/ V. corps, v. Kirchbach
| (VI.) " v. Tuempling
| XI. " v. Bose
III. Army: | I. Bavarian, v. der Tann
crown prince of Prussia < II. " v. Hartmann
(C. of S., v. Blumenthal) | Wuerttemberg div. \ v. Werder
| Baden div. /
\ (2nd) and 4th cavalry divisions
Total 180,000
-------
Grand Total 475,000
(The units within brackets were those at first retained in Germany.)
Positions of the French forces.
On the French side no such plan of operations was in existence when on
the night of the 15th of July _Krieg mobil_ was telegraphed all over
Prussia. An outline scheme had indeed been prepared as a basis for
agreement with Austria and Italy, but practically no details were fixed,
and the troops were without transport and supplies. Nevertheless, since
speed was the essence of the contract, the troops were hurried up
without waiting for their reserves, and delivered, as Moltke had
foreseen, just where the lie of the railways and convenience of
temporary supply dictated, and the Prussian Intelligence Department was
able to inform Moltke on the 22nd of July (seventh day of mobilization)
that the French stood from right to left in the following order, on or
near the frontier:
1st corps Marshal MacMahon, duke of Magenta, Strassburg
5th corps General de Failly, Saargemuend and Bitche
2nd corps General Frossard, St Avold
4th corps General de Ladmirault, Thionville
With, behind them:
3rd corps Marshal Bazaine, Metz
Guard General Bourbaki, Nancy
6th corps Marshal Canrobert, Chalons
7th corps General Felix Douay, Belfort
If therefore they began a forward movement on the 23rd (eighth day) the
case foreseen by Moltke had arisen, and it became necessary to detrain
the II. army upon the Rhine. Without waiting for further confirmation of
this intelligence, Moltke, with the consent of the king, altered the
arrangements accordingly, a decision which, though foreseen, exercised
the gravest influence on the course of events. As it happened this
decision was premature, for the French could not yet move. Supply trains
had to be organized by requisition from the inhabitants, and even arms
and ammunition procured for such reserves as had succeeded in joining.
Nevertheless, by almost superhuman exertions on the part of the railways
and administrative services, all essential deficiencies were made good,
and by the 28th of July (13th day) the troops had received all that was
absolutely indispensable and might well have been led against the enemy,
who, thanks to Moltke's premature action, were for the moment at a very
serious disadvantage. But the French generals were unequal to their
responsibilities. It is now clear that, had the great Napoleon and his
marshals been in command, they would have made light of the want of
cooking pots, cholera belts, &c., and, by a series of rapid marches,
would have concentrated odds of at least three to one upon the heads of
the Prussian columns as they struggled through the defiles of the Hardt,
and won a victory whose political results might well have proved
decisive.
To meet this pressing danger, which came to his knowledge during the
course of the 29th, Moltke sent a confidential staff officer, Colonel v.
Verdy du Vernois, to the III. army to impress upon the crown prince the
necessity of an immediate advance to distract the enemy's attention from
the I. and II. armies; but, like the French generals, the crown prince
pleaded that he could not move until his trains were complete.
Fortunately for the Germans, the French intelligence service not only
failed to inform the staff of this extraordinary opportunity, but it
allowed itself to be hypnotized by the most amazing rumours. In
imagination they saw armies of 100,000 men behind every forest, and, to
guard against these dangers, the French troops were marched and
counter-marched along the frontiers in the vain hope of discovering an
ideal defensive position which should afford full scope to the power of
their new weapons.
As these delays were exerting a most unfavourable effect on public
opinion not only in France but throughout Europe, the emperor decided on
the 1st of August to initiate a movement towards the Saar, chiefly as a
guarantee of good faith to the Austrians and Italians.
On this day the French corps held the following positions from right to
left:
1st corps Hagenau
2nd corps Forbach
3rd corps St Avold
4th corps Bouzonville
5th corps Bitche
6th corps Chalons
7th corps Belfort and Colmar
Guard near Metz
Action of Saarbruecken.
