RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER: WARS WITH THE DUTCH.
In the Dutch Wars of the 17th century the British navy may be said
to have caught its stride in the march that made Britannia the
unrivaled mistress of the seas. The defeat of the Armada was caused
by other things besides the skill of the English, and the steady
decline of Spain from that point was not due to that battle or to
any energetic naval campaign undertaken by the English thereafter.
In fact, save for the Cadiz expedition of 1596, in which the Dutch
coöperated, England had a rather barren record after the Armada
campaign down to the middle of the 17th century. During that period
the Dutch seized the control of the seas for trade and war. They
appropriated what was left of the Levantine trade in the Mediterranean,
and contested the Portuguese monopoly in the East Indies and the
Spanish in the West. Indeed the Dutch were at this time freely
acknowledged to be the greatest sea-faring people of Europe.[1]
[Footnote 1: "Dutch exports reached a figure in the 17th century,
which was not attained by the English until 1740. Even the Dutch
fisheries, which employed over 2000 boats, were said to be more
valuable than the manufactures of France and England combined."
A HISTORY OF COMMERCE, Clive Day, p. 194.]
When the Commonwealth came into power in England the new government
turned its attention to the navy, which had languished under the
Stuarts. A great reform was accomplished in the bettering of the
living conditions for the seamen. Their pay was increased, their
share of prize money enlarged, and their food improved. At the
same time, during the years 1648-51, the number of ships of the
fleet was practically doubled, and the new vessels were the product
of the highest skill in design and honest work in construction. The
turmoil between Roundhead and Royalist had naturally disorganized
the officer personnel of the fleet. Prince Rupert, nephew of Charles
I, had taken a squadron of seven Royalist ships to sea, hoping to
organize, at the Scilly Islands or at Kinsdale in Ireland, bases
for piratical raids on the commerce of England, and it was necessary
to bring him up short. Moreover, Ireland was still rebellious,
Barbados, the only British possession in the West Indies, was held
for the King, and Virginia also was Royalist. To establish the
rule of the Commonwealth Cromwell needed an efficient fleet and
an energetic admiral.
For the latter he turned to a man who had won a military reputation
in the Civil War second only to that of the great Oliver himself,
Robert Blake, colonel of militia. Blake was chosen as one of three
"generals at sea" in 1649. As far as is known he had never before
set foot on a man of war; he was a scholarly man, who had spent ten
years at Oxford, where he had cherished the ambition of becoming
a professor of Greek. At the time of his appointment he was fifty
years old, and his entire naval career was comprised in the seven
or eight remaining years of his life, and yet he so bore himself
in those years as to win a reputation that stands second only to
that of Nelson among the sea-fighters of the English race.
Blake made short work of Rupert's cruising and destroyed the Royalist
pretensions to Jersey and the Scillies. One of his rewards for
the excellent service rendered was a position in the Council of
State, in which capacity he did much toward the bettering of the
condition of the sailors, which was one of the striking reforms
of the Commonwealth. His test, however, came in the first Dutch
War, in which he was pitted against Martin Tromp, then the leading
naval figure of Europe.
In the wars with Spain, English and Dutch had been allies, but
the shift of circumstances brought the two Protestant nations into
a series of fierce conflicts lasting throughout the latter half
of the 17th century. The outcome of these was that England won
the scepter of the sea which she has ever since held. The main
cause of the war was the rivalry of the two nations on the sea.
There were various other specific reasons for bad feeling on both
sides, as for instance a massacre by the Dutch of English traders
at Amboyna in the East Indies, during the reign of James I, which
still rankled because it had never been avenged. The English on
their side insisted on a salute to their men of war from every
ship that passed through the Channel, and claimed the rights to
a tribute, of all herrings taken within 30 miles off the English
coast.
Cromwell formulated the English demands in the Navigation Act of
1651. The chief of these required that none but English ships should
bring cargoes to England, save vessels of the country whence the
cargoes came. This was frankly a direct blow at the Dutch carrying
trade, one to which the Dutch could not yield without a struggle.
For this struggle the Netherlanders were ill prepared. The Dutch
Republic was a federation of seven sovereign states, lacking a strong
executive and torn by rival factions. Moreover, her geographical
position was most vulnerable. Pressed by enemies on her land frontiers,
she was compelled to maintain an army of 57,000 men in addition to
her navy. As the resources of the country were wholly inadequate
to support the population, her very life depended on the sea. For
the Holland of the 17th century, as for the England of the 20th, the
fleets of merchantmen were the life blood of the nation. Unfortunately
for the Dutch, this life blood had to course either through the
Channel or else round the north of Scotland. Either way was open
to attacks by the British, who held the interior position. Further,
the shallows of the coasts and bays made necessary a flat bottomed
ship of war, lighter built than the English and less weatherly
in deep water.
