with the Reformer, Maitland again returned to the charge, and engaged
to defend the uncontrollable authority of rulers. “Well,” said he,
“I am somewhat better provided in this last head, than I was in the
other two. Mr Knox, yesterday we heard your judgment upon the 13th
to the Romans; we heard the mind of the apostle well opened; we heard
the causes why God has established powers upon earth; we heard the
necessity that mankind has of the same; and we heard the duty of
magistrates sufficiently declared. But in two things I was offended,
and I think some more of my lords that then were present: The one was,
ye made difference betwixt the ordinance of God, and the persons that
are placed in authority; and ye affirmed, that men might resist the
persons, and yet not offend God’s ordinance: The other was, that
subjects were not bound to obey their princes if they commanded
unlawful things, but that they might resist their princes, and were
not ever bound to suffer.” Knox said that the secretary had given
a correct statement of his sentiments. “How will you prove your
division and difference,” said Maitland, “and that the person placed
in authority may be resisted, and God’s ordinance not transgressed,
seeing that the {118} apostle says, ‘He that resists the power,
resists the ordinance of God?’” Knox replied, that the difference
was evident from the words of the apostle, and that his affirmative
was supported by approved examples. For the apostle asserts, that the
powers ordained of God are for the preservation of quiet and peaceable
men, and for the punishment of malefactors; whence it is plain, that
God’s ordinance is wholly intended for the preservation of mankind,
the punishment of vice, and the maintenance of virtue; but the persons
placed in authority are often corrupt, unjust, and oppressive. Having
referred to the conduct of the people of Israel in rescuing Jonathan
from the hands of Saul, which is recorded with approbation, and to
the conduct of Doeg, in putting to death the priests at the command
of that monarch, which is recorded with disapprobation in scripture,
he proceeded thus: “And now, my lord, in answer to the place of the
apostle, I say, that ‘the power’ in that place is not to be understood
of the unjust commandment of men, but of the just power wherewith
God has armed his magistrates to punish sin and to maintain virtue.
As if any man should enterprise to take from the hands of a lawful
judge a murderer, an adulterer, or any other malefactor that by God’s
law deserved the death, this same man resisted God’s ordinance, and
procured to himself vengeance and damnation, because that he stayeth
God’s sword to strike. But so it is not, if that men, in the fear of
God, oppose themselves to the fury and blind rage of princes; for so
they resist not God, but the devil, who abuses {119} the sword and
authority of God.”――“I understand sufficiently,” said Maitland, “what
you mean; and unto the one part I will not oppose myself, but I doubt
of the other. For if the queen would command me to slay John Knox,
because she is offended at him, I would not obey her; but if she would
command others to do it, or yet by a colour of justice take his life
from him, I cannot tell if I be bound to defend him against the queen,
and against her officers.”――“Under protestation,” replied the Reformer,
“that the auditory think not that I speak in favour of myself, I say,
my lord, that if ye be persuaded of my innocence, and if God hath
given you such power or credit as might deliver me, and yet ye suffer
me to perish, that in so doing ye should be criminal, and guilty of
my blood.”――“Prove that, and win the plea,” said Maitland. “Well, my
lord,” answered Knox, “remember your promise, and I shall be short
in my probation.” He then produced the example of Jeremiah, who, when
accused by the priests and false prophets, said to the princes, “Know
ye for certain, that if ye put me to death, ye shall surely bring
innocent blood upon yourselves, and upon this city, and upon the
inhabitants thereof.”――“The cases are not like,” said Maitland. “And I
would learn,” said Knox, “wherein the dissimilitude stands.”――“First,”
replied Maitland, “the king had not condemned him to death. And
next, the false prophets, the priests, and the people, accused him
without a cause, and therefore they could not but be guilty of his
blood.”――“Neither of these fights with my argument,” said {120} Knox;
“for, albeit neither the king was present, nor yet had condemned
him, yet were the princes and chief counsellors there sitting in
judgment, who represented the king’s person and authority. And if ye
think that they should all have been criminal only because they all
accused him, the plain text witnesses the contrary; for the princes
defended him, and so, no doubt, did a great part of the people, and
yet he boldly affirms that they should be all guilty of his blood, if
that he should be put to death.”――“Then will ye,” said the secretary,
“make subjects to control their princes and rulers?”――“And what harm,”
asked the Reformer, “should the commonwealth receive, if the corrupt
affections of ignorant rulers were moderated, and so bridled, by the
wisdom and discretion of godly subjects, that they should do wrong or
violence to no man?”
