[14\11: ~ho theo/s~ is both the Universal Fire, that transforms
itself into the world, and at the same time its power (and ~lo/gos~:
_frr._ 2 [1], 92 [2]): _fr._ 36 (67). ~to\ pu=r theo\n
hupei/lêphen~, Herakl.: Cl. Al., _Prot._ 5, 64, p. 55 P. [_Vors._ n.
8 A 8]. ~pu=r noero\n to\n theo\n (ei=nai ephthe/gxato)~, Hippol.,
_RH._ i, 4, p. 10, 57 Mill.--"Zeus" as metaphor for this universal
fire (hence ~ouk ethe/lei kai\ ethe/lei~), the "only wise one";
_fr._ 65 (32).]
[15\11: ~hê epixenôthei=sa toi=s hêmete/rois sô/masin apo\ tou=
perie/chontos moi=ra (perie/ch.~ = the universal Fire) is said of the
soul and its reasoning faculty ap. S.E., _M._ vii, 130; _Vors._, p.
75, 19; (cf. ~aporroê\ kai\ moi=ra ek tou= phronou=ntos~, Plu., _Is.
et O._ 77, p. 382 B). This is fully Herakleitean in thought if not
also in actual form of expression.]
[16\11: That Herakleitos drew the conclusions affecting also the
"Soul"--the spiritual man--freely paraphrased in the text, arising
necessarily out of his doctrine of the perpetual change in the
material substance that excludes all possibility of lasting
self-identity in any object (_frr._ 40, 41, 42, 81 = 91, 12, 49 a),
is proved especially by the words of Plutarch in the eighteenth
chapter of his treatise _de E Delph._ p. 392--a chapter which is
entirely based on Herakleitos, who is twice actually cited in it.
Not only does ~ho ne/os~ die ~eis to\n akma/zonta ktl.~, but ~ho
chthe\s (a/nthrôpos) eis to\n sê/meron te/thnêken, ho de\ sê/meron
eis to\n {392} au/rion apothnê/skei. me/nei d' oudei/s, oud' e/stin
hei=s, alla gigno/metha polloi\ peri\ he\n pha/ntasma ktl.~; cf.
_Cons. ad Apoll._ 10, p. 106 E. Herakl. is also the origin of what
is said in Plato, _Smp._ 207 D ff.: each man is only apparently one
and the same; in reality, even while he is still alive, "he
continually suffers a new and different man to take the place of the
old and departing one"--and this applies, just as much to the soul
as to the body. (Only from the standpoint of Herakleitean
doctrine--here adopted in passing by Plato as suiting his chosen
method of argument--is the conclusion he reaches justified; the
conclusion is that it is only by the perpetual substitution of a new
being like the old one that man has immortality, and not by the
eternal preservation of his own proper being; for this advantage
belongs peculiarly to the divine. This, of course, cannot possibly
be understood as the serious teaching of Plato himself.)--The
Herakleitean denial of personal identity in men is alluded to by
Epicharmos (or a pseudo-Ep.?) ap. D.L. iii, 11, ll. 13-18; _Vors._,
p. 118-19 (cf. Wytt. ad Plu., _Ser. Num. V._ 559 A = vii, p. 397 f.
Ox.; Bernays, _Rh. Mus._ viii, 280 ff.); and cf. Sen., _Ep._ 58,
23.--It is instructive to compare with Herakl.'s doctrine of the
instability of the psychic complex the very similar theory of the
influx and reflux of the elements of the "soul" as described in the
Indian doctrine of Jainism. The soul (in the Indian doctrine)
continually transforms, re-arranges, and restores itself, just like
the body. See Deussen, _System d. Vedânta_, 330.]
[17\11: The apparently contradictory statement ~psuchê=|si te/rpsin,
mê\ tha/naton, hugrê=|si gene/sthai~ ap. Porph., _Antr. Nymph._ 10
(72 By., 77 D.), does not represent the words or real opinion of
Hkl., but only of Numenios' (_fr._ 35 Thedinga) arbitrary and
personal interpretation of Hkl. doctrine (see Gomperz in _Sitzb. d.
Wien. Ak._ 113, 1015 ff.).]
[18\11: A doctrine of transmigration of souls is attributed to Hkl.
by Schuster, _Heraklit_, p. 174 ff. (1873). The utterances of
Herakleitos there quoted to prove this thesis (_frr._ 78, 67, 123 =
88, 62, 63) do not, however, imply anything of the kind and there is
not the slightest indication in the whole of Hkl's doctrinal system
upon which a theory of the transmigration of the soul might be
founded.]
[19\11: To prove that Herakleitos spoke of a continuation of the
life of the individual soul after its separation from the body,
appeal is made partly to the statements of later philosophers,
partly to actual utterances of Herakl. (cf. in particular Zeller,
_Greek Phil. to Socr._ ii, 86; Pfleiderer, _Philos. d. Heraklit im
Lichte der Mysterienidee_, p. 214 ff.). Platonist philosophers do,
of course, attribute to Herakleitos a doctrine of the soul which
taught the pre-existence of the individual soul, "its fall in
birth," and its departure into a separate life of its own after
death (cf. Numenios ap. Porph., _Ant._ 10; Iamb., ap. Stob., _Ecl._
i, 375, 7; 38, 21 ff. W.; Aen. Gaz., _Thphr._, pp. 5, 7 Boiss.).