The French 2nd corps was directed to advance on the following morning
direct on Saarbruecken, supported on the flanks by two divisions from the
5th and 3rd corps. The order was duly carried out, and the Prussians
(one battalion, two squadrons and a battery), seeing the overwhelming
numbers opposed to them, fell back fighting and vanished to the
northward, having given a very excellent example of steadiness and
discipline to their enemy.[1] The latter contented themselves by
occupying Saarbruecken and its suburb St Johann, and here, as far as the
troops were concerned, the incident closed. Its effect, however, proved
far-reaching. The Prussian staff could not conceive that nothing lay
behind this display of five whole divisions, and immediately took steps
to meet the expected danger. In their excitement, although they had
announced the beginning of the action to the king's headquarters at
Mainz, they forgot to notify the close and its results, so that Moltke
was not in possession of the facts till noon on the 3rd of August.
Meanwhile, Steinmetz, left without instructions and fearing for the
safety of the II. army, the heads of whose columns were still in the
defiles of the Hardt, moved the I. army from the neighbourhood of Merzig
obliquely to his left front, so as to strike the flank of the French
army if it continued its march towards Kaiserslautern, in which
direction it appeared to be heading.
Moltke, Prince Frederick Charles and Steinmetz.
Whilst this order was in process of execution, Moltke, aware that the
II. army was behind time in its march, issued instructions to Steinmetz
for the 4th of August which entailed a withdrawal to the rear, the idea
being that both armies should, if the French advanced, fight a defensive
battle in a selected position farther back. Steinmetz obeyed, though
bitterly resenting the idea of retreat. This movement, further, drew his
left across the roads reserved for the right column of the II. army, and
on receipt of a peremptory order from Prince Frederick Charles to
evacuate the road, Steinmetz telegraphed for instructions direct to the
king, over Moltke's head. In reply he received a telegram from Moltke,
ordering him to clear the road at once, and couched in terms which he
considered as a severe reprimand. An explanatory letter, meant to soften
the rebuke, was delayed in transmission and did not reach him till too
late to modify the orders he had already issued. It must be remembered
that Steinmetz at the front was in a better position to judge the
apparent situation than was Moltke at Mainz, and that all through the
day of the 5th of August he had received intelligence indicating a
change of attitude in the French army.
Battle of Spicheren.
The news of the German victory at Weissenburg on the 4th (see below) had
in fact completely paralysed the French headquarters, and orders were
issued by them during the course of the 5th to concentrate the whole
army of the Rhine on the selected position of Cadenbronn. As a
preliminary, Frossard's corps withdrew from Saarbruecken and began to
entrench a position on the Spicheren heights, 3000 yds. to the
southward. Steinmetz, therefore, being quite unaware of the scheme for a
great battle on the Saar about the 12th of August, felt that the
situation would best be met, and the letter of his instructions strictly
obeyed, by moving his whole command forward to the line of the Saar, and
orders to this effect were issued on the evening of the 5th. In
pursuance of these orders, the advance guard of the 14th division
(Lieutenant General von Kameke) reached Saarbruecken about 9 A.M. on the
6th, where the Germans found to their amazement that the bridges were
intact. To secure this advantage was the obvious duty of the commander
on the spot, and he at once ordered his troops to occupy a line of low
heights beyond the town to serve as a bridge-head. As the leading troops
deployed on the heights Frossard's guns on the Spicheren Plateau opened
fire, and the advanced guard battery replied. The sound of these guns
unchained the whole fighting instinct carefully developed by a long
course of Prussian manoeuvre training. Everywhere, generals and troops
hurried towards the cannon thunder. Kameke, even more in the dark than
Steinmetz as to Moltke's intentions and the strength of his adversaries,
attacked at once, precisely as he would have done at manoeuvres, and in
half an hour his men were committed beyond recall. As each fresh unit
reached the field it was hurried into action where its services were
most needed, and each fresh general as he arrived took a new view of the
combat and issued new orders. On the other side, Frossard, knowing the
strength of his position, called on his neighbours for support, and
determined to hold his ground. Victory seemed certain. There were
sufficient troops within easy reach to have ensured a crushing numerical
superiority. But the other generals had not been trained to mutual
support, and thought only of their own immediate security, and their
staffs were too inexperienced to act upon even good intentions; and,
finding himself in the course of the afternoon left to his own devices,
Frossard began gradually to withdraw, even before the pressure of the
13th German division on his left flank (about 8 P.M.) compelled his
retirement. When darkness ended the battle the Prussians were scarcely
aware of their victory. Steinmetz, who had reached the field about 6
P.M., rode back to his headquarters without issuing any orders, while
the troops bivouacked where they stood, the units of three army corps
being mixed up in almost inextricable confusion. But whereas out of
42,900 Prussians with 120 guns, who in the morning lay within striking
distance of the enemy, no fewer than 27,000, with 78 guns were actually
engaged; of the French, out of 64,000 with 210 guns only 24,000 with 90
guns took part in the action.
