CHAPTER I

AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT

IN CHINA

WRITINGS OF PAUL S. REINSCH

The Common Law in the Early American Colonies, 1899

World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century As Influenced by

The Oriental Situation, 1900

Colonial Government, 1902

Colonial Administration, 1905

American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, 1907

Intellectual Currents in the Far East, 1911

International Unions, 1911

Essentials of Government, 1920 (_Published in Chinese_)

Secret Diplomacy, 1921

AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT

IN CHINA

BY

PAUL S. REINSCH

AMERICAN MINISTER TO CHINA,

1913-1919

[Illustration]

GARDEN CITY, N.Y., AND TORONTO

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

1922

COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION

INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN

COPYRIGHT, 1921, 1922, BY ASIA PUBLISHING COMPANY IN THE

UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES

AT

THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N.Y.

_First Edition_

CONTENTS

PART I OLD CHINA AND THE NEW REPUBLIC

CHAPTER PAGE

I. The Dictator-President of China 1

II. China of Many Persons 8

III. Old Confucianism in the New China 23

IV. A Glimpse Behind the Political Scenes 42

V. With Men Who Watch Politics 48

VI. China of Merchant-Adventurers 59

VII. Prompt Proposals for American Action 70

VIII. A Little Vision for China 80

IX. "Slow Americans" 95

X. Folk Ways and Officials 108

PART II

THE PASSING OF YUAN SHIH-KAI

XI. The War: Japan in Shantung 123

XII. The Famous Twenty-One Demands 129

XIII. Getting Together 150

XIV. War Days in Peking 161

XV. Emperor Yuan Shih-Kai 171

XVI. Downfall and Death of Yuan Shih-Kai 183

XVII. Republicans in the Saddle 198

PART III

THE WAR AND CHINA

XVIII. American Entrepreneurs in Peking 207

XIX. Guarding the "Open Door" 217

XX. Diary of Quiet Days. Autumn of 1916 230

XXI. China Breaks with Germany 241

XXII. China's Bosses Come to Peking 260

XXIII. An Emperor for a Day 272

XXIV. War With Germany: Readjustments 286

XXV. The Chinese Go A-Borrowing 296

PART IV

LAST YEAR OF WAR AND AFTERMATH

XXVI. The Lansing-Ishii Notes 307

XXVII. Amidst Troubles Peking Rejoices 317

XXVIII. A New World War Coming? 328

XXIX. Japan Shows Her Teeth 339

XXX. Bandits, Intriguers, and a House Divided 347

XXXI. Young Men in Peking, Old Men in Paris 358

XXXII. A Nation Strikes and Unites 368

XXXIII. Taking Leave of Peking 375

Index 391

INTRODUCTION

Through recent developments China has been put in the forefront of

international interest. The world is beginning to have an idea of its

importance. Those who have long known it, who have given attention

to its traditions and the sources of its social and industrial

strength, have the conviction that China will become a factor of the

first magnitude in the composition of the world of the twentieth

century. They have penetrated beyond the idea that China is a land

of topsy-turvy, the main function of which is to amuse the outsider

with unexpected social customs, and which, from a political point of

view, is in a state bordering upon chaos. When we ask ourselves what

are the elements which may constitute China's contribution to the

future civilization of the world, what are the characteristics which

render her civilization significant to all of us, we enter upon a

subject that would in itself require a volume merely to present in

outline. From the point of view of social action, there is the widely

diffused sense of popular equity which has enabled Chinese society for

these many centuries to govern itself, to maintain property rights,

personal honour and dignity without recourse to written law or set

tribunals, chiefly through an informal enforcement by society itself

acting through many agencies, of that underlying sense of proportion

and rightness which lives in the hearts of the people. From the point

of view of economic life, China presents the picture of a society in

which work has not been robbed of its joy, in which the satisfaction

of seeing the product of industry grow in the hands of the craftsman

still forms the chief reward of a labour performed with patient toil

but without heartbreaking drudgery. From the point of view of social

organization, China forms an extremely intricate organism in which

the specific relationship between definite individuals counts far

more than any general principles or ideas. Loyalty, piety, a sense of

fitness give meaning to the ceremonial of Chinese social life, which

is more than etiquette as a mere ornament of social intercourse in

that it bodies forth in visible form as every-day observances, the

relations and duties upon which society rests. From the point of view

of art, China stands for a refinement of quality which attests the

loving devotion of generations to the idea of a perfect product; in the

representative arts, calmness of perception has enabled the Chinese to

set a model for the artistic reproduction of the environments of human

life. In their conception of policy and world position, the Chinese

people have ever shown a readiness to base any claim to ascendancy

upon inherent excellence and virtue. They have not imposed upon their

neighbours any artificial authority, though they have proudly received

the homage and admiration due their noble culture.