These accounts, however, are plainly but private and arbitrary
interpretations of Herakleitean sayings (~metaba/llon anapau/etai,
ka/mato/s esti toi=s autoi=s aei\ mochthei=n kai\ a/rchesthai~) in
the light of the conceptions current among those philosophers
themselves; they are homiletic, fancifully conceived expositions of
very short and ambiguous texts, and can so much the less serve as
witnesses of Herakleitos' real opinions since Plotinos (4, 8, 1)
openly admits that Herakl. in this matter has omitted ~saphê= hêmi=n
poiê=sai to\n lo/gon~. Others read into certain Herakleitean
utterances the Orphic doctrine of ~sô=ma--sê=ma~, the entombment of
the soul in the body (Philo, _Leg. Alleg._ 1, 33, i, p. 65 M.; S.E.,
_P._ iii, 230), which cannot, however, be seriously supposed to be
his teaching. The soul did not for Hkl., any more than for the
Pythagoreans or Platonics, {393} come into existence at birth
(substantially) out of nothing (which was the popular idea); it
rather, as a portion of the universal fire (the universal psyche) is
in existence from eternity. But it certainly does not follow,
because later writers insisted on finding in him the idea so
familiar to themselves, that Hkl. himself accepted the pre-existence
of disembodied separate souls possessing complete and absolute
individuality. A few enigmatic and highly picturesque
expressions--typical of this philosopher's favourite manner of
expressing abstract ideas by clothing them in symbolic
imagery--might tempt to such an interpretation. ~atha/natoi
thnêtoi/, thnêtoi\ atha/natoi, zô=ntes to\n ekei/nôn tha/naton to\n
de\ ekei/nôn bi/on tethneô=tes~ (_fr._ 67 = 62)--that certainly does
sound as if Hkl. had meant to speak of the entrance into the human
life of individual divine beings (and this was simply substituted in
inaccurate quotations of the saying: ~theoi\ thnêtoi/, a/nthrôpoi
atha/natoi~, etc.; cf. Bernays, _Heraklit. Briefe_, 39 ff.). And yet
Herakleitos can only have meant, in conformity with his whole
position, that eternal and perishable, divine and human are alike
and interchangeable; he has for the moment personified ~to\ thei=on~
(also called ~ho theo/s~ _fr._ 36 = 67; cf. _fr._ 61 = 102) as
individual ~atha/natoi~, but he only means what he says in another
place: ~tauto\ to\ zô=n kai\ tethnêko/s~ (_fr._ 78 = 88), ~bi/os~
and ~tha/natos~ are the same (_fr._ 66 = 48). It seems to me
impossible to extract from these words of this 67th fragment (62nd),
or from no. 44 (= 53), a doctrine of the ascent to divinity of
special great men (with Gomperz, _Sitzb. Wien. Ak._ 1886, p. 1010,
1041 f.). Nor would anything be asserted by such a doctrine about
the immortality of such men. The striking phrase ~anthrô/pous me/nei
teleutê/santas ha/ssa ouk e/lpontai~ (_fr._ 122 = 27) is certainly
understood by Cl. Al. as referring to the punishment of the soul
after death. But the same Cl. Al., _Str._ **v, 9, p. 649 P., is
capable of explaining the Herakleitean ~ekpu/rôsis~ (in which
Herakl. actually speaks of a ~kri/sis~ by fire: _fr._ 26 = 66) as a
~dia\ puro\s ka/tharsis tô=n _kakô=s bebiôko/tôn_~. In fact, he is
giving to statements torn from their context a meaning that accords
with his own knowledge and comprehension. The same sentence (_fr._
122 = 27) is given a quite different and consolatory sense by Plu.
ap. Stob., _Fl._ 120, 8 fin.; cf. Schuster, _Heraklit_, p. 190, n.
1. Herakl. himself need have meant nothing more than the perpetual
process of change that "awaits men after death".--Other utterances
are no more conclusive for a doctrine of immortality in Hkl. (_fr._
7 = 18 belongs to quite another context). "Those who have fallen in
war are honoured both by gods (whose existence was not denied by
Hkl. nor was it necessary that he should) and men," _fr._ 102 = 24;
that their reward was anything else but fame--for example, blessed
immortality--is not suggested even by Cl. Al. (_Str._ iv, 16, p. 571
P.), and is certainly not to be extracted from H.'s words, _fr._ 126
= 5 (the fool) ~hou/ti ginô/skôn theou\s oud' hê/rôas hoi/tine/s
eisin~ simply shows that Hkl. did not share the popular ideas about
gods and Heroes, but supplies nothing positive.--In _fr._ 38 = 98 we
have ~hai psuchai\ osmô=ntai kath' ha/|dên~. Are we really to deduce
from this that Herakl. believed in a regular Homeric Hades?
~ha/|dês~ is a metaphorical expression for the opposite of the life
on earth (just as it is used metaphorically for the opp. of ~pha/os~
by the Herakleitean [Hippocr.] _de Victu_, 1, 4, p. 632 Kühn = vi,
476 Lit.). For the souls ~ha/|dês~ means the ~ho/dos ka/tô~ and the
sense of the dictum is: after disappearing in death the souls when
they have travelled on the way downwards through water and earth
will at last rise up again through water, and drawing in to
themselves pure, dry "fire" will become "souls" again, (~osmô=ntai~
is remarkable {394} but not to be altered. ~hosiou=ntai~ Pfleiderer;
but the connexion in which Plu. quotes the saying of Herakl. [_Fac.
