CEASE FIRING
Before taking up the final phases of the Meuse-Argonne campaign, and the
final phases of the war, it is fitting to follow the fortunes of some
divisions which saw action in other parts of the front. The Second
Corps, for example, remained with the British and saw desperately hard
service and won corresponding fame. This corps was composed of the
Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions, and in conjunction with the
Australian Corps it participated in the attack which broke the
Hindenburg line near St. Quentin. The Twenty-seventh Division had the
honor of being the first unit actually to breach the famous defensive
system of the Germans.
The attack began on September 29 and continued through October 1. Both
divisions were compelled to advance over difficult terrain against
strongly fortified positions. They were raked from both sides by
machine-gun fire as they cut their way through innumerable lines of
barbed wire. But in spite of the determined resistance of the Germans,
they broke the line. The divisions also saw hard service from October 6
to October 19. In these operations the Second Corps was credited with
the capture of more than 6,000 prisoners, and advanced into enemy
territory for a distance of thirteen miles. Marshal Haig expressed his
admiration of the conduct and achievements of both the American
divisions which served with his forces.
American divisions also played an important role in conjunction with the
French when they assisted in an attack against the Germans just outside
of Rheims. This operation continued from October 2 to October 9 and was
marked by severe and bitter fighting. The American forces engaged were
the Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions. Perhaps the most noteworthy
achievement in the campaign was the capture of Blanc Mont by the Second
Division. Blanc Mont is a wooded hill, and was very strongly held by the
Germans. The Americans were repulsed in their first assault, but came
back and tried again. This time they swept the German defenders before
them. The assault by no means completed their labors, for after the
capture of the hill the division was called upon to repulse strong
counter-attacks in front of the village of St. Etienne. Not content with
driving the Germans back, the Second went on and took the town. The
Germans were forced to abandon positions they had held ever since the
autumn of 1914.
By this time the Second Division had earned a rest, and it was relieved
by the Thirty-sixth. The relieving troops were inexperienced. They had
never been under fire, and the Germans subjected them to a severe
artillery strafing, but did not shake their confidence. The division
performed useful work in pursuing the Germans in their retirement behind
the Aisne.
Other divisions saw service with the French in Belgium. After the ending
of the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign, the Thirty-seventh
and Ninety-first Divisions were withdrawn and sent to join the French
near Ypres. They took part in a heavy attack on October 31. The
Thirty-seventh inflicted a severe defeat upon opposing troops at the
Escaut River on November 3, and the Ninety-first won much praise from
the French for a flanking movement which resulted in the capture of the
Spitaals Bosschen Wood.
Although the German Army had begun to disintegrate by November 1, the
Americans saw some hard fighting after that date. The task set for
Pershing's men was in theory almost as difficult as clearing the Argonne
Forest. The offensive was aimed at the Longuyon-Sedan-Mezieres railway,
which was one of the most important lines of communication of the German
Army. Germany was aware of the gravity of this threat and used her very
best troops in an effort to stop the Americans. For a time the Germans
fought steadily, but their morale was waning at the end. The Americans
found on several occasions that their second-day gains were greater than
those of the first day, which was formerly an unheard of thing on the
western front.
In the final days of the war the Americans had to go their fastest in an
effort to reach Sedan before the armistice went into effect. During one
phase of the battle doughboys mounted on auto-trucks went forward in a
vain effort to establish contact with the enemy. The roads were so bad,
however, that the Americans were unable to catch up with the fleeing
Germans.
The third phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign found the Americans
absolutely confident of success. They knew their superiority over the
Germans, and the American Army was constantly growing stronger while the
Germans grew weaker. Pershing was able to send well-rested divisions
into the battle. The final advance began on November 1. American
artillery was stronger than ever in numbers and much more experienced.
Never before had our army seen such a barrage, and the German infantry
broke before the advance of the doughboys. The German heart to fight had
begun to develop murmurs, although there were some units among the enemy
forces which fought with great gallantry until the very end.
Aincreville, Doulcon, and Andevanne fell in the first day of the attack.
Landres et St. Georges was next to go, as the Fifth Corps, in an
impetuous attack, swept up to Bayonville. On November 2, which was the
second day of the attack, the First Corps was called in to give added
pressure. By this time the German resistance was pretty well broken. It
was now that the motor-truck offensive began. Behind the trucks the
field-guns rattled along as the artillerymen spurred on their horses in
a vain effort to catch up with something at which they could shoot. At
the end of the third day of the attack the American Army had penetrated
the German line to a depth of twelve miles. A slight pause was then
necessary in order that the big guns might come up, but on November 5
the Third Corps crossed the Meuse. They met a sporadic resistance from
German machine-gunners but swept them up with small losses. By the 7th
of November the chief objective of the offensive thrust was obtained. On
that day American troops, among them the Rainbow Division, reached
Sedan. Pershing's army had cut the enemy's line of communication.
Nothing but surrender or complete defeat was left to him.
In estimating the extent of the American victory it is interesting to
note that General Pershing reported that forty enemy divisions
participated in the Meuse-Argonne battle. Our army took 26,059 prisoners
and captured 468 guns. Colonel Frederick Palmer estimates that 650,000
American soldiers were engaged in the battle. This is a greater number
than were engaged at St. Mihiel, and it was, of course, a new mark in
the records of the American Army. Colonel Palmer has stated his opinion
that Meuse-Argonne was one of the four decisive battles of the war. The
other three which he names are the first battle of the Marne, the first
battle of Ypres, and Verdun.