Action of Weissenburg.
Meanwhile on the German left wing the III. army had begun its advance.
Early on the 4th of August it crossed the frontier and fell upon a
French detachment under Abel Douay, which had been placed near
Weissenburg, partly to cover the Pigeonnier pass, but principally to
consume the supplies accumulated in the little dismantled fortress, as
these could not easily be moved. Against this force of under 4000 men of
all arms, the Germans brought into action successively portions of three
corps, in all over 25,000 men with 90 guns. After six hours' fighting,
in which the Germans lost some 1500 men, the gallant remnant of the
French withdrew deliberately and in good order, notwithstanding the
death of their leader at the critical moment. The Germans were so elated
by their victory over the enemy, whose strength they naturally
overestimated, that they forgot to send cavalry in pursuit, and thus
entirely lost touch with the enemy.
Next day the advance was resumed, the two Bavarian corps moving via
Mattstall through the foothills of the Vosges, the V. corps on their
left towards Preuschdorf, and the XI. farther to the left again, through
the wooded plain of the Rhine valley. The 4th cavalry division scouted
in advance, and army headquarters moved to Sulz. About noon the advanced
patrols discovered MacMahon's corps in position on the left bank of the
Sauer (see WOeRTH: _Battle of_). As his army was dispersed over a wide
area, the crown prince determined to devote the 6th to concentrating the
troops, and, probably to avoid alarming the enemy, ordered the cavalry
to stand fast.
At night the outposts of the I. Bavarians and V. corps on the Sauer saw
the fires of the French encampment and heard the noise of railway
traffic, and rightly conjectured the approach of reinforcements.
MacMahon had in fact determined to stand in the very formidable position
he had selected, and he counted on receiving support both from the 7th
corps (two divisions of which were being railed up from Colmar) and from
the 5th corps, which lay around Bitche. It was also quite possible, and
the soundest strategy, to withdraw the bulk of the troops then facing
the German I. and II. armies to his support, and these would reach him
by the 8th. He was therefore justified in accepting battle, though it
was to his interest to delay it as long as possible.
Battle of Woerth.
At dawn on the 6th of August the commander of the V. corps outposts
noticed certain movements in the French lines, and to clear up the
situation brought his guns into action. As at Spicheren, the sound of
the guns set the whole machinery of battle in motion. The French
artillery immediately accepted the Prussian challenge. The I. Bavarians,
having been ordered to be ready to move if they heard artillery fire,
immediately advanced against the French left, encountering presently
such a stubborn resistance that parts of their line began to give way.
The Prussians of the V. corps felt that they could not abandon their
allies, and von Kirchbach, calling on the XI. corps for support,
attacked with the troops at hand. When the crown prince tried to break
off the fight it was too late. Both sides were feeding troops into the
firing line, as and where they could lay hands on them. Up to 2 P.M. the
French fairly held their own, but shortly afterwards their right yielded
to the overwhelming pressure of the XI. corps, and by 3.30 it was in
full retreat. The centre held on for another hour, but in its turn was
compelled to yield, and by 4.30 all organized resistance was at an end.
The debris of the French army was hotly pursued by the German divisional
squadrons towards Reichshofen, where serious panic showed itself. When
at this stage the supports sent by de Failly from Bitche came on the
ground they saw the hopelessness of intervention, and retired whence
they had come. Fortunately for the French, the German 4th cavalry
division, on which the pursuit should have devolved, had been forgotten
by the German staff, and did not reach the front before darkness fell.
Out of a total of 82,000 within reach of the battlefield, the Germans
succeeded in bringing into action 77,500. The French, who might have had
50,000 on the field, deployed only 37,000, and these suffered a
collective loss of no less than 20,100; some regiments losing up to 90%
and still retaining some semblance of discipline and order.
Under cover of darkness the remnants of the French army escaped. When at
length the 4th cavalry division had succeeded in forcing a way through
the confusion of the battlefield, all touch with the enemy had been
lost, and being without firearms the troopers were checked by the French
stragglers in the woods and the villages, and thus failed to establish
the true line of retreat of the French. Ultimately the latter, having
gained the railway near Luneville, disappeared from the German front
altogether, and all trace of them was lost until they were discovered,
about the 26th of August, forming part of the army of Chalons, whither
they had been conveyed by rail via Paris. This is a remarkable example
of the strategical value of railways to an army operating in its own
country.
