MEUSE-ARGONNE BEGINS
Having successfully accomplished one piece of work, the American Army
received as its reward another piece of work. The reward consisted in
the fact that the second task assigned to Pershing's men was, perhaps,
the hardest possible at any point in the line. Since 1915 the Argonne
Forest had been a rest area for the German Army. Everything had been
done to make the position impregnable, and so it was in theory. But the
Americans broke that theory and took the forest. So confident were the
Germans of their tenancy that they had built all sorts of palatial
underground dwellings. Barring light, there was no modern convenience
which these dugouts (although that is no fit name) did not possess. Some
had running water. All the most pretentious ones had feather-beds, and
the big underground rooms were gay with pictures and furniture stolen
from the French. The defenses of the positions in the forest included
miles and miles of barbed wire, sometimes hidden in the underbrush, and
again carried around tree-trunks higher than a man could reach. There
were high concrete walls to stop the progress of tanks and deep-pit
traps into which they might fall. And machine guns were everywhere.
The Meuse-Argonne campaign, which falls into three phases, reads far
differently than the taking of St. Mihiel. Except in its early stages
this was no grand running, flawless offensive without a hitch worth
mentioning. In the nature of things it could not be so. The Argonne was
less susceptible to the laws of military strategy. Warfare in these
woods became a struggle between small detached units. Much of the
fighting took place in the dark and practically all of it in the rain.
The American victory was a triumph of the bomb and the rifle, and
perhaps the wire-cutter should be added, over the machine-gun. In many
encounters the opposing units fired at each other from short ranges, and
directed their fire solely by the flashes of the other fellow's
machine-gun. War in the Argonne Forest was a cat-and-dog fight, and
Germany was destined to play the cat's usual role, though she clawed her
hardest.
And yet though many of the phases of the Meuse-Argonne were primitive
and elemental in their nature, sound strategy lay behind the campaign.
General Pershing in his vivid report explains not only the necessity for
the campaign but the objects which he sought and gained. St. Mihiel
shook the confidence of the Germans, but neither that success nor those
scored by other allied armies was sufficient to batter the Germans into
defeat.
"The German Army," wrote General Pershing, "had as yet shown no
demoralization, and while the mass of its troops had suffered in morale,
its first-class divisions, and notably its machine-gun defense, were
exhibiting remarkable tactical efficiency as well as courage. The German
General Staff was fully aware of the consequences of a success on the
Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that he would do everything in his power to
oppose us, the action was planned with as much secrecy as possible, and
was undertaken with the determination to use all our divisions in
forcing decision. We expected to draw the best German divisions to our
front and to consume them while the enemy was held under grave
apprehension lest our attack should break his line, which it was our
firm purpose to do."
"Our right flank," wrote General Pershing in describing his position at
the beginning of the battle, "was protected by the Meuse, while our left
embraced the Argonne Forest, whose ravines, hills, and elaborate defense
screened by dense thickets, had been generally considered impregnable.
Our order of battle from right to left was: the Third Corps from the
Meuse to Malancourt, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth, and Fourth
Divisions in line, and the Third Division as corps reserve; the Fifth
Corps from Malancourt to Vauquois, with Seventy-ninth, Eighty-seventh,
and Ninety-first Divisions in line, and the Thirty-second in corps
reserve; and the First Corps, from Vauquois to Vienne Le Chateau, with
Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth, and Seventy-seventh Divisions in line, and
the Ninety-second in corps reserve. The army reserve consisted of the
First, Twenty-ninth, and Eighty-second Divisions."
The American Army had no extended vacation after the victory at St.
Mihiel. That action had hardly been completed when some of the artillery
left its positions and departed for the Meuse-Argonne front. St. Mihiel
began on September 12. Just two weeks later the first attack in the
long-protracted Meuse-Argonne campaign began. The first portion of this
offensive was by far the easiest. It was difficult, to be sure, but the
terrific hardships were still to come. One factor which mitigated the
task of the troops engaged in the first attack was that again the
Germans seemed to have been taken by surprise. The Americans moved very
fast over difficult terrain. This was country which had already been
sorely disputed, and shell-holes were everywhere. In the places where
there were no shell-holes there was barbed wire.
As the attack progressed the German resistance increased. Artillery was
moved forward and machine-guns seemed to spring up overnight in that
much ploughed and harrowed land. Yet after three days' fighting the
Americans had penetrated a distance of from three to seven miles into
the enemy's positions, in spite of the large numbers of reserves which
were thrown in to check them. Even a German _communique_ writer would
hardly have the face to maintain that the territory captured by the
Americans was of no strategic importance. Every mile that Pershing's men
went forward brought them that much nearer to Sedan, and on Sedan rested
the whole fate of the German lines in France. But Sedan was still many a
weary mile away. The territorial gains in the onward rush of the first
three days included the villages of Montfaucon, Exermont, Gercourt,
Cuisy, Septsarges, Malancourt, Ivoiry (known to the doughboys, of
course, as Solid Ivory), Epinonville, Charpentry, and Very. Ten thousand
prisoners were taken.