The secretary, finding himself hard pushed, said that they had
wandered from the argument; and he professed that if the queen should
become a persecutor, he would be as ready as any within the realm to
adopt the doctrine of the Reformer. “But our question,” said he, “is,
whether that we may, and ought, suppress the queen’s mass. Or, whether
that her idolatry should be laid to our charge.”――“Idolatry ought not
only to be suppressed,” said Knox, “but the idolater ought to die the
death.”――“I know,” answered Maitland, “that the idolater ought to die
the death; but by whom?”――“By the people,” rejoined the Reformer; “for
the commandment was made to Israel, as ye may read, ‘Hear, O Israel,
{121} saith the Lord, the statutes and commandments of the Lord thy
God.’”――“But there is no commandment given to the people to punish
their king, if he be an idolater.”――“I find no privilege granted
unto kings,” said Knox, “more than unto the people, to offend God’s
majesty.”――“I grant,” said the secretary; “but yet the people may not
be judge unto their king, to punish him, albeit he be an idolater. The
people may not execute God’s judgment, but must leave it unto himself,
who will either punish it by death, by war, by imprisonment, or by
some other kind of plagues.”――“I know,” replied Knox, “the last part
of your reason to be true; but for the first I am assured ye have no
other warrant except your own imagination, and the opinion of such as
more fear to offend princes than God.”
“Why say you so?” said Maitland. “I have the judgments of the most
famous men within Europe, and of such as ye yourself will confess
both godly and learned.” Upon which he produced a bundle of papers,
and read extracts from the writings of the principal reformed divines
against resistance to rulers; adding, that he had bestowed more
labour on the collection of these authorities than on the reading
of commentaries for seven years. Knox replied, that it was a pity he
had given himself so much labour, for none of the extracts which he
had read bore upon the question under discussion; some of them being
directed against the anabaptists, who denied that Christians should
be subject to magistrates, or that it was lawful for them to hold
the {122} office of magistracy; and the rest referring to the case
of a small number of Christians scattered through heathen and infidel
countries, which was the situation of the primitive church. In this
last case, he said, he perfectly agreed with the writers whom Maitland
had quoted; but when the majority of a nation were professors of the
true religion, the case was very different. While the posterity of
Abraham were few in number, and while they sojourned in different
countries, they were merely required to avoid all participation in
the idolatrous rites of the heathen; but as soon as they “prospered
into a kingdom,” and obtained possession of Canaan, they were strictly
charged to suppress idolatry, and to destroy all its monuments and
incentives. The same duty was now incumbent on the professors of the
true religion in Scotland, whose release from bondage, temporal and
spiritual, was no less wonderful than the redemption of the Israelites
from Egypt. Formerly, when not more than ten persons in a country
were enlightened, and when these were called to seal their testimony
to the truth by giving their bodies to the flames, it would have
been foolishness to have demanded of the nobility the suppression of
idolatry. But now, when knowledge had increased, and God had given
such a signal victory to the truth, that it had been publicly embraced
by the realm, if they suffered the land to be again defiled, both they
and their queen should drink of the cup of divine indignation――she,
because, amidst the great light of the gospel, she continued
obstinately addicted to {123} idolatry, and they, because they
tolerated, and even countenanced her in such conduct.
