THE LAY AUTHORS
Theology and Philosophy, each in its own way attempting to go beyond
inadequate popular belief, could only very gradually transcend the
limits of those narrow communities within which their influence was
first felt and reach the circles in which that popular belief held
sway. During the earliest successes of the theological and
philosophical spirit hardly a voice was raised that might have
suggested that the belief in the imperishability and divine nature
of the human Soul, of the inherence of all things spiritual in one
imperishable, fundamental substance, might become something more
than a mystery known to the wise and illuminated, and enter into the
convictions of the people and the unlearned. "After the death of the
body, the Image of Life remains alive; for that alone is descended
from the gods"--such is the announcement of Pindar. But for all the
confidence with which, as though anticipating no contradiction, he
here proclaims the view of the soul's immortality and bases it upon
its divine nature, such an opinion can at that time have been no
more than the persuasion of isolated communities formed and
instructed in that particular doctrine. It cannot be merely
accidental,[1\12] that in the fragments which have come down to us
of the lyric and semi-lyric (elegiac and iambic) poetry--poetry
intended for a wide and unspecialized public and expressing feelings
and ideas in language that all could understand--hardly a trace
appears of that enhanced conception of the worth and nature of the
Soul. Reflexion does not linger over such dark subjects; whenever
they are illuminated for a passing moment, we discern the outlines
of those figures from the spirit world just as the Homeric
imagination had given them shape.
Life and light are only to be found in this world;[2\12] Death, to
which we are all "owing",[3\12] leads the soul into a realm of
nothingness.[4\12] Inarticulate, voiceless, the dead man lies in the
grave like a statue.[5\12] Upon earth, and not in any shadowy
hereafter, is completed that judgment[6\12] which divine Justice
passes upon the criminal himself, or upon his descendants in whom
something of him still lives on. It is the lack of such descendants
that forms the bitterest pang, as he goes down to Hades, of the man
who passes childless out of this life.[7\12] {412}
More distinctly and bitterly, in this age of advancing civilization
and growing sensibility, sounds the wail over the pain and
affliction of life, the obscurity of its ways, and the uncertainty
of its outcome.[8\12] Silenos, the prophetic wood-spirit, so went
the ancient legend, when captured by King Midas in his rose-gardens
at Bermios earned his release with the judgment of melancholy wisdom
that the Greek was never tired of repeating in ever-varying
forms--not to be born is the best thing for men, but having been
born, let him pray that he may return as soon as possible to the
kingdom of Night,[9\12] and of Hades.[10\12] The cheerful enjoyment
of life is no longer so sure of itself as once it had been in the
days of its naïve confidence: and yet there is no substitute
attempted, no compensatory hereafter in a next world of justice and
untroubled happiness. We rather hear the opinion expressed that rest
is the greatest of all earthly blessings; and rest is brought by
Death. Nevertheless there is little demand for consolation; a robust
and virile sense of life that can put up with whatever may befall of
evil or hardship in healthy indifference, is in the air, and speaks
to us from many a page of this poetic legacy with unpretending
veracity. No attempt is made to smooth over the hardship and cruelty
of life. Man's power is small, his efforts go unrewarded, one
necessity after another besets his short life: over all alike hangs
the shadow of inevitable death. All things come at last to the awful
chasm--the bravest virtue and the highest authority in the
world.[11\12] Yet life is good and death an evil; else, why do the
blessed gods not die? asks Sappho[12\12] with feminine naiveté;
though indeed, her life's path had lain through the deepest valley
of the shadow. Even the dead man, if he wishes to be preserved from
utter nothingness, must depend upon the world of the living as the
only place of reality; the fame of his virtues and his deeds is all
that outlasts his death.[13\12] Perhaps some dim perception of that
fame reaches even to the dead.[14\12] They themselves are for the
living as though they had passed into nothingness; we should not,
thinks a poet, give them another thought after we have buried
them.[15\12]
Here even the time-honoured conventions associated with the cult of
souls seem to be perversely cast aside. In general, the poet with
his wide-ranging observation of mankind had small occasion to be
reminded of the cult of the soul that the narrow circles of family
or city offered to their dead, or of the conceptions thereby
encouraged of the continued life enjoyed by the departed. The
omission is supplied by the Orators of the fifth and fourth
centuries and by what they say--and do {413} not say--of the state
of things hereafter. The greatest period of lyric poetry was by that
time already fading into the past, and yet whoever wished in
speaking before a citizen assembly to meet with general agreement
and understanding was still obliged to refrain from speaking of the
blessed immortality, the eternity and divinity of the soul. The
Orators[16\12] never pass beyond the conceptions of the survival,
power, and rights of the souls of the departed which were called
forth and maintained in existence by the cult of the soul. The
continued existence of the souls in the next world is not called in
question; but the opinion that the souls still preserve their
consciousness and have any knowledge of what happens on this earth
is only expressed with the most cautious avoidance of
definiteness.[17\12] What--apart from the sacrificial offerings of
their relatives--still binds the dead to the life upon earth, is
little more than the fame accorded to them among the living.[18\12]
Even in the elevated language of solemn funeral orations the
consolations offered to the survivors omit all mention of any
enhanced state of being, any thought of immortal life in
fully-conscious blessedness, that might belong now to the glorious
departed.[19\12] Such high visions and hopes for the future were
still, it appears, as little necessary or demanded for the comfort
of the people as they had been in the times of the great wars of
liberty.[20\12] The beloved dead who had given their lives for their
country in those wars, as well as many others of the time whom death
had overtaken, were the recipients of the epitaphs composed by
Simonides the master of brilliant and condensed inscriptions.
Nevertheless, not once does he vouchsafe a word that might point
forward to a land of blessed immortality for the departed. There is
a vestige of life still remaining for the dead--but it is in this
world; the memory of the living and their own great name honoured by
after generations is all that can prolong their existence.
It seems like an echo from another world when (about the middle of
the fifth century) Melanippides the dithyrambic poet addresses a god
in the words: "Hear me Father, marvel of all mortal men, Thou that
rulest over the _everliving Souls_." The words must be addressed to
Dionysos;[21\12] for such as entered into the magic circle of his
nightly festival those visions of the imperishability of the human
soul and its divine power acquired reality. Such wisdom received but
partial assent from those who lived unaffected by the conceptions of
isolated sects of the theologically or philosophically minded. {414}
§ 2
A peculiar position is taken up by Pindar. Two contrasted views of
the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul seem to be combined in
his mind with equal claim to authority.
In the Victory Odes allusions predominate which imply an agreement
with the popular view expressed in the sayings of poets and the
presuppositions of the cult of souls and the worship of Heroes.
After its separation from the body, the soul disappears into the
underworld.[22\12] The piety and affectionate memory of relatives
and descendants remains as a link between the dead and the
living;[23\12] whether the soul itself is still conscious of any
connexion with the world of the living seems uncertain.[24\12] Its
power is over and done with--it is certainly no condition of blessed
happiness into which it has entered. Only the glorious name, the
fame that is honoured in song, rewards the great deeds of the
virtuous after death.[25\12]
An exalted state of being, after their departure from this earth, is
attributed to the _Heroes_ alone. The belief in the existence,
importance, and power of these illuminated spirits holds complete
sway;[26\12] it emerges in lively reality from the words and
narrations of the poet throughout all his work. Moreover, the
ancient conception--in reality rendered untenable by the belief in
Heroes--that only with the undivided union of body and soul is
complete life imaginable, is discernible in many allusions and
stories of Translation that imply that conception. Amphiaraos, the
most illustrious of those who have been translated to everlasting
life, is specially dear to the heart of the Theban poet, and is
glorified more than once in the language of unaffected faith in such
miracles.[27\12] But, further, even when death has occurred in the
meantime, elevation to a higher life remains possible--even beyond
the heights of the "Hero". Semele lives for ever, though she died
under the crash of the thunder-bolt.[28\12] The barrier between men
and gods is not insuperable; we can distantly approach the immortals
not only in greatness of mind, but in bodily vigour.[29\12] One
mother gave birth to both races, though the gulf between them is
indeed a deep one; man is nought--a shadow's dream-image; for the
gods the brazen heavens remain for ever as an unconquerable
stronghold.[30\12] Only a miracle of divine interference with the
lawful and normal course of nature, can raise the individual soul to
the everlasting life of the gods and Heroes.
Such visions as these could be indulged in by one who still {415}
kept his feet firmly fixed upon the ground of popular belief. And
yet side by side with them in Pindar's works are to be found
descriptions of quite another order in which is expressed, with
elaborate fullness and dogmatic exactitude, a complete doctrine of
the nature, destiny, and fate of the soul; passages in which, in
spite of some little poetic licence in detail, a well ordered and,
in the main, consistent whole is pictured.