Curiously enough, Chateau-Thierry looms larger in the mind of the
average American than Meuse-Argonne, although the number of Americans
engaged in the former battle was not half as great as those who battered
their way through the forest. Of course the importance of a battle is
not to be judged solely by the number of men engaged, but there seems to
be no good reason for assigning a strategic importance to
Chateau-Thierry which is denied to Meuse-Argonne. Most of the military
critics are of the opinion that the wide-spread belief that the
Americans saved Paris at the battle of Chateau-Thierry is not literally
true. The American victory was a factor, to be sure. It was even an
important factor. Perhaps, from the point of view of morale, it was
vital, but judged by strict military standards there is no support for
the frequent assertion that only a few marines stood between Paris and
the triumphant entry of the German Army. Meuse-Argonne, on the other
hand, was not only a campaign solely under American control but a
large-scale battle which probably shortened the war by many months. This
victory was America's chief contribution in the field to the cause of
the Allies. It is on Meuse-Argonne that our military prestige will rest.
The divisions engaged were the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third,
Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh,
Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth, Eightieth, Eighty-second, Eighty-ninth,
Ninetieth, and Ninety-first. The First, Fifth, Twenty-sixth,
Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Eightieth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth
were particularly honored by being put in the line twice during the
campaign.
Though the armistice was now close at hand the war had not ended. The
policy of allied leadership was to fight until the last minute lest
there should be some hitch. The American plans called for an advance
toward Longwy by the First Army in co-operation with the Second Army,
which was to threaten the Briey iron-fields. If the war had kept up,
this would have been followed by an offensive in the direction of
Chateau-Salins, with the ultimate object of cutting off Metz. The attack
of the Second Army was actually in progress when the time came set in
the armistice for the cessation of hostilities. At eleven o'clock the
hostilities ceased suddenly, although just before that the Second Army
was advancing against heavy and determined machine-gun fire, with both
sides apparently unwilling to believe that the war was almost over. At
other points in the line where no offensive was set for the last day,
the artillerymen had the final word to say. Most of the American guns
fired at the foe just before eleven o'clock, and in many batteries the
gunners joined hands to pull the lanyards so that all might have a share
in the final defiance to Germany.
When the war ended, the American position ran from Port-sur-Seille
across the Moselle to Vandieres, through the Woevre to Bezonvaux,
thence to the Meuse at Mouzay, and ending at Sedan. There were abroad or
in transit 2,053,347 American soldiers, less the losses, and of these
there were 1,338,169 combatant troops in France. The American Army
captured about 44,000 prisoners and 1,400 guns. The figures on our
losses are not yet entirely checked up at the time of this writing, but
they were approximately 300,000 in killed, died of disease, wounded, and
missing.
When he wrote his report to Secretary Baker, General Pershing reserved
his final paragraph for a tribute to his men, and in it he said:
"Finally, I pay the supreme tribute to our officers and soldiers of the
line. When I think of their heroism, their patience under hardships,
their unflinching spirit of offensive action, I am filled with emotion
which I am unable to express. Their deeds are immortal, and they have
earned the eternal gratitude of our country."
GENERAL PERSHING'S REPORT
BATTLES FOUGHT BY AMERICAN ARMIES IN FRANCE FROM THEIR ORGANIZATION TO
THE FALL OF SEDAN
[CABLED BY GENERAL PERSHING TO MR. BAKER, SECRETARY OF WAR, AND MADE
PUBLIC WITH HIS ANNUAL REPORT, DEC. 5, 1918]
November 20, 1918.
_My dear Mr. Secretary:_ In response to your request, I have the honor
to submit this brief summary of the organization and operation of the
American Expeditionary Force from May 26, 1917, until the signing of the
armistice Nov. 11, 1918. Pursuant to your instructions, immediately upon
receiving my orders I selected a small staff and proceeded to Europe in
order to become familiar with conditions at the earliest possible
moment.
The warmth of our reception in England and France was only equalled by
the readiness of the Commanders in Chief of the veteran armies of the
Allies, and their staffs, to place their experience at our disposal. In
consultation with them the most effective means of co-operation of
effort was considered. With the French and British Armies at their
maximum strength, and when all efforts to dispossess the enemy from his
firmly intrenched positions in Belgium and France had failed, it was
necessary to plan for an American force adequate to turn the scale in
favor of the Allies. Taking account of the strength of the Central
Powers at that time, the immensity of the problem which confronted us
could hardly be overestimated. The first requisite being an organization
that could give intelligent direction to effort, the formation of a
General Staff occupied my early attention.
A well-organized General Staff, through which the Commander exercises
his functions, is essential to a successful modern army. However capable
our division, our battalion, and our companies as such, success would be
impossible without thoroughly co-ordinated endeavor. A General Staff
broadly organized and trained for war had not hitherto existed in our
army. Under the Commander in Chief, this staff must carry out the policy
and direct the details of administration, supply, preparation, and
operations of the army as a whole, with all special branches and bureaus
subject to its control. As models to aid us we had the veteran French
General Staff and the experience of the British, who had similarly
formed an organization to meet the demands of a great army. By selecting
from each the features best adapted to our basic organization, and
fortified by our own early experience in the war, the development of our
great General Staff system was completed.
The General Staff is naturally divided into five groups, each with its
chief, who is an assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. G. 1 is in
charge of organization and equipment of troops, replacements, tonnage,
priority of overseas shipment, the auxiliary welfare association, and
cognate subjects; G. 2 has censorship, enemy intelligence, gathering and
disseminating information, preparation of maps, and all similar
subjects; G. 3 is charged with all strategic studies and plans, movement
of troops, and the supervision of combat operations; G. 4 co-ordinates
important questions of supply, construction, transport arrangements for
combat, and of the operations of the service of supply, and of
hospitalization and the evacuation of the sick and wounded; G. 5
supervises the various schools and has general direction and
co-ordination of education and training.
The first Chief of Staff was Colonel (now Major Gen.) James G. Harbord,
who was succeeded in March, 1918, by Major Gen. James W. McAndrew. To
these officers, to the Deputy Chief of Staff, and to the Assistant
Chiefs of Staff, who, as heads of sections, aided them, great credit is
due for the results obtained, not only in perfecting the General Staff
organization, but in applying correct principles to the multiplicity of
problems that have arisen.
ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
After a thorough consideration of allied organizations, it was decided
that our combat division should consist of four regiments of infantry of
3,000 men, with three battalions to a regiment and four companies of 250
men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade of three regiments,
a machine-gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench-mortar battery,
a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staffs and
military police. These, with medical and other units, made a total of
over 28,000 men, or practically double the size of a French or German
division. Each corps would normally consist of six divisions--four
combat and one depot and one replacement division--and also two
regiments of cavalry, and each army of from three to five corps. With
four divisions fully trained, a corps could take over an American sector
with two divisions in line and two in reserve, with the depot and
replacement divisions prepared to fill the gaps in the ranks.
Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force which should be
able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly, the
development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of
the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The
plan of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month
for acclimatization and instruction in small units from battalions down,
a second month in quiet trench sectors by battalion, and a third month
after it came out of the trenches when it should be trained as a
complete division in war of movement.
Very early a system of schools was outlined and started which should
have the advantage of instruction by officers direct from the front. At
the great school centre at Langres, one of the first to be organized,
was the staff school, where the principles of general staff work, as
laid down in our own organization, were taught to carefully selected
officers. Men in the ranks who had shown qualities of leadership were
sent to the school of candidates for commissions. A school of the line
taught younger officers the principles of leadership, tactics, and the
use of the different weapons. In the artillery school, at Saumur, young
officers were taught the fundamental principles of modern artillery;
while at Issoudun an immense plant was built for training cadets in
aviation. These and other schools, with their well-considered
curriculums for training in every branch of our organization, were
co-ordinated in a manner best to develop an efficient army out of
willing and industrious young men, many of whom had not before known
even the rudiments of military technique. Both Marshal Haig and General
Petain placed officers and men at our disposal for instructional
purposes, and we are deeply indebted for the opportunities given to
profit by their veteran experience.
AMERICAN ZONE
The eventual place the American Army should take on the western front
was to a large extent influenced by the vital questions of communication
and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British
Armies' shipping and supplies, while the southern ports, though
otherwise at our service, had not adequate port facilities for our
purposes, and these we should have to build. The already overtaxed
railway system behind the active front in Northern France would not be
available for us as lines of supply, and those leading from the southern
ports of Northeastern France would be unequal to our needs without much
new construction. Practically all warehouses, supply depots, and
regulating stations must be provided by fresh constructions. While
France offered us such material as she had to spare after a drain of
three years, enormous quantities of material had to be brought across
the Atlantic.
With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making
plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover,
broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would
bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the
nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy. The tonnage for
material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three
and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth programme of
shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a
corresponding large project for additional railways and for storage
depots.
All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we
were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the
war we must utilize the southern ports of France--Bordeaux, La Pallice,
St. Nazaire, and Brest--and the comparatively unused railway systems
leading therefrom to the northeast. Generally speaking, then, this would
contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere in that
direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally located,
preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and Chateauroux, so
that our armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever they
might be serving on the western front.
GROWTH OF SUPPLY SERVICE
To build up such a system there were talented men in the Regular Army,
but more experts were necessary than the army could furnish. Thanks to
the patriotic spirit of our people at home, there came from civil life
men trained for every sort of work involved in building and managing the
organization necessary to handle and transport such an army and keep it
supplied. With such assistance the construction and general development
of our plans have kept pace with the growth of the forces, and the
Service of Supply is now able to discharge from ships and move 45,000
tons daily, besides transporting troops and material in the conduct of
active operations.
As to organization, all the administrative and supply services, except
the Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, and Judge Advocate
General's Departments, which remain at general headquarters, have been
transferred to the headquarters of the services of supplies at Tours
under a commanding General responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for
supply of the armies. The Chief Quartermaster, Chief Surgeon, Chief
Signal Officer, Chief of Ordnance, Chief of Air Service, Chief of
Chemical Warfare, the general purchasing agent in all that pertains to
questions of procurement and supply, the Provost Marshal General in the
maintenance of order in general, the Director General of Transportation
in all that affects such matters, and the Chief Engineer in all matters
of administration and supply, are subordinate to the Commanding General
of the Service of Supply, who, assisted by a staff especially organized
for the purpose, is charged with the administrative co-ordination of all
these services.
The transportation department under the Service of Supply directs the
operation, maintenance, and construction of railways, the operation of
terminals, the unloading of ships, and transportation of material to
warehouses or to the front. Its functions make necessary the most
intimate relationship between our organization and that of the French,
with the practical result that our transportation department has been
able to improve materially the operations of railways generally.
Constantly laboring under a shortage of rolling stock, the
transportation department has nevertheless been able by efficient
management to meet every emergency.
The Engineer Corps is charged with all construction, including light
railways and roads. It has planned and constructed the many projects
required, the most important of which are the new wharves at Bordeaux
and Nantes, and the immense storage depots at La Pallice, Mointoir, and
Glevres, besides innumerable hospitals and barracks in various ports of
France. These projects have all been carried on by phases keeping pace
with our needs. The Forestry Service under the Engineer Corps has cut
the greater part of the timber and railway ties required.
To meet the shortage of supplies from America, due to lack of shipping,
the representatives of the different supply departments were constantly
in search of available material and supplies in Europe. In order to
co-ordinate these purchases and to prevent competition between our
departments, a general purchasing agency was created early in our
experience to co-ordinate our purchases and, if possible, induce our
allies to apply the principle among the allied armies. While there was
no authority for the general use of appropriations, this was met by
grouping the purchasing representatives of the different departments
under one control, charged with the duty of consolidating requisitions
and purchases. Our efforts to extend the principle have been signally
successful, and all purchases for the allied armies are now on an
equitable and co-operative basis. Indeed, it may be said that the work
of this bureau has been thoroughly efficient and businesslike.