In the absence of all resistance, the III. army now proceeded to carry
out the original programme of marches laid down in Moltke's memorandum
of the 6th of May, and marching on a broad front through a fertile
district it reached the line of the Moselle in excellent order about the
17th of August, where it halted to await the result of the great battle
of Gravelotte-St Privat.
Movements on the Saar.
We return now to the I. army at Saarbruecken. Its position on the morning
of the 7th of August gave cause for the gravest anxiety. At daylight a
dense fog lay over the country, and through the mist sounds of heavy
firing came from the direction of Forbach, where French stragglers had
rallied during the night. The confusion on the battlefield was
appalling, and the troops in no condition to go forward. Except the 3rd,
5th and 6th cavalry divisions no closed troops were within a day's
march; hence Steinmetz decided to spend the day in reorganizing his
infantry, under cover of his available cavalry. But the German cavalry
and staff were quite new to their task. The 6th cavalry division, which
had bivouacked on the battlefield, sent on only one brigade towards
Forbach, retaining the remainder in reserve. The 5th, thinking that the
6th had already undertaken all that was necessary, withdrew behind the
Saar, and the 3rd, also behind the Saar, reported that the country in
its front was unsuited to cavalry movements, and only sent out a few
officers' patrols. These were well led, but were too few in number, and
their reports were consequently unconvincing.
In the course of the day Steinmetz became very uneasy, and ultimately he
decided to concentrate his army by retiring the VII. and VIII. corps
behind the river on to the I. (which had arrived near Saarlouis), thus
clearing the Saarbruecken-Metz road for the use of the II. army. But at
this moment Prince Frederick Charles suddenly modified his views. During
the 6th of August his scouts had reported considerable French forces
near Bitche (these were the 5th, de Failly's corps), and early in the
morning of the 7th he received a telegram from Moltke informing him
that MacMahon's beaten army was retreating on the same place (the troops
observed were in fact those which had marched to MacMahon's assistance).
The prince forthwith deflected the march of the Guards, IV. and X.
corps, towards Rohrbach, whilst the IX. and XII. closed up to supporting
distance behind them. Thus, as Steinmetz moved away to the west and
north, Frederick Charles was diverging to the south and east, and a
great gap was opening in the very centre of the German front. This was
closed only by the III. corps, still on the battle-field, and by
portions of the X. near Saargemuend,[2] whilst within striking distance
lay 130,000 French troops, prevented only by the incapacity of their
chiefs from delivering a decisive counter-stroke.
Fortunately for the Prussians, Moltke at Mainz took a different view.
Receiving absolutely no intelligence from the front during the 7th, he
telegraphed orders to the I. and II. armies (10.25 P.M.) to halt on the
8th, and impressed on Steinmetz the necessity of employing his cavalry
to clear up the situation. The I. army had already begun the marches
ordered by Steinmetz. It was now led back practically to its old
bivouacs amongst the unburied dead. Prince Frederick Charles only
conformed to Moltke's order with the III. and X. corps; the remainder
executed their concentration towards the south and east.
During the night of the 7th of August Moltke decided that the French
army must be in retreat towards the Moselle and forthwith busied himself
with the preparation of fresh tables of march for the two armies, his
object being to swing up the left wing to outflank the enemy from the
south. This work, and the transfer of headquarters to Homburg, needed
time, hence no fresh orders were issued to either army, and neither
commander would incur the responsibility of moving without any. The I.
army therefore spent a fourth night in bivouac on the battlefield. But
Constantin von Alvensleben, commanding the III. corps, a man of very
different stamp from his colleagues, hearing at first hand that the
French had evacuated St Avold, set his corps in motion early in the
morning of the 10th August down the St Avold-Metz road, reached St Avold
and obtained conclusive evidence that the French were retreating.
Advance to the Moselle.
During the 9th the orders for the advance to the Moselle were issued.
These were based, not on an exact knowledge of where the French army
actually stood, but on the opinion Moltke had formed as to where it
ought to have been on military grounds solely, overlooking the fact that
the French staff were not free to form military decisions but were
compelled to bow to political expediency.