At this time, when the Far Eastern question is the chief subject-matter

of international conferences and negotiations, China stands before

the world in the eyes of those who really know her, not as a bankrupt

pleader for indulgence and assistance, but as a great unit of human

tradition and force which, heretofore somewhat over-disdainful of the

things through which other nations had won power and preference and

mechanical mastery, has lived a trifle carelessly in the assurance that

real strength must rest on inner virtue; China has made no use of the

arts of self-advertisement, but has felt within her the consciousness

of a great human force that must ultimately prevail over petty

intrigue and forceful aggression. The secular persistence of Chinese

civilization has given to the Chinese an inner strength and confidence

which make them bear up even when the aggressiveness of nations more

effectively organized for attack seems to render their position

well-nigh desperate. Can the world fail to realize that if this vast

society can continue to live according to its traditions of peace and

useful industry instead of being made the battleground of contending

Imperial interests, the peace of the world will be more truly advanced

than it may be by any covenants of formal contrivance? Declarations,

treaties, and leagues are all useful instruments, but unless the

nations agree without afterthought to respect the life and civilization

of China, all professions of world betterment would be belied in fact.

If China is to be looked upon as material for the imperialist policies

of others, peace conferences will discuss and resolve in vain.

During the six years of my work in China I was constantly surrounded

by the evidences of the transition of Chinese life to new methods and

aims. In all its complex phases this enormous transformation passed

in review before my eyes, in all its deep significance, not only for

China and the Far East, but for the whole world. It was this that made

life and work in China at this time so intensely fascinating. A new

form of government had been adopted. As I represented the Republic

upon which it had been largely modeled, whose spirit the Chinese were

anxious to follow, it fell to me to counsel with Chinese leaders as

if I had been one of their number. The experience of a great American

commonwealth which had itself successfully endeavoured to raise its

organization to a higher plane was of unending assistance to me in

enabling me to see the Chinese problems as part of what right-thinking

men were struggling for throughout the world. The most discouraging

feature was, however, that the needs of China so often took the form of

emergencies in which it seemed futile to plan at long range, in which

immediate help was necessary. Where one was coöperating with a group of

men beset by overpowering difficulties of the moment, it often seemed

academic even to think of the general improvement of political and

economic organization, over a longer range of time. The old elements

of the Imperial régime, the traditional methods of basing authority on

something from above, the purely personal conception of politics with

the corruption incident upon the idea that members of clans must take

care of each other--which formerly was a virtue--all were the sources

of the outstanding difficulties that jutted everywhere into the plans

for a more highly and efficiently organized commonwealth. But it was

a pleasure to see the growing manifestation of a commonwealth spirit,

the organization of public opinion, and the clearer vision of the

demands of public service. Even among the officials the idea that the

Government was merely a taxing and office-holding organization was

giving way, especially among the younger men, to a desire that the

functions of government should be used for developmental purposes, in

helping the people towards better methods in agriculture and industry,

in encouraging improved communications and public works of many kinds.

International action as seen from Peking during this period did not

have many reassuring qualities. In most cases it was based upon a

desire to lose no technical advantage of position; to yield not a whit,

no matter what general benefit might result through mutual concessions.

Each one was jealously guarding his position in which he had advanced

step by step. Some were willing to make common cause with others in

things that would not always commend themselves to a sense of equity,

in order that they might take still another step forward. During the

major part of this period one power employed every device of intrigue,

intimidation, corruption, and force in order to gain a position for

itself in flagrant disregard of the rights of the Chinese people

itself, and in oblivion of the rights of others.