ARTILLERY, AIRPLANES, TANKS
Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary
for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important
deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation, and tanks. In order
to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer
of the French Government to provide us with the necessary artillery
equipment of seventy-fives, one fifty-five millimeter howitzers, and one
fifty-five G. P. F. guns from their own factories for thirty divisions.
The wisdom of this course is fully demonstrated by the fact that,
although we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home,
there were no guns of the calibres mentioned manufactured in America on
our front at the date the armistice was signed. The only guns of these
types produced at home thus far received in France are 109 seventy-five
millimeter guns.
In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the French
Government came to our aid until our own aviation programme should be
under way. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for training
our personnel, and they have provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit,
observation, and bombing planes. The first airplanes received from home
arrived in May, and altogether we have received 1,379. The first
American squadron completely equipped by American production, including
airplanes, crossed the German lines on Aug. 7, 1918. As to tanks, we
were also compelled to rely upon the French. Here, however, we were less
fortunate, for the reason that the French production could barely meet
the requirements of their own armies.
It should be fully realized that the French Government has always taken
a most liberal attitude, and has been most anxious to give us every
possible assistance in meeting our deficiencies in these as well as in
other respects. Our dependence upon France for artillery, aviation, and
tanks was, of course, due to the fact that our industries had not been
exclusively devoted to military production. All credit is due our own
manufacturers for their efforts to meet our requirements, as at the time
the armistice was signed we were able to look forward to the early
supply of practically all our necessities from our own factories.
The welfare of the troops touches my responsibility as Commander in
Chief to the mothers and fathers and kindred of the men who came to
France in the impressionable period of youth. They could not have the
privilege accorded European soldiers during their periods of leave of
visiting their families and renewing their home ties. Fully realizing
that the standard of conduct that should be established for them must
have a permanent influence in their lives and on the character of their
future citizenship, the Red Cross, the Young Men's Christian
Association, Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army, and the Jewish
Welfare Board, as auxiliaries in this work, were encouraged in every
possible way. The fact that our soldiers, in a land of different customs
and language, have borne themselves in a manner in keeping with the
cause for which they fought, is due not only to the efforts in their
behalf, but much more to their high ideals, their discipline, and their
innate sense of self-respect. It should be recorded, however, that the
members of these welfare societies have been untiring in their desire to
be of real service to our officers and men. The patriotic devotion of
these representative men and women has given a new significance to the
Golden Rule, and we owe to them a debt of gratitude that can never be
repaid.
COMBAT OPERATIONS
During our period of training in the trenches some of our divisions had
engaged the enemy in local combats, the most important of which was
Seicheprey by the 26th on April 20, in the Toul sector, but none had
participated in action as a unit. The 1st Division, which had passed
through the preliminary stages of training, had gone to the trenches for
its first period of instruction at the end of October, and by March 21,
when the German offensive in Picardy began, we had four divisions with
experience in the trenches, all of which were equal to any demands of
battle action. The crisis which this offensive developed was such that
our occupation of an American sector must be postponed.
On March 28 I placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch, who had been
agreed upon as Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies, all of our
forces, to be used as he might decide. At his request the 1st Division
was transferred from the Toul sector to a position in reserve at
Chaumont en Vexin. As German superiority in numbers required prompt
action, an agreement was reached at the Abbeville conference of the
allied Premiers and commanders and myself on May 2 by which British
shipping was to transport ten American divisions to the British Army
area, where they were to be trained and equipped, and additional British
shipping was to be provided for as many divisions as possible for use
elsewhere.
On April 26 the 1st Division had gone into the line in the Montdidier
salient on the Picardy battle-front. Tactics had been suddenly
revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men, confident of the
results of their training, were eager for the test. On the morning of
May 28 this division attacked the commanding German position in its
front, taking with splendid dash the town of Cantigny and all other
objectives, which were organized and held steadfastly against vicious
counter-attacks and galling artillery fire. Although local, this
brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it demonstrated our
fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions, and also that the
enemy's troops were not altogether invincible.
HOLDING THE MARNE
The Germans' Aisne offensive, which began on May 27, had advanced
rapidly toward the River Marne and Paris, and the Allies faced a crisis
equally as grave as that of the Picardy offensive in March. Again every
available man was placed at Marshal Foch's disposal, and the 3d
Division, which had just come from its preliminary training in the
trenches, was hurried to the Marne. Its motorized machine-gun battalion
preceded the other units and successfully held the bridgehead at the
Marne, opposite Chateau-Thierry. The 2d Division, in reserve near
Montdidier, was sent by motor trucks and other available transport to
check the progress of the enemy toward Paris. The division attacked and
retook the town and railroad station at Bouresches and sturdily held its
ground against the enemy's best guard divisions. In the battle of
Belleau Wood, which followed, our men proved their superiority and
gained a strong tactical position, with far greater loss to the enemy
than to ourselves. On July 1, before the 2d was relieved, it captured
the village of Vaux with most splendid precision.
Meanwhile our 2d Corps, under Major Gen. George W. Read, had been
organized for the command of our divisions with the British, which were
held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. Five of
the ten divisions were withdrawn from the British area in June, three to
relieve divisions in Lorraine, and in the Vosges and two to the Paris
area to join the group of American divisions which stood between the
city and any further advance of the enemy in that direction.
The great June-July troop movement from the States was well under way,
and, although these troops were to be given some preliminary training
before being put into action, their very presence warranted the use of
all the older divisions in the confidence that we did not lack reserves.
Elements of the 42d Division were in the line east of Rheims against the
German offensive of July 15, and held their ground unflinchingly. On the
right flank of this offensive four companies of the 28th Division were
in position in face of the advancing waves of the German infantry. The
3d Division was holding the bank of the Marne from the bend east of the
mouth of the Surmelin to the west of Mezy, opposite Chateau-Thierry,
where a large force of German infantry sought to force a passage under
support of powerful artillery concentrations and under cover of smoke
screens. A single regiment of the 3d wrote one of the most brilliant
pages in our military annals on this occasion. It prevented the crossing
at certain points on its front while, on either flank, the Germans, who
had gained a footing, pressed forward. Our men, firing in three
directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical
points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete
confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.