Maitland challenged his opponent to prove that the apostles or
prophets ever taught that subjects might suppress the idolatry of
their rulers. Knox appealed to the conduct of the prophet Elisha in
anointing Jehu, and giving him a charge to punish the idolatry and
bloodshed of the royal family of Ahab. “Jehu was a king before he put
any thing in execution,” said the secretary.――“My lord, he was a mere
subject, and no king, when the prophet’s servant came to him; yea,
and albeit that his fellow captains, hearing of the message, blew
the trumpet, and said ‘Jehu is king,’ yet I doubt not but Jezebel
both thought and said he was a traitor, and so did many others in
Israel and Samaria.”――“Besides this,” said Maitland, “the fact is
extraordinary, and ought not to be imitated.”――“It had the ground of
God’s ordinary judgment, which commands the idolater to die the death,”
answered Knox. “We are not bound to imitate extraordinary examples,”
rejoined Maitland, “unless we have like commandment and assurance.”
Knox granted that this was true when the example was repugnant to
the ordinary precept of the law, as in the case of the Israelites
borrowing from the Egyptians without repayment. But when the example
agreed with the law, he insisted that it was imitable; and of this
kind was the instance to which he had appealed. But, said Maitland,
“whatsoever they did, was done at God’s commandment.”――“That
fortifies my argument,” retorted the Reformer; “for God, {124} by
his commandment, has approved that subjects punish their princes for
idolatry and wickedness by them committed.”――“We have not the like
commandment,” said the secretary.――“That I deny; for the commandment,
that the idolater shall die the death, is perpetual, as ye yourself
have granted; ye doubted only who should be the executioner, and I
have sufficiently proven that God has raised up the people, and by his
prophet has anointed a king, to take vengeance upon the king and his
posterity, which fact God since that time has never retracted.”――“Ye
have produced but one example,” said Maitland.――“One sufficeth;
but yet, God be praised, we lack not others, for the whole people
conspired against Amaziah, king of Judah, after he had turned away
from the Lord.”――“I doubt whether they did well, or not,” said
Maitland.――“God gave sufficient approbation of their fact, for
he blessed them with victory, peace, and prosperity, the space of
fifty‑two years after.”――“But prosperity does not always prove that
God approves the facts of men.”――“Yes, when the facts of men agree
with the law of God, and are rewarded according to his promise, I say
that the prosperity succeeding the fact is a most infallible assurance
that God has approved that fact. And now, my lord, I have but one
example to produce, and then I will put an end to my reasoning,
because I weary longer to stand.” The lords desired him to take a
chair; but he declined it, saying, “that melancholic reasons needed
some mirth to be intermixed with them.” After a short dispute on the
resistance of the {125} priests to Uzziah, the Reformer recapitulated
the propositions which he thought had been established in the course
of the debate. “Well,” said Maitland, “I think ye shall not have many
learned men of your opinion.” Knox replied, that the truth ceased
not to be the truth, because men misunderstood or opposed it, and
yet he did not want the suffrages of learned men to his opinions.
Upon which he presented a copy of the Apology of Magdeburgh, desiring
the secretary to look at the names of the ministers who had approved
of the defence of that city against the emperor, and subscribed the
proposition, that to resist a tyrant is not to resist the ordinance
of God. “Homines obscuri!”[129] said Maitland, slightingly, after
perusing the list. “Dei tamen servi!”[130] replied the Reformer.
The secretary now insisted that the questions which they had discussed
should be put to the vote, and that the determination of the meeting
should fix a rule for uniformity of doctrine among the ministers. Knox
protested against this motion, and reminded their lordships that the
General Assembly had agreed to the present conference upon the express
condition that nothing should be voted or decided at it. At last it
was agreed, that the opinions of those who were present should be
taken, but that they should not be considered as decisive. Winram,
superintendent of Fife, and Douglas, rector of the university of
St Andrew’s, were the principal persons among the ministers, {126}
who agreed in sentiment with the courtiers. Knox’s colleague, in
delivering his opinion, took occasion to give an account of a public
dispute at which he had been present in Bologna, upon the question,
Whether subjects have a right to control and reform their rulers,
when they have been guilty of violating their oaths of office. Thomas
de Finola, rector of the University, and Vincentius de Placentia,
persons celebrated for their learning, maintained the affirmative on
this question, and their opinion was adopted after long discussion.