Actually on the 7th of August the emperor had decided to attack the
Germans on the 8th with the whole Rhine Army, but this decision was
upset by alarmist reports from the beaten army of MacMahon. He then
decided to retreat to the Moselle, as Moltke had foreseen, and there to
draw to himself the remnants of MacMahon's army (now near Luneville). At
the same time he assigned the executive command over the whole Rhine
Army to Marshal Bazaine. This retreat was begun during the course of the
8th and 9th of August; but on the night of the 9th urgent telegrams from
Paris induced the emperor to suspend the movement, and during the 10th
the whole army took up a strong position on the French Nied.
Meanwhile the II. German army had received its orders to march in a line
of army corps on a broad front in the general direction of
Pont-a-Mousson, well to the south of Metz. The I. army was to follow by
short marches in echelon on the right; only the III. corps was directed
on Falkenberg, a day's march farther towards Metz along the St
Avold-Metz road. The movement was begun on the 10th, and towards evening
the French army was located on the right front of the III. corps. This
entirely upset Moltke's hypothesis, and called for a complete
modification of his plans, as the III. corps alone could not be expected
to resist the impact of Bazaine's five corps. The III. corps therefore
received orders to stand fast for the moment, and the remainder of the
II. army was instructed to wheel to the right and concentrate for a
great battle to the east of Metz on the 16th or 17th.
Before, however, these orders had been received the sudden retreat of
the French completely changed the situation. The Germans therefore
continued their movement towards the Moselle. On the 13th the French
took up a fresh position 5 m. to the east of Metz, where they were
located by the cavalry and the advanced guards of the I. army.
Battle of Colombey-Borny.
Again Moltke ordered the I. army to observe and hold the enemy, whilst
the II. was to swing round to the north. The cavalry was to scout beyond
the Moselle and intercept all communication with the heart of France
(see Metz). By this time the whole German army had imbibed the idea that
the French were in full retreat and endeavouring to evade a decisive
struggle. When therefore during the morning of the 14th their outposts
observed signs of retreat in the French position, their impatience could
no longer be restrained; as at Woerth and Spicheren, an outpost commander
brought up his guns, and at the sound of their fire, every unit within
reach spontaneously got under arms (battle of Colombey-Borny). In a
short time, with or without orders, the I., VII., VIII. and IX. corps
were in full march to the battle-field. But the French too turned back
to fight, and an obstinate engagement ensued, at the close of which the
Germans barely held the ground and the French withdrew under cover of
the Metz forts.
Still, though the fighting had been indecisive, the conviction of
victory remained with the Germans, and the idea of a French retreat
became an obsession. To this idea Moltke gave expression in his orders
issued early on the 15th, in which he laid down that the "fruits of the
victory" of the previous evening could only be reaped by a vigorous
pursuit towards the passages of the Meuse, where it was hoped the French
might yet be overtaken. This order, however, did not allow for the
hopeless inability of the French staff to regulate the movement of
congested masses of men, horses and vehicles, such as were now
accumulated in the streets and environs of Metz. Whilst Bazaine had come
to no definite decision whether to stand and fight or continue to
retreat, and was merely drifting under the impressions of the moment,
the Prussian leaders, in particular Prince Frederick Charles, saw in
imagination the French columns in rapid orderly movement towards the
west, and calculated that at best they could not be overtaken short of
Verdun.
In this order of ideas the whole of the II. army, followed on its right
rear by two-thirds of the I. army (the I. corps being detached to
observe the eastern side of the fortress), were pushed on towards the
Moselle, the cavalry far in advance towards the Meuse, whilst only the
5th cavalry division was ordered to scout towards the Metz-Verdun road,
and even that was disseminated over far too wide an area.
Later in the day (15th) Frederick Charles sent orders to the III. corps,
which was on the right flank of his long line of columns and approaching
the Moselle at Corny and Noveant, to march via Gorze to Mars-la-Tour on
the Metz-Verdun road; to the X. corps, strung out along the road from
Thiaucourt to Pont-a-Mousson, to move to Jarny; and for the remainder to
push on westward to seize the Meuse crossings. No definite information
as to the French army reached him in time to modify these instructions.