In contrast the British had a unity of government under the iron
hand of Cromwell, they had the enormous advantage of position,
they were self-sustaining, and their ships were larger, stouter
and better in every respect than those of their enemies. Hence,
although the Dutch entered the conflict with the naval prestige
on their side, it is clear that the odds were decidedly against
them.
_The First Dutch War_
[Illustration: SCENE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL ACTIONS OF THE 17TH
CENTURY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND AND ENGLAND AND FRANCE]
The fighting did not wait for a declaration of war. Blake met Tromp,
who was convoying a fleet of merchantmen, off Dover on May 19,
1652. On coming up with him Blake fired guns demanding the required
salute. Tromp replied with a broadside. Blake attacked with his
flagship, well ahead of his own line, and fought for five hours with
Tromp's flagship and several others. The English were outnumbered
about three to one, and Blake might have been annihilated had not
the English admiral, Bourne, brought his squadron out from Dover
at the sound of the firing and fallen upon Tromp's flank. As the
Dutch Admiral's main business was to get his convoy home, he fell
back slowly toward the coast of France, both sides maintaining a
cannonade until they lost each other in the darkness. Apparently
there was little attempt at formation after the first onset; it
was close quarters fighting, and only the wild gunnery of the day
saved both fleets from enormous losses. As it was, Blake's flagship
was very severely hammered.
Following this action, Tromp reappeared with 100 ships, but failed
to keep Blake from attacking and ruining the Dutch herring fisheries
for that year. This mistake temporarily cost Tromp his command.
He was superseded by DeWith, an able man and brave, but no match
for Blake. On September 28, 1652, Blake met him off the "Kentish
Knock" shoal at the mouth of the Thames. In order to keep the weather
gage, which would enable him to attack at close quarters, Blake
took the risk of grounding on the shoal. His own ship and a few
others did ground for a time, but they served as a guide to the
rest. In the ensuing action Blake succeeded in putting the Dutch
between two fires and inflicting a severe defeat. Only darkness
saved the Dutch from utter destruction.
The effect of this victory was to give the English Council of State
a false impression of security. In vain Blake urged the upkeep of
the fleet. Two months later, November 30, 1652, Tromp, now restored
to command, suddenly appeared in the Channel with 80 ships and a
convoy behind him. Blake had only 45 and these only partly manned,
but he was no man to refuse a challenge and boldly sailed out to
meet him. It is said that during the desperate struggle--the "battle
of Dungeness"--Blake's flagship, supported by two others, fought
for some time with twenty of the Dutch. As Blake had the weather
gage and retained it, he was able to draw off finally and save his
fleet from destruction. All the ships were badly knocked about and
two fell into the hands of the enemy. Blake came back so depressed
by his defeat that he offered to resign his command, but the Council
of State would not hear of such a thing, handsomely admitted their
responsibility for the weakness of the fleet, and set at work to
refit. Meanwhile for the next three months the Channel was in Tromp's
hands. This is the period when the legend describes him as hoisting
a broom to his masthead.
By the middle of February the English had reorganized their fleet
and Blake took the sea with another famous Roundhead soldier, Monk,
as one of his divisional commanders. At this time Tromp lay off
Land's End waiting for the Dutch merchant fleet which he expected
to convoy to Holland. On the 18th the two forces sighted each other
about 15 miles off Portland. Then followed the "Three Days' Battle,"
or the battle of Portland, one of the most stubbornly contested
fights in the war and its turning point.
In order to be sure to catch Tromp, Blake had extended his force
of 70 or 80 ships in a cross Channel position. Under cover of a
fog Tromp suddenly appeared and caught the English fleet divided.
Less than half were collected under the immediate command of Blake,
only about ten were in the actual vicinity of his flagship, and
the rest were to eastward, especially Monk's division which he
had carelessly permitted to drift to leeward four or five miles.
As the wind was from the west and very light, Monk's position made
it impossible for him to support his chief for some time. Tromp saw
his opportunity to concentrate on the part of the English fleet
nearest him, the handful of ships with Blake. The latter had the
choice of either bearing up to make a junction with Monk and the
others before accepting battle or of grappling with Tromp at once,
trusting to his admirals to arrive in time to win a victory. It
was characteristic of Blake that he chose the bolder course.
The fighting began early in the afternoon and was close and furious
from the outset. Again Blake's ship was compelled to engage several
Dutch, including Tromp's flagship. De Ruyter, the brilliant lieutenant
of Tromp, attempted to cut Blake off from his supports on the north,
and Evertsen steered between Blake and Penn's squadron on the south.
(See diagram 1.) Blake's dozen ships might well have been surrounded
and taken if his admirals had not known their business. Penn tacked
right through Evertsen's squadron to come to the side of Blake,
and Lawson foiled de Ruyter by bearing away till he had enough
southing to tack in the wake of Penn and fall upon Tromp's rear
(diagram 2). Evertsen then attempted to get between Monk and the
rest of the fleet and two hours after the fight in the center began
Monk also was engaged. When the lee vessels of the "red" or center
squadron came on the scene about four o'clock, they threatened to
weather the Dutch and put them between two fires. To avoid this
and to protect his convoy, Tromp tacked his whole fleet together--an
exceedingly difficult maneuver under the circumstances--and drew
off to windward. Darkness stopped the fighting for that day. All
night the two fleets sailed eastward watching each other's lights,
and hastily patching up damages.