“Ye tell us what was done in Bologna,” exclaimed one of the courtiers;
“we are in a kingdom, and they are but a commonwealth.”――“My lord,”
replied Craig, “my judgment is, that every kingdom is a commonwealth,
or at least should be, albeit that every commonwealth is not a kingdom;
and therefore I think that in a kingdom no less diligence ought to be
taken that laws be not violated than in a commonwealth, because the
tyranny of princes who continually reign in a kingdom, is more hurtful
to the subjects than the misgovernment of those that from year to
year are changed in free commonwealths.” He added, that the dispute to
which he had referred was conducted on general principles, applicable
equally to monarchies and republics; and that one of the conclusions
adopted was, that, although laws contrary to the law of God, and to
the true principles of government, had been introduced, through the
negligence of the people or the tyranny of princes, yet the same
people, or their posterity, had a right to demand that all things
{127} should be reformed according to the original institution of
kings and commonwealths.[131]
The speech of Craig alarmed the courtiers as to the issue of the vote;
and the clerk register took occasion to observe that, at a former
conference, it had been agreed that Knox should write to Calvin to
obtain his opinion on this question. Knox corrected this statement, by
saying that the secretary had undertaken to consult that reformer, but
although repeatedly reminded of his promise, had never fulfilled it.
Maitland acknowledged this, and said that upon mature deliberation
he durst not, considering his station, ask advice respecting any
controversy between the queen and her subjects, without her majesty’s
consent. It was now proposed that Knox should write to Calvin; but
he refused to be employed in the business. Before he returned to
the kingdom, he said, he had obtained the judgment of the most
eminent foreign divines on that question, and he could not renew
his application to them, without exposing himself to the charge of
forgetfulness or inconsistency. The proper course was for them to
write, complaining that he had taught such doctrines as he had now
defended, and requesting Calvin to {128} communicate his judgment
respecting them. This proposal was thought reasonable, but none
would undertake the task; and the conference broke up without any
determinate resolution being adopted.[132]
The reader must be struck with the difference between this dispute,
and that which Knox formerly maintained with the abbot of Crossraguel.
Although long, it was kept up by the disputants with great spirit;
nor did they take refuge under those ambiguities of speech, or those
sophistical forms of argument, of which persons trained to wrangle
in the schools were ever ready to avail themselves, to perplex an
adversary, or to conceal their own defeat. Few secretaries of state
in modern times would, it is presumed, be able to acquit themselves
so well as Maitland did, on questions which were decided chiefly by
an appeal to the scriptures. But learned and acute as he was, Knox
was fully a match for him, and, on the greater part of the topics
introduced into the debate, evidently had the advantage, according to
the principles held, and the concessions made, by his opponent. For
both parties maintained, that idolatry ought to be punished by death;
a sentiment which they were led to adopt in consequence of their
holding the untenable opinion, that Christian nations are bound to
enact the same penalties against all breaches of the moral law, which
were enjoined by the judicial laws of Moses.[133] This being taken
for granted, {129} the dispute between them resolved itself entirely
into a question respecting the prerogatives of princes and the rights
and duties of subjects. It may be questioned, too, whether Knox’s
reasoning from extraordinary examples, qualified as it was by him,
is sufficiently guarded and correct; for the instances in which
punishment was inflicted in an extraordinary way on criminals,
although the punishment itself was merited and agreeable to law,
cannot be pleaded as precedents in ordinary cases. But even when
we cannot approve of his reasonings, we are compelled to admire the
openness with which he avowed, and the boldness with which he defended,
sentiments so opposite to those which were generally received in that
age.