Meanwhile the 5th (Rheinbaben's) cavalry division, at about 3 P.M. in
the afternoon, had come into contact with the French cavalry in the
vicinity of Mars-la-Tour, and gleaned intelligence enough to show that
no French infantry had as yet reached Rezonville. The commander of the
X. corps at Thiaucourt, informed of this, became anxious for the
security of his flank during the next day's march and decided to push
out a strong flanking detachment under von Caprivi, to support von
Rheinbaben and maintain touch with the III. corps marching on his right
rear.
Battle of Vionville-Mars-la-Tour.
Von Alvensleben, to whom the 6th cavalry division had meanwhile been
assigned, seems to have received no local intelligence whatsoever; and
at daybreak on the 16th he began his march in two columns, the 6th
division on Mars-la-Tour, the 5th towards the Rezonville-Vionville
plateau. And shortly after 9.15 A.M. he suddenly discovered the truth.
The entire French army lay on his right flank, and his nearest supports
were almost a day's march distant. In this crisis he made up his mind at
once to attack with every available man, and to continue to attack, in
the conviction that his audacity would serve to conceal his weakness.
All day long, therefore, the Brandenburgers of the III. corps, supported
ultimately by the X. corps and part of the IX., attacked again and
again. The enemy was thrice their strength, but very differently led,
and made no adequate use of his superiority (battle of Vionville-Mars-la
Tour).
The 17th of August.
Meanwhile Prince Frederick Charles, at Pont-a-Mousson, was still
confident in the French retreat to the Meuse, and had even issued orders
for the 17th on that assumption. Firing had been heard since 9.15 A.M.,
and about noon Alvensleben's first report had reached him, but it was
not till after 2 that he realized the situation. Then, mounting his
horse, he covered the 15 m. to Flavigny over crowded and difficult roads
within the hour, and on his arrival abundantly atoned for his strategic
errors by his unconquerable determination and tactical skill. When
darkness put a stop to the fighting, he considered the position.
Cancelling all previous orders, he called all troops within reach to the
battle-field and resigned himself to wait for them. The situation was
indeed critical. The whole French army of five corps, only half of which
had been engaged, lay in front of him. His own army lay scattered over
an area of 30 m. by 20, and only some 20,000 fresh troops--of the IX.
corps--could reach the field during the forenoon of the 17th. He did not
then know that Moltke had already intervened and had ordered the VII.,
VIII. and II. corps[3] to his assistance. Daylight revealed the extreme
exhaustion of both men and horses. The men lay around in hopeless
confusion amongst the killed and wounded, each where sleep had overtaken
him, and thus the extent of the actual losses, heavy enough, could not
be estimated. Across the valley, bugle sounds revealed the French
already alert, and presently a long line of skirmishers approached the
Prussian position. But they halted just beyond rifle range, and it was
soon evident that they were only intended to cover a further withdrawal.
Presently came the welcome intelligence that the reinforcements were
well on their way.
About noon the king and Moltke drove up to the ground, and there was an
animated discussion as to what the French would do next. Aware of their
withdrawal from his immediate front, Prince Frederick Charles reverted
to his previous idea and insisted that they were in full retreat towards
the north, and that their entrenchments near Point du Jour and St Hubert
(see map in article METZ) were at most a rearguard position. Moltke was
inclined to the same view, but considered the alternative possibility of
a withdrawal towards Metz, and about 2 P.M. orders were issued to meet
these divergent opinions. The whole army was to be drawn up at 6 A.M. on
the 18th in an echelon facing north, so as to be ready for action in
either direction. The king and Moltke then drove to Pont-a-Mousson, and
the troops bivouacked in a state of readiness. The rest of the 17th was
spent in restoring order in the shattered III. and X. corps, and by
nightfall both corps were reported fit for action. Strangely enough,
there were no organized cavalry reconnaissances, and no intelligence of
importance was collected during the night of the 17th-18th.
Early on the 18th the troops began to move into position in the
following order from left to right: XII. (Saxons), Guards, IX., VIII.
and VII. The X. and III. were retained in reserve.
Battle of Gravelotte-Saint Privat.