O. L._ xxviii, p. 943 E] shows that there is no reference to the
purification of the souls in Hades, but merely of their nourishment
and strengthening by the ~anathumi/asis~ of the fiery aether; cf.
also S.E., _M._ ix, 73, following Poseidonios. This
~anathumia=n~--and the becoming "fiery" again--is what Hkl. calls
~osma=sthai~.)--From the hopelessly corrupt _fr._ 123 = 63 nothing
intelligible can be extracted.--Nowhere can we find clear and
unambiguous statements of Herakleitos witnessing to his belief in
the immortality of the individual soul; and it would require such
statements to make us attribute to Herakleitos a conception that, as
everyone admits, is in hopeless contradiction with the rest of his
teaching. He says perfectly plainly that in death the soul becomes
water; and that means that it, as the soul = fire, _perishes_. If
his belief had been anything like that of the mystics (as the
Neoplatonists supposed) he must have regarded death--the liberation
of the soul from the fetters of corporeality and the realm of the
lower elements--as a complete issue of the soul into its proper
element, the fire. Whereas, what he teaches is the opposite of this:
the soul perishes, becomes water, then earth, and then water again,
and finally soul once more (_fr._ 68 = 36). Only in this sense is it
indestructible.]
[20\11: e.g. by Pfleiderer, _Philos. d. Heraklit_, etc., p. 209, and
frequently.]
[21\11: The Sibyl _fr._ 12 = 92; the Delphic Oracle 11 = 93;
Kathartic practices 130 = 5; Bakchoi, etc., 124 = 14.]
[22\11: ~hôuto\s Ha/idês kai\ Dio/nusos~ _fr._ 127 = 15 (and to that
extent--as being reconcilable with the doctrine of Hkl.--may the
Dionysiac mysteries be considered valid: this must be the meaning of
the sentence). On the other hand, we have disapproval of the
~mustê/ria~ carried out ~anierôsti/~ by men: _fr._ 125 = 14 (for the
worshippers do not perceive the real meaning of the ceremonies).]
[23\11: In contrast to the Neoplatonic writers who attributed to
Hkl. a doctrine of the soul like the Orphico-Pythagorean, the
[Plutarchian] account in the _Placita Philos._ is again much nearer
the real meaning of Herakleitos; cf. 4, 7 (where the name of
Herakleitos has fallen out, as can be seen from Theodoret; see
Diels, _Dox._, p. 392; _Vors._ 76, 1) ~. . . exiou=san (tê\n
anthrô/pou psuchê\n) eis tê\n tou= panto\s psuchê\n anachôrei=n
pro\s to\ homogene/s~. Even this is not quite correct as expressing
what Hkl. really thought as to the fate of the soul but it does at
least show once more that the contrary views of the Neoplatonists
are also only _interpretations_, not evidence.]
[24\11: ~Hêra/kleitos êremi/an kai\ sta/sin ek tô=n ho/lôn anê/|rei;
e/sti ga\r tou=to tô=n nekrô=n~. _Dox._, p. 320; _Vors._ 73, 10.
~sta/sis~ and ~êremi/a~ could never make a real "life"--not even a
blessed life far removed from the world--but are signs of what is
"dead", i.e. of what is nowhere to be found in this world, in fact,
Nothing.]
[25\11: Parmenldes' polemic against Herakleitos: l. 46 ff. Mull.;
_fr._ 6, 4 ff. Diels; see Bernays, _Rh. Mus._ vii, 115 (cf. Diels,
_Parm._ 68).]
[26\11: Aristotle (acc. to S.E., _M._ x, 46; _Vors._ 142, 33 ff.)
~aphusi/kous autou\s ke/klêken, ho/ti archê\ kinêseô/s estin hê
phu/sis, hê\n anei=lon pha/menoi mêde\n kinei=sthai~.]
[27\11: Thphr., _Sens._ § 4; _Vors._ 146, 13 f.]
[28\11: ~gegenê=sthai tê\n tô=n pa/ntôn phu/sin ek thermou= kai\
psuchrou= kai\ xêrou= kai\ hugrou=, lambano/ntôn eis a/llêla tê\n
metanolê/n, kai\ psuchê\n kra=ma hupa/rchein ek tô=n proeirême/nôn
kata\ mêdeno\s tou/tôn epikra/têsin~, Zeno ap. D.L. ix, 29; _Vors._
166, 14. The composition out of four elements instead of two as with
Parmenides may have been arrived at by Zeno {395} in imitation of
the "four roots" of Empedokles, each of which was distinguished by
possessing one of the four qualities ~thermo/n ktl.~ The statement
that the ~psuchê/~ arises from the _equal_ mixture of the four
qualities reminds us of Empedokles' account of ~phronei=n~ (_Vors._
218, 1 = 220, 23; Thphr., _Sens._ 10, 23). On the other side, Zeno
takes over and applies to the ~psuchê/~ what the Pythagorean
physician Alkmaion said about ~hugi/eia~ (_Vors._ 136, 1; _Dox._, p.
442; cf. Arist., _An._ 408a, 1): his point of view is almost
identical with that of those Pythagoreans who regarded the "soul" as
made up out of a ~harmoni/a~ of the Cold, the Warm, etc. (see
below). He may have actually got his views from the acquaintance of
Pythagorean physiologists (he was regarded as a "Pythagorean": Str.
252).]
[29\11: Simpl. ad Arist., _Ph._, p. 39 D.; _Vors._ 162, 11; cf.
Diels, _Parm._ 109 f. (1897).]
[30\11: Parmenides pupil of Diochaites the Pythagorean and of
Ameinias, also as it appears a Pythagorean: Sotion ap. D.L. ix, 21;
_Vors._ 138. He was counted a Pythagorean by tradition which,
however, was very free with its attributions of this kind. Call.