As to American policy, the difficulties which I encountered arose from

the fact that a great deal was expected of a country so powerful, which

had declared and always pursued a policy so just to China. Chinese

goodwill and confidence, and the real friendship of the Chinese people

toward America certainly tended to make easier any task America might

be ready to undertake. But America had no political aims and desired to

abstain particularly from anything verging on political interference,

even in behalf of those principles we so thoroughly believe in.

American relationships to China depended not on governmental action,

but on a spontaneous coöperation between the two peoples in matters of

education, commerce, and industry.

Infinitely complex as were the questions of Chinese internal affairs

and of the privileges and desires of the various powers, yet to my mind

it was not a difficult problem to see what should be done in order

to put matters on a sound foundation. I had learned to have great

confidence in the ability of the Chinese to manage their own affairs

when let alone, particularly in commerce and industry.

That was the first desideratum, to secure for them immunity from

the constant interference, open and secret, on the part of foreign

interests desirous of confusing Chinese affairs and drawing advantage

from such confusion. So far as American diplomatic action was

concerned, its essential task was to prevent such interference, and

to see to it that China could not be closed even by those indirect

methods which often accompany the most vociferous, ardent declarations

in favour of Chinese independence and sovereignty. We therefore had

to keep a close watch and to resist in specific detail any and all of

those innumerable efforts on the part of others to secure and fortify

a position of privilege. That was the negative side of our action. The

positive side, however, was entirely non-political. Americans sought

no position of tutordom or control. Only upon the free and spontaneous

invitation of the Chinese would they come to counsel and assist.

The important thing was that Americans should continue to take a

hand in the education of China and the upbuilding of Chinese business

and enterprise. They had done this in the past, and would do it in

the future in the spirit of free coöperation, without desire to

exercise a tutelage over others, always rejoicing in any progress the

Chinese themselves made. Such activities must continue and increase.

Sound action in business and constructive work in industry should be

America's contribution to the solution of the specific difficulties of

China. The Chinese people were discouraged, confused, disillusioned;

but every centre, no matter how small, from which radiate sound

influences in education and business, is a source of strength and

progress. If Americans could be stopped from doing these things, or

impeded and obstructed in them, then there would nothing further

remain worth while for Americans to do. But if they could organize

enterprises, great and small, they would in the most direct and

effective manner give the encouragement and organizing impulse which

China needed so urgently. So the simple principle of American action

in China is this: By doing things in themselves worth while, Americans

will contribute most to the true liberation of the Chinese people.

Never has one nation had a greater opportunity to act as counsellor and

friend to another and to help a vast and lovable people to realize its

striving for a better life. Coöperation freely sought, unconstrained,

spontaneous desire to model on institutions and methods which are

admired--that is the only way in which nations may mutually influence

each other without the coercion of political power and the cunning of

intrigue. That is a feeling which has existed in the hearts of the

Chinese toward America. The American people does not yet realize what a

treasure it possesses in this confidence.

PART I

OLD CHINA AND THE

NEW REPUBLIC

AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA

CHAPTER I

THE DICTATOR-PRESIDENT OF CHINA

"My opponents are disloyal. They would pull down my government." He who

spoke was cordial in his manner as he thus off handedly epitomized his

theory of government.

Yuan Shih-kai, President of the Chinese Republic, was short of stature

and thickset; but his expressive face, his quick gestures, his powerful

neck and bullet head, gave him the appearance of great energy. His

eyes, which were fine and clear, alive with interest and mobile, were

always brightly alert. They fixed themselves on the visitor with keen

penetration, yet never seemed hostile; they were full always of keen

interest. These eyes of his revealed how readily he followed--or

usually anticipated--the trend of the conversation, though he listened

with close attention, seemingly bringing his judgment to bear on each

new detail. Frenchmen saw in him a resemblance to Clemenceau; and this

is born out by his portrait which appears on the Chinese dollar. In

stature, facial expression, shape of head, contour of features as well

as in the manner of wearing his moustache, he did greatly resemble the

Tiger.