[Illustration: Based on diagram of Mahan's in Clowes, _The Royal
Navy_, Vol. II, p. 180-1.
THE BATTLE OF PORTLAND, FEB. 18, 1653]
Morning discovered them off the Isle of Wight, with the English
on the north side of the Channel. As Tromp's chief business was to
save his convoy and as the English force was now united, he took
a defensive position. He formed his own ships in a long crescent,
with the outward curve toward his enemy, and in the lee of this
line he placed his convoy. The wind was so light that the English
were unable to attack until late. The fighting, though energetic,
had not proved decisive when darkness fell.
The following day, the 20th, brought a fresh wind that enabled
the English to overhaul the Dutch, who could not move faster than
the heavily laden merchantmen, and force a close action. Blake
tried to cut off Tromp from the north so as to block his road home.
Vice Admiral Penn, leading the van, broke through the Dutch battle
line and fell upon the convoy, but Blake was unable to reach far
enough to head off his adversary before he rounded Cape Gris Nez
under cover of darkness and found anchorage in Calais roads. That
night, favored by the tide and thick weather, Tromp succeeded in
carrying off the greater part of his convoy unobserved. Nevertheless
he had left in Blake's hand some fifty merchantmen and a number
of men of war variously estimated from five to eighteen. At the
same time the English had suffered heavily in men and ships. On
Blake's flagship alone it is said that 100 men had been killed
and Blake and his second in command, Deane, were both wounded, the
former seriously.
The result of this three days' action was to encourage the English
to press the war with energy and take the offensive to the enemy's
own coast. English crews had shown that they could fight with a
spirit fully equal to that of the Dutch, and English ships and
weight of broadside, as de Ruyter frankly declared to his government,
were decidedly superior. The fact that the shallow waters of the
Dutch coast made necessary a lighter draft man of war than that
of the English proved a serious handicap to the Dutch in all their
conflicts with the British. Both fleets were so badly shot up by
this prolonged battle that there was a lull in operations until
May.
In that month Tromp suddenly arrived off Dover and bombarded the
defenses. The English quickly took the sea to hunt him down. As
Blake was still incapacitated by his wound, the command was given
to Monk. The latter, with a fleet of over a hundred ships, brought
Tromp to action on June 2 (1653) in what is known as the "Battle
of the Gabbard" after a shoal near the mouth of the Thames, where
the action began. Tromp was this time not burdened with a convoy
but his fleet was smaller in numbers than Monk's and, as he well
knew, inferior in other elements of force. Accordingly, he adapted
defensive tactics of a sort that was copied afterwards by the French
as a fixed policy. He accepted battle to leeward, drawing off in a
slanting line from his enemy with the idea of catching the English
van as it advanced to the attack unsupported by the rest of the
fleet, and crippling it so severely that the attack would not be
pressed. As it turned out, a shift of the wind gave him the chance
to fall heavily upon the English van, but a second shift gave back
the weather gage to the English and the two fleets became fiercely
engaged at close quarters. Blake, hearing the guns, left his sick
bed and with his own available force of 18 ships sailed out to join
battle. The sight of this fresh squadron flying Blake's flag, turned
the fortune of battle decisively. The Dutch escaped destruction
only by finding safety in the shallows of the Flemish coast, where
the English ships could not follow.
After this defeat the Dutch were almost at the end of their resources
and sued far peace, but Cromwell's ruthless demands amounted to
a practical loss of independence, which even a bankrupt nation
could not accept. Accordingly, every nerve was strained to build
a fleet that might yet beat the English. The latter, for their
part, were equally determined not to lose the fruits of their hard
won victories. Since Blake's active share in the battle of the
Gabbard aggravated his wound so severely that he was carried ashore
more nearly dead than alive, Monk retained actual command.
Monk attempted to maintain a close blockade of the Dutch coast
and to prevent a junction between Tromp's main fleet at Flushing
and a force of thirty ships at Amsterdam. In this, however, he was
outgeneraled by Tromp, who succeeded in taking the sea with the
greatest of all Dutch fleets, 120 men of war. The English and the
Dutch speedily clashed in the last, and perhaps the most furiously
contested, battle of the war, the "Battle of Scheveningen." The
action began at six in the morning of July 30, 1653. Tromp had the
weather gage, but Monk, instead of awaiting his onslaught, tacked
towards him and actually cut through the Dutch line. Tromp countered
by tacking also, in order to keep his windward position, and this
maneuver was repeated three times by Tromp and Monk, and the two
great fleets sailed in great zigzag courses down the Dutch coast a
distance of forty miles, with bitter fighting going on at close
range between the two lines. Early in the action the renowned Tromp
was killed, but his flag was kept flying and there was no flinching
on the part of his admirals. About one o'clock a shift of the wind
gave the weather gage to the English. Some of the Dutch captains
then showed the white feather and tried to escape. This compelled
the retirement of DeWith, who had succeeded to the command, and
who, as he retreated, fired on his own fugitives as well as on
the English. As usual in those battles with the Dutch, the English
had been forced to pay a high price for their victory. Their fleet
was so shattered that they were obliged to lift the blockade and
return home to refit. But for the Dutch it was the last effort.