The idea of the French retreat was still uppermost in the prince's mind,
and the whole army therefore moved north. But between 10 and 11 A.M.
part of the truth--viz. that the French had their backs to Metz and
stood in battle order from St Hubert northwards--became evident, and
the II. army, pivoting on the I., wheeled to the right and moved
eastward. Suddenly the IX. corps fell right on the centre of the French
line (Amanvillers), and a most desperate encounter began, superior
control, as before, ceasing after the guns had opened fire. Prince
Frederick Charles, however, a little farther north, again asserted his
tactical ability, and about 7 P.M. he brought into position no less than
five army corps for the final attack. The sudden collapse of French
resistance, due to the frontal attack of the Guards (St Privat) and the
turning movement of the Saxons (Roncourt), rendered the use of this mass
unnecessary, but the resolution to use it was there. On the German right
(I. army), about Gravelotte, all superior leading ceased quite early in
the afternoon, and at night the French still showed an unbroken front.
Until midnight, when the prince's victory was reported, the suspense at
headquarters was terrible. The I. army was exhausted, no steps had been
taken to ensure support from the III. army, and the IV. corps (II. army)
lay inactive 30 m. away.
Bazaine in Metz.
This seems a fitting place to discuss the much-disputed point of
Bazaine's conduct in allowing himself to be driven back into Metz when
fortune had thrown into his hands the great opportunity of the 16th and
17th of August. He had been appointed to command on the 10th, but the
presence of the emperor, who only left the front early on the 16th, and
their dislike of Bazaine, exercised a disturbing influence on the
headquarters staff officers. During the retreat to Metz the marshal had
satisfied himself as to the inability of his corps commanders to handle
their troops, and also as to the ill-will of the staff. In the
circumstances he felt that a battle in the open field could only end in
disaster; and, since it was proved that the Germans could outmarch him,
his army was sure to be overtaken and annihilated if he ventured beyond
the shelter of the fortress. But near Metz he could at least inflict
very severe punishment on his assailants, and in any case his presence
in Metz would neutralize a far superior force of the enemy for weeks or
months. What use the French government might choose to make of the
breathing space thus secured was their business, not his; and subsequent
events showed that, had they not forced MacMahon's hand, the existence
of the latter's nucleus army of trained troops might have prevented the
investment of Paris. Bazaine was condemned by court-martial after the
war, but if the case were reheard to-day it is certain that no charge of
treachery could be sustained.
On the German side the victory at St Privat was at once followed up by
the headquarters. Early on the 19th the investment of Bazaine's army in
Metz was commenced. A new army, the Army of the Meuse (often called the
IV.), was as soon as possible formed of all troops not required for the
maintenance of the investment, and marched off under the command of the
crown prince of Saxony to discover and destroy the remainder of the
French field army, which at this moment was known to be at Chalons.
Campaign of Sedan.
The operations which led to the capture of MacMahon's army in Sedan call
for little explanation. Given seven corps, each capable of averaging 15
m. a day for a week in succession, opposed to four corps only, shaken by
defeat and unable as a whole to cover more than 5 m. a day, the result
could hardly be doubtful. But Moltke's method of conducting operations
left his opponent many openings which could only be closed by excessive
demands on the marching power of the men. Trusting only to his cavalry
screen to secure information, he was always without any definite fixed
point about which to manoeuvre, for whilst the reports of the screen and
orders based thereon were being transmitted, the enemy was free to move,
and generally their movements were dictated by political expediency, not
by calculable military motives.
Thus whilst the German army, on a front of nearly 50 m., was marching
due west on Paris, MacMahon, under political pressure, was moving
parallel to them, but on a northerly route, to attempt the relief of
Metz.
So unexpected was this move and so uncertain the information which
called attention to it, that Moltke did not venture to change at once
the direction of march of the whole army, but he directed the Army of
the Meuse northward on Damvillers and ordered Prince Frederick Charles
to detach two corps from the forces investing Metz to reinforce it. For
the moment, therefore, MacMahon's move had succeeded, and the
opportunity existed for Bazaine to break out. But at the critical moment
the hopeless want of real efficiency in MacMahon's army compelled the
latter so to delay his advance that it became evident to the Germans
that there was no longer any necessity for the III. army to maintain the
direction towards Paris, and that the probable point of contact between
the Meuse army and the French lay nearer to the right wing of the III.
army than to Prince Frederick Charles's investing force before Metz.
The detachment from the II. army was therefore countermanded, and the
whole III. army changed front to the north, while the Meuse army headed
the French off from the east. The latter came into contact with the head
of the French columns, during the 29th, about Nouart, and on the 30th at
Buzancy (battle of Beaumont); and the French, yielding to the force of
numbers combined with superior moral, were driven north-westward upon
Sedan (q.v.), right across the front of the III. army, which was now
rapidly coming up from the south.