I had noted these things when I was first presented to the President,

and I had felt also the almost ruthless power of the man. Republican

in title he was, but an autocrat at heart. All the old glittering

trappings of the empire he had preserved. Even the Chief of the

Military Department of the President's household, General Yin Chang,

whom Yuan had sent to fetch me in Imperial splendour, is a Manchu and

former Imperial commander. His one foreign language significantly

enough was German which he acquired when he was minister in Berlin. I

had passed between files of the huge guardsmen of Yuan Shih-kai, who

had Frederick the Great's fondness for tall men; and I found him in the

showy palace of the great Empress Dowager, standing in the main throne

hall to receive me. He was flanked by thirty generals of his household,

extended in wings at both sides of him, and their uniforms made it a

most impressive scene.

But that was an occasion of state. Later, at a more informal interview,

accompanied only by Mr. Williams, secretary of the legation and Mr.

Peck, the Chinese secretary, observed Yuan's character more fully.

He had just expelled from parliament the democratic party (Kuo Min

Tang); then he had summarily dismissed the Parliament itself. Feeling,

perhaps, a possible loss of American goodwill he had sent for me to

explain his action.

"It was not a good parliament, for it was made up largely of

inexperienced theorists and young politicians," he began. "They wished

to meddle with the Government as well as to legislate on all matters.

Their real function was to adopt a permanent constitution for the

Republic, but they made no headway with that." And with much truth he

added: "Our traditions are very different from your Western ones and

our affairs are very complex. We cannot safely apply your abstract

ideas of policy."

Of his own work of stirring up, through emissaries, internal and

partisan controversies which prevented the new parliament from

effectively organizing, Yuan of course omitted to speak. Moreover,

he said little of the possibility of more closely coördinating the

executive and the legislative branches; so while he avowed his desire

to have a constitution forthwith, and to reconstitute Parliament by

more careful selections under a new electoral law, I found myself

thinking of his own career. His personal rule, his unscrupulous

advancement to power, with the incidental corruption and cold-blooded

executions that marked it, and his bitter personal feeling against all

political opponents--these were not qualities that make for stable

parliamentary government, which depends on allowing other people

frankly to advocate their opinions in the effort to gain adherents

enough to succeed in turn to political power. The failure to understand

this basic principle of democracy is the vice of Chinese politics.

"As you see," Yuan beamed eagerly, "the Chinese Republic is a very

young baby. It must be nursed and kept from taking strong meat or

potent medicines like those prescribed by foreign doctors." This

metaphor he repeated with relish, his eyes sparkling as they sought

mine and those of the other listeners to get their expressions of

assent or reserve.

A young baby indeed and childishly cared for! Here, for example, is a

decree published by Yuan Shih-kai on March 8, 1915. It indicates how

faith in his republicanism was penetrating to remote regions, and how

such faith was rewarded by him:

"Ihsihaishun, Prince of the Koersin Banner, reported through the Board

for Mongolia and Tibet that Kuanchuk-chuaimupal, Hutukhtu of the

Banner, has led his followers to support the cause of the Republic and

requested that the said Hutukhtu be rewarded for his good sentiments.

The said Hutukhtu led his followers and vowed allegiance to the

Republic, which action shows that he clearly understands the good

cause. He is hereby allowed to ride in a yellow canopied carriage to

show our appreciation."

This rather naïve emphasis on externals and on display is born of the

old imperialism, a more significant feature of Chinese political life

than it may seem. It colours most of the public ceremonies in China.

The state carriage which the President had sent to convey me to his

official residence in the Imperial City for the presentation of my

credentials, on November 17th, was highly ornate, enamelled in blue

with gold decorations. It was drawn by eight horses, with a cavalry

escort sent by the President and my own guard of mounted marines; the

legation staff of secretaries and attachés accompanied me in other

carriages.

Thus in an old Imperial barouche and with an ex-Imperial military

officer, General Yin, at my side, I rolled on toward the abode of the

republican chief magistrate. We alighted at the monumental gate of an

enclosure that surrounds the lovely South Lake in the western part of

the Imperial City. On an island within this lake arose, tier above

tier, and roofed with bright tiles of blue and yellow, the palace

assigned by the Empress Dowager to Emperor Kwang Hsu; for long years,

until death took him, it was his abode in semi-captivity. This palace

was now the home of President Yuan.