Again they sued for peace. Cromwell drove a hard bargain; he insisted
on every claim England had ever made against the Netherlands before
the war, but on this occasion he agreed to leave Holland her
independence.
Thus in less than two years the First Dutch War came to an end. In
the words of Mr. Hannay,[1] the English historian, its "importance
as an epoch in the history of the English Navy can hardly be
exaggerated. Though short, for it lasted barely twenty-two months,
it was singularly fierce and full of battles. Yet its interest is
not derived mainly from the mere amount of fighting but from the
character of it. This was the first of our naval wars conducted
by steady, continuous, coherent campaigns. Hitherto our operations
on the sea had been of the nature of adventures by single ships
and small squadrons, with here and there a great expedition sent
out to capture some particular port or island."
[Footnote 1: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, Vol. I, p. 217.]
As to the intensity of the fighting, it is worth noting that in this
short period six great battles took place between fleets numbering
as a rule from 70 to 120 ships on a side. By comparison it may be
remarked that at Trafalgar the total British force numbered 27
ships of the line and the Allies, 33. Nor were the men of war of
Blake and Tromp the small types of an earlier day. In 1652 the
ship of the line had become the unit of the fleet as truly as it
was in 1805. It is true that Blake's ships were not the equal of
Nelson's huge "first rates," because the "two-decker" was then
the most powerful type. The first three-decker in the English navy
was launched in the year of Blake's death, 1657. The fact remains,
however, that these fleet actions of the Dutch Wars took place
on a scale unmatched by any of the far better known engagements
of the 18th or early 19th century.
A curious naval weapon survived from the day when Howard drove
Medina Sidonia from Calais roads, the fireship, or "brander." This
was used by both English and Dutch. Its usefulness, of course, was
confined to the side that held the windward position, and even
an opponent to leeward could usually, if he kept his head, send
out boats to grapple and tow the brander out of harm's way. In the
battle of Scheveningen, however, Dutch fireships cost the English
two fine ships, together with a Dutch prize, and very nearly destroyed
the old flagship of Blake, the _Triumph_. She was saved only by
the extraordinary exertions of her captain, who received mortal
injury from the flames he fought so courageously.
This First Dutch War is interesting in what it reveals of the advance
in tactics. Tromp well deserves his title as the "Father of Naval
Tactics," and he undoubtedly taught Blake and Monk a good deal by
the rough schooling of battle, but they proved apt pupils. From
even the brief summary of these great battles just given, it is
evident that Dutch and English did not fight each other in helter
skelter fashion. In fact, there is revealed a great advance in
coördination over the work of the English in the campaign of the
Armada. These fleets worked as units. This does not mean that they
were not divided into squadrons. A force of 100 ships of the line
required division and subdivision, and considerable freedom of
movement was left to division and squadron commanders under the
general direction of the commander in chief, but they were all
working consciously together. Just as at Trafalgar Nelson formed
his fleet in two lines (originally planned as three) and allowed
his second in command a free hand in carrying out the task assigned
him, so Tromp and Blake operated their fleets in squadrons--Tromp
usually had five--and expected of their subordinates responsibility
and initiative. All this is in striking contrast with the practice
that paralyzed tactics in the latter 17th and 18th centuries, which
sacrificed everything to a rigid line of battle in column ahead,
and required every movement to emanate from the commander in chief.
Although details about the great battles of the First Dutch War
are scanty, there is enough recorded to show that both sides used
the line ahead as the normal battle line. It is equally clear,
however, that they repeatedly broke through each other's lines
and aimed at concentration, or destroying in detail. These two
related principles, which had to be rediscovered toward the end of
the 18th century, were practiced by Tromp, de Ruyter, and Blake.
Their work has not the advantage of being as near our day as the
easy, one-sided victories over the demoralized French navy in the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, but the day may come when the
British will regard the age of Blake as the naval epoch of which
they have the most reason to be proud. Then England met the greatest
seamen of the day led by one of the greatest admirals of history
and won a bitterly fought contest by virtue of better ships and
the spirit of Cromwell's "Ironsides."
_Porto Farina and Santa Cruz_
Nor did the age of Blake end with the First Dutch War. As soon
as the admiral was able to go aboard ship, Cromwell sent him with
a squadron into the Mediterranean to enforce respect for the
Commonwealth from the Italian governments and the Barbary states.