The Soul, the "Image of Life", the other Self of the living and
visible man, sleeps while the limbs of man are active; when the
individual is asleep it shows him dream-visions of the
future.[31\12] This psyche[32\12] which during the waking and
conscious hours of the man is itself lying in the darkness of
unconsciousness, is far from being the totality of mental powers
gathered together in a single creature, or at any rate, in a single
concept, such as the philosophers as well as the everyday use of the
word at that period understood by the name "psyche". Here, again,
the name once more denotes the double of mankind dwelling within the
living man such as it was known to primeval popular belief and to
the Homeric poems. A theological meaning has, however, been added to
it. This "Image" of man, we are told, "is alone descended from the
gods," and with this the _reason_ also is discovered why the
soul-image alone after the destruction of the body by death remains
alive.[33\12]
Derived from the gods and therefore eternally exempt from
destruction, everlasting and immortal, the soul is none the less
condemned to finiteness; it dwells within the mortal body of man.
This is the result of the "ancient guilt" of which, quite in the
manner of theological poetry, Pindar also speaks.[34\12] After the
death of the body it is to await in Hades the stern sentence that
"One" shall pronounce over its earthly deeds.[35\12] For the
condemned there is in store "affliction past beholding"[36\12] in
deep Tartaros, "where the slow rivers of murky night spit out
endless darkness," and forgetfulness encloses the victims.[37\12]
The just enter into the subterranean places of bliss where the sun
gives them light when he has set upon earth.[38\12] In flowery
meadows they enjoy an existence of resplendent idleness, such as
only the Greek imagination, nourished amid the artistic surroundings
of Greek life, could describe without falling into emptiness and
futility.
But the soul has not even so found its last resting place. It must
again give life to a body and not until it has completed upon earth
a third faultless life can it hope for an end of its earthly course
of being.[39\12] The conditions of each new life {416} upon earth
depend upon the degree of purity that the soul has achieved in its
previous lifetimes. When at last the Queen of the Underworld
considers that its "ancient guilt" has been atoned for, she sends
forth the souls after the ninth year[40\12] of their last sojourn in
Hades once more to live in the upper world, this time in happiness.
Here they pass through one more lifetime as kings, mighty men of
valour, and Wise Men.[41\12] Then at last they escape from the
necessity of earthly rebirth. As "Heroes" they are honoured among
men;[42\12] and they have therefore entered into a state of higher
being which the popular belief of Pindar's time ascribed not only to
the souls of the great ancestral figures of the past, but also to
many who had departed hence in more recent times after a life of
valour and service.[43\12] Now they are beyond the reach of Hades as
much as of the world of men. Faith seeks them in "Islands of the
Blest" far out in Okeanos; thither, to the "Citadel of Kronos" they
travel on the "Way of Zeus"[44\12] and enjoy, in company with the
great ones of the past, under the protection of Kronos[45\12] and
his assessor Rhadamanthys, a life of bliss for ever undisturbed.
Such conceptions of the origin, fortunes, and ultimate destiny of
the soul, the more they diverge from commonly held opinions, the
more certainly must they be regarded as being part of the private
and real persuasion of the poet himself. The poet, who on other
occasions when he makes passing and casual reference to the things
of the next world accommodates himself to the traditional view,
gives himself up willingly to such hopes and aspirations where the
circumstances of his song provided an opportunity of dealing at
length with such matters--especially in hymns of mourning for the
dead. He may have paid attention in such poems to the special
opinions of those who were to be the first hearers of his song.
Theron, the ruler of Akragas, to whom was dedicated the second
Olympian Ode of Victory that deals so fully with the hope of bliss
to come, was an old man whose thoughts might well be occupied with
the life after death.[46\12] In this case, therefore, we may presume
perhaps the special interest of the person whose praises are sung in
these reflections that lead so far away from the commonly accepted
view of the Soul.[47\12] But that Pindar, proud and self-willed,
conscious of specific knowledge and proud of that consciousness,
should have given expression to strange doctrine so foreign to
popular ideas simply out of complaisance to another's will, and in
**subservience to another man's belief--that is quite unthinkable.
It is rather the substance of what he believes himself {417} and has
achieved by his own struggles that in a solemn hour he reveals for a
moment to like-minded friends.
The different elements out of which Pindar has composed his special
view are not hard to distinguish. He is following theological
doctrine in what he tells of the divine origin of the soul, its
wanderings through several bodies, the judgment in Hades, the
special place assigned to the just, and that of the wicked. But it
is layman's theology that he is propounding; it does not bind itself
to a single unalterable formula, and betrays throughout that its
exponent is a poet. Pindar, throughout the whole of his poetic
activity, combines the office of singer with that of professional
teacher, more especially where he has to speak of the things of an
invisible divine world. But for all his didactic professionalism he
remains the poet, for whom as depository and trustee of the Myth it
is out of the question to abandon the traditional, whether in legend
or belief. His task is to keep pure what has been handed down to
him, to make it more profound, perhaps to supplement and complete
it, but with all this to justify it. Thus, poetic legend and popular
belief enter even into his theologian's doctrine of the Soul; the
Islands of the Blest, the elevation of man to Hero--these were
things he could not give up.
From what particular direction Pindar's theological interests may
have come to him we cannot say with precision or certainty. Orphic
as well as Pythagorean doctrines may have come to his notice in
Sicily whither he made repeated visits after 477 B.C.[48\12] For
both sects this country was the original nursery and breeding
ground.
There, too, the poet may perhaps have (even at that date) met with
certain varieties of the Orphic mystical doctrine which, like his
own views, were intermingled with elements taken from conventional
mythology. Examples of this type of Orphic mysticism allied with
foreign elements are the verses which, inscribed upon gold tablets,
were found not long ago in graves near the ancient Sybaris.[49\12]
Three of these poems begin with phrases that are common to them all,
and imply the same underlying conceptions; after that they part
company and represent two different views. The soul of the dead
person[50\12] thus addresses itself to the Queen of the lower world,
and the other gods of the depths below: "I draw near to you purified
and born of pure parents."[51\12] It belongs then to a mortal who,
like his parents before him, has been "purified" in the sacred
mysteries of a religious association.[52\12] It claims also to be
descended from the blessed race of the deities of the lower {418}
world.[53\12] "Lightning robbed me of life," so one of the versions
goes on,[54\12] "and so I escaped from the Circle, the burdensome,
the grievous". In these words purely Orphic belief is expressed: the
Soul has now at last escaped entirely from the "Circle of
Births",[55\12] and it enters as it tells us "with speedy feet into
the wished-for precinct",[56\12] and buries itself in the bosom of
the Queen of the Underworld.[57\12] It is the latter, probably, who
at the end greets the liberated soul with the words: "Fortunate and
to be called Blessed art thou; now shalt thou be, instead of a
mortal--_a god_."
Much less exalted are the hopes expressed in the other two versions
of the mystic document--two versions that resemble each other in
most essentials. Here the soul asserts that it has done penance for
unrighteous deeds; now it appears before the revered Persephoneia to
implore her graciously to send it to the dwelling places of the pure
and the holy.[58\12]
How are we to explain the discrepancy? It would indeed be possible
to explain the more restrained version as that of a sect whose
members were less confident of their own divine origin and of the
necessary return of the soul at last to its enfranchised divine
state. It is much more probable, however--since in fact the
presupposition of the divine nature of the soul and its kinship with
the divine is really made in both cases and with the same
words--that we here have to do with the beliefs of one and the same
sect, and that the varying heights of felicity aspired to correspond
to different stages of the process of redemption. He who through
participation in the sacred mysteries has atoned for the ancient
guilt, can be admitted by the goddess into the paradise of the blest
in the midst of Hades. But he must still, in subsequent rebirths
upon earth first complete the cycle before he can be fully released
from rebirth and become once more what he was at the beginning,
entirely a god. The dead man of the first tablet has reached the
final goal of his pilgrimage; the other two have only reached an
intermediate resting place.[59\12] Another inscription, found in a
grave of the same neighbourhood,[60\12] by its use of a mystic
formula[61\12] appended also to the first version of the
above-mentioned poems, reveals itself as an expression of faith
deriving from the same sect. Among a variety of disconnected
instructions and appeals to the dead,[62\12] strung together with no
particular arrangement, it contains the following statement: "a
_god_ hast thou become instead of a mortal", This then always
remained the crowning point of the salvation promised by the sect.
{419}
In the cult and beliefs of this sect which thus with divided voice
speaks to us in these verses, the worship of the ancient Greek
divinities of the Underworld (among whom Dionysos is not this time
included) was fused with the boldest conception belonging to the
Dionysiac mysteries: the confident assurance that the divine nature
of the soul must in the end break through, purified and triumphant
over the earthliness that obscured it. Pindar in another, but not
very different, way has brought the same elements into conjunction.
One would indeed like to be able to estimate the influence which his
doctrine, which lay so close to his own heart, may have exercised on
the hearers and readers of his poems. He was at once something more
and something less than a theological teacher. Never again among the
Greeks did the blessed life of the sanctified soul receive such
majestic expression, clothed in such ample and resplendent diction,
as that which poured so freely from the heart of this richly gifted
poet. But though the poet may have touched the heart of his hearer
and tempted his imagination to stray along the path laid out for
him, yet it cannot have been easy (and perhaps the greatness of the
poet's triumph almost made it harder) permanently to mistake the
magic gleam of poetry for the sunlight of reality. One may doubt
whether the poems in which Pindar recounted his dreams of future
blessedness can have found many hearers in whom they awakened not
merely æsthetic satisfaction, but belief in the literal truth of the
teaching, in the reality of those beautiful, dim, haloed figures.