In spite of this great success it was not possible for the Americans to
drive straight forward. The country over which the action was fought was
so bad that several days were needed to build new roads up to the
positions which had been won. Even with the best efforts in the world,
the moving of supplies was a prodigious job. The mud was almost as great
a foe as the German guns. In the necessary lull the Germans, of course,
rushed new troops into the sector to combat the American advance.
Naturally, the lull was not complete. There was constant raiding by
Americans to identify units opposed to them, and here and there in small
local attacks strategic points were taken which would be of advantage in
the big push to come. From prisoners the Americans learned that among
the divisions opposite them were many of the crack units of the German
Army. America was also represented by its best organizations, but under
the constant losses incurred in attacks against strongly intrenched
positions units dwindled, and replacements were poured in. Under the
circumstances it was necessary to send many soldiers to the front who
had been in training but a short while. These were mixed in, however,
with veterans, and it should be said to the credit of these green men
that in practically every case they upheld the reputation of the units
to which they were sent. They were quick to feel themselves as sharers
in the reputation of their new-found organizations.
There was no element of surprise to help the American Army when the
attack began again in full force on October 4. Where progress before had
been measured in miles, now it was counted in yards. Possibly it was
even a matter of feet at some points in the line. Yet always the
movement was forward. Weight of numbers and dogged courage proved that
machine-gun nests of the strongest sort were vulnerable. The Germans
counter-attacked constantly, but such tactics were actually welcomed by
the Americans as they brought the Germans into the open and gave our
riflemen and machine-gunners something at which to shoot. The
difficulties with which the Americans had to contend may be judged by
the fact that, according to an official report, the Germans had
machine-guns at intervals of every yard all along their line.
The Argonne fighting produced many actions more important than the
rescue of the Lost Battalion, but hardly any as dramatic. The incident
could have happened only in the Argonne, where communication with
co-operating units was always difficult, and sometimes impossible.
Major Whittlesey's battalion, in making an attack through the forest,
gained their objectives, only to find that they were out of touch with
the American and French units with which they were co-operating. It is
not true, as sometimes reported, that Whittlesey pushed ahead beyond the
objectives which had been set for him. Nevertheless, he was so far away
from help as to make his chances of rescue small. German machine-guns
were behind him. His men were raked by fire from all sides. Yet their
position was a strong one and they hung on. Soon their rations were
gone. For more than twenty-four hours even their position was unknown to
the American Army. Eventually they were located by aeroplanes and an
attempt was made to supply them with food and ammunition. Even yet
rescue seemed a long chance. The Germans thought the battalion was at
their mercy and sent a messenger asking Whittlesey to surrender. He
refused, and the "Go to Hell" which has been put into his mouth as a
fitting expression for the occasion will probably go down in American
history in spite of the fact that Whittlesey has done his best to
convince people that he never said it. Several attacks were made in an
effort to rescue the Americans but without success until a force under
Lieutenant-Colonel Gene Houghton broke through and brought the exhausted
men back to safety.
The last strongly fortified line of the Germans was the Kriemhilde, and
the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive had not been in progress
long before our men were astride the line at many points. But there was
still much desperate fighting to do before the Germans were completely
driven from their scientifically perfect positions. The honor of
actually breaching the line fell to the Fifth Corps, which entered the
line on October 14 and drove the Germans out after some fearful close
fighting. In the meantime the continual pressure of the American forces
was beginning to tell. Chatel-Chehery fell to the First Corps on October
7. On the 9th the Fifth Corps took Fleville, and the Third Corps, after
some desperate fighting, worked its way through Brieulles and Cunel. By
October 10 the Argonne Forest was practically clear of the enemy.
One of the important factors in the Argonne campaign was aviation.
Aerial activity was great on both sides, since in no other campaign was
observation so difficult or so important. Both sides did a great deal of
day bombing, and during one such American foray the greatest battle of
the air took place. The American expedition consisted of thirty-four
machines. It was attacked by thirty-six Fokkers. Although the German
machines are faster, the American squadron managed to hold its
formation. Seven Fokker machines were brought down in the battle and
five American.
All in all, the Meuse-Argonne campaign was one of the most remarkable in
the history of the war. Its second phase in particular is sure to be a
bone of contention for military experts. General Pershing himself
declared very frankly in his report to Secretary Baker that he had
purposely abandoned traditional military tactics in the campaign. "The
enemy," he wrote, "had taken every advantage of the terrain, which
especially favored the defense, by a prodigal use of machine-guns manned
by highly trained veterans, and by using his artillery at short ranges.
In the face of such strong frontal positions we should have been unable
to accomplish any progress according to previously accepted standards,
but I had every confidence in our aggressive tactics and the courage of
our troops."
Such strategists as oppose the theory of the Meuse-Argonne campaign will
undoubtedly assert that American losses were high. In rebuttal defenders
of the plan of the campaign will say that the losses were very light
considering the nature of the fighting, and that the campaign shortened
the duration of the war appreciably by putting the Germans into a
position where they were compelled either to surrender or be
overwhelmed. But whatever decision may be reached by the experts, there
is no necessity of calling for testimony as to the part the American
soldier played in this campaign. It seems fair to say that he has never
shown more dogged courage or resourcefulness than in the fighting in the
forest.