He conducted his mission with eminent success. Although the Barbary
pirates did not course the sea in great fleets as in the palmy
days of Barbarossa, they were still a source of peril to Christian
traders. Blake was received civilly by the Dey of Algiers but
negotiations did not result satisfactorily. At Tunis he was openly
flouted. The Pasha drew up his nine cruisers inside Porto Farina
and defied the English admiral to do his worst. Blake left for a
few days to gain the effect of surprise and replenish provisions.
On April 4, 1655, he suddenly reappeared and stood in to the attack.
The harbor of Porto Farina was regarded as impregnable. The entrance
was narrow and the shores lined with castles and batteries. As Blake
foresaw, the wind that took him in would roll the battle smoke upon
the enemy. In a short time he had silenced the fire of the forts
and then sent boarding parties against the Tunisian ships, which
were speedily taken and burnt. Then he took his squadron out again,
having destroyed the entire Tunisian navy, shattered the forts, and
suffered only a trifling loss. This exploit resounded throughout
the Mediterranean. Algiers was quick to follow Tunis in yielding
to Blake's demands. It is characteristic of this officer that he
should have made the attack on Tunis entirely without orders from
Cromwell, and it is equally characteristic of the latter that he
was heartily pleased with the initiative of his admiral in carrying
out the spirit rather than the letter of his instructions.
Meanwhile Cromwell had been wavering between a war against France
or Spain. The need of a capture of money perhaps influenced him to
turn against Spain, for this country still drew from her western
colonies a tribute of gold and silver, which naturally would fall a
prey to the power that controlled the sea. One month after Blake's
exploit at Tunis, another English naval expedition set out to the
West Indies to take Santo Domingo. Although Jamaica was seized and
thereafter became an English possession, the expedition as a whole
was a disgraceful failure, and the leaders, Penn and Venables, were
promptly clapped by Cromwell into the Tower on their return. This
stroke against Spain amounted to a declaration of war, and on Blake's
return to England he was ordered to blockade Cadiz. One detachment
of the plate fleet fell into the hands of his blockading ships and
the silver ingots were dispatched to London. Blake continued his
blockade in an open roadstead for six months, through autumn and
winter, an unheard of thing in those days and exceedingly difficult.
Blake was himself ill, his ships were not the copper-bottomed ones
of a hundred years later, and there was not, as in later days, an
English base at Gibraltar. But he never relaxed his vigilance.
In April (1657) he learned that another large plate fleet had arrived
at Santa Cruz, Teneriffe. Immediately he sailed thither to take or
destroy it. If Porto Farina had been regarded as safe from naval
attack, Santa Cruz was far more so. A deep harbor, with a narrow,
funnel entrance, and backed by mountains, it is liable to dead
calms or squally bursts of wind from the land. In addition to its
natural defenses it was heavily fortified. Blake, however, reckoned
on coming in with a flowing tide and a sea breeze that, as at Porto
Farina, would blow his smoke upon the defenses. He rightly guessed
that if he sailed close enough under the castles at the harbor
entrance their guns could not be sufficiently depressed to hit
his ships, and as he saw the galleons and their escorts lined up
along the shore he perceived also that they were masking the fire
of their own shore batteries. For the most difficult part of his
undertaking, the exit from the harbor, he trusted to the ebbing
tide with the chance of a shift in the wind in his favor.
Early on the morning of April 20th (1657) he sailed in. As he had
judged, the fire of the forts did little damage. By eight o'clock
the English ships were all at their appointed stations and fighting.
During the entire day Blake continued his work of destruction till
it was complete, and at dusk drifted out on the ebb. Some writers
mention a favoring land breeze that helped to extricate the English,
but according to Blake's own words, "the wind blew right into the
bay." In spite of this head wind the ships that were crippled were
warped or towed out and not one was lost. The English suffered
in the entire action only 50 killed and 120 wounded, and repairs
were so easily made that Blake returned to his blockading station
at once.
This was the greatest of Blake's feats as it also was his last.
All who heard of it--friend or enemy--pronounced it as without
parallel in the history of ships. A few months later Blake was
given leave to return home. He had long been a sick man, but his
name alone was worth a fleet and Cromwell had not been able to spare
him. As it happened, he did not live long enough to see England
again. Cromwell, who knew the worth of his faithful admiral, gave
him a funeral of royal dignity and interment in Westminster Abbey.
Blake never showed, perhaps, great strategic insight--Tromp and
de Ruyter were his superiors there, as was also Nelson--but he,
more than any other, won for England her mastery of the sea, and
no other can boast his record of great victories. These he won
partly by skill and forethought but chiefly by intrepidity. We
can do no better than leave his fame in the words of the Royalist
historian, Clarendon--a political enemy--who says: "He quickly made
himself signal there (on the sea) and was the first man who declined
the old track ... and disproved those rules that had long been in
practice, to keep his ships and men out of danger, which had been
held in former times a point of great ability and circumspection,
as if the principal requisite in the captain of a ship had been
to come home safe again. He was the first man who brought ships
to contemn castles on shore, which had been thought ever very
formidable.... He was the first that infused that proportion of
courage into the seamen by making them see what mighty things they
could do if they were resolved, and taught them to fight in fire
as well as on water. And though he hath been very well imitated
and followed, he was the first that drew the copy of naval courage
and bold resolute achievement."