§ 3
But perhaps by the expression of such doubts we do less than justice
to the influence which a Greek poet might exercise upon the minds
and dispositions of his hearers. Greek popular opinion was very much
inclined to place the poet on a pedestal to which his modern
representative would hardly care to aspire, and to which at any rate
he could never attain. The purely artistic value and importance of a
poem did not seem to be impaired by the demand that it should at the
same time instruct and edify. The poet was to be the teacher of his
people in an age when, in the conditions of Greek life, the people
had no other instructor. He was to be a teacher in the highest sense
of all when, speaking in the language of the most exalted poetry, he
dealt with the doubts and certainties of religion and the
relationship between religion and morality. In these matters he
could supplement out of the wealth of {420} his own far-reaching
reflection what was lacking in the public morality of the time
through the absence of an official, authoritative religious Book. By
giving them intelligible and memorable expression, together with
greater cohesion and unity, he could strengthen the foundations of
the common stock of moral ideas that had been evolved in the course
of social and city life. He might also expand and give greater depth
to the ideas of popular morality, tempering them in the fire of his
own more rigorous thought and interpreting and refining them from
the heights of a more elevated understanding of the divine. What he
thus gave back to the people stamped with the impress of his own
very personal temperament and outlook, no longer remained the casual
opinion of a single individual, but took root in suitably
constituted minds and became for many a valued possession, an
enduring addition to their consciousness.
It was not until the rise in later times of a fully developed
philosophy extending its range of interpretation to the whole of
life that poetry was deprived of its special office of instructress
to the aspiring minds among the people.[63\12] Poetry had always
been willing to exercise this function, but never so decidedly or
with such fully conscious purpose as in the times of transition at
the beginning of which Pindar lived--the transition from an
unsophisticated faith in the traditional view of all things visible
and invisible to a fresh stabilization of belief secured by, and
resting upon, philosophic conviction. The need felt for the
readjustment or verification of the ancestral or traditional forms
of belief was vividly awakened, and it was still only poetry that
could extend the light of its teaching to illuminate the minds of
whole classes of the population. The influence of the poets must
have increased in proportion as the numbers increased of those who
were ready to receive the special bounty which they were able to
offer. But if the influence wielded by Pindar, the Pan-Hellenic poet
of the great Festivals, as the teacher of his people was, as we have
seen, considerable, a very wide field indeed for the propagation of
fruitful ideas lay open to the Attic tragedians in the huge
concourse of the people which flocked together to hear their
creations--a multitude which seemed all the greater for being
confined within a narrower space. The poets themselves frequently
allow it to be seen how seriously they regarded themselves as the
teachers of their public, and the people admitted their claims. All
men expected and demanded instruction from the word of the poet--the
highest instruction from the highest poetry.[64\12] We shall not be
much mistaken {421} if we believe that the opinions and reflections
to which Aeschylus, Sophokles, and not least Euripides, gave
utterance in their tragic drama did not remain the sole property of
those in whose minds they had first arisen.
§ 4
The Attic Tragedy of the fifth century must of its own accord, even
if the conscious purpose of the dramatists had not tended in the
same direction, have developed into an artistic product based on
psychological interest. The real theatre of that drama must
inevitably have become the interior of its hero's mind.
The tragic poet attempted something hitherto unknown. The characters
and events of ancient legend or history which had passed shadowlike
before the minds of the hearers or readers of all earlier poetry, at
the mercy of those hearers' own private and variously limited
imagination--these same events and characters were now to take form
and body and appear visibly before the eyes of all beholders alike
in equal clearness. What had hitherto seemed a dream-vision of the
imagination now visibly presented itself to the eyes of the
beholder, unchanging, precise, independent of the limitations of
intellect among the audience, a concrete and self-moving object of
waking perception. Thus reawakened to a palpable and fully realized
life, the myth was seen in a new light. What in it was mere incident
became subordinated to the personality of the man who plays his part
in these events before our eyes, and whose importance and content is
not exhausted in the single particular action. The old legend in
becoming drama has undergone an extension both spatial and temporal,
and even in externals the plot that unfolds itself in a series of
momentary acts plays the least part in the story. The speeches and
counter-speeches of the hero and the other actors who take part in
the story were bound to take up the greater part of the time.
Motives of action, expressed, debated and fought out in words,
become more important than their eventual outcome in passionate deed
or mortal woe. With the advance of artistic skill the intellect
seeks to grasp the permanent outlines of the character that in the
given circumstances can be moved by particular motives to particular
acts. Thus, the complete materialization of the myth leads to its
complete spiritualization. The eyes and mind of the beholder are
directed less to the external events--these, being familiar from the
ancient legend, could {422} awaken little curiosity--and more to the
inward meaning and import of what the hero does and suffers.
And it was here that the dramatic poet was faced with his special
and peculiar problem. What was to happen in his drama was settled
out of hand by the course of the ancient legend (in a few cases by
the course of historical events) and the lines along which his
invention must move were planned out for him in advance. To give
life to the personages of the drama, motivation and justification to
the events of the drama--that was his particular business. But in
this he was thrown entirely upon his own resources. Even if he could
he was not permitted to derive the inner motive forces of the action
from the real modes of feeling and thinking that had belonged to the
distant past in which the myth had first been conceived. Such
motives would have remained unintelligible to the audience, and his
play would have been stillborn. But on the other hand, how was he to
make plausible and intelligible to the vastly different mentality
and changed feelings of the age in which he lived actions which
really sprang from the habits and moral ideas of a long since
vanished age? It is open to him (if he is not content to be a mere
annalist simply stringing together bare events) to take the actual
incident given him by the mythical legend and set over against it
the actor in the story whose emotions are those of a modern man, and
upon whose shoulders the burden of the event is laid; he may
represent this opposition as beyond reconciliation, and so lead to
the most simple and overwhelming of tragic conflicts. This simple
opposition of character and destiny which places both the poet and
his hero--another Hamlet--in a position of direct hostility to the
mythological background can, however, never become the rule. It is
the business of the poet as far as possible to assimilate and make
his own the spirit that actually called forth the dark and cruel
legend of the past, while yet remaining true to the mode of
perception proper to his own time. He must manage to leave
undisturbed the full primitive sense of the mythical story and bring
it about that by its marriage with the spirit of a later age its
meaning is not destroyed but deepened. He is committed to the search
for an adjustment between the mental attitudes of an older and a
newer age.
Such an adjustment came most easily to Aeschylus and satisfied the
needs of his temperament. As one who had grown to manhood in the
Athens of the period before the Persian wars his own character had
its roots in ancient and traditional modes of thought. These he
built up under the guiding {423} influence of his own special ways
of thinking and feeling into a new and loftier whole: to corroborate
this whole, which appeared to him as a law of the moral world, by
reference to typical examples taken from mythology--examples chosen
by him with deliberate care to serve as subjects of his dramatic
poetry--this was one of the chief aims of his art. To the plot in
its moral--nay, its religious--sense, all his thoughts are directed;
the characters of the actors themselves are only illuminated from
the standpoint of this special interest; their wider, independent
existence outside the life of the drama which completely **envelops
them is not meant to draw attention to itself. He himself gives us
the right, in studying his plays, to leave out of sight for a moment
the representational aspect of the particular and the personal--all
that in fact makes them essentially works of art--in order to
observe more closely the under-current of generalized belief which
we may reasonably call the ethic and theology of the poet.
Behind the living tissue of his artistic creation Aeschylus allows
us to perceive pretty clearly the firm outlines of his own ethical
and religious convictions. He fuses together elements prescribed to
him from without with that which was dictated by his own spirit.
What is prescribed to him by legend--which he allows to run its full
course, in strictly dramatic form and by preference as a trilogy, a
form in this case uniquely adapted to the subject--is a history that
deals with the continued operation of the forces of evil and
suffering upon several generations of a family, persisting from
father to son and from son to son's son. The belief also in such
interconnexion of human destinies is prescribed to him from without.
That the sins of the ancestors were visited upon their descendants
here upon earth was an ancient article of faith especially strong in
Attica.[65\12] What Aeschylus contributes on his part is the
unswerving conviction that the son and grandson of the sinner are
punished for their _own_ sin too. Suffering is punishment,[66\12]
and suffering would not have overtaken Oedipus, nor the sons of
Oedipus, if Laïos had been the only guilty one--if their own sin had
not deserved punishment.
And yet it does not lie within their power to choose whether the
guilt shall be theirs or not: they cannot escape the deed of sin.