During the 31st the retreat practically became a rout, and the morning
of the 1st of September found the French crowded around the little
fortress of Sedan, with only one line of retreat to the north-west still
open. By 11 A.M. the XI. corps (III. army) had already closed that line,
and about noon the Saxons (Army of the Meuse) moving round between the
town and the Belgian frontier joined hands with the XI., and the circle
of investment was complete. The battle of Sedan was closed about 4.15
P.M. by the hoisting of the white flag. Terms were agreed upon during
the night, and the whole French army, with the emperor, passed into
captivity. (F. N. M.)
Later operations.
Thus in five weeks one of the French field armies was imprisoned in
Metz, the other destroyed, and the Germans were free to march upon
Paris. This seemed easy. There could be no organized opposition to their
progress,[4] and Paris, if not so defenceless as in 1814, was more
populous. Starvation was the best method of attacking an overcrowded
fortress, and the Parisians were not thought to be proof against the
deprivation of their accustomed luxuries. Even Moltke hoped that by the
end of October he would be "shooting hares at Creisau," and with this
confidence the German III. and IV. armies left the vicinity of Sedan on
the 4th of September. The march called for no more than good staff
arrangements, and the two armies arrived before Paris a fortnight later
and gradually encircled the place--the III. army on the south, the IV.
on the north side--in the last days of September. Headquarters were
established at Versailles. Meanwhile the Third Empire had fallen, giving
place on the 4th of September to a republican Government of National
Defence, which made its appeal to, and evoked, the spirit of 1792.
Henceforward the French nation, which had left the conduct of the war to
the regular army and had been little more than an excited spectator,
took the burden upon itself.
The regular army, indeed, still contained more than 500,000 men (chiefly
recruits and reservists), and 50,000 sailors, marines, douaniers, &c.,
were also available. But the Garde Mobile, framed by Marshal Niel in
1868, doubled this figure, and the addition of the Garde Nationale,
called into existence on the 15th of September, and including all
able-bodied men of from 31 to 60 years of age, more than trebled it. The
German staff had of course to reckon on the Garde Mobile, and did so
beforehand, but they wholly underestimated both its effective members
and its willingness, while, possessing themselves a system in which all
the military elements of the German nation stood close behind the
troops of the active army, they ignored the potentialities of the Garde
Nationale.
Meanwhile, both as a contrast to the events that centred on Paris and
because in point of time they were decided for the most part in the
weeks immediately following Sedan, we must briefly allude to the sieges
conducted by the Germans--Paris (q.v.), Metz (q.v.) and Belfort (q.v.)
excepted. Old and ruined as many of them were, the French fortresses
possessed considerable importance in the eyes of the Germans.
Strassburg, in particular, the key of Alsace, the standing menace to
South Germany and the most conspicuous of the spoils of Louis XIV.'s
_Raubkriege_, was an obvious target. Operations were begun on the 9th of
August, three days after Woerth, General v. Werder's corps (Baden troops
and Prussian Landwehr) making the siege. The French commandant, General
Uhrich, surrendered after a stubborn resistance on the 28th of
September. Of the smaller fortresses many, being practically unarmed and
without garrisons, capitulated at once. Toul, defended by Major Huck
with 2000 mobiles, resisted for forty days, and drew upon itself the
efforts of 13,000 men and 100 guns. Verdun, commanded by General Guerin
de Waldersbach, held out till after the fall of Metz. Some of the
fortresses lying to the north of the Prussian line of advance on Paris,
e.g. Mezieres, resisted up to January 1871, though of course this was
very largely due to the diminution of pressure caused by the appearance
of new French field armies in October. On the 9th of September a strange
incident took place at the surrender of Laon. A powder magazine was
blown up by the soldiers in charge and 300 French and a few German
soldiers were killed by the explosion. But as the Germans advanced,
their lines of communication were thoroughly organized, and the belt of
country between Paris and the Prussian frontier subdued and garrisoned.
Most of these fortresses were small town enceintes, dating from Vauban's
time, and open, under the new conditions of warfare, to concentric
bombardment from positions formerly out of range, upon which the
besieger could place as many guns as he chose to employ. In addition
they were usually deficient in armament and stores and garrisoned by
newly-raised troops. Belfort, where the defenders strained every nerve
to keep the besiegers out of bombarding range, and Paris formed the only
exceptions to this general rule.