The chaos that followed the death of the Protector resulted in
Monk's bringing over the exiled Stuart king--Charles II. Thereafter
Round Head and Royalist served together in the British navy. An
important effect of the Restoration was organization of a means of
training the future officers of the fleet. The Navy as a profession
may be said to date from this time, in contrast with the practice of
using merchant skippers and army officers, which had prevailed to
so great a degree hitherto. Under the new system "young gentlemen"
were sent to sea as "King's Letter Boys"--midshipmen--to learn
the ways of the navy and to grow up in it as a preparation for
command. This was an excellent reform but it resulted in making
the navy the property of a social caste from that day to this,
and it made promotion, for a century and more, largely subject to
family influence.
Another effect of the Restoration was to break down the fighting
efficiency of the fleet as it had been in the days of Blake. The
veterans of the First Dutch War fought with their old time courage
and discipline, but the newer elements did not show the same devotion
and initiative. The effect on the material was still worse, for
the fleet became a prey to the cynical dishonesty that Charles
II inspired in every department of his government.
_The Second Dutch War_
Five years after Charles II became king, England was involved in
another war with the Netherlands. There was still bad feeling between
the two peoples, and trading companies in the far east or west
kept up a guerilla warfare which flooded both governments with
complaints. The chief cause seems to have been the desire of the
English Guinea Company to get rid of their Dutch competitors who
persistently undersold them in the slave markets of the West Indies.
Before there was any declaration of war an English squadron was sent
out to attack the Dutch company's settlement on the West African
coast. After this it crossed the Atlantic and took New Amsterdam,
which thereafter became New York. The Dutch retaliated by sending
out one of their squadrons to retake their African post and threaten
the Atlantic colonies. In March, 1665, war was declared.
In this conflict the relative strengths of the two navies were about
the same as in the previous war. The Dutch had made improvements
in their ships, but they still suffered from the lack of unity
in organization and spirit. The first engagement was the battle
of Lowestoft, on June 3, 1665. The English fleet was under the
personal command of the Duke of York, later James II; the Dutch
were led by de Ruyter. The two forces numbered from 80 to 100 ships
each, and strung out as they were, must have extended over nearly
ten miles of sea. The Duke of York formed his fleet in the pattern
that he set by his own "Fighting Instructions," which governed the
tactics of all navies thereafter for a hundred years, namely, the
entire force drawn up in single line. This line bore down abreast
toward the enemy until it reached gunshot, then swung into line
ahead and sailed on a course parallel to that of the enemy. De
Ruyter arranged his fleet accordingly, and the two long lines passed
each other on opposite tacks three times, cannonading furiously
at close range. This meant that the force was distributed evenly
along the enemy's line and as against an evenly matched force these
tactics could result, as a rule, only in mere inconclusive artillery
duels which each side would claim as victories. In the battle of
Lowestoft, however, several of the captains in the Dutch center
flinched at the third passing and bore up to leeward, leaving a
wide gap in de Ruyter's line. The English broke through at this
point and hammered the weakened Dutch line in the center with a
superior force. This was the decisive point in the battle and de
Ruyter was forced to retreat. The Dutch would have suffered even
greater loss than they did had it not been for the masterly fashion
in which Cornelius Tromp--son of the famous Martin Tromp--covered
the retreat.
The defeat of the Dutch was due to the bad conduct of the captains
in the center, four of whom were shot by order of de Ruyter and
others dismissed from the service. It is interesting to note that
while the first half of the battle was fought on the formal lines
that were soon to be the cast iron rule of conduct for the British
navy, and led to nothing conclusive; the second half was characterized
by the breaking of the enemy's line, in the older style of Blake,
and led to a pronounced victory.
At this time Louis XIV had pledged himself to give aid to the
Netherlands in case of attack by a third Power. But when the Dutch
and his own ministers called on him to make good his promise he
offered more promises and no fulfillment. The rumor of an approaching
French squadron which was to make junction with de Ruyter, who had
now been placed in command of the Dutch fleet, caused the English
government to make the grave mistake of detaching Prince Rupert
with 20 ships to look for the mythical French force. This division
left Monk, who was again in command of the fleet, with only 57
ships. Hearing that de Ruyter was anchored on the Flanders coast,
Monk went out to find him. De Ruyter left his anchorage to meet the
English, and on June 1, 1666, the two forces met in mid-Channel,
between Dunkirk and the Downs. As the Dutch force heavily outnumbered
him--nearly two to one--Monk might have been expected to avoid
fighting, but he acted in the spirit of Blake. Having the windward
position he decided that he could strike the advanced division
under Tromp and maul it severely before the rest of the Dutch could
succor it. Accordingly he boldly headed for the enemy's van. When
Monk attacked he had only about 35 ships in hand, for the rest were
straggling behind too far to help. Thus began the famous "Four
Days' Battle," characterized by Mahan as "the most remarkable, in
some of its aspects that has ever been fought upon the ocean."[1]
[Footnote 1: THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, p. 125.]