_fr._ 100d, 17; Str. 252; _V. Pyth._ ap. Phot., _Bibl._ 249, p.
439a, 37 Bk.; Iamb., _VP._ 267 (with Sch., p. 190 N.). The Pyth.
influence on Parmenides may have been essentially of an ethical
nature: ~eis hêsuchi/an proetra/pê hupo\ Ameini/ou~, D.L. ix, 21.
~Parmeni/deios kai\ Puthago/reios bi/os~ as equivalent: [Ceb.]
_Tab._ 2 fin. Str., p. 252, connects the good government of Elea
with the Pythagorean influence of Parmenides (and of Zeno).
Parmenides law-giver of Elea: Speus. ~p. philoso/phôn~ ap. D.L. ix,
23.]
[31\11: ~philosophi/an de\ prô=tos ôno/mase Puthago/ras kai\
heauto\n philo/sophon~: D.L., _Proem._ 12 (though the rest is from
the fictitious dialogue of Herakl. Pont. see Cic., _TD._ v, 8-9).]
[32\11: Pl., _Rp._ 600 AB.]
[33\11: ~polumathi/ê, histori/ê~ of Pythag.; Herakl. _frr._ 16, 17 =
40, 129. ~pantoi/ôn ta\ ma/lista sophô=n epiê/ranos e/rgôn~ is said
of Pythag. by Emped. (429 Mull.) _fr._ 129, 3.--The Pythagorean
account of the construction of the world was known to Parmenides at
the beginning of the fifth century and imitated by him in several
points: Krische, _Theol. Lehren d. gr. D._ 103 ff. (To what extent
Parmenides in other respects controverted Pythag. doctrine--as has
been recently asserted of him--may be left undecided.) Fanciful
speculations about numbers are attributed to Pythag. himself by
Aristot., _MM._ 1182a, 11 ff.; _Vors._ 347, 3.]
[34\11: Emped. 427 ff. Mull.; _fr._ 129 Diels. That this
_praeconium_ does really refer to Pythag. (as Timaeus and others
supposed) and not to Parmenides (as the undefined ~hoi de/~ of D.L.
viii, 54, thought) appears to be proved by l. 4 ff., which allude to
a remarkable power of ~ana/mnêsis~ which was certainly attributed by
legend to Pythag., never to Parmenides.]
[35\11: ~psuchai/~ filling the whole air, not distinguished from
~dai/mones~ and ~hê/rôes~, Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 32; _Vors._^4
i, xliv (who in this section of his account--§§31 ff.--is giving
_older_ Pythagorean ideas. Poseidonios expresses the same ideas; but
it does not therefore follow that he got them from the Stoics.
Poseid. borrowed and elaborated many Pythagorean views). More subtly
expressed: the soul is ~atha/natos~ because it is eternally in
motion like ~ta\ thei=a pa/nta~, the moon, sun, stars, and heaven;
Alkmaion ap. Arist., _An._ 405a, 29 ff.; _Vors._ 133, 40; cf.
Krische, 75 f. The perpetual movement of the ~psuchai/~ was one of
the older Pythag. beliefs: it is expressed in the old fable (known
already to Demokritos) of the motes in the sunbeam, {396} which, in
their continual agitation, are, or enclose, swarming souls (see
below, n. 40). In Alkmaion's treatment of the doctrine there is the
additional idea that the soul of man ~e/oike toi=s athana/tois~. The
derivation of its immortality and divinity from its origin in the
World-soul (this is often said to be a Pythagorean doctrine: Cic.,
_ND._ i, 27; _Sen._ 78; D.L. viii, 28; S.E., _M._ ix, 127) does
indeed suggest Stoic pantheism in the form of its expression but in
substance it may very well go back to the older Pythag. teaching.
(The genuineness of the frag. [21 D.] of Philolaos ap. Stob., _Ecl._
i, 20, 2 ff.; _Vors._ 318, 13, remains, however, dubious.) The idea
that the soul and ~nou=s~ of man came to him from an impersonal
~thei=on~, an all-pervading ~en tô=| panti\ phro/nêsis~, must have
been widespread even in the fifth century. It finds expression in
Xen., _M._ 1, 4, 8-17; 4, 3, 14, where it is certainly not an
original fancy of Xenophon's, but must have been derived by him from
somewhere or other (not from Socrates, however, nor Plato).]
[36\11: ~en phroura=|~, Pl., _Phd._ 62 B. This is traced back to
Pythag. belief (though he misinterprets the meaning of the word
~phroura/~) by Cic., _Sen._ 73; cf. the Pythagorean Euxitheos ap.
Ath. 157 C; _Vors._ 315, 19. See Böckh, _Philol._ 179 ff. (Philolaos
_fr._ 15 [16 Mull.] speaks of the World-soul or God who holds and
contains all things ~en phroura=|~ without mentioning the human
soul: see Böckh, p. 151.) The comparison of life in the body to a
~phroura/~ may very well be Pythagorean; nor is this **prevented by
the fact that it is also Orphic (see above, chap. x, n. 43). This
comparison implies the conception of the earthly life as a
punishment. ~dia/ tinas timôri/as~ the soul is enclosed in the body:
Philolaos _fr._ 14 (23) appealing to ~palaioi\ theolo/goi te kai\
ma/nties~ (cf. Iamb., _VP._ 85, ~agatho\n hoi po/noi . . . epi\
_kola/sei_ ga\r eltho/ntas dei= kolasthê=nai~).--Espinas in _Arch.
f. Ges. d. Philos._ viii, 452, interprets the ~en phroura=|~ of Pl.,
_Phd._ 62, as = "in the cattle-pen" or "sheep-fold"; the idea of God
as the Shepherd of man would then be vaguely present even here (cf.