OFFENSIVE OF JULY 18
The great force of the German Chateau-Thierry offensive established the
deep Marne salient, but the enemy was taking chances, and the
vulnerability of this pocket to attack might be turned to his
disadvantage. Seizing this opportunity to support my conviction, every
division with any sort of training was made available for use in a
counter-offensive. The place of honor in the thrust toward Soissons on
July 18 was given to our 1st and 2d Divisions in company with chosen
French divisions. Without the usual brief warning of a preliminary
bombardment, the massed French and American artillery, firing by the
map, laid down its rolling barrage at dawn while the infantry began its
charge. The tactical handling of our troops under these trying
conditions was excellent throughout the action. The enemy brought up
large numbers of reserves and made a stubborn defense both with machine
guns and artillery, but through five days' fighting the 1st Division
continued to advance until it had gained the heights above Soissons and
captured the village of Berzy-le-Sec. The 2d Division took Beau Repaire
Farm and Vierzy in a very rapid advance and reached a position in front
of Tigny at the end of its second day. These two divisions captured
7,000 prisoners and over 100 pieces of artillery.
The 26th Division, which, with a French division, was under command of
our 1st Corps, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons. On the
18th it took the village of Torcy, while the 3d Division was crossing
the Marne in pursuit of the retiring enemy. The 26th attacked again on
the 21st, and the enemy withdrew past the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons road.
The 3d Division, continuing its progress, took the heights of Mont St.
Pere and the villages of Charteves and Jaulgonne in the face of both
machine-gun and artillery fire.
On the 24th, after the Germans had fallen back from Trugny and Epieds,
our 42d Division, which had been brought over from the Champagne,
relieved the 26th, and, fighting its way through the Foret de Fere,
overwhelmed the nest of machine guns in its path. By the 27th it had
reached the Ourcq, whence the 3d and 4th Divisions were already
advancing, while the French divisions with which we were co-operating
were moving forward at other points.
The 3d Division had made its advance into Roncheres Wood on the 29th and
was relieved for rest by a brigade of the 32d. The 42d and 32d undertook
the task of conquering the heights beyond Cierges, the 42d capturing
Sergy and the 32d capturing Hill 230, both American divisions joining in
the pursuit of the enemy to the Vesle, and thus the operation of
reducing the salient was finished. Meanwhile the 42d was relieved by the
4th at Chery-Chartreuve, and the 32d by the 28th, while the 77th
Division took up a position on the Vesle. The operations of these
divisions on the Vesle were under the 3d Corps, Major Gen. Robert L.
Bullard commanding.
BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL
With the reduction of the Marne salient, we could look forward to the
concentration of our divisions in our own zone. In view of the
forthcoming operation against the St. Mihiel salient, which had long
been planned as our first offensive action on a large scale, the First
Army was organized on Aug. 10 under my personal command. While American
units had held different divisional and corps sectors along the western
front, there had not been up to this time, for obvious reasons, a
distinct American sector; but, in view of the important parts the
American forces were now to play, it was necessary to take over a
permanent portion of the line. Accordingly, on Aug. 30, the line
beginning at Port sur Seille, east of the Moselle and extending to the
west through St. Mihiel, thence north to a point opposite Verdun, was
placed under my command. The American sector was afterward extended
across the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, and
included the 2d Colonial French, which held the point of the salient,
and the 17th French Corps, which occupied the heights above Verdun.
The preparation for a complicated operation against the formidable
defenses in front of us included the assembling of divisions and of
corps and army artillery, transport, aircraft, tanks, ambulances, the
location of hospitals, and the molding together of all the elements of a
great modern army with its own railheads, supplied directly by our own
Service of Supply. The concentration for this operation, which was to be
a surprise, involved the movement, mostly at night, of approximately
600,000 troops, and required for its success the most careful attention
to every detail.
The French were generous in giving us assistance in corps and army
artillery, with its personnel, and we were confident from the start of
our superiority over the enemy in guns of all calibres. Our heavy guns
were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail
movements. The French Independent Air Force was placed under my command,
which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our air forces,
gave us the largest assembly of aviators that had ever been engaged in
one operation on the western front.
From Les Eparges around the nose of the salient at St. Mihiel to the
Moselle River the line was, roughly, forty miles long and situated on
commanding ground greatly strengthened by artificial defenses. Our 1st
Corps (82d, 90th, 5th, and 2d Divisions), under command of Major Gen.
Hunter Liggett, resting its right on Pont-a-Mousson, with its left
joining our 3d Corps (the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions), under Major
Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, in line to Xivray, was to swing toward
Vigneulles on the pivot of the Moselle River for the initial assault.
From Xivray to Mouilly the 2d Colonial French Corps was in line in the
centre, and our 5th Corps, under command of Major Gen. George H.
Cameron, with our 26th Division and a French division at the western
base of the salient, was to attack three difficult hills--Les Eparges,
Combres, and Amaranthe. Our 1st Corps had in reserve the 78th Division,
our 4th Corps the 3d Division, and our First Army the 35th and 91st
Divisions, with the 80th and 33d available. It should be understood that
our corps organizations are very elastic, and that we have at no time
had permanent assignments of divisions to corps.
After four hours' artillery preparation, the seven American divisions in
the front line advanced at 5 A. M. on Sept. 12, assisted by a limited
number of tanks, manned partly by Americans and partly by French. These
divisions, accompanied by groups of wire cutters and others armed with
bangalore torpedoes, went through the successive bands of barbed wire
that protected the enemy's front-line and support trenches in
irresistible waves on schedule time, breaking down all defense of an
enemy demoralized by the great volume of our artillery fire and our
sudden approach out of the fog.