How, we may ask, can a guilty deed be necessitated, imposed upon the
guilty one by the decree of a higher power, and yet at the same time
the _fault_ of the doer of the deed, as though he had acted of his
own free will? {424} The question is a perplexing and a formidable
one, and it was by no means unnoticed by the poet. Behind the
external apparatus of myth he finds himself faced by the problem of
the freedom or determination of man's will, which, as civilization
and culture advance, feels itself morally responsible for every
decision. He finds a way out of the difficulty in the view that it
is not merely the deed of wickedness itself, but the conscious
decision that leads up to the deed that arises out of the family
inheritance of crime. The conscious choice and decision, though
regarded as necessary, seemed to demonstrate fully the personal
guilt and responsibility of the doer.[67\12] The cloud of evil that
proceeds from the deed of the ancestor casts a dark shadow also over
the minds of his son and his son's son. Not from his own mind or
character does the will to do wrong take its origin. The noble, pure
and resolute Eteokles, the model of intelligent manhood, the shield
and protection of his people, falls in a moment, a victim to ominous
destiny; his clear-sighted spirit is darkened, he gives himself
up--his better self--for lost,[68\12] and rushes upon his doom with
awful resolve. The "sins derived from his ancestors"[69\12] drive
him on. Then, and not till then, is the full measure of penance at
last paid for the crime done by the ancestor;[70\12] his descendants
are his representatives, and become guilty on his behalf and then,
for their own guilt as well as his, they suffer retribution.
Divinity, or a spirit of vengeance sent with a divine mission,
drives the victims burdened with the inheritance of crime to the
criminal deed. The divine guidance is actuated no longer, as in
ancient and undying popular belief, by personal desire of vengeance,
anger or malice,[71\12] but by divine justice, acting with "just
deceit",[72\12] that the measure of guilt may be fulfilled, and that
the divine will to justice may have a means to complete
satisfaction. The evil Spirit of the House assists Klytaimnestra to
conceive the thought of murdering her husband;[73\12] God himself
guides and urges forward Orestes to the act of matricide which he
plans and carries out with fully conscious purpose--a crime that is
also a duty. To the poet the old ideas of the duty of avenging
murder are a very living reality. The right to worship and cult
possessed by the souls, their claim to vengeance when they have been
violently done to death, their ghostly influence exerted upon the
life and destinies of their immediate kinsfolk upon whom the duty of
taking vengeance rests--all these things are for him not the
obsolete fancies of an older generation but true and awful
realities.[74\12] Whole dramas, the **Choephoroi and the Eumenides,
for {425} instance, would appear as a meaningless beating of the air
if they were not animated and made significant by unaltered faith in
the right and the might of the souls, the reality and potency of the
daimonic counsel, the Erinyes,[75\12] who appear on behalf of the
murdered mother. And now at last light breaks through the dark and
clouded sky of awful imagination: where Duty and Crime have become
inextricably confused, divine grace, though yielding nothing of its
rights, finds at last a solution.
All these things, however--conflict and solution, crime and its
expiation in ever-renewed crime and the suffering that arises
thence--fulfil themselves in _this_ world. Guilt is avenged always
upon earth. The "other" world is by no means an indispensable link
in this chain of conceptions and fancies; the poet's view is rarely
turned in that direction. Speculation upon the state of the soul
after death, upon a blessed life in the kingdom of the
spirits,[76\12] does not interest him. Only such portions of the
eschatological imaginings of the theologians as might serve the
purposes of moral inspiration or support, found favour with the
poet. There are occasional allusions to the judgment that, in Hades,
"another Zeus" holds over the deeds of earthly life,[77\12] but they
remain dark and vague. It is not explained in what relation this
judgment in Hades stands to the complete equivalence of guilt and
destiny that, here upon earth, Zeus and Moira bring to completion in
the person of the criminal himself and, after his death, of his
descendants. Side by side with the allusions to the judgment in the
underworld implying the complete consciousness of the dead, stand
expressions that call up a picture of the senseless, twilight
existence of the souls in Hades like that described in Homer.[78\12]
The poet, to whom every feature of the beliefs derived from the cult
of the souls about the relations of the departed to the life of the
dwellers on earth was intensely and vividly real, never cared to fix
his attention for long upon the nature and condition of the dead in
their separate other-world existence. In fact his chosen work of
giving a moral significance and deeper meaning to popular and
ancient faith was wholly derived from this faith itself; and so also
was the lofty and consistent idea of divinity which fills the
background of his picture of life. The generation which had fought
at Marathon, in spite of a profounder and even more sombre
meditation upon life and destiny, could still dispense almost
entirely with the assistance of the theological doctrines of the
sects who sought refuge from the dark and austere {426} realities of
this unsatisfying world in thoughts of an imagined hereafter.
§ 5
Towards the great problems of dramatic philosophy--the problems of
the freedom or compulsion of the will, the guilt and destiny of
man--Sophokles took up a position that differed essentially from
that of his great predecessor. A maturer and calmer self-abandonment
to the observation of life and its difficulties made him less able
to rest content with simple or sweeping solutions of the
complexities; made him seek out other and more various modes of
understanding. The individual man, stamped with the unique
impression of his peculiar being, with him becomes more fully
detached from the background of omnipotent might and universal law.
The individual finds within himself the rules of his behaviour, the
causes of his success, or his tragic failure. No petty, egotistical
motive inspires the action of Antigone or Elektra: they are obedient
to the old, unwritten laws of the gods. But the force that leads
them to obey is derived solely from the special fashion and impulse
of their own hearts. No one else could do what they do, suffer what
they suffer. We realize the necessity and justification of what they
do and suffer solely from the contemplation of the strength and
weakness of their own characters as displayed for us in the action
that takes place upon the stage. Indeed, the length to which
Sophokles, in the "Elektra", goes in the suppression of such
universally recognized and binding motives as those derived from the
duty of vengeance and the rights of injured souls, may well cause
surprise. The special and individual case must for him carry its own
justification within itself, and in fact it receives such
justification so completely from the character and behaviour of the
actors in the drama that, unlike the hero of Aeschylus' tragedy,
Orestes needs to have no qualm of doubt in the performance of his
deed, and suffers no remorse after the murder of the wicked
murderess. Once again as in the Homeric story, with Orestes'
"righteous deed of blood",[79\12] the circle of calamity is
complete: no Erinys rises from the earth to demand his
overthrow.[80\12]
So, too, when the suffering and calamity that befalls the mortal
hero comes not from his own conscious decision and exercise of will,
but from obscure decrees of fate it is still the special character
of the hero which not only demands the greater part of our
attention, but entirely conditions and sufficiently explains the
course of events. The same {427} misfortune might overtake another
man, but neither its inward nor its outward effects would be the
same as they are for Oedipus or Aias. Only tragically extreme
characters can have a tragic fate.
And yet, in these as in other tragedies, what gives the first
impulse and direction to the course of the story does not arise from
the will or character of their heroes. The mind of Aias is not free
but subject when he performs the deed that sends him to his death.
Oedipus, Deianeira take vengeance upon themselves for the deeds of
horror that they have brought about without knowing what they did.
Notwithstanding the fact that the interest of the "Philoktetes"
centres so completely round the vividly contrasted characters of
Philoktetes, Neoptolemos, and Odysseus, yet the situation which
brings them into opposition is one which it was beyond the power or
the purpose of man to bring about or to hinder. An obscure destiny
plunges man into suffering, drives him to actions in the face of
which easy and ready-made judgments about "guilt" and the relation
between suffering and desert are silenced. It is not inherited
family crime that here forces the son and the grandson to deeds that
can hardly be called their own. The poet, it is true, knows of these
conceptions[81\12] that play so large a part in the poetry of
Aeschylus, but they are mere historical tradition to him, not vital
motives of his drama. Nor is it mere irrational chance, or
impersonal fate working by necessity and without passion that
directs the mind and guides the hand of the actor in his bondage.
Clearly or obscurely moving about in the background of events the
will of a divine power can be discerned that, inevitable as
fate,[82\12] guides the deeds and the fate of men in accordance with
its own purpose.
The divine purpose brings to maturity a plan in which the individual
man and his destiny are mere instruments. To make plain the
premeditated character of this purposeful direction of human affairs
is the object of the prophetic anticipations of the future, the
divine oracles and prophecies of seers of which we hear so much in
the plays. If this divine purpose should involve the fatal act, the
undeserved suffering of the individual, then that purpose will be
fulfilled though human happiness may be destroyed in the process,
and though pain, crime, agony, and violent death may overwhelm the
mortal individual. The well-being of the individual does not enter
into the question where the intentions of a divinity that sees far
beyond this puny existence are concerned. An honest, simple-minded,
good-hearted man, without {428} deceit or fault, like Philoktetes,
is abandoned for many long years to every kind of suffering in order
that he may not interfere prematurely in the development of the war
against Troy with the magic weapons that are in his
possession.[83\12] He is an involuntary martyr for the good of the
whole community. In order that Herakles may be released from this
life at the precise moment of time that has been fixed by divine
foreknowledge,[84\12] Deianeira, the most devoted and womanly
character in the whole of the Attic drama, must out of the goodness
of her heart and the love she bears to her husband send him to the
most awful of deaths and then perish herself. Simply because such is
the will of heaven[85\12] must Oedipus, unknowing and blameless,
slay his father, marry his mother, and plunge himself into the
deepest depth of misery.