_Plt._ 271 E; _Criti._ 109 B). It remains, however, to be proved (to
begin with) that ~phroura/~ is ever used in the sense of ~sêko/s~ or
~heirktê/~.]
[37\11: Arist., _An._ 1, 3, p. 407b, 22 ff.]
[38\11: ~hoi en tô=| tarta/rô=|~ terrified by thunder acc. to
Pythag. belief: Arist., _An. Po._ 94b, 32 ff.; ~su/nodoi tô=n
tethneô/tôn~ in the depths of the earth, Ael., _VH._ iv, 17 (perhaps
from Arist. ~p. tô=n Puthagorei/ôn~). Description of the condition
of things in Hades given in the Pythagorean ~Kata/basis eis
ha/|dou~. As in the case of the Orphics this purgation and
punishment in the spirit-world must have belonged to the parts of
the ~Puthago/reioi mu=thoi~ that were quite seriously believed.]
[39\11: ~ekriphthei=san~ (out of the body) ~autê\n (tê\n psuchê\n)
epi\ gê=s pla/zesthai en tô=| ae/ri homoi/an tô=| sô/mati~ (being a
complete ~ei/dôlon~ of the living): Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 31.]
[40\11: Arist., _An._ 1, 2, 4, p. 404a, 16 ff.; _Vors._ 357, 1; many
called the ~en tô=| ae/ri xu/smata~ themselves "souls", others ~to\
tau=ta kinou=n~. This may rest on a real popular belief which,
however, has already been partially elevated to a philosophical
standing: the souls are compared to what is evidently itself in
perpetual agitation (Arist., l. 19 f.). This was undoubtedly
Pythagorean (and old Ionic) teaching: see Alkmaion ap. Arist., _An._
405a, 29 ff.; _Vors._ 133, 40. (Statement of _Dox._ 386a, 13 ff., b,
8 ff., is more doubtful.)]
[41\11: D.L. viii, 32; _Vors_^4. i, p. xliv.]
[42\11: That the Pythagoreans believed in the entry of the soul into
the bodies of animals also is implied in the satirical verses of
Xenophanes {397} (_fr._ 6) ap. D.L. viii, 36. All probability
suggests that this was the reason for the injunction to abstain from
flesh food among the older Pythagoreans themselves (and with
Empedokles). (S.E., _M._ ix, 127 ff., however, drags in the
"World-Soul" in a moment of untimely Stoicism. S.E.'s own quotation
from Empedokles shows that the latter at any rate derived the
~apochê\ empsu/chôn~ simply from the fact of Metamorphosis, and not
at all from the ~psuchê=s pneu=ma~ which rules in all life; though
this last is attributed to him by S.E.)]
[43\11: See Appendix x.]
[44\11: According to the Pythagoreans ~to\ di/kaion~ is nothing else
than ~to\ antipepontho/s~, i.e. ~ha\ tis epoi/êse tau=t'
antipathei=n~: Arist., _EN._ 5, 5, p. 1132b, 21 ff.; _MM._ 1194a, 29
ff. (also given with fanciful numerical expression, _MM._ 1182a, 14;
Sch. Arist. 540a, 19 ff.; 541b, 6 Br.; [Iamb.] _Theol. Arith._, p.
28 f. Ast). This definition of justice was simply taken over by the
Pythagoreans from popular sayings such as the verse of Rhadamanthys
ap. Arist., _EN._ about the ~dra/santi pathei=n~ and similar
formulae: see collection in Blomfield's Gloss. in A., _Cho._ 307;
Soph. _fr._ 229 P. Compensatory justice of this kind we may suppose
was manifested in the rebirths of men (in this respect the P. went
beyond the commonplace sense of that ~trige/rôn mu=thos~): we may
assume this without further hesitation if we remember the completely
analogous application of this conception by the Orphics (above,
chap. x, n. 71).]
[45\11: ~Puthago/reios tro/pos tou= bi/ou~, Pl., _Rp._ 600 B.]
[46\11: ~akolouthei=n tô=| theô=|~, Iamb., _VP._ 137 (following
Aristoxenos); _Vors._ 362, 32; ~he/pou theô=|~ Pythagoras ap. Stob.,
_Ecl._ ii, p. 49, 16 W. See Wyttenb. on Plu., _Ser. Num. Vind._ 550
D.]
[47\11: Ancient testimony ascribes to the Pythagoreans: abstinence
from flesh-food or at least from the flesh of such animals as are
not sacrificed to the Olympians (the ~anthrô/pou psuchê/~ does not
enter into the ~thu/sima zô=|a~ in transmigration: Iamb., _VP._ 85;
_Vors._ 359, 13); from eating fish, particularly ~tri/glai~ and
~mela/nouroi~, and beans; from using linen clothing (or being buried
in it: Hdt. ii, 81); and a few other forms of abstinence and
measures assuring ritual purity. The whole apparatus of ritual
~hagnei/a~ is ascribed to the older Pythagoreans by Alex. Polyh. ap.