Our 1st Corps advanced to Thiaucourt, while our 4th Corps curved back to
the southwest through Nonsard. The 2d Colonial French Corps made the
slight advance required of it on very difficult ground, and the 5th
Corps took its three ridges and repulsed a counterattack. A rapid march
brought reserve regiments of a division of the 5th Corps into Vigneulles
and beyond Fresnes-en-Woevre. At the cost of only 7,000 casualties,
mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns, a great
quantity of material, released the inhabitants of many villages from
enemy domination, and established our lines in a position to threaten
Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its first
offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found they had a
formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had
one to reckon with.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, FIRST PHASE
On the day after we had taken the St. Mihiel salient much of our corps
and army artillery which had operated at St. Mihiel, and our divisions
in reserve at other points, were already on the move toward the area
back of the line between the Meuse River and the western edge of the
Forest of Argonne. With the exception of St. Mihiel the old German front
line from Switzerland to the east of Rheims was still intact. In the
general attack all along the line the operations assigned the American
Army as the hinge of this allied offensive were directed toward the
important railroad communications of the German armies through Mezieres
and Sedan. The enemy must hold fast to this part of his lines, or the
withdrawal of his forces, with four years' accumulation of plants and
material, would be dangerously imperiled.
The German Army had as yet shown no demoralization, and, while the mass
of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions, and
notably its machine-gun defense, were exhibiting remarkable tactical
efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware
of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that
he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned
with as much secrecy as possible and was undertaken with the
determination to use all our divisions in forcing decision. We expected
to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them while
the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break
his line, which it was our firm purpose to do.
Our right flank was protected by the Meuse, while our left embraced the
Argonne Forest, whose ravines, hills, and elaborate defense, screened by
dense thickets, had been generally considered impregnable. Our order of
battle from right to left was the 3d Corps from the Meuse to Malancourt,
with the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions in line and the 3d Division as
corps reserve; the 5th Corps from Malancourt to Vauquois, with the 79th,
87th, and 91st Divisions in line and the 32d in corps reserve, and the
1st Corps from Vauquois to Vienne le Chateau, with the 35th, 28th, and
77th Divisions in line and the 92d in corps reserve. The army reserve
consisted of the 1st, 29th, and 82d Divisions.
On the night of Sept. 25 our troops quietly took the place of the
French, who thinly held the line in this sector, which had long been
inactive. In the attack which began on the 26th we drove through the
barbed-wire entanglements and the sea of shell craters across No Man's
Land, mastering all the first-line defenses. Continuing on the 27th and
28th, against machine guns and artillery of an increasing number of
enemy reserve divisions, we penetrated to a depth of from three to seven
miles and took the village of Montfaucon and its commanding hill and
Exermont, Gercourt, Cuisy, Septsarges, Malancourt, Ivoiry, Epinonville,
Charpentry, Very, and other villages. East of the Meuse one of our
divisions, which was with the 2d Colonial French Corps, captured
Marcheville and Rieville, giving further protection to the flank of our
main body. We had taken 10,000 prisoners, we had gained our point of
forcing the battle into the open, and were prepared for the enemy's
reaction, which was bound to come, as he had good roads and ample
railroad facilities for bringing up his artillery and reserves.
In the chill rain of dark nights our engineers had to build new roads
across spongy, shell-torn areas, repair broken roads beyond No Man's
Land, and build bridges. Our gunners, with no thought of sleep, put
their shoulders to wheels and drag ropes to bring their guns through the
mire in support of the infantry, now under the increasing fire of the
enemy's artillery. Our attack had taken the enemy by surprise, but,
quickly recovering himself, he began to fire counter-attacks in strong
force, supported by heavy bombardments, with large quantities of gas.
From Sept. 28 until Oct. 4 we maintained the offensive against patches
of woods defended by snipers and continuous lines of machine guns, and
pushed forward our guns and transport, seizing strategical points in
preparation for further attacks.
OTHER UNITS WITH ALLIES
Other divisions attached to the allied armies were doing their part. It
was the fortune of our 2d Corps, composed of the 27th and 30th
Divisions, which had remained with the British, to have a place of honor
in co-operation with the Australian Corps on Sept. 29 and Oct. 1 in the
assault on the Hindenburg line where the St. Quentin Canal passes
through a tunnel under a ridge. The 30th Division speedily broke through
the main line of defense for all its objectives, while the 27th pushed
on impetuously through the main line until some of its elements reached
Gouy. In the midst of the maze of trenches and shell craters and under
crossfire from machine guns the other elements fought desperately
against odds. In this and in later actions, from Oct. 6 to Oct. 19, our
2d Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced over thirteen miles.
The spirit and aggressiveness of these divisions have been highly
praised by the British Army commander under whom they served.
On Oct. 2-9 our 2d and 36th Divisions were sent to assist the French in
an important attack against the old German positions before Rheims. The
2d conquered the complicated defense works on their front against a
persistent defense worthy of the grimmest period of trench warfare and
attacked the strongly held wooded hill of Blanc Mont, which they
captured in a second assault, sweeping over it with consummate dash and
skill. This division then repulsed strong counter-attacks before the
village and cemetery of Ste. Etienne and took the town, forcing the
Germans to fall back from before Rheims and yield positions they had
held since September, 1914. On Oct. 9 the 36th Division relieved the 2d,
and in its first experience under fire withstood very severe artillery
bombardment and rapidly took up the pursuit of the enemy, now retiring
behind the Aisne.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SECOND PHASE
The allied progress elsewhere cheered the efforts of our men in this
crucial contest, as the German command threw in more and more
first-class troops to stop our advance. We made steady headway in the
almost impenetrable and strongly held Argonne Forest, for, despite this
reinforcement, it was our army that was doing the driving. Our aircraft
was increasing in skill and numbers and forcing the issue, and our
infantry and artillery were improving rapidly with each new experience.