Thus, out of the darkness, the hand of divine superiority guides the
destinies of humanity, the will and behaviour of men, according to
its own purposes. The problematical in human life, the disparity
between personal guilt and personal suffering, which daily
experience brings before our eyes, seemed to the poet to be rendered
more intelligible by this conception. He preaches dutiful submission
to these dispensations of a higher power. He himself is one of the
pious, in the specific sense of the word,[86\12] for whom to
perceive the will of the gods is sufficient to call forth adoration
of the gods; who feel no need that this mighty will should justify
itself to human ideas of morality and goodness.[87\12] It may be
right to call this will a holy will; but there is no need for it to
prove itself such at the bar of human judgment. Nor does such piety
find itself disturbed in its worship when, in order to assert the
divine prerogative over humanity (whose first duty it is to
recognize the limits of what is allowed and possible for it), divine
inhumanity and cold lust of vengeance manifest themselves so clearly
as in the Athene of the "Ajax".[88\12] It gives the measure of the
peculiar and unique character of Sophoklean art and the Sophoklean
attitude to life--a quite personal character not to be explained on
abstract grounds--that this attitude of awed submissiveness in
matters of religion could exist side by side with the strong
appreciation and justification of the unfettered action of free
individuality. Rarely--only once or twice in the plays--is a cry of
pain wrested from the lips of one of these uncomplaining victims of
a purpose not their own.[89\12] As a rule, the eye shuns to behold,
the judgment to criticize, the ultimate reasons of divine action. It
is partly artistic restraint no doubt, but religious discretion,
too, makes the poet leave {429} such things in
semi-obscurity.[90\12] The majesty of divine power remains for the
most part in the background and does not mingle familiarly with men
or too notoriously interfere with human destiny.[91\12]
But the individual who with his sufferings must serve a purpose that
is not his own, Humanity that lives under such bitter laws--what
elevating and consoling thoughts are awakened by the contemplation
of their fate. The poet employs all the resources of his
overwhelming art to secure the profoundest sympathies of his hearers
for the undeserved sufferings of the victim, for the delusions of
well-intentioned but limited vision that must always stray from the
goal at which it aims. The moral of the play is not lost even on the
sufferer's foe as he beholds the error and guilt of the noble but
misguided heart.[92\12] What thus overwhelms the strong and the
wise, the good and the well-meaning, through no fault of their own,
may descend upon any member of the human family. Thus the destinies
of men are allotted. The lament over the vanity and the sorrow of
life, its brief happiness, and the uncertainty of its joy, is poured
forth in memorable lines.[93\12] They end on a note of resignation
which gives the keynote of the poet's own character; but there is a
bitterness which remains behind.
It might have been supposed that one who thus abandoned all attempt
to reconcile the worth and actions of men with their fate upon
earth, would feel all the more need, for his own satisfaction and
that of others, to prove the existence of a divine justice that
should restore the balance in a future state of being. But the poet
shows little sign of any such need. Thoughts of what may happen
after death are never of very great moment to him. They never
distinctly affect the behaviour of those whose deeds or suffering
fill his plays.[94\12]
When, however, light is thrown for a passing moment on the unknown
land beyond the grave the scene that imagination reveals hardly
differs at all from the picture that had once been present to the
minds of the Homeric singers. The place that is in store for the
departed is Hades,[95\12] the unlovely country of the dead,[96\12]
whither the Soul flits powerless, shadowlike, little more than a
nothing,[97\12] feeling no joy but no pain either;[98\12] where it
enters upon a state of insensibility that the grief-stricken
sufferer on earth often longs for as a much-desired haven of
rest.[99\12] Plouton, Persephone, all the deities of the earth
below,[100\12] there rule over the departed. But it is not grace nor
kindliness that prevails there--only Justice: Hades demands equal
justice for all.[101\12] {430} Pious veneration of the gods
continues also in the other world,[102\12] and for the rest we hear
nothing of either reward or punishment or of a final supplementing
in the land of the Souls of the inadequacy of the justice that
fulfils itself on earth.
But though departed into Hades the dead have still a claim upon the
upper world and on those who still are living there. Together with
the Homeric picture of the lower world is united the cult of the
souls and the ideas, connected with that cult, of the continued life
of the dead. The next of kin owe to the departed the ceremonious
burial that is the first expression of their pious solicitude for
his soul's welfare.[103\12] In two plays the "Ajax" and the
"Antigone", the love and loyalty of the survivors is obliged to
fight for this right of the dead in desperate encounter with earthly
authority and even with the sacrifice of their own devoted lives.
Such instances serve to bring out clearly the fact that it is no
empty convention or tradition that is thus defended and carried
through to the end. Nor does the completion of the burial mark the
end of the dead man's relations with the upper world: even after
that he may be benefited by offerings made at his grave.[104\12]
Information of what happens on earth may penetrate to the
dead;[105\12] and he himself, under the protection of the underworld
spirits and of their assessor Dikê, who take cognizance of his
claims,[106\12] may interfere in the affairs of the living as a
"Curse-spirit" upon those who disregard his wishes,[107\12] by
sending threatening dream-visions upon his foes,[108\12] and as a
very present help and unseen ally to his friends in their hour of
need.[109\12]
As to an eternity of bliss awaiting the soul, the god in man, after
its final release from the shackles of the body, the poet knows as
little of such as he does of an eternity of damnation for the
wicked. Only the quite special state of grace which is enjoyed by
those who have been purified in the mysteries of the goddesses at
Eleusis receives mention by him[110\12]: he is frequently disposed
to think of this supreme expression of Attic worship with patriotic
pride.[111\12] But it is only a minority of the good who thus
achieve by the grace of the goddesses a privileged "life" in the
kingdom of shadows. One and only one is lifted by the divine grace
clear of the human fate of annihilation, and in the Grove of the
Erinyes the sorely-tried Oedipus is translated without seeing death
out of this earthly life.[112\12] So living a reality to this poet
of ancient piety is the conviction that the divine miracle of
translation[113\12] is a literal truth, that he is even ready {431}
to make this strange circumstance serve as the sole aim and purpose
of a whole drama: a miracle which all the other scenes serve not so
much to prepare as simply to postpone, and thus heighten the
expectancy with which the event is awaited. It is not supreme virtue
that secures an immortality for Oedipus which others also who showed
an equal degree of goodness might possibly attain. He reveals
himself to us as an innocent sufferer indeed,[114\12] but also as
obdurate in his rash and violent nature, vindictive, stubborn, and
self-willed, not ennobled but rather brutalized by his
sufferings.[115\12] Nevertheless, divine power elevates him to the
state of immortal _Hero_ less almost for the sake of the
satisfaction and bliss to himself as in order that he may be the
saviour of the Attic land, the country of humanity and kindness that
has taken into its protection[116\12] the unfortunate one, and
desires to preserve for ever his power of blessing.[117\12] Just as
once it had pleased divine power to overwhelm the innocent victim in
a sea of crime and suffering, so now it pleases the same divine
power to raise the sufferer, without any new or special merit on his
side, to a fate of superhuman bliss.[118\12] In his case a divine
miracle occurs, into the ultimate reasons for which it is not
profitable to inquire.
In his views, so far as he allows us to see them, of the things of
the next world, Sophokles differs not at all from those who still
saw life and worshipped the gods as their fathers had done before
them. The great poet of human, tragic destiny, the profound student
of the divine government of this mournful world, was unwilling to
set by the side of it a brighter and more comforting picture of a
spirit world of the imagination. In this, too, he is modest and will
not say much--he knows no more of these matters, and in no other
fashion, than "any other honest citizen of Athens".[119\12]
§ 6
In the course of a long life Sophokles was able to make himself
complete master of his art and grow up into strong and generous
manhood without the guidance or support of either theological or
philosophical learning. Theology he did not care to seek out in its
hiding place, the obscurity of isolated sects. Philosophy, in the
period of his impressionable youth, had not yet reached Athens, and
when he had attained riper years his noble simplicity of temper had
little to gain or to fear from the meditated wisdom or folly of the
younger generation. In serene detachment he passed on his way
through all the press and clamour of the market place. {432}
The moving impulse which since the end of the sixth century had
collected together at Athens all the intellectual forces of Greece
for a final expansion of their capacity now began, in the middle of
the fifth century, to take hold of philosophy as it had long since
done literature and the fine arts. Athens saw the last
representatives of Ionian physiology gathered together within her
walls. Some, like Anaxagoras, took up their residence there for a
long period, and left the impress of their teaching upon the
foremost minds of the city. The others who paid briefer visits were
those who in conscious opposition to the recent trend of thinking,
stoutly upheld the older principles of philosophic Monism or
Hylozoism, such as Diogenes of Apollonia or Hippon of Samos; or who
sought like Archelaos to reconcile the old and the new Ionic
doctrine. Besides these, Athens was a headquarters of the wandering
exponents of the newest wisdom, the Sophists. Nowhere did unfettered
discussion find such cultivated appreciation of its daring; nowhere
was such an eager welcome given to the dialectical word-play that,
seeming to be an end in itself, was destined to become the most
fruitful nursery of native Athenian philosophy. All traditional
beliefs and customs that had not their origin or their justification
in reflexion were already doomed as soon as they, together with
every conventional view of life and the world, were deprived of
their natural protection of unchallenged self-evidence by the cold
scrutiny of the sovereign tyrant Dialectic. The Sophists, those
skirmishers of a new and as yet unrecognizable philosophy, scattered
and put to flight the old guard of positive and doctrinal wisdom,
but to the individual, who was bidden to depend upon his own
resources, they offered stimulus to reflection in abundance but no
permanent foothold in the shifting sands of opinion. It would be but
a final assertion of the principle that there are no principles if
by any chance the Sophists themselves should for a moment speak in
the language of edification and, for example, lend the support of
their eloquence to certain articles of doctrine that provided a
positive teaching as to the nature and life of the soul.[120\12]
If Sophokles remained quite unaffected by this whole movement which
reached its flood tide in Athens, Euripides was drawn completely
into its current. He sought out philosophers and sophists personally
and in their writings. His was a spirit that urgently desired to
know the truth and he followed every available guide to knowledge
and wisdom for a stage upon their journey. But he was never able to
continue permanently in any one direction; in the restlessness {433}
and bewilderment of search and experiment he is the true son of his
age.