D.L. viii, 33. This, as a general statement is certainly correct. It
is customary to say that it began among the degenerate Pythagoreans
after the break up of the Italian society (so esp. Krische, _De Soc.
a Pythag. cond. scopo politico_, Gött., 1831). But when Aristoxenos,
the contemporary of the later, scientifically-minded Pythagoreans,
denies all such superstitious ideas and regulations to the original
Pythagoreans, his evidence really applies only to those Pythagorean
_scholars_ with whom he was acquainted and who seemed to him to have
preserved the real spirit of the older Pythagoreanism much more
truly than the ascetic (and in any case degenerate) Pythagoreans of
the same period. Everything, however, goes to show that the strength
of the surviving community as it had been founded by Pythagoras lay
in the religious and mystical elements of its doctrine; and that
what was oldest in Pythagoreanism was what it had in common with the
faith and religious discipline of the Orphics. To this side belongs
what we learn from tradition of the older Pythagorean asceticism.
Much, then, that is of early Pythagorean origin (though certainly
combined with other and later elements) is to be found in many of
the ~akou/smata~ or ~su/mbola~ of the Pythagoreans, esp. in those of
them (and they are numerous) that give directions of a ritual or
merely superstitious kind. A fresh collection, arrangement and {398}
explanation of these remarkable fragments would be very useful:
Göttling's purely rationalist treatment of them does them less than
justice. (Corn. Hölk, _De acusmatis s. symbolis Pythag._, Diss.
Kiel. 1894.)]
[48\11: Efforts in a more positive direction may perhaps be seen in
the practice of the musical form of ~ka/tharsis~ which Pythag. and
the Pythagoreans used in accordance with an elaborate system: cf.
Iamb., _VP._ 64 ff., 110 ff.; Sch. V. on ~Ch~ 391; also Quint. 9, 4,
12; Porph., _VP._ 33, etc.--What Aristoxenos has to say about
Pythagorean ethics, moralistic _parainesis_ and edification--most of
it of a purely rationalist kind--can scarcely be said to have
historical value.]
[49\11: Good formulation of Pythag. belief ap. Max. Tyr. 16, 2, i,
287 R.: ~Puthago/ras prô=tos en toi=s He/llêsin eto/lmêsen eipei=n,
ho/ti hautô=| to\ me\n sô=ma tethnê/xetai, hê de\ psuchê\ anapta=sa
oichê/setai athanê\s kai\ agê/rôs. _kai\ ga\r ei=nai autê\n pri\n
hê/kein deu=ro_~. i.e. the life of the soul is not only endless but
without beginning; the soul is immortal because it is timeless.]
[50\11: The withdrawal of the soul from the ~ku/klos ana/gkês~ and
its return to an emancipated existence as a bodiless spirit was
never so clearly held in view for the "Pure" by the older
Pythagorean tradition as it was among the Orphics (and Empedokles).
It is, however, hardly thinkable that a system which regarded every
incarnation of the soul as a punishment and the body as its prison
or its tomb should never have held out to the true ~ba/kchoi~ of its
mysteries the prospect of a full and permanent liberation of the
soul, at last, from corporeality and the earthly life. Only so could
the long chain of deaths and rebirths reach a final and satisfactory
conclusion. Eternally detained in the cycle of births the soul would
be eternally punished (this is e.g. the idea of Empedokles: 455 f.,
_fr._ 145 D.); and this cannot have been the real conclusion of the
Pythagorean doctrine of salvation. Claud. Mamertus, _de An._ 2, 7
[_Vors._ 320, 12], gives it as a doctrine of Philolaos [_fr._ 22]
that the (pure soul after its separation from the body leads a
"bodiless" life in the "Universe" (the ~ko/smos~ situated above the
~ourano/s~): see Böckh, _Philol._ 177. Apart from this the only
evidence for the withdrawal of the soul is late: _Carm. Aur._ 70 f.
(making use of the Empedok. verses, _fr._ 112, 4 f. = 400 Mull.),
Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 31 (~a/gesthai ta\s kathara\s [psucha\s]
epi\ to\n hu/psiston~ "in altissimum locum" Cobet: but an ellipse of
~to/pon~ is hardly admissible. ~ho hu/psistos~ = the highest God
would be a Hebraic form of expression, nor can it be a possible one
here for Alex. Polyh.--we should also, with this meaning of
~hu/psistos~, expect ~pro\s t. hu/.~ ad superiores circulos bene
viventium animae, secundum philosophorum altam scientiam, Serv.,
_A._ vi, 127--should we then supply ~epi\ to\n hu/psiston
<ku/klon>~? Or perh. ~epi\ to\ hu/psiston~?)--An escape of the souls
after the expiry of their ~peri/odoi~ must have been known as a
Pythagorean belief to Luc., _VH._ ii, 21. (Vergil, too, is speaking
in a Pythagorean sense, _A._ vi, 744, pauci laeta arva [Elysii]
tenemus.--i.e. for ever without renewed ~ensôma/tôsis~--see Serv.,
_A._ vi, 404, 426, 713. It is true the line is out of its right
place, but there can be no doubt that it reproduces the words and
the--in this section Pythagorean--opinion of Vergil.) The idea that
the cycle of births is never to be broken cannot be regarded as
Pythagorean nor even as Neopythagorean. (A few isolated later
accounts of Pythag. doctrine; e.g. D.L. viii, 14 (from Favorinus),
Porph., _VP._ 19, and also the cursory description in Ov., _M._
xv--with a good deal of foreign matter added--speak of the Pyth.
doctrine of soul-transmigration without also referring to the
possibility of ~ku/klou lê=xai~; but they are not meant to deny that
{399} possibility but merely leave it unmentioned as unnecessary in
the context.) There seems to be no example of a Greek doctrine of
transmigration that did not also include a promise to the ~ho/sioi~
or the ~philo/sophoi~ that they would be able to escape from the
cycle of births (at least for a world-period: as Syrian. took it,
though probably not Porph.). Such a promise, as the consummation of
the promises of salvation therein made, could only be dispensed with
in the case of a doctrine of transmigration in which being born
again was itself regarded as a _reward_ for the pious (as in the
teaching which Jos., _BJ._ 2, 8, 14, attributes to the Pharisees).
