ENGLAND AND THE ARMADA
By reason of England's insularity, it is an easy matter to find
instances from even her early history of the salutary or fatal
influence of sea power. Romans, Saxons, Danes swept down upon England
from the sea. By building a fleet, King Alfred, said to have been
the true father of the British navy, kept back the Danes. It was
the dispersion of the English fleet by reason of the lateness of
the season that enabled William the Conqueror, in the small open
vessels interestingly pictured in the Bayeux tapestry, to win a
footing on the English shore.
But during the next three centuries, with little shipping and little
trade save that carried on by the Hansa, with no enemy that dangerously
threatened her by sea, England had neither the motives nor the
national strength and unity to develop naval power. She claimed,
it is true, dominion over the narrow waters between her and her
possessions in France, and also over the "four seas" surrounding
her; and as early as 1201 an ordinance was passed requiring vessels
in these waters to lower sails ("vail the bonnet") and also to
"lie by the lee" when so ordered by King's ships. But though these
claims were revived in the 17th century against the Dutch, and
though the requirement that foreign vessels strike their topsails
to the British flag remained in the Admiralty Instructions until
after Trafalgar, they were at this time enforced chiefly to rid
the seas of pirates--the common enemies of nations. During this
period there were a few "king's ships," the sovereign's personal
property, forming a nucleus around which a naval force of fishing
and merchant vessels could be assembled in time of war. The Cinque
Ports, originally Dover, Sandwich, Hastings, Romney and Hythe, long
enjoyed certain trading privileges in return for the agreement
that when the king passed overseas they would "rigge up fiftie and
seven ships" (according to a charter of Edward I) with 20 armed
soldiers each, and maintain them for 15 days.
An attack in 1217 by such a fleet, under the Governor of Dover
Castle, affords perhaps the earliest instance of maneuvering for
the weather-gage. The English came down from the windward and, as
they scrambled aboard the enemy, threw quicklime into the Frenchmen's
eyes. At Sluis, in 1340, to take another instance of early English
naval warfare, Edward III defeated a large French fleet and a number
of hired Genoese galleys lashed side by side in the little river
Eede in Flanders. Edward came in with a fair wind and tide and fell
upon the enemy as they lay aground at the stem and unmanageable.
This victory gave control of the Channel for the transport of troops
in the following campaign. But like most early naval combats, it
was practically a land battle over decks, and, although sanguinary
enough, it is from a naval stand paint interesting chiefly for
such novelties as a scouting force of knights on horseback along
the shore.
The beginnings of a permanent and strong naval establishment, as
distinct from merchant vessels owned by the king or in his service,
must be dated, however, from the Tudors and the period of national
rehabilitation following the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) and
the War of the Roses (1455-1485). One reason for this was that
the employment of artillery on shipboard and the introduction of
port-holes made it increasingly difficult to convert merchant craft
into dependable men-of-war. Henry VIII took a keen interest in
his navy, devoted the revenues of forfeited church property to
its expansion, established the first Navy Board (1546), and is
even credited with the adoption of sailing vessels as the major
units of his fleet.
_From Oar to Sail_
The use of heavy ordnance, already mentioned, as well as the increasing
size and efficiency of sail-craft that came with the spread of
ocean commerce and navigation, naturally pointed the way to this
transition in warfare from oar to sail. The galley was at best a
frail affair, cumbered with oars, benches and rowers, unable to
carry heavy guns or withstand their fire. Once sailing vessels had
attained reasonable maneuvering qualities, their superior strength
and size, reduced number of non-combatant personnel, and increased
seaworthiness and cruising radius gave them a tremendous superiority.
That the change should have begun in the north rather than in the
Mediterranean, where naval and military science had reached its
highest development, must be attributed not only to the rougher
weather conditions of the northern seas, and the difficulty of
obtaining slaves as rowers, but also to the fact that the southern
nations were more completely shackled by the traditions of galley
warfare.
[Illustration: GALLEON]
Yet for the new type it was the splendid trading vessels of Venice
that supplied the design. For the Antwerp and London trade, and in
protection against the increasing danger from pirates, the Venetians
had developed a compromise between the war-galley and the round-ship
of commerce, a type with three masts and propelled at least primarily
by sails, with a length about three times its beam and thus shorter
and more seaworthy than the galley, but longer, lower and swifter
than the clumsy round-ship. To this new type the names _galleass_ and
_galleon_ were bath given, but in English and later usage _galleass_
came to be applied to war vessels combining oar and sail, and _galleon_
to either war or trading vessels of medium size and length and
propelled by sail alone.
The Spanish found the galleon useful in the Atlantic carrying trade,
but, as shown at Lepanto, they retained the galley in warfare;
whereas Henry VIII of England was probably the first definitely
to favor sail for his men-of-war. An English navy list of 1545
shows four clumsy old-fashioned "great-ships" of upwards of 1000
tons, but second to these a dozen newer vessels of distinctly galleon
lines, lower than the great-ships, flush-decked, and sail-driven.