His philosophical and sophistical leanings were sufficiently marked
to make it impossible for him to accept any part of the belief or
tradition of his countrymen without trial. So far as it is possible
within the limits of dramatic art, he instituted an unsparing and
unhesitating criticism of all accepted things, and in the process
felt himself immeasurably superior to the wit and wisdom of the
past. And yet he never satisfied himself. He could never rest
content with a merely negative position, for all onesidedness was
foreign to his nature. The tremendous honesty of his nature made it
impossible for him to admit that element of frivolity which made the
sophistic movement and the dialectical negation of all certainty so
simple and attractive, and at the same time took away half its
sting. But he could take nothing easily; and so with all his
sophistic enlightenment he was never happy. The pupil of the
Sophists would hear every other side as well; there were even
moments when he longed to take refuge in the restful narrowness of
old and traditional piety. But it was not given to him to settle
down in any fixed set of opinions; all his convictions were
provisional, mere hypotheses adopted for the purposes of experiment.
Afloat on a changeful sea, he let himself be driven hither and
thither by every wind of intellectual excitement or artistic
necessity.
When all convictions were involved together in a state of perpetual
change and instability, the conception of the nature and being of
the soul and its relation to the powers of life and death could not
alone remain in fixed and dogmatic certainty.
Where the content and character of the fable chosen as the subject
of his drama demand it, the poet frankly adopts the popular view of
the nature and destiny of the departed soul, its power and claim
upon the worship of the survivors upon earth. In the fairy-tale play
of the "Alcestis" the whole apparatus of popular belief plays its
part; the God of Death and his awful office, the dwelling of the
dead in the underworld, are spoken of as facts and creatures of
experience and reality.[121\12] The elaborate funeral ceremonies
owed to the dead are treated with the utmost seriousness and
precision.[122\12] A whole drama, the "Suppliant Women", has as its
real subject, or at least as its ostensible motive, the religious
importance of a ritual burial,[123\12] nor is there any lack of
isolated passages in which the importance of burial and the honour
paid to graves is stressed.[124\12] The survivors on earth give
pleasure to the dead by offerings at their graves,[125\12] {434} and
in this way obtain their goodwill and can count upon their
support.[126\12] Power and honour belong not only to the great ones
of antiquity translated to a higher state of being;[127\12] not only
"Heroes" can extend their influence beyond their graves and affect
the course of earthly events:[128\12] from the soul of his murdered
father, the son expects assistance and succour in his time of need.
The dread creatures of antique faith, the Erinyes, exact vengeance
for the murdered mother.[129\12]
But at this point it becomes apparent that the poet only associates
himself for his own purposes with this circle of ancient and
sanctified popular fancy--so long in fact as it suits the tone that
he wishes to give to the drama and its characters. The Erinyes are
excellent material for the play--that in reality their horrid
figures only exist in the imagination of the mentally diseased is
clearly asserted in the "Orestes".[130\12] The whole series of
beliefs and demands--murder ever calling forth fresh murder in
accordance with the sacred duty of vengeance, the Erinyes, the
bloodthirsty patrons of the murdered victim who leaves no proper
avenger behind him--all these have ceased to have any validity for
him. The "animal and bloodthirsty" part of these figures of ancient
belief call forth the loathing of the poet living in the days of
organized justice and humaner manners.[131\12] He does not believe
in the souls' right to blood; the ancient legends which depend on
this right are an abomination to him. In fact, he only seems to have
written his plays about them in order, by the manner of his
presentation, to have his revenge upon this material that was almost
unavoidably thrust upon him by the tradition of the tragic stage.
The duty of the living to offer a cult to the departed souls becomes
doubtful in its turn. The seriousness with which that cult is
sometimes handled in the plays is compromised by such reflections as
these: it is certain that it matters little to the dead whether rich
offering are placed in their graves or not; such things only satisfy
the idle vanity of the living;[132\12] honour and dishonour are of
no further consequence to the dead.[133\12] How should they be, if
the departed no longer feel either pleasure or pain, are nothing at
all, as is repeatedly declared even in the middle of the
"Alcestis"?[134\12]
It is evident that only from an arbitrarily adopted point of view do
the picturesque creations of popular belief in the soul and of the
cult of souls seem real to the poet; apart from this they disappear
from his mind like the creatures of a dream.[135\12] The teachings
of the theologians supplied him with no real substitute for popular
faith; at the most they were a {435} momentary and passing stimulus.
No doubt he did not shut his eyes completely to these manifestations
of the spiritual life of his time. His plays contain allusions to
Orphic poetry and he joins the asceticism of the Orphics to the cold
virtue of his Hippolytos.[136\12] The thought that the soul has
fallen from a higher state of being and is enclosed within the body
like the dead man in his coffin takes captive his imagination for a
moment. "Who knows then whether life is not a kind of death," so
that in death the soul awakes to its real life?[137\12] The gloomy
view of human destiny upon this earth to which the poet so often
gives expression, might seem to hint at a consolation to come in a
more satisfactory hereafter; but the poet has no longing for the
consolation offered by the theologians. Among the many and various
reflections of the poet upon the reality that may reveal itself when
the curtain is drawn aside by death, we never meet with the
conception that lies at the bottom of the assurances made by the
theologians--the conception that the spiritual individual is certain
of its immortality because in its individuality it is of divine
nature and is itself a god.[138\12] True, he is the author of the
bold saying so often quoted and varied in later times, that God is
nothing else but the mind that dwells in men.[139\12] But this makes
no allusion to the theological doctrine of the multiplicity of
individual gods or daimones banished into the life of men; it rather
implies a semi-philosophic doctrine of the soul in which one may
perceive for the first time the expression of a permanent conviction
on the part of the poet.