The replacements fresh from home were put into exhausted divisions with
little time for training, but they had the advantage of serving beside
men who knew their business and who had almost become veterans
overnight. The enemy had taken every advantage of the terrain, which
especially favored the defense, by a prodigal use of machine guns manned
by highly trained veterans and by using his artillery at short ranges.
In the face of such strong frontal positions we should have been unable
to accomplish any progress according to previously accepted standards,
but I had every confidence in our aggressive tactics and the courage of
our troops.
On Oct. 4 the attack was renewed all along our front. The 3d Corps,
tilting to the left, followed the Brieulles-Cunel road; our 5th Corps
took Gesnes, while the 1st Corps advanced for over two miles along the
irregular valley of the Aire River and in the wooded hills of the
Argonne that bordered the river, used by the enemy with all his art and
weapons of defense. This sort of fighting continued against an enemy
striving to hold every foot of ground and whose very strong
counter-attacks challenged us at every point. On the 7th the 1st Corps
captured Chatal-Chenery and continued along the river to Cornay. On the
east of Meuse sector one of the two divisions, co-operating with the
French, captured Consenvoye and the Haumont Woods. On the 9th the 5th
Corps, in its progress up the Aire, took Fleville, and the 3d Corps,
which had continuous fighting against odds, was working its way through
Brieulles and Cunel. On the 10th we had cleared the Argonne Forest of
the enemy.
It was now necessary to constitute a second army, and on Oct. 9 the
immediate command of the First Army was turned over to Lieut. Gen.
Hunter Liggett. The command of the Second Army, whose divisions
occupied a sector in the Woevre, was given to Lieut. Gen. Robert L.
Bullard, who had been commander of the 1st Division and then of the 3d
Corps. Major Gen. Dickman was transferred to the command of the 1st
Corps, while the 5th Corps was placed under Major Gen. Charles P.
Summerall, who had recently commanded the 1st Division. Major Gen. John
L. Hines, who had gone rapidly up from regimental to division commander,
was assigned to the 3d Corps. These four officers had been in France
from the early days of the expedition and had learned their lessons in
the school of practical warfare.
Our constant pressure against the enemy brought day by day more
prisoners, mostly survivors from machine-gun nests captured in fighting
at close quarters. On Oct. 18 there was very fierce fighting in the
Caures Woods east of the Meuse and in the Ormont Woods. On the 14th the
1st Corps took St. Juvin, and the 5th Corps, in hand-to-hand encounters,
entered the formidable Kriemhilde line, where the enemy had hoped to
check us indefinitely. Later the 5th Corps penetrated further the
Kriemhilde line, and the 1st Corps took Champigneulles and the important
town of Grandpre. Our dogged offensive was wearing down the enemy, who
continued desperately to throw his best troops against us, thus
weakening his line in front of our allies and making their advance less
difficult.
DIVISIONS IN BELGIUM
Meanwhile we were not only able to continue the battle, but our 37th and
91st Divisions were hastily withdrawn from our front and dispatched to
help the French Army in Belgium. Detraining in the neighborhood of
Ypres, these divisions advanced by rapid stages to the fighting line and
were assigned to adjacent French corps. On Oct. 31, in continuation of
the Flanders offensive, they attacked and methodically broke down all
enemy resistance. On Nov. 3 the 37th had completed its mission in
dividing the enemy across the Escaut River and firmly established itself
along the east bank included in the division zone of action. By a clever
flanking movement troops of the 91st Division captured Spitaals
Bosschen, a difficult wood extending across the central part of the
division sector, reached the Escaut, and penetrated into the town of
Audenarde. These divisions received high commendation from their corps
commanders for their dash and energy.
MEUSE-ARGONNE--LAST PHASE
On the 23d the 3d and 5th Corps pushed northward to the level of
Bantheville. While we continued to press forward and throw back the
enemy's violent counter-attacks with great loss to him, a regrouping of
our forces was under way for the final assault. Evidences of loss of
morale by the enemy gave our men more confidence in attack and more
fortitude in enduring the fatigue of incessant effort and the hardships
of very inclement weather.
With comparatively well-rested divisions, the final advance in the
Meuse-Argonne front was begun on Nov. 1. Our increased artillery force
acquitted itself magnificently in support of the advance, and the enemy
broke before the determined infantry, which, by its persistent fighting
of the past weeks and the dash of this attack, had overcome his will to
resist. The 3d Corps took Ancreville, Doulcon, and Andevanne, and the
5th Corps took Landres et St. Georges and pressed through successive
lines of resistance to Bayonville and Chennery. On the 2d the 1st Corps
joined in the movement, which now became an impetuous onslaught that
could not be stayed.
On the 3d advance troops surged forward in pursuit, some by motor
trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close
behind. The 1st Corps reached Authe and Chatillon-sur-Bar, the 5th
Corps, Fosse and Nouart, and the 3d Corps, Halles, penetrating the
enemy's line to a depth of twelve miles. Our large-calibre guns had
advanced and were skillfully brought into position to fire upon the
important lines at Montmedy, Longuyon, and Conflans. Our 3d Corps
crossed the Meuse on the 5th, and the other corps, in the full
confidence that the day was theirs, eagerly cleared the way of machine
guns as they swept northward, maintaining complete co-ordination
throughout. On the 6th a division of the 1st Corps reached a point on
the Meuse opposite Sedan, twenty-five miles from our line of departure.
The strategical goal which was our highest hope was gained. We had cut
the enemy's main line of communications, and nothing but surrender or an
armistice could save his army from complete disaster.
In all forty enemy divisions had been used against us in the
Meuse-Argonne battle. Between Sept. 26 and Nov. 6 we took 26,059
prisoners and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged were the
1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 32d, 33d, 35th, 37th, 42d,
77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 82d, 89th, 90th, and 91st. Many of our divisions
remained in line for a length of time that required nerves of steel,
while others were sent in again after only a few days of rest. The 1st,
5th, 26th, 42d, 77th, 80th, 89th, and 90th were in the line twice.