The fighting was close and furious and in its unparalleled duration
numbers were bound to tell. On the third day Monk retreated to
the Thames, but on being joined by Rupert's squadron immediately
sallied forth to do battle again. On this day, June 4, the Dutch
succeeded in cutting through his formation and putting him between
two fires. Indeed Monk escaped destruction only by breaking through
his ring of enemies and finding refuge in the Thames. The Dutch had
won a great victory, for the English had lost some twenty ships
and 5000 in killed and wounded. But Monk was right in feeling a
sense of pride in the fight that he had made against great odds.
The losses that he had inflicted were out of all proportion to the
relative strength of the two forces. Unfortunately the new spirit
that was coming into the navy of the Restoration was evidenced by
the fact that a number of English captains, finding the action too
hot for them, deserted their commander in chief. On the Dutch side
de Ruyter's handling of his fleet was complicated by the conduct
of Cornelius Tromp. This officer believed that he, not de Ruyter,
should have been made commander of the Dutch fleet and in this
action as in the next, acted with no regard for his chief's orders.
As a consequence of the Four Days' Battle, Dutchmen again controlled
the Channel and closed the mouth of the Thames to trade. The English
strained every nerve to create a fleet that should put an end to
this humiliating and disastrous situation. The preparations were
carried out with such speed that on July 22 (1666), Monk and Rupert
anchored off the end of the Gunfleet shoal with a fleet of about
80 ships of the line and frigates. On the 25th the English sighted
de Ruyter, with a fleet slightly larger in numbers, in the broad
part of the Thames estuary. Monk, forming his fleet in the long
line ahead, sailed to the attack. The action that followed is called
the "Battle of St. James's Day" or the "Gunfleet."
[Illustration: THE THAMES ESTUARY]
Whether or not Monk was influenced by his princely colleague it
is impossible to say, but the tactics of this engagement do not
suggest the Monk of earlier battles. He followed the "Fighting
Instructions" and in spite of them won a victory, but it might
have been far more decisive. The English bore down in line abreast,
then formed line ahead on reaching gunshot, the van, center, and
rear, engaging respectively the Dutch van, center, and rear. In these
line ahead attacks the rear usually straggled. Tromp, commanding
the Dutch rear, saw his chance to attack Smith, commanding the
English rear, before his squadron was in proper formation. Smith
retreated, and Tromp, eager to win a victory all by himself, abandoned
the rest of the Dutch fleet and pursued Smith. Thus the action
broke into two widely separated parts. The English van and center
succeeded in forcing the corresponding Dutch divisions to retreat,
and if Monk had turned to the help of Smith he might have taken
or destroyed all of the 39 ships in Tromp's division. Instead,
he and Rupert went careering on in pursuit of the enemy directly
ahead of them. Eventually de Ruyter's ships found refuge in shallow
water and then Monk turned to catch Tromp. But the latter proved too
clever for his adversaries and slipped between them to an anchorage
alongside of de Ruyter.
Although the victory was not nearly so decisive as it should have
been with the opportunity offered, nevertheless it served the need
of the hour. De Ruyter was no longer able to blockade the Thames and
the Straits of Dover. And Monk, following up his success, carried
the war to the enemy's coast, where he burned a merchant fleet
of 160 vessels in the roadstead of the island of Terschelling,
and destroyed one of the towns. Early in 1666 active operations
on both sides dwindled down, and Charles, anxious to use naval
appropriations for other purposes, allowed the fleet to fall into
a condition of unreadiness for service. One of the least scandals in
this corrupt age was the unwillingness or inability of the officials
to pay the seamen their wages. In consequence large numbers of
English prisoners in Holland actually preferred taking service
in the Dutch navy rather than accepting exchange, on the ground
that the Dutch government paid its men while their own did not.
Early in June, 1667, de Ruyter took advantage of the condition of
the English fleet by inflicting perhaps the greatest humiliation on
England that she has ever suffered. Entering the Thames unopposed,
he was prevented from attacking London only by unfavorable wind and
tide. He then turned his attention to the dockyards of Chatham and
burnt or captured seven great ships of the line, besides numerous
smaller craft, carried off the naval stores at Sheerness, and then
for the next six weeks kept a blockade on the Thames and the eastern
and southern coasts of England. This mortifying situation continued
until the signing of the "Peace of Breda" concluded the war.
_The Third Dutch War_
Less than five years later Charles again made war on the Netherlands.
For this there was not the shadow of excuse, but Louis XIV saw
fit to attack the Dutch, and Charles was ever his willing vassal.
