the post. On the morning of the 18th bullets from a new
direction were whizzing in amongst us, and partly enfilading our
traverses. This was not to be tolerated, and the same night arrangements
were made for the capture of the position.
Five companies stole out during the hours of darkness and surrounded the
house. The rush, delivered at dawn, was left to the Gurkhas. But the
entrance was found blocked with stones, and the enemy was thoroughly
awake by the time the Gurkhas were under the wall. Luckily, the
loopholes were not so constructed as to allow the Tibetans to fire their
jingals down upon our men, who had only to bear the brunt of showers of
stones thrown upon them from the roof. The shower was well directed
enough to bruise a good many Gurkhas. Three officers were struck--
Major Murray, Lieutenant Lynch, and Lieutenant Franklin, I.M.S. Whilst
the Gurkhas were striving to effect an entrance, the Pioneer companies
deployed on the flanks came under a heavy fire from the jong. We had
three men hit. One fell on a bit of very exposed ground, and was
gallantly dragged under cover by Colonel Brander and Captain Minogue,
Staff officer.
It was soon evident that the Gurkhas would never get in without
explosives. Accordingly, Lieutenant Gurdon, 32nd Pioneers, was sent to
join them with a box of guncotton. Gurdon speedily blew a hole through
the wall, and the Gurkhas dashed in yelling. The Tibetans on the roof
could easily at this time have jumped off and escaped towards the jong.
But they chose a braver part. They slid down into the middle of the
courtyard, and, drawing their swords, awaited the Gurkha onset. I must
not describe the pitiful struggle that followed. The Tibetans--about
fifty in number--herded themselves together as if to meet a bayonet
charge, but our troops, rushing through the door, extended themselves
along the edges of the courtyard, and emptied their magazines into the
mob. Within a minute all the fifty were either dead or mortally wounded.
The house was hereafter held by a company of Gurkhas all through the
bombardment, and proved a great thorn in the side of the enemy; for the
Gurkhas often used to sally out at night and ambuscade parties of men
and convoys on the Shigatze road.