In quite inapposite contexts Euripides sometimes introduces passing
allusions to a philosophical view of the world and humanity, that is
the more certainly to be regarded as the private conviction of the
poet himself as the utterances fail to correspond fully with the
character of the person in the play who makes them, and do not arise
necessarily from the dramatic situation. Everything in the world has
had its origin from Earth and "the Aether of Zeus"; the Earth is the
maternal womb from which the Aether brings everything to
birth.[140\12] Both constituents combine to produce the multiplicity
of appearance; they are not fused together nor are they to be
derived from a single common original element;[141\12] they remain
in dualistic contrast side by side.[142\12] It was probably the
dualism of this cosmological fancy that reminded the ancients of
Anaxagoras; but these statements cannot be regarded as simply a
poetical version of the doctrine of Anaxagoras;[143\12] for they
derive the multiplicity of matter and things from the simple element
of "Earth" from which {436} they arise only by a process of change
and transformation, while in the "seedmixture" of Anaxagoras, the
unchangeable seeds of all things only separate themselves out from
the whole and give rise by mechanical reassemblings to all the
perceived appearances of the world. The "Aether" of Euripides in its
relations with the "Earth" is besides being the active partner also
the intellectual and animated element. The isolation of such an
element from the rest of matter does indeed remind us of the
procedure of Anaxagoras. But the poet's Aether is still an element
though it may be penetrated by mind and animated by spirit; it is
not a mental being standing over against all the other elements in
essential distinctness like the _Nous_ of Anaxagoras. The fact that
it is the element of the Aether, i.e. the dry and hot air, in which
intellectual capacity is said to inhere, may be regarded as having
been borrowed from Diogenes of Apollonia, a philosopher who was held
in considerable estimation at Athens at that time, and who was well
known to Euripides.[144\12] In his doctrine, the air (which indeed,
in contrast to the view of Euripides, produces all other things
simply out of itself) is expressly identified with the "Soul" and is
itself described as "having understanding".[145\12]
This view of the elementary forces and constitution of the universe,
made up as it is from philosophical suggestions of a scarcely
reconcilable character, in which the dualistic tendency is in fact
finally predominant, suggests itself to the poet whenever in an
exalted mood he speaks of the final destiny of the human soul. The
soul on its separation from the body will depart to join the
"Aether". But in such conceptions it is not always the imagination
of the philosopher-poet that finds expression. On this subject it is
accompanied or replaced by a more popular view that only distantly
resembles it, but which led to the same result. When we hear now and
again of the Aether, the luminous atmosphere above the clouds, as
being the _dwelling place_ of the departed souls,[146\12] the
view--more theological than philosophic in its character--seems to
be implied that after death the liberated soul will float upwards to
the seat of the gods[147\12] which has long ceased to be situated
upon Olympos, but is in "heaven" or in this same Aether. This, too,
was the meaning of a saying traditionally ascribed to Epicharmos the
comic-poet of Sicily who was himself versed in philosophy. In this
saying the pious man is assured that for him death will bring no
evil for his "mind" will dwell permanently in "heaven".[148\12] This
conception, which appears so frequently in later epitaphs, {437}
must have been familiar to popular imagination at Athens at an early
period; at least in the grave-epigram officially dedicated by the
state to the memory of the Athenians who fell in the year 432 before
Poteidaia, we find the belief expressed (as a commonly received
opinion) that the souls of these brave men have been received by the
"Aether" just as the earth has received their bodies.[149\12] Such
official use implies a commonly accepted opinion and the fundamental
ideas of the popular cult of the souls might have led to similar
results. From the beginning popular belief had regarded the psyche,
which got its name from the air or breath, as closely akin to the
winds, the mobile air and its spirits. It would not be difficult for
the idea to arise that the soul, as soon as it was free to decide
for itself what should become of it, should go to join the elemental
spirits that are its kinsfolk. Perhaps this, too, is what Epicharmos
means when on another occasion he says that in death when the united
are parted asunder each returns whence it came, the body to earth,
but the soul up to the heights--its name, in which allusion is made
to its perpetual mobility, being now after the example of Xenophanes
derived from the breath of the wind, the moving air (~pneu=ma~), a
usage which became very common in later times.[150\12]
But perhaps the use of such a name is an indication that this poet
also regards the soul as standing in a close relation and kinship
with the Aether that is destined to receive it after its release
from the body; so that from this side, too[151\12]--in addition to
the more popular conception just mentioned--Euripides may have
received a hint for his peculiar version of the physiological theory
of Diogenes. In his view the soul participates in the nature of the
Aether. But it is more important to notice that the Aether
participates in the nature and true reality of the soul; it
possesses life, consciousness and power of thought. They both belong
to one family. The Aether according to the poet--and here the
speculations of Anaximenes as revived by Diogenes are
unmistakable[152\12]--is a true vital atmosphere, an all-embracing
psychic element, so that it becomes, not a mere vehicle of mind, but
the All-Mind itself. The concept is even condensed and
half-personified, it is called by the name of the highest divine
power, Zeus,[153\12] and the poet as though speaking of a personal
god, calls it "immortal".[154\12] The human mind, too, as akin to
the universal god and the All-Mind, appears, as it had been in the
teaching of Diogenes,[155\12] as a part of this God, this universal
Mind. God is the mind, and the mind and understanding in us is
God--so the poet clearly asserts.[156\12] In death, when {438} the
separation of the mind from its earthly elements takes place, the
Pneuma of man will "not indeed live", as it had done in the separate
existence of the individual man, but it will "preserve an immortal
consciousness", entering into the immortal Aether and fusing itself
with the All-living and the All-thinking.[157\12] None of the
physiologists who conceived the same idea of an immortality
excluding the personal immortality of the individual, of the
universal spirit of life in mankind, has expressed his meaning with
such distinctness as this philosophic layman.
The poet may have wished to remain permanently upon the sublime
heights of this Pantheistic vision; but he must, in his peculiar
all-embracing spirit that never held fast to any one view with
enduring persistence, have experienced too often the truth of the
saying of Protagoras that every statement calls forth its equally
legitimate opposite,[158\12] to have become an unswerving adherent
of any single opinion. Death, and whatever may reveal itself after
death, is beyond the experience of any man.[159\12] It may be that
complete disappearance into nothingness follows death; that the dead
man becomes simply nothing.[160\12] It may be that in the permanence
of the human race the great name and the renown of glorious deeds
lives on undying.[161\12] Whether there may remain besides a vestige
of life in a spirit world, who can tell? Perhaps such a thing is
hardly even to be wished.[162\12] It is just what makes death such a
comforting thing, that it puts an end to all feeling and therefore
to all pain and every care. We should not lament over our fate if,
like the harvests that follow each other in the course of the years,
one generation of men after another flowers, fades, and is carried
off. So it is ordered in the course of Nature, and we ought not to
be dismayed by anything that is rendered inevitable by her
laws.[163\12]
NOTES TO CHAPTER XII
[1\12: The learned and more particularly the philosophers of later
ages paid special attention to utterances of the older poetry that
gave expression to belief of a spiritualist tendency. Just as they
selected and preserved passages from Pindar (and from Melanippides
in the case soon to be mentioned), which bore witness to an advanced
view of the soul, so they must also have given us similar passages
from other melic or from iambic and elegiac poets--if such passages
had existed. They must, for example, have been absent from the
~thrê=noi~ of Simonides which were famous as the models of this kind
of poetry. And so with all the rest.]
[2\12: Hades puts an end to all pleasure for every man; hence the
warning that man should enjoy his youth upon earth: Thgn. 973 ff.;
cf. 877 f., 1191 ff., 1009 f.; Sol. 24; Thgn. 719 ff.]
[3\12: ~thana/tô| pa/ntes opheilo/metha~--an ancient saying often
repeated; cf. Bergk on Simon. 122, 2; Nauck on Soph., _El._ 1173
[Blaydes ad loc.].]
[4\12: Hades himself plays the part of Thanatos and carries off the
souls to the lower world. Thus as early as Semon. i, 13 f., ~tou\s
d' A/rei dedême/nous pe/mpei melai/nês Aï/dês hupo\ chthono/s~. In
metaphorical language ~Ha/idês~ for ~tha/natos~ is quite regular
from the time of Pindar onwards. This, in turn, lent support to the
use of the name of ~Ha/idês~ instead of the _personified_
~Tha/natos~. So esp. in Pi., _O._ ix, 33-5; cf. besides, _Epigr.
Gr._ 89, 3-4. ~to/nde . . . ma/rpsas Ha/idês hoi skoti/as
amphe/balen pte/rugas~; cf. 201, 2; 252, 1-2. (And therefore in
Eur., _Alc._ 261, we should not alter the ~pterôto\s Ha/idas~ who is
named instead of Thanatos--not even in favour of the otherwise
ingenious ~ble/pôn . . . ha/|dan~.)]
[5\12: ~dêro\n e/nerthen gê=s ole/sas psuchê\n kei/somai hô/ste
li/thos a/phthoggos~ Thgn. 567 f.--the condition of things in Hades
is regarded exactly as in the Homeric pictures: Thgn. 704-10.]
[6\12: See esp. Sol. 13, 29 ff.: Thgn. 731-42; 205 ff.]
[7\12: Mimn. ii, 13: ~a/llos d' hau= pai/dôn epideu/etai, hô=nte
ma/lista himei/rôn kata\ gê=s e/rchetai eis Aï/dên~. Without
children there can be no assurance that the cult of the soul will be
carried on. But we may well believe that the attaching of so much
importance to offspring was assisted by the natural human belief
that the man who left children behind him on earth did not
completely perish in death (hence ~aeigene/s esti kai\ atha/naton
hôs thnêtô=| hê ge/nnêsis~ as in Plato, _Smp._ 206 E). This alone
gives a meaning and a reason for the widespread belief among the
Greeks that the wicked man who is punished after his death in his
children and children's children himself feels that punishment.]
[8\12: Semon. 1; 3. Mimn. 2. Sol. 13, 63 ff.; 14. Thgn. 167 f.; 425
ff. We may also add here the expressions of resignation, Hdt. vii,
46; i, 31.]
[9\12: ~Nukto\s tha/lamos~ [Ion] _fr._ 8, 2.]
[10\12: On the story of Midas and Silenos see _Griech. Roman_, p.
204 f. As to the ancient and often repeated maxim ~archê\n~ (or
~pa/ntôn) me\n mê\ phu=nai epichthoni/oisin a/riston ktl.~, see
Bgk., _Opusc._ ii, 214; _PLG^4. ii, p. 155 f. Nietzsche, _Rh. Mus._
xxviii, 212 ff. (whose view that the {440} beginning ~archê\n . . .~
is old and original--but not his involved explanation of this--has
been fully confirmed by the finding of the primitive form of the
~agô/n~: Mahaffy, _On the Flinders Petrie Papyri_, i, p. 70).]