In the month of August, Knox went, by appointment of the General
Assembly, as visitor of the {130} churches, to Aberdeen and other
parts of the north, where he remained six or seven weeks.[134] At the
subsequent meeting of Assembly, he received a similar appointment to
Fife and Perthshire.[135]
Our Reformer’s predictions at the last meeting of parliament were
now fully realized. Another parliament was held in the end of 1564,
but nothing was done for securing the protestant religion.[136]
The queen’s marriage had long engaged the anxious attention of her
ministers, and had been the subject of much negotiation with England
and at foreign courts; but the various proposals which had been made
with a view to it, and the political intrigues to which they gave
rise, were all thwarted by the sudden and strong passion which Mary
conceived for Henry, lord Darnley, the son of the earl of Lennox.
As this young nobleman, so far as he had discovered any religious
sentiments, was inclined to popery,[137] the match could not be very
agreeable to the great body of the nation, who had already testified
the strongest jealousy at the queen’s attachment to that religion.
It was, therefore, natural for the nobility, in the prospect of this
event, to provide additional securities {131} for the protestant
church, and to insist that the royal sanction, hitherto withheld,
should now be granted to its legal establishment. Upon this condition,
they promised their consent to the marriage.[138] The queen agreed
to summon a parliament to settle this important affair, but she found
some pretext for proroguing its meeting;[139] and, having gained a
number of the nobility by favours and promises, she proceeded, in July
1565, not only to solemnize the nuptials, but to proclaim her husband
king, without the consent of the estates of the kingdom.
The dissatisfaction produced by these precipitate and illegal steps
was heightened by the conduct of Darnley. Naturally vain, rash,
and vindictive, his unexpected prosperity rendered him insolent and
overbearing; and it required all the prudence of the queen to preserve
him from falling into contempt, even before their marriage.[140]
Although he could not have come to Scotland, and his father could not
have been restored to his honours and possessions, considering the
opposition made by the house of Hamilton, without the concurrence and
interest of the earl of Murray; yet, he no sooner found himself seated
in the affections of Mary, than he exerted his influence to deprive
that nobleman of her favour, represented the honours which she had
conferred on him as excessive, and leagued with those who were hostile
to him and to the reformed religion. Lennox, Athole, and David Rizzio,
a low‑bred Italian, who had insinuated himself {132} into the good
graces of Mary, now ruled the court, to the exclusion of the most
able counsellors.[141] Murray had been urged in private to sign an
approbation of the intended marriage, but refused to do it until the
nobility were consulted.[142] His refusal to gratify the queen, by
forwarding a match on which she was passionately bent, obliterated
the memory of all his past services, and drew upon him the furious
resentment of Darnley. Having declined to attend a convention at Perth,
from just apprehensions of personal danger, he was summoned to court
by the queen. The summons was repeated three days after her marriage,
and because he refused to intrust his person, on her safe conduct,
to a court where the influence of his declared enemies prevailed,
he was immediately proclaimed an outlaw.[143] In the meantime, the
persons who had discovered the greatest hostility to him were openly
encouraged. Bothwell was invited to return; lord George Gordon was set
at liberty, and the earldom of Huntly restored to him; and the earl
of Sutherland was recalled from banishment.[144] The lords who were
dissatisfied with the late proceedings, assembled at Stirling, and,
after agreeing to request the protection of Elizabeth, retired to
their houses;[145] but the queen taking the field with all the forces
which she could collect, they were at last compelled {133} to arm in
their own defence.[146] Even after they were driven to this extremity,
they neglected no means of conciliation. They professed their
steadfast loyalty to the queen. They declared that their sole desire
was, that the reformed religion should be secured against the dangers
to which it was exposed, and that the administration of public affairs
should be put into the hands of those whom the nation could trust.
And they offered to submit their own cause to be tried by the laws
of their country.[147] But the queen spurned all their offers of
submission, refused to listen to any intercession in their favour,
and advancing against them with an army, obliged them to take refuge
in England.[148]