By Greek partisans of the doctrine of Metempsychosis rebirth upon
earth is always regarded as a punishment or at any rate a burden,
not as a desirable goal for the life of the soul. We must therefore
presume that the promise of escape from the cycle of rebirth was
made also by the oldest Pythagorean teaching as the final benefit of
its message of salvation. Without this completing touch
Pythagoreanism would be like Buddhism without the promise of a final
attainment of Nirvâna.]
[51\11: Pythagoras is called the pupil of Pherekydes as early as
Andron of Ephesos (before Theopompos): D.L. i, 119; _Vors._ ii, 199,
18. Pherekydes was regarded as "the first" who taught the
immortality of the soul (Cic., _TD._ i, 38) or more correctly
metempsychosis (Suid. ~Pherek.~); cf. Preller, _Rh. Mus._ (N.F.),
iv, 388 f. A hint of such teaching must have been found in his
mystical treatise (cf. Porph., _Antr._ 31; _Vors._ ii, 204,
12--Gomperz is rather too sceptical, _Gk. Thinkers_, i, 542). This
teaching seems to have been the chief reason which tempted later
writers to make the old _theologos_ into the teacher of Pythagoras,
the chief spokesman of the doctrine of the soul's
transmigrations.--It is, however, an untenable theory that Pherek.
illustrated his doctrine of transmigration by the example of
Aithalides. What the Sch. on A.R. i, 645 [_Vors._ ii, 204, 24],
quotes from "Pherekydes" about the alternate sojourn of the
~psuchê/~ of Aithalides in Hades and on earth, does not come from
Pherekydes the _theologos_ (as Göttling, _Opusc._ 210, and Kern, _de
Orph. Epim. Pherec._, pp. 89, 106, think) but without the slightest
doubt from the genealogist and historian; this is the only
Pherekydes who is used by the Sch. of Ap. Rh., and he is used
frequently. Besides this, the way in which the different statements
of the various authorities used in this Scholion are distinguished,
shows quite clearly that Pherekydes had only spoken of Aithalides'
alternate dwelling above and below the earth, but _as still being_
Aithalides, and not as metamorphosed by the series of births into
other personalities living upon earth. Pherekydes was obviously
reproducing a Phthiotic local-legend in which Aithalides as the son
of (the chthonic?) Hermes alternately lived on and below the earth,
as an ~heterê/meros~--like the Dioscuri in Lacedaimonian legend (~l~
301 ff.: in that passage and generally in the older view--as held by
Alkman, Pindar, etc.--_both_ the Dioscuri change their place of
abode together: it is not till later that the variant arose acc. to
which they alternate with each other: see Hemst. _Luc._ ii, p. 344
Bip.). It was Herakleides Pont. who first turned the alternate
sojourning of Aithalides into death and resurrection (he also made
Aithalides one of the previous incarnations of Pythagoras; see
Appendix x); but as a _different_ person, so that A. thus became an
example of metempsychosis. It is not hard to see why Aithalides was
chosen as one of the previous incarnations of P., nor how the old
miracle-story, preserved to literature by Pherekydes, was thus
transformed to suit its new purpose. Plainly Pherekydes did _not_
say that Hermes {400} also gave Aithalides the power of memory after
his death (otherwise the statement to this effect in Sch. A.R. would
have stood under the name of Pherek.); and the privilege was rather
meaningless until after Herakleides' narrative. Perhaps it was Her.
who first added this touch to the story. Ap. Rh. follows him in this
point (i, 643 ff.), but not--or not plainly, at least: 646 ff.--in
what Herakleides had invented about the metempsychosis of
Aithalides.]
[52\11: Macr., _Som. Scip._ 1, 14, 19, attributes this view to
Pythagoras and Philolaos, being certainly correct in the case of the
latter; since the opinion that the soul is a ~kra=sis~ and
~harmoni/a~ of the warm and the cold, the dry and the wet, which go
to make up the body, is given by Simmias in Pl., _Phd._ 86 B, as a
tradition that he has received and not an invention of his own. But
what else can this mean than a tradition handed down in Thebes by
his teacher Philolaos (_Phd._ 61 D)? (Hence ~Harmoni/as tê=s
Thêbaïkê=s~, 95 A.) It is true that Claud. Mam. _de An._ ii, 7, only
attributes to Philolaos the doctrine that the soul is _bound up_
with the body "in eternal and incorporeal harmony"
(_convenientiam_): which would imply an independent substance of the
soul side by side with that of the body. But this must have been a
misunderstanding of the real meaning of Philolaos. Aristoxenos, too,
can only have got his doctrine of the soul as a harmony from his
Pythagorean friends. Perhaps, too, this was the influence which
suggested to Dikaiarchos his view that the "soul" is a ~harmoni/a
tô=n tessa/rôn stoichei/ôn~ (_Dox._, p. 387), and indeed ~tô=n en
tô=| sô/mati thermô=n kai\ psuchrô=n kai\ hugrô=n kai\ xêrô=n~, as
Nemes., _Nat. Hom._, p. 69 Matth., tells us--thus exactly resembling
Simmias in Plato (unless indeed the passage in Nemes. is a mere
reminiscence of Plato strayed here by accident). See also chap. x,
n. 27.]