Although some of the divisions were fighting their first battle, they
soon became equal to the best.
EAST OF THE MEUSE
On the three days preceding Nov. 10, the 3d, the 2d Colonial, and the
17th French Corps fought a difficult struggle through the Meuse hills
south of Stenay and forced the enemy into the plain. Meanwhile, my plans
for further use of the American forces contemplated an advance between
the Meuse and the Moselle in the direction of Longwy by the First Army,
while, at the same time, the Second Army should assure the offensive
toward the rich coal fields of Briey. These operations were to be
followed by an offensive toward Chateau-Salins east of the Moselle, thus
isolating Metz. Accordingly, attacks on the American front had been
ordered, and that of the Second Army was in progress on the morning of
Nov. 11 when instructions were received that hostilities should cease at
11 o'clock A. M.
At this moment the line of the American sector, from right to left,
began at Port-sur-Seille, thence across the Moselle to Vandieres and
through the Woevre to Bezonvaux, in the foothills of the Meuse, thence
along to the foothills and through the northern edge of the Woevre
forests to the Meuse at Mouzay, thence along the Meuse connecting with
the French under Sedan.
RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIES
Co-operation among the Allies has at all times been most cordial. A far
greater effort has been put forth by the allied armies and staffs to
assist us than could have been expected. The French Government and Army
have always stood ready to furnish us with supplies, equipment, and
transportation, and to aid us in every way. In the towns and hamlets
wherever our troops have been stationed or billeted the French people
have everywhere received them more as relatives and intimate friends
than as soldiers of a foreign army. For these things words are quite
inadequate to express our gratitude. There can be no doubt that the
relations growing out of our associations here assure a permanent
friendship between the two peoples. Although we have not been so
intimately associated with the people of Great Britain, yet their troops
and ours when thrown together have always warmly fraternized. The
reception of those of our forces who have passed through England and of
those who have been stationed there has always been enthusiastic.
Altogether it has been deeply impressed upon us that the ties of
language and blood bring the British and ourselves together completely
and inseparably.
STRENGTH
There are in Europe altogether, including a regiment and some sanitary
units with the Italian Army and the organizations at Murmansk, also
including those en route from the States, approximately 2,053,347 men,
less our losses. Of this total there are in France 1,338,169 combatant
troops. Forty divisions have arrived, of which the infantry personnel of
ten have been used as replacements, leaving thirty divisions now in
France organized into three armies of three corps each.
The losses of the Americans up to Nov. 18 are: Killed and wounded,
36,145; died of disease, 14,811; deaths unclassified, 2,204; wounded,
179,625; prisoners, 2,163; missing, 1,160. We have captured about 44,000
prisoners and 1,400 guns, howitzers, and trench mortars.
COMMENDATION
The duties of the General Staff, as well as those of the army and corps
staffs, have been very ably performed. Especially is this true when we
consider the new and difficult problems with which they have been
confronted. This body of officers, both as individuals and as an
organization, has, I believe, no superiors in professional ability, in
efficiency, or in loyalty.
Nothing that we have in France better reflects the efficiency and
devotion to duty of Americans in general than the Service of Supply,
whose personnel is thoroughly imbued with a patriotic desire to do its
full duty. They have at all times fully appreciated their responsibility
to the rest of the army, and the results produced have been most
gratifying.
Our Medical Corps is especially entitled to praise for the general
effectiveness of its work, both in hospital and at the front. Embracing
men of high professional attainments, and splendid women devoted to
their calling and untiring in their efforts, this department has made a
new record for medical and sanitary proficiency.
The Quartermaster Department has had difficult and various tasks, but it
has more than met all demands that have been made upon it. Its
management and its personnel have been exceptionally efficient and
deserve every possible commendation.
As to the more technical services, the able personnel of the Ordnance
Department in France has splendidly fulfilled its functions, both in
procurement and in forwarding the immense quantities of ordnance
required. The officers and men and the young women of the Signal Corps
have performed their duties with a large conception of the problem, and
with a devoted and patriotic spirit to which the perfection of our
communications daily testifies. While the Engineer Corps has been
referred to in another part of this report, it should be further stated
that the work has required large vision and high professional skill, and
great credit is due their personnel for the high proficiency that they
have constantly maintained.
Our aviators have no equals in daring or in fighting ability, and have
left a record of courageous deeds that will ever remain a brilliant page
in the annals of our army. While the Tank Corps has had limited
opportunities, its personnel has responded gallantly on every possible
occasion, and has shown courage of the highest order.
The Adjutant General's Department has been directed with a systematic
thoroughness and excellence that surpassed any previous work of its
kind. The Inspector General's Department has risen to the highest
standards, and throughout has ably assisted commanders in the
enforcement of discipline. The able personnel of the Judge Advocate
General's Department has solved with judgment and wisdom the multitude
of difficult legal problems, many of them involving questions of great
international importance.
It would be impossible in this brief preliminary report to do justice to
the personnel of all the different branches of this organization, which
I shall cover in detail in a later report.
The navy in European waters has at all times most cordially aided the
army, and it is most gratifying to report that there has never before
been such perfect co-operation between these two branches of the
service.
As to the Americans in Europe not in the military service, it is the
greatest pleasure to say that, both in official and in private life,
they are intensely patriotic and loyal, and have been invariably
sympathetic and helpful to the army.
Finally, I pay the supreme tribute to our officers and soldiers of the
line. When I think of their heroism, their patience under hardships,
their unflinching spirit of offensive action, I am filled with emotion
which I am unable to express. Their deeds are immortal, and they have
earned the eternal gratitude of our country.
I am, Mr. Secretary, very respectfully,
JOHN J. PERSHING,
_General, Commander in Chief,
American Expeditionary Forces._
To the Secretary of War.