The English began hostilities without any declaration of war by
a piratical attack on a Dutch convoy.
At this juncture Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Attacked
on her land frontiers by France, then the dominating military power,
and on her sea frontiers by England, the strongest naval power, she
seemed to have small chance to survive. But her people responded
with a heroism worthy of her splendid history. They opened their
dykes to check the armies of invasion and strained every nerve to
equip a fleet large enough to cope with the combined navies of
France and England. In this Third Dutch War four great naval battles
were fought: that of Solebay, May 28, 1672, the two engagements
off Schooneveldt, May 28 and June 4, 1673, and that of the Texel,
August 11, 1673.
In all of these the honors go to the Dutch and their great admiral,
de Ruyter. Since these actions did not restore the Netherlands to
their old-time position or check the ascendancy of England, they
need not be discussed individually here. The outstanding feature
of the whole story is the surpassing skill and courage of de Ruyter
in the face of overwhelming odds. In this war he showed the full
stature of his genius as never before, and won his title as the
greatest seaman of the 17th century. After his death one must wait
till the day of Suffren and Nelson to find men worthy to rank with
him.
In this campaign de Ruyter showed his powers not only as a tactician
but as a strategist. In the words of Mahan, the Dutch "made a strategic
use of their dangerous coast and shoals, upon which were based their
sea operations. To this they were forced by the desperate odds under
which they were fighting; but they did not use their shoals as a
mere shelter,--the warfare they waged was the defensive-offensive.
When the wind was fair for the allies to attack, de Ruyter kept
under cover of his islands, or at least on ground where the enemy
dared not follow; but when the wind served so that he might attack
in his own way he turned and fell upon them."[1] That is, instead of
accepting the tame rôle of a "fleet in being" and hiding in a safe
harbor, de Ruyter took and held the sea, always on the aggressive,
always alert to catch his enemy in a position of divided forces
or exposed flank and strike hard. His master, Martin Tromp, is
regarded as the father of the line ahead formation for battle, but
he undoubtedly taught de Ruyter its limitations as well as its
advantages, and there is no trace of the stupid formalism of the
Duke of York's regulations in de Ruyter's brilliant work.
[Footnote 1: INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, p. 144.]
At this time he had no worthy opponent. As Monk was dead, the Duke of
York had again assumed active command with Rupert as his lieutenant.
Although the Duke was honestly devoted to the navy he was dull-witted,
and in spite of the advantage of numbers and the dogged courage of
officers and men which so often in English history has made up for
stupid leadership, he was wholly unable to cope with de Ruyter's
genius. As for the French navy, their ships were superb, the best
in Europe, but their officers had no experience and apparently
small desire for close fighting. At all events, despite the odds
against him, de Ruyter defeated the allies in all four battles,
prevented their landing an army of invasion, and broke up their
attempt to blockade the coast.
The war was unpopular in England and as it met with ill success
it became more so. After the battle of the Texel, in 1673, active
operations died down to practically nothing, and at the beginning
of the year England made peace. By this time Holland had managed
to find other allies on the Continent--Spain and certain German
states--and while she had to continue her struggle against Louis
XIV by land she was relieved of the menace of her great enemy on
the sea. Fifteen years later, by a curious freak of history, a
Dutch prince became King William III of England, and the two old
enemies became united in alliance. But the Netherlands had exhausted
themselves by their protracted struggle. They had saved their
independence, but after the close of the 17th century they ceased
to be a world power of any consequence.
The persistent enmity of the French king for the Dutch gained nothing
for France but everything for England. Unwittingly he poured out his
resources in money and men to the end that England should become
the great colonial and maritime rival of France. As a part of her
spoils England had gained New York and New Jersey, thus linking her
northern and southern American colonies, and she had taken St. Helena
as a base for her East Indies merchantmen. She had tightened her
hold in India, and by repeatedly chastising the Barbary pirates had
won immunity for her traders in the Mediterranean. At the beginning
of the Second Dutch War Monk had said with brutal frankness, "What
matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade
which the Dutch have." This, the richest prize of all, fell from
the hands of the Dutch into those of the English. During the long
drawn war which went on after the English peace of 1674, while
Holland with her allies fought against Louis XIV, the great bulk
of the Dutch carrying trade passed from the Dutch to the English
flag. The close of the 17th century, therefore, found England fairly
started on her career as an ocean empire, unified by sea power.
Her navy, despite the vices it had caught from the Stuart régime,
had become firmly established as a permanent institution with a
definite organization. By this time every party recognized its
essential importance to England's future.
Nevertheless, whatever satisfaction may be felt by men of English
speech in this rapid growth of England's power and prestige as
a result of the three wars with the Dutch, one cannot avoid the
other side of the picture. A people small in numbers but great
in energy and genius was hounded to the point of extinction by
the greed of its powerful neighbors. Peace-loving, asking merely
to be let alone, the only crime of the Dutch was to excite the
envy of the English and the French.
REFERENCES
See next chapter, page 221.