[53\11: See Pl., _Phd._ 86 CD. Pre-existence of the soul impossible
if it is only an ~harmoni/a~ of the body: 92 AB.]
[54\11: It was in itself almost unavoidable that a community founded
like the Pythagorean mainly on a mystical doctrine but not
ill-disposed to scientific studies, should, as it was extended (and
still followed practical aims) split up into two parties: an inner
circle of qualified teachers and scholars, and one or more groups,
outside and attached to them, of lay members for whom a special
teaching suited for popular comprehension would be provided. Thus
the inner circle of Buddhism, the Bikshu, was surrounded by the
common herd of "worshippers"; and the same can be seen in Christian
monastic organisations. A division, then, of the followers of
Pythagoras into Akousmatikoi and Mathematikoi--Pythagoreioi and
Pythagoristai--etc., is not in itself at all incredible.]
[55\11: The division of the soul, or the ~duna/meis~ of the soul,
into the ~logiko/n~ and the ~a/logon~ was made, before Plato, by
Pythagoras--so we might have learnt, ~autou= tou= Puthago/rou
suggra/mmatos oudeno\s eis hêma=s sôzome/nou~, from the writings of
his followers, acc. to Poseidonios ap. Galen, _de Plac. Hipp. et
Pl._ 5, p. 459 Müll. = v, 478 K.; cf. also 425 K. (_Vors._ 34, 23).
From Poseidonios evidently comes the same opinion in Cic., _TD._ iv,
10. And, in fact, a fragment of Philolaos ~p. phu/seôs~, _fr._ 13
Diels (_Theol. Ar._, p. 20, 35 A.), gives a division of the ~archai\
tou= zô/|ou tou= logikou=~, which depends upon the idea that the
highest living organism contains within itself and makes use of all
the lower organisms as well (~nou=s~ in the head, ~anthrô/pou
archa/--psucha\ kai\ ai/sthêsis~ in the heart, ~zô/|ou
archa\--rhi/zôsis kai\ ana/phusis~ in the navel, ~phutou=
archa\--spe/rmatos metabola/~ and ~ge/nnêsis~ in the ~aidoi=on,
xunapa/ntôn archa/~). Then in the psychical region we have a
division between the ~logiko/n~ {401} and the ~a/logon~ according to
their nature and "seat" in man (~logiko/n~ being made up of
reasoning power, ~nou=s~, specific to man, and sense-perception,
~ai/sthêsis~, which also belongs to the other ~zô=|a~, while the
~a/logon = rhi/zôsis kai\ ana/phusis~ and resembles the ~ai/tion
tou= tre/phesthai kai\ au/xesthai~, or the ~phutiko/n~, a part of
the ~a/logon tê=s psuchê=s~ in Arist., _EN._ 1, 13, p. 1102a, 32
ff.). This evidently represents an attempt at a division of the soul
into ~logiko/n~ and ~a/logon~, such as Poseidonios must have found
carried out by other Pythagoreans. A clear distinction between
~phronei=n (xunie/nai~ and ~aistha/nesthai~ was made by the Pythag.
physician Alkmaion, whose division was at least different from and
more profound than that of Empedokles (with whom he is contrasted by
Thphr., _Sens._ 25; _Vors._ 132, 20). Empedokles did indeed
distinguish between thinking and perceiving, but thinking (~noei=n~)
was only a ~sômatiko/n ti hô/sper to\ aistha/nesthai~ and to this
extent ~tauto/n~ with it (Arist., _An._ 3, 3, p. 427a, 21). Alkmaion
cannot, therefore, have made ~xunie/nai sômatiko/n~. These
Pythagoreans were on the way to separating from the soul as a whole
a separate, thinking soul that required no sense-perception for its
thought, the ~nou=s~. To this latter alone would divinity and
immortality be ascribed, as in later philosophy (and thus _Dox._
393a, 10, though unhistorically and prematurely, gives ~to\ logiko\n
[tê=s psuchê=s] a/phtharton~ as a doctrine of "Pythagoras").--It is
certainly difficult to see how Philolaos' doctrine of the
distinction between the ~anthrô/pou archa/~, the ~nou=s~--an element
of the soul belonging exclusively to men--and the ~zô/|ou archa/~
(confined to ~ai/sthêsis~ and ~psucha/~, power of life) could
possibly be reconciled with the older Pythagorean doctrine of the
soul's transmigration. Acc. to that belief the soul wanders through
the bodies of animals as well as men, and the idea implies the view
that the _same_ soul could inhabit animals as well as men; that, in
fact, ~pa/nta ta\ geno/mena e/mpsucha~ are ~homogenê=~ (Porph.,
_VP._ 19; cf. S.E., _M._ ix, 127). Philolaos, on the contrary, holds
that the soul of man is differently constituted from the souls of
animals--the latter lack ~nou=s~ (it is not merely that its efficacy
is hindered in animals by the ~duskrasi/a tou= sô/matos~ as is said
wrongly to be the opinion of Pythag. by _Dox._ 432a, 15 ff.). The
same difficulty arises again in the case of Plato's doctrine of
transmigration.--Alkmaion who ascribes ~xunie/nai~ to man alone
seems not to have held the transmigration doctrine.]
[56\11: 401 ff. Mull.; _fr._ 112, 5 