Though in engagements with French galleys during the campaign of
1545 these were handicapped by calm weather, they seem to have
held their own both in battle and in naval opinion. Of the royal
ships at the opening of Elizabeth's reign (1558), there were 11
large sailing vessels of 200 tans and upwards, and 10 smaller ones,
but only two galleys, and these "of no continuance and not worth
repair."[1] In comment on these figures, it should be added that
there were half a hundred large ships available from the merchant
service, and also that pinnaces and other small craft still combined
oar and sail.
[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Corbett, Vol. I, p. 133.]
In England the superiority of sail propulsion was soon definitely
recognized, and discussion later centered on the relative merits
of the medium-sized galleon and the big "great-ship." The
characteristics of each are well set forth in a contemporary naval
treatise by Sir William Monson: the former with "flush deck fore and
aft, sunk and low in the water; the other lofty and high-charged,
with a half-deck, forecastle, and copperidge-heads [athwortship
bulkheads where light guns were mounted to command the space between
decks]." The advantages of the first were that she was speedy and
"a fast ship by the wind" so as to avoid boarding by the enemy,
and could run in close and fire effective broadsides between wind
and water without being touched; whereas the big ship was more
terrifying, more commodious, stronger, and could carry more and
heavier guns. Monson, like many a later expert, suspended judgment
regarding the two types; but Sir Walter Raleigh came out strongly
for the smaller design. "The greatest ships," he writes, "are the
least serviceable...., less nimble, less maniable; 'Grande navi
grande fatiga,' saith the Spaniard. A ship of 600 tons will carry
as good ordnance as a ship of 1200 tons; and though the greater
have double her number, the lesser will turn her broadsides twice
before the greater can wind once." And elsewhere: "The high charging
of ships makes them extreme leeward, makes them sink deep in the
water, makes them labor, and makes them overset. Men may not expect
the ease of many cabins and safety at once in sea-service."[1]
[Footnote 1: WORKS, Oxford ed. 1829, Vol. VIII, p. 338.]
These statements were made after the Armada; but the trend of English
naval construction away from unwieldy ships such as used by the Spanish
in the Armada, is clearly seen in vessels dating from 1570-1580--the
_Foresight, Bull,_ and _Tiger_ (rebuilt from galleasses), the
_Swiftsure, Dreadnought, Revenge,_ and others of names renowned
in naval annals. These were all of about the dimensions of the
_Revenge,_ which was of 440 tons, 92 feet over all, 32 feet beam,
and 15 feet from deck to keel. That is to say, their length was
not more than three times their beam, and their beam was about
twice their depth in the hold--the characteristic proportions of
the galleon type.
The progressiveness of English ship construction is highly significant,
for to it may be attributed in large measure the Armada victory.
Spain had made no such advances; in fact, until the decade of the
Armada, she hardly had such a thing as a royal navy. The superiority
of the English ships was generally recognized. An English naval
writer in 1570 declared the ships of his nation so fine "none of
any other region may seem comparable to them"; and a Spaniard some
years later testified that his people regarded "one English ship
worth four of theirs."
Though not larger than frigates of Nelson's time, these ships were
crowded with an even heavier armament, comprising guns of all sizes
and of picturesque but bewildering nomenclature. According to
Corbett,[1] the ordnance may be divided into four main classes
based on caliber, the first two of the "long gun" and the other
two of the carronade or mortar type.
[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Vol. I, p. 384.]
I. Cannon proper, from 16 to 28 caliber, of 8.5-inch bore and 12
feet in length, firing 65-pound shot. The demi-cannon, which was
the largest gun carried on ships of the time, was 6.5 inches by
9 feet and fired 30-pound shot.
II. Culverins, 28 to 34 caliber long guns, 5 inches by 12 feet,
firing 17-pound shot. Demi-culverins were 9-pounders. Slings, bases,
sakers, port-pieces, and fowlers belonged to this class.
III. Perriers, from 6 to 8 caliber, firing stone-balls, shells,
fire-balls, etc.
IV. Mortars, of 1.5 caliber, including petards and murderers.
The "great ordnance," or cannon, were muzzle-loading. The secondary
armament, mounted in tops, cageworks, bulkheads, etc., were
breech-loading; but these smaller pieces fell out of favor as time
went on owing to reliance on long-range fire and rareness of boarding
actions. Down to the middle of the 19th century there was no great
improvement in ordnance, save in the way of better powder and boring.
Even in Elizabeth's day the heaviest cannon had a range of three
miles.
These advances in ship design and armament were accompanied by
some changes in naval administration. In 1546 the Navy Board was
created, which continued to handle matters of what may be termed
civil administration until its functions were taken over by the
Board of Admiralty in the reorganization of 1832. The chief members
of the Navy Board, the Treasurer, Comptroller, Surveyor of Ships,
Surveyor of Ordnance, and Clerk of Ships, were in Elizabethan times
usually experienced in sea affairs. To John Hawkins, Treasurer from
1578 to 1595, belongs chief credit for the excellent condition of
ships in his day. The Lord High Admiral, a member of the nobility,
exercised at least nominal command of the fleet in peace and war. For
vice admiral under him a man of practical experience was ordinarily
chosen. On shipboard, the only "gentleman" officers were the captains;
the rest--masters, master's mates, pilots, carpenters, boatswains,
coxswains, and gunners--were, to quote a contemporary description,
"mechanick men that had been bred up from swabbers." But owing
to the small proportion of soldiers on board, the English ships
were not like those of Spain, which were organized like a camp,
with the soldier element supreme and the sailors "slaves to the
rest."
_The Political Situation_
The steps taken to build up the navy in the decade or more preceding
the Armada were well justified by the political and religious strife
in western Europe and the dangers which on all sides threatened the
English realm. France, the Netherlands, and Scotland were torn by
religious warfare. In England the party with open or secret Catholic
sympathies was large, amounting to perhaps half the population,
the strength of whose loyalty to Elizabeth it was difficult to
gage. Since 1568 Elizabeth had held captive Mary Queen of Scots,
driven out of her own country by the Presbyterian hierarchy, and
a Catholic with hereditary claims to the English throne. Before
her death, Philip of Spain had conspired with her to assassinate
the heretic Elizabeth; after Mary's execution in 1587 he became
heir to her claims and entered the more willingly upon the task
of conquering England and restoring it to the faith. For years,
in fact, there had been a state of undeclared hostility between
England and Spain, and acts which, with sovereigns less cautious
and astute than both Elizabeth and Philip, would have meant war.
In 1585 Elizabeth formed an alliance with the Netherlands, and sent
her favorite, Leicester, there as governor-general, and Sir Philip
Sidney as Governor of Flushing, which with two other "cautionary
towns" she took as pledges of Dutch loyalty. The motives for this
action are well stated in a paper drawn up by the English Privy
Council in 1584, presenting a situation interesting in its analogy
to that which faced the United States when it entered the World
War:
"The conclusion of the whole was this: Although her Majesty should
thereby enter into the war presently, yet were she better to do
it now, while she may make the same out of her realm, having the
help of the people of Holland, and before the King of Spain shall
have consummated his conquest of those countries, whereby he shall
be so provoked by pride, solicited by the Pope, and tempted by the
Queen's own subjects, and shall be so strong by sea; and so free
from all other actions and quarrels--yea, shall be so formidable
to all the rest of Christendom, as that her Majesty shall no wise
be able, with her own power, nor with the aid of any other, neither
by land nor sea, to withstand his attempts, but shall be forced
to give place to his insatiable malice, which is most terrible
to be thought of, but miserable to suffer."
These were the compelling reasons for England's entry into the
war. The aid to Holland and the execution of Mary, on the other
hand, were sufficient to explain Philip's attempted invasion. The
grievance of Spain owing to the incursions of Hawkins and Drake
into her American possessions, and England's desire to break Spain's
commercial monopoly, were at the time relatively subordinate, though
from a naval standpoint the voyages are interesting in themselves
and important in the history of sea control and sea trade.
_Hawkins and Drake_
John Hawkins was a well-to-do ship-owner of Plymouth, and as already
stated, Treasurer of the Royal Navy, with a contract for the upkeep
of ships. His first venture to the Spanish Main was in 1562, when
he kidnapped 300 negroes on the Portuguese coast of Africa and
exchanged them at Hispanola (Haiti), for West Indian products,
chartering two additional vessels to take his cargo home. Though
he might have been put to death if caught by either Portugal or
Spain, his profits were so handsome by the double exchange that
he tried it again in 1565, this time taking his "choice negroes
at £160 each" to Terra Firme, or the Spanish Main, including the
coasts of Venezuela, Colombia, and the Isthmus. When the Spanish
authorities, warned by their home government, made some show of
resistance, Hawkins threatened bombardment, landed his men, and
did business by force, the inhabitants conniving in a contraband
trade very profitable to them.
On his third voyage he had six vessels, two of which, the _Jesus
of Lubeck_ and the _Minion_, were Queen's ships hired out for the
voyage. The skipper of one of the smaller vessels, the _Judith_,
was Francis Drake, a relative and protégé of the Hawkins family,
and then a youth of twenty-two. On September 16, 1567, after a
series of encounters stormier than ever in the Spanish settlements,
the squadron homeward bound was driven by bad weather into the
port of Mexico City in San Juan de Ulua Bay. Here, having a
decided superiority over the vessels in the harbor, Hawkins secured
the privilege of mooring and refitting his ships inside the island
that formed a natural breakwater, and mounted guns on the island
itself. To his surprise next morning, he beheld in the offing 13
ships of Spain led by an armed galleon and having on board the
newly appointed Mexican viceroy. Hawkins, though his guns commanded
the entrance, took hostages and made some sort of agreement by
which the Spanish ships were allowed to come in and moor alongside.
But the situation was too tense to carry off without an explosion.
Three days later the English were suddenly attacked on sea and
shore. They at once leaped into their ships and cut their cables,
but though they hammered the Spanish severely in the fight that
followed, only two English vessels, the _Minion_ and the _Judith_,
escaped, the _Minion_ so overcrowded that Hawkins had to drop 100 of
his crew on the Mexican coast. Drake made straight for Plymouth,
nursing a bitter grievance at the alleged breach of faith, and
vowing vengeance on the whole Spanish race. "The case," as Drake's
biographer, Thomas Fuller, says, "was clear in sea-divinity, and
few are such infidels as not to believe doctrines which make for
their own profit."[1]
[Footnote 1: THE HOLY STATE, Bk. II, Ch. XXII.]
In the next three years, following the example of many a French
Huguenot privateersman before him, and forsaking trade for semi-private
reprisal (in that epoch a few degrees short of piracy), he made
three voyages to the Spanish Indies. On the third, in 1572, he
raided Nombre de Dios with fire and sword. Then, leaguing himself
with the mixed-breed natives or cameroons, he waylaid a guarded
mule-train bearing treasure across the Isthmus, securing 15 tons of
silver which he buried, and as much gold as his men could stagger
away under. It was on this foray that he first saw the Pacific
from a height of the Cordilleras, and resolved to steer an English
squadron into this hitherto unmolested Spanish sea.
The tale of Drake's voyage into the Pacific and circumnavigation
of the globe is a piratical epic, the episodes of which, however,
find some justification in the state of virtual though undeclared
hostilities between England and Spain, in the Queen's secret sanction,
and in Spain's own policy of ruthless spoliation in America. Starting
at the close of 1577 with five small vessels, the squadron was
reduced by shipwreck and desertion until only the flagship remained
when Drake at last, on September 6 of the next year, achieved his
midwinter passage of the Straits of Magellan and bore down, "like
a visitation of God" as a Spaniard said, upon the weakly defended
ports of the west coast. After ballasting his ship with silver from
the rich Potosi mines, and rifling even the churches, he hastened
onward in pursuit of a richly laden galleon nicknamed _Cacafuego_--a
name discreetly translated _Spitfire_, but which, to repeat a joke
that greatly amused Drake's men at the time, it was proposed to
change to _Spitsilver_, for when overtaken and captured the vessel
yielded 26 tons of silver, 13 chests of pieces of eight, and gold
and jewels sufficient to swell the booty to half a million pounds
sterling.
For 20 years the voyage across the northern Pacific had been familiar
to the Spanish, who had studied winds and currents, laid down routes,
and made regular crossings. Having picked up charts and China pilots,
and left the whole coast in panic fear, Drake sailed far to the
northward, overhauled his ship in a bay above San Francisco, then
struck across the Pacific, and at last rounded Good Hope and put
into Plymouth in September of the third year. It suited Elizabeth's
policy to countenance the voyage. She put the major part of the
treasure into the Tower, took some trinkets herself, knighted Drake
aboard the _Golden Hind_, and when the Spanish ambassador talked
war she told him, in a quiet tone of voice, that she would throw
him into a dungeon.
This red-bearded, short and thickset Devon skipper, bold of speech
as of action, was now the most renowned sailor of England, with a
name that inspired terror on every coast of Spain. It was inevitable,
therefore, that when Elizabeth resolved upon open reprisals in
1585, Drake should be chosen to lead another, and this time fully
authorized, raid on the Spanish Indies. Here he sacked the cities
of San Domingo and Carthagena, and, though he narrowly missed the
plate fleet, brought home sufficient spoils for the individuals
who backed the venture. In the year 1587 with 23 ships and orders
permitting him to operate freely on Spain's home coasts, he first
boldly entered Cadiz, in almost complete disregard of the puny
galleys guarding the harbor, and destroyed some 37 vessels and
their cargoes. Despite the horrified protests of his Vice Admiral
Borough (an officer "of the old school" to be found in every epoch)
at these violations of traditional methods, he then took up a position
off Saigres where he could harry coastwise commerce, picked up the
East Indiaman _San Felipe_ with a cargo worth a million pounds
in modern money, and even appeared off Lisbon to defy the Spanish
Admiral Santa Cruz. Thus he "singed the King of Spain's beard,"
and set, in the words of a recent biographer, "what to this day
may serve as the finest example of how a small, well-handled fleet,
acting on a nicely timed offensive, may paralyze the mobilization
of an overwhelming force."[1]
[Footnote 1: DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Corbett, Vol. II, p. 108.]
_The Grand Armada_
At the time of this Cadiz expedition Spanish preparations for the
invasion of England were already well under way, Philip being now
convinced that by a blow at England all his aims might be secured--the
subjugation of the Netherlands, the safety of Spanish America,
the overthrow of Protestantism, possibly even his accession to
the English throne. As the secret instructions to Medina Sidonia
more modestly stated, it was at least believed that by a vigorous
offensive and occupation of English territory England could be forced
to cease her opposition to Spain. For this purpose every province
of the empire was pressed for funds. Pope Sixtus VI contributed
a million gold crowns, which he shrewdly made payable only when
troops actually landed on English soil. Church and nobility were
squeezed as never before. The Cortes on the eve of the voyage voted
8,000,000 ducats, secured by a tax on wine, meat, and oil, the
common necessities of life, which was not lifted for more than two
hundred years.
To gain control of the Channel long enough to throw 40,000 troops
ashore at Margate, and thereafter to meet and conquer the army
of defense--such was the highly difficult objective, to assure
the success of which Philip had been led to hope for a wholesale
defection of English Catholics to the Spanish cause. Twenty thousand
troops were to sail with the Armada; Alexander Farnese, Duke of
Parma, was to add 17,000 veterans from Flanders and assume supreme
command. With the Spanish infantry once landed, under the best
general in Europe, it was not beyond reason that England might become
a province of Spain.
What Philip did not see clearly, what indeed could scarcely be
foreseen from past experience, was that no movement of troops should
be undertaken without first definitely accounting for the enemy
fleet. The Spanish had not even an open base to sail to. With English
vessels thronging the northern ports of the Channel, with 90 Dutch
ships blockading the Scheldt and the shallows of the Flanders coast,
it would be necessary to clear the Channel by a naval victory,
and maintain control until it was assured by victory on land. The
leader first selected, Santa Cruz--a veteran of Lepanto--at least
put naval considerations uppermost and laid plans on a grand scale,
calling for 150 major ships and 100,000 men, 30,000 of them sailors.
But with his death in 1587 the campaign was again thought of primarily
from the army standpoint. The ships were conceived as so many
transports, whose duty at most was to hold the English fleet at
bay. Parma was to be supreme. To succeed Santa Cruz as naval leader,
and in order, it is said, that the gray-haired autocrat Philip
might still control from his cell in the Escorial, the Duke of
Medina Sidonia was chosen--an amiable gentleman of high rank, but
consciously ignorant of naval warfare, uncertain of purpose, and
despondent almost from the start. Medina had an experienced Vice
Admiral in Diego Flores de Valdes, whose professional advice he
usually followed, and he had able squadron commanders in Recalde,
Pedro de Valdes, Oquendo, and others; but such a commander-in-chief,
unless a very genius in self-effacement, was enough to ruin a far
more auspicious campaign.
Delayed by the uncertain political situation in France, even more
than by Drake's exploits off Cadiz, the Armada was at last, in
May of 1588, ready to depart. The success of the Catholic party
under the leadership of the Duke of Guise gave assurance of support
rather than hostility on the French flank. There were altogether
some 130 ships, the best of which were 10 war galleons of Portugal
and 10 of the "Indian Guard" of Spain. These were supported by
the Biscayan, Andalusian, Guipuscoan, and Levantine squadrons of
about 10 armed merchantmen each, four splendid Neapolitan galleasses
that gave a good account of themselves in action, and four galleys
that were driven upon the French coast by storms and took no part
in the battle--making a total (without the galleys) of about 64
fighting ships. Then there were 35 or more pinnaces and small craft,
and 23 _urcas_ or storeships of little or no fighting value. The
backbone of the force was the 60 galleons, large, top-lofty vessels,
all but 20 of them from the merchant service, with towering poops
and forecastles that made them terrible to look upon but hard to
handle. On board were 8,000 sailors and 19,000 troops.
Dispersed by a storm on their departure from Lisbon, the fleet
again assembled at Corunna, their victuals already rotten, and
their water foul and short. Medina Sidonia even now counseled
abandonment; but religious faith, the fatalistic pride of Spain,
and Philip's dogged fixity of purpose drove them on. Putting out
of Corunna on July 22, and again buffeted by Biscay gales, they
were sighted off the Lizard at daybreak of July 30, and a pinnace
scudded into Plymouth with the alarm.
[Illustration: CRUISE OF THE SPANISH ARMADA]
For England the moment of supreme crisis had come, Elizabeth's
policy of paying for nothing that she might expect her subjects
to contribute had left the royal navy short of what the situation
called for, and the government seems also, even throughout the
campaign, to have tied the admirals to the coast and kept them from
distant adventures by limited supplies of munitions and food. But
in the imminent danger, the nobility, both Catholic and Protestant,
and every coastwise city, responded to the call for ships and men.
Their loyalty was fatal to Philip's plan. The royal fleet of 25
ships and a dozen pinnaces was reënforced until the total craft of
all descriptions numbered 197, not more than 140 of which, however,
may be said to have had a real share in the campaign. For a month
or more a hundred sail had been mobilized at Plymouth, of which
69 were greatships and galleons. These were smaller in average
tonnage than the Spanish ships, but more heavily armed, and manned
by 10,000 capable seamen. Lord Henry Seymour, with Palmer and Sir
William Winter under him, watched Parma at the Strait of Dover,
with 20 ships and an equal number of galleys, barks and pinnaces.
The Lord High Admiral, Thomas Howard of Effingham, a nobleman of 50
with some naval experience and of a family that had long held the
office, commanded the western squadron, with Drake as Vice Admiral
and John Hawkins as Rear Admiral. The _Ark_ (800 tons), _Revenge_
(500), and _Victory_ (800) were their respective flagships. Martin
Frobisher in the big 1100-ton _Triumph_, Lord Sheffield in the
_White Bear_ (1000), and Thomas Fenner in the _Nonpareil_ (500)
were included with the Admirals in Howard's inner council of war.
"Howard," says Thomas Fuller, "was no deep-seaman, but he had
skill enough to know those who had more skill than himself and
to follow their instructions." As far as as possible for a
commoner, Drake exercised command.
[Illustration: From Pigafetta's _Discorso sopro l'Ordinanza dell'
Armata Catholico_ (Corbett's _Drake_, Vol. II, p. 213).
ORIGINAL "EAGLE" FORMATION OF THE ARMADA, PROBABLY ADOPTED WITH
SOME MODIFICATIONS AND SHOWING THE INFLUENCE OF GALLEY WARFARE]
On the morning of the 31st the Armada swept slowly past Plymouth
in what has been described as a broad crescent, but which, from a
contemporary Italian description, seems to have been the "eagle"
formation familiar to galley warfare, in line abreast with wide
extended wings bent slightly forward, the main strength in center
and guards in van and rear. Howard was just completing the arduous
task of warping his ships out of the harbor. Had Medina attacked at
once, as some of his subordinates advised, he might have compelled
Howard to close action and won by superior numbers. But his orders
suggested the advisability of avoiding battle till he had joined with
Parma; and for the Duke this was enough. As the Armada continued its
course, Howard fell in astern and to windward, inflicting serious
injuries to two ships of the enemy rear.
[Illustration: From Hale's _Story of the Great Armada._
THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL]
A week of desultory running battle ensued as the fleets moved slowly
through the Channel; the English fighting "loose and large," and
seeking to pick off stragglers, still fearful of a general action,
but taking advantage of Channel flaws to close with the enemy and
sheer as swiftly away; the Spanish on the defensive but able to
avoid disaster by better concerted action and fleet control. Only
two Spanish ships were actually lost, one of them Pedro de Valdes'
flagship _Neustra Señora del Rosario_, which had been injured in
collision and surrendered to Drake without a struggle on the night
of August 1, the other the big _San Salvador_ of the Guipuscoan
squadron, the whole after part of which had been torn up by an
explosion after the fighting on the first day. But the Spanish
inferiority had been clearly demonstrated and they had suffered
far more in morale than in material injuries when on Sunday, August
7, they dropped anchor in Calais roads. The English, on their part,
though flushed with confidence, had seen their weakness in organized
tactics, and now divided their fleet into four squadrons, with
the flag officers and Frobisher in command.
It betrays the fatuity of the Spanish leader, if not of the whole
plan of campaign, that when thus practically driven to refuge in
a neutral port, Medina Sidonia thought his share of the task
accomplished, and wrote urgent appeals to Parma to join or send
aid, though the great general had not enough flat-boats and barges
to float his army had he been so foolhardy as to embark, or the
Dutch so benevolent as to let him go. But the English, now reënforced
by Seymour's squadron, gave the Duke little time to ponder his next
move. At midnight eight fire hulks, "spurting flames and their
ordnance exploding," were borne by wind and tide full upon the
crowded Spanish fleet. Fearful of _maquinas de minas_ such as had
wrought destruction a year before at the siege of Antwerp, the
Spanish made no effort to grapple the peril but slipped or cut cables
and in complete confusion beat off shore.
At dawn the Spanish galleons, attempting with a veering wind from
the southward and westward to form in order off Gravelines, were set
upon in the closest approach to a general engagement that occurred
in the campaign. While Howard and several of his ships were busy
effecting the capture of a beached galleass, Drake led the attack
in the _Revenge_, seeking to force the enemy to leeward and throw
the whole body upon the shallows of the Flanders coast. With splendid
discipline, the Spanish weather ships, the flagship _San Martin_
among them, fought valiantly to cover the retreat. But it was an
unequal struggle, the heavier and more rapid fire of the English
doing fearful execution on decks crowded with men-at-arms. Such
artillery combat was hitherto unheard of. Though warned of the new
northern methods, the Spanish were obsessed by tradition; they were
prepared for grappling and boarding, and could they have closed,
their numbers and discipline would have told. Both sides suffered
from short ammunition; but the Armada, with no fresh supplies, was
undoubtedly in the worse case. "They fighting with their great
ordnance," writes Medina Sidonia, "and we with harquebus fire and
musketry, the distance being very small." Six-inch guns against
bows and muskets tells the tale.
A slackening of the English pursuit at nightfall after eight hours'
fighting, and an off-shore slant of wind at daybreak, prevented
complete disaster. One large galleon sank and two more stranded
and were captured by the Dutch. These losses were not indeed fatal,
but the remaining ships staggering away to leeward were little
more than blood-drenched wrecks. Fifteen hundred had been killed
and wounded in the day's action, and eleven ships and some eight
thousand men sacrificed thus far in the campaign. The English,
on the other hand, had suffered no serious ship injuries and the
loss of not above 100 men. In the council held next day beyond the
Straits of Dover, only a few of the Spanish leaders had stomach
for further fighting; the rest preferred to brave the perils of a
return around the Orkneys rather than face again these defenders
of the narrow seas. Before a fair wind they stood northward, Drake
still at their heels, though by reason of short supplies he left
them at the Firth of Forth.
In October, fifty ships, with 10,000 starved and fever-stricken
men, trailed into the Biscay ports of Spain. Torn by September
gales, the rest of the Armada had been sunk or stranded on the rough
coasts of Scotland and Ireland. "The wreckers of the Orkneys and the
Faroes, the clansmen of the Scottish isles, the kernes of Donegal
and Galway, all had their part in the work of murder and robbery.
Eight thousand Spaniards perished between the Giant's Causeway and
the Blaskets. On a strand near Sligo an English captain numbered
eleven hundred corpses which had been cast up by the sea."[1]
[Footnote 1: HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE, Green, Vol. II, p. 448.]
"Flavit Deus, et dissipati sunt"--"The Lord sent His wind, and
scattered them." So ran the motto on the English medal of victory.
But storms completed the destruction of a fleet already thoroughly
defeated. Religious faith, courage, and discipline had availed
little against superior ships, weapons, leadership, and nautical
skill. "Till the King of Spain had war with us," an Englishman
remarked, "he never knew what war by sea meant."[2] It might be
said more accurately that the battle gave a new meaning to war
by sea.
[Footnote 2: Sir Wm. Monson, NAVAL TRACTS, Purchas, Vol. III, p.
121.]
From the standpoint of naval progress, the campaign demonstrated
definitely the ascendancy of sail and artillery. For the old galley
tactics a new system now had to be developed. Since between sailing
vessels head-on conflict was practically eliminated, and since
guns mounted to fire ahead and astern were of little value save
in flight or pursuit, the arrangement of guns in broadside soon
became universal, and fleets fought in column, or "line ahead,"
usually close-hauled on the same or opposite tacks. While these
were lessons for the next generation, there is more permanent value
in the truth, again illustrated, that fortune favors the belligerent
quicker to forsake outworn methods and to develop skill in the use
of new weapons. The Spanish defeat illustrates also the necessity
of expert planning and guidance of a naval campaign, with naval
counsels and requirements duly regarded; and the fatal effect of
failure to concentrate attention on the enemy fleet. It is doubtful,
however, whether it would have been better, as Drake urged, and as
was actually attempted in the month before the Armada's arrival, if
the English had shifted the war to the coast of Spain. The objections
arise chiefly from the difficulties, in that age, of maintaining
a large naval force far from its base, all of which the Spanish
encountered in their northward cruise. It is noteworthy that, even
after the brief Channel operations, an epidemic caused heavy mortality
in the English fleet. Finally, the Armada is a classic example
of the value of naval defense to an insular nation. In the often
quoted words of Raleigh, "To entertain the enemy with their own
beef in their bellies, before they eat of our Kentish capons, I
take it to be the wisest way, to do which his Majesty after God
will employ his good ships at sea."
Upon Spain, already tottering from inherent weakness, the Armada
defeat had the effect of casting down her pride and confidence
as leader of the Catholic world. Though it was not until three
centuries later that she lost her last colonies, her hold on her
vast empire was at once shaken by this blow at her sea control.
While she maintained large fleets until after the Napoleonic Wars,
she was never again truly formidable as a naval power. But the victory
lifted England more than it crushed Spain, inspiring an intenser
patriotism, an eagerness for colonial and commercial adventure, an
exaltation of spirit manifested in the men of genius who crowned
the Elizabethan age.
_The Last Years of the War_
The war was not ended; and though Philip was restrained by the
rise of Protestant power in France under Henry of Navarre, he was
still able to gather his sea forces on almost as grand a scale. In
the latter stages of the war the naval expeditions on both sides
were either, like the Armada, for the purpose of landing armies on
foreign soil, or raids on enemy ports, colonies and commerce. Thus
Drake in 1589 set out with a force of 18,000 men, which attacked
Corunna, moved thence upon Lisbon, and lost a third or more of
its number in a fruitless campaign on land. Both Drake and the
aged Hawkins, now his vice admiral, died in the winter of 1595-96
during a last and this time ineffective foray upon the Spanish
Main. Drake was buried off Puerto Bello, where legend has it his
spirit still awaits England's call--
"Take my drum to England, hang et by the shore,
Strike et when your powder's running low.
If the Dons sight Devon, I'll leave the port of Heaven,
An' drum them up the Channel as we drummed them long ago."[1]
[Footnote 1: DRAKE'S DRUM, Sir Henry Newbolt.]
We are still far from the period when sea control was thought of
as important in itself, apart from land operations, or when fleets
were kept in permanent readiness to take the sea. It is owing to
this latter fact that we hear of large flotillas dispatched by
each side even in the same year, yet not meeting in naval action.
Thus in June of 1596 the Essex expedition, with 17 English and
18 Dutch men-of-war and numerous auxiliaries, seized Cadiz and
burned shipping to the value of 11,000,000 ducats. There was no
naval opposition, though Philip in October of the same year had
ready a hundred ships and 16,000 men, which were dispersed with
the loss of a quarter of their strength in a gale off Finisterre.
Storms also scattered Philip's fleet in the next year; in 1598,
Spanish transports landed 5,000 men at Calais; and England's fears
were renewed in the year after that by news of over 100 vessels
fitting out for the Channel, which, however, merely protected the
plate fleet by a cruise to the Azores. As late as 1601, Spain landed
3500 troops in Ireland.
But if these major operations seem to have missed contact, there
were many lively actions on a minor scale, the well-armed trading
vessels of the north easily beating off the galley squadrons guarding
Gibraltar and the routes past Spain. Among these lesser encounters, the
famous "Last Fight of the Revenge," which occurred during operations
of a small English squadron off the Azores in 1591, well illustrates
the fighting spirit of the Elizabethan Englishman and the ineptitude
which since the Armada seems to have marked the Spaniard at sea.
In Drake's old flagship, attacked by 15 ships and surrounded by
a Spanish fleet of 50 sail, a bellicose old sea-warrior named Sir
Richard Grenville held out from nightfall until eleven the next
day, and surrendered only after he had sunk three of the enemy,
when his powder was gone, half his crew dead, the rest disabled,
and his ship a sinking wreck. "Here die I, Richard Grenville," so
we are given his last words, "with a joyful and a quiet mind, for
that I have ended my life as a good soldier ought to do, who has
fought for his country and his queen, his honor and his religion."
The naval activities mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraphs
had no decisive effect upon the war, which ended, for England at
least, with the death of Elizabeth in 1603 and the accession of
James Stuart of Scotland to the English throne. James at once adopted
a policy of _rapprochement_ with Spain, which while it guaranteed
peace during the 22 years of his reign, was by its renunciation of
trade with the Indies, aid to the Dutch, and leadership of Protestant
Europe, a sorry sequel to the victory of fifteen years before.
The Armada nevertheless marks the decadence of Spanish sea power.
With the next century begins a new epoch in naval warfare, an age
of sail and artillery, in which Dutch, English, and later French
fleets contested for the sea mastery deemed essential to colonial
empire and commercial prosperity.
REFERENCES
DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY, Sir Julian Corbett, 2 vols., 1898.
THE SUCCESSORS OF DRAKE, Sir Julian Corbett, 1900.
THE STORY OF THE GREAT ARMADA, J. R. Hale, no date.
ARMADA PAPERS, Sir John Knox Laughtun, 2 vols., Navy Records
Society, 1894.
LA ARMADA INVENCIBLE, Captain Fernandez Duro, 1884.
A HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1509-1660,
by M. Oppenheim, 1896.
A HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, William Laird Clowes, Vol. 1., 1897.
THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, W. Cunningham, 1907.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS IN THE TUDOR NAVY, Capt. G. Goldingham,
United Service Magazine, June, 1918.