[11\12: Simon, _fr._ 39; 38.]
[12\12: _fr._ 137.--Usener, _Götternamen_, 229, 13, says of Sappho
that "she was possessed by the belief that as a poetess she would
live again after her death among the gods, and would therefore
become a _heroine_; see _frr._ 68 and 136". But from these fragments
of Sappho no such belief can be extracted without first reading into
them a good deal that they do not say.]
[13\12: Of the man who has fallen in glory on the battlefield
Tyrtaios says, 12, 31 f.: ~oude/ pote kle/os esthlo\n apo/llutai
oud' o/nom' au/tou=, all' hupo\ gê=s per eô\n gi/gnetai
_atha/natos_~ (i.e. in renown upon earth). Thgn. says to his Kyrnos,
243 ff., in your lifetime my songs will make you famous ~kai\ ho/tan
dnopherê=s hupo\ keu/thesi gai/ês bê=|s polukôku/tous eis Ai/dao
do/mous, oude/pot' oude\ thanô\n apolei=s kle/os alla\ melê/seis
a/phthiton anthrô/pois aie\n e/chôn o/noma . . .~ cf. Aesch.,
_Epigr._ iii, 3 (241 Bgk. = 449 Di.), ~zôo\n de\ phthime/nôn
pe/letai kle/os~.]
[14\12: Even in Hades the dead perceive ~chthoni/a| phreni/~ if they
themselves or the ~aretai/~ of their descendants upon earth are
praised: Pi., _P._ v, 98: cf. _O._ viii, 81 ff.; xiv, 20 ff.; [Ion]
_Anth. Pal._ vii, 43, 3 (to Eurip.), ~i/sthi d' hupo\ chthono\s ô/n,
ho/ti soi kle/os a/phthiton e/stai ktl.~--In the expressions
collected by Meuss, _Jahrb. f. Philol._ 1889, p. 812 f., from the
fourth century orators there only remains a very faint recollection
of such a belief.]
[15\12: Semon. 2, ~tou= me\n thano/ntos ouk a\n enthumoi/metha, ei/
ti phronoi=men, plei=on hême/rês miê=s~.--Stes. 51, ~atele/stata
ga\r kai\ ama/chana tou\s thano/ntas klai/ein~. 52, ~thano/ntos
andro\s pa=s' apo/llutai pot' anthrô/pôn cha/ris~.]
[16\12: This emerges at once if we review the material collected by
H. Meuss upon "the conceptions appearing in the Attic orators of
existence after death": _Jahrb. f. Philol._ 1889, pp. 801-15. For
the cult of the soul and all that attaches to it the orators are our
most authoritative witnesses and as such are frequently examined in
the sections of this book that deal with the subject.]
[17\12: ~_ei/_ tines tô=n teteleutêko/tôn la/boien _tro/pô| tini\_
tou= nu=n gignome/nou pra/gmatos ai/sthêsin~ and frequently in this
style: cf. the passages quoted by Westermann on D., _Lept._ (20),
87; cf. also Lehrs, _Pop. Aufs._ 329 ff. The question is always
whether the dead are capable in any way of apprehending what goes on
in this world. The continued life of the dead is never doubtful but
rather implied throughout, for without such implication no
possibility whatever would be left for that ~ei~--.]
[18\12: See Nägelsbach, _Nachhom. Theol._ 420. Meuss, p. 812.]
[19\12: This is well brought out by Lehrs, _Pop. Aufs._ 331. But the
statement holds good in an even more precise and exclusive sense
than he there gives it. The words of Hyper., _Epit._ xiii, § 39,
deal simply with the existence in Hades of those who have died for
their country (with some traditional embellishments; see above,
chap. vii, n. 5)--this much can hardly ever have been expressly
doubted or denied by any orator. But it is wrong to say (as Lehrs
does: p. 331) that Hyp. expresses, though in other words, what was
afterwards laid down by [D.H.] _Rhet._ vi, 5, as proper "for such
funeral speeches" (no, only for _private_ funerals--which is quite
another matter). It is true that the advice there given is to say
that the soul is _~atha/natos~_ and now dwells {441} "with the
gods". But it never enters into the head of Hyp. to say any such
thing (nor in the frag. of the speech preserved by Stob., _Fl._ 124,
36). In fact, the precept of this sophistic writer (still more the
advice given by Men. Rhet., _de Encom._ 414, 16 ff.; 421, 16 ff.
Sp.) rather reveals the enormous contrast between the style of the
sophistic funeral oratory of a later period and the real
characteristics of the old Attic funeral orations: a difference
founded upon the difference of sentiment manifested by the public
that listened to such speeches in two different ages. Even the
statements of [Dem.] _Epit._ (60) 34 (~pa/redroi toi=s ka/tô
theoi=s~ together with the ~agathoi\ a/ndres~ of earlier times ~en
maka/rôn nê/sois~) betray sophistic colouring though falling far
short of the excesses of Ps.-D.H. and Men. Rhet.]
[20\12: The only thing ~ agê/rantos~ about those who have fallen in
the wars of freedom is their ~eulogi/ê~ Simon. 100, 4; cf. 106, 4
(with Bgk.'s note). 99, 3-4 ~oude\ tethna=si thano/ntes epei/ sph'
aretê\ kathu/perthen kudai/nous' ana/gei dô/matos ex Aï/deô~ (which
is imitated in the epitaph of Thrasymachos the Kretan ~oude\ thanô\n
areta=s o/num' ôle/sas, alla\ se Pha/ma kudai/nous' ana/gei dô/matos
ex Aï/da~, _BCH._ 1889, p. 60).]
[21\12: ~klu=thi/ moi ô= pa/ter, thau=ma brotô=n, ta=s aeizô/ou
mede/ôn psucha=s~, Melanipp. 6. The words ~thau=ma brotô=n~
(modelled on the ~thau=ma brotoi=si~ of Homer) can refer only to
Dionysos (of the gods who enter into the question here): ~Diô/nusos,
cha/rma brotoi=sin~, ~X~ 325. Further, it is natural to think of
Dionysos in the work of a dithyrambic poet.]
[22\12: The dead man ~amph' Ache/ronti naieta/ôn~, Pi., _N._ iv, 85.
This is the general assumption: e.g. _P._ xi, 19-22; _O._ ix, 33-5;
_I._ viii, 59 f.; _fr._ 207 Bgk.]
[23\12: ~e/sti de\ kai/ ti thano/ntessin me/ros ka\n no/mon
erdo/menon; katakru/ptei d' ou ko/nis suggo/nôn kedna\n cha/rin~,
_O._ viii, 77 ff.]
[24\12: Something of the kind is adopted for the moment, e.g. in
_O._ xiv, 20 ff.; viii, 81 ff. A real belief in such a possibility
appears perhaps most clearly in _P._ v, 98 ff.]
[25\12: For him who dies fighting for his country there is in
store--not blessedness but only Fame, _I._ vii, 26 ff. He who comes
~kala\ e/rxais aoida=s a/ter eis Aï/da stathmo/n~ has little reward
for his pains (his reward would, in fact, have been just the praise
given in the ~aoida/~), _O._ x, 91 ff., cf. _N._ vii, 30-2.]
[26\12: A strange expression is the ~dai/môn gene/thlios~ of _O._
xiii, 105 (in the same poem we also have ~Xenophô=ntos dai/môn~ 28,
which in this case at least is something more than "destiny",
otherwise the normal meaning of ~dai/môn~ in Pindar, cf. _P._ v,
123, _I._ vii, 43). It almost seems as if it were intended to
describe the ancestor spirit that brings good luck to the house like
the _genius generis_ or ~hê/rôs suggenei/as~ (see above, chap. v, n.
132).]
[27\12: Amphiaraos, _O._ vi, 14; _N._ ix, 24 ff.; x, 8 f. (Amph.
from his underground cavern sees the fighting in the war of the
Epigonoi, _P._ viii, 39-56. There is no suggestion that the
~Epi/gonoi~ inquire at his oracle--as Dissen supposes; with this the
~hô=d' eipe _marname/nôn_~ 43 is inconsistent.)--Ganymedes
translated to eternal life, _O._ i, 44; x, 104 f. Apart from this
there are temporary translations to the gods or from one place on
earth to another, _O._ i, 36 ff.; ix, 59; _P._ ix, 5ff.; _I._ viii,
20 f.]
[28\12: _O._ ii, 27 ff.]
[29\12: ~alla/ ti prosphe/romen e/mpan ê\ me/gan no/on ê/toi phu/sin
athana/tois~, _N._ vi, 4 f.]
[30\12: ~skia=s o/nar a/nthrôpos~, _P._ viii, 95. ~he\n andrô=n he\n
theô=n ge/nos, ek mia=s de\ pne/omen matro\s ampho/teroi; diei/rgei
de\ pa=sa kekrime/na du/namis, {442} hôs to\ me\n oude/n, ho de\
chalkeos asphale\s aie\n he/dos me/nei ourano/s~, _N._ vi, 1 ff.]
[31\12: _fr._ 131 Bgk.]