The remote origin of its buildings, their exquisite forms and brilliant

colouring, as contrasted with the sombreness of the lake at that

season, and the stirring events of which they have been the scene,

cannot fail to impress the visitor as he slowly glides across the

Imperial lake in the old-fashioned boat, with its formal little cabin,

curtained and upholstered, and with its lateral planks, up and down

which pass the men who propel the boat with long poles.

Arrived at the palace, everything recalled the colourful court life

so recently departed. I was greeted by the master of ceremonies, Mr.

Lu Cheng-hsiang, and his associate, Mr. Alfred Sze, later Chinese

minister at London and Washington. The former soon after became

Minister for Foreign Affairs, while Mr. Sze was originally sent as

minister to England. These gentlemen escorted me through a series of

courts and halls, all spacious and impressive, until we reached the

old Imperial library, a very jewel of architecture in this remarkable

Eastern world of beauty. The library faces on a clear and deep pool

round which are grouped the court theatre and various throne rooms

and festival halls; all quiet and secluded--a charming place for

distinguished entertainments. The rustle of heavy silks, the play of

iridescent colour, the echoes of song and lute from the theatre--all

that exquisite oriental refinement still seems to linger.

The library itself is the choicest of all these apartments. The perfect

sense of proportion expressed in the architecture, the quiet reserve

in all its decorations, the living literary reminiscence in the verses

written on the paper panels by the Imperial hand, all testify to a most

fastidious taste.

Here we rested for a few minutes while word was carried to the

President, who was to receive my credentials. Then followed our walk

between the files of the huge guardsmen, our entrance to the large

audience chamber in the pretentious modern structure erected by the

Empress Dowager, and the presentation to Yuan Shih-kai, as he stood in

the centre, flanked by his generals.

I was formally presented to the President by Mr. Sun Pao-chi, Minister

of Foreign Affairs; and Dr. Wellington Koo translated my brief address

and the President's reply.

A military dictatorship had succeeded the old imperialism, that was

all. Yuan had made his reputation and gained his power as a military

commander. Yet there was about him nothing of the adventurer, nor any

suggestion of the field of battle. He seemed now to be an administrator

rather than a military captain. Certainly he had won power through

infinite patience, great knowledge of men, political insight, and,

above all, through playing always a safe if unscrupulous game.

What is meant by governing in a republic he could not know. Without

high literary culture, although with a mind trained and well informed,

he had not seen foreign countries, nor had he any knowledge of foreign

languages. Therefore, he could have only a remote and vague notion of

the foreign institutions which China at this time was beginning to

imitate. He had no real knowledge or conception of the commonwealth

principle of government, nor of the true use and function of a

parliament, and particularly of a parliamentary opposition. He merely

accepted these as necessary evils to be held within as narrow limits as

possible.

During the two and a half years from my coming to Peking until the

time of his death, Yuan Shih-kai left the enclosure of his palace only

twice. This reminds me of the American, with an introduction from the

State Department, who wired me from Shanghai asking me to arrange for

him to take a moving picture of Yuan "proceeding from his White House

to his Capitol." This enterprising Yankee would have had plenty of

time to meditate on the difference between oriental political customs

and our own if he had waited for Yuan Shih-kai to "proceed" from his

political hermitage. The President's seclusion was usually attributed

to fear of assassination, but if such fear was present in his mind, as

well it might have been, there was undoubtedly also the idea, taken

over from the Empire, that the holder of the highest political power

should not appear in public except on very unusual occasions.

When he received me informally, he doffed the uniform of state and

always wore a long Chinese coat. He had retained the distinction and

refinement of Chinese manners, with a few additions from the West, such

as shaking hands. His cue he had abandoned in 1912, when he decided

to become President of the Republic. In the building which is now the

Foreign Office and where he was then residing, Yuan asked Admiral Tsai

Ting-kan whether his entry into the new era should not be outwardly

expressed by shedding the traditional adornment of the head which

though once a sign of bondage had become an emblem of nationality.

When Admiral Tsai advised strongly in favour of it, Yuan sent for a big

pair of scissors, and said to him: "It is your advice. You carry it

out." The Admiral, with a vigorous clip, transformed Yuan into a modern

man.

But inwardly Yuan Shih-kai was not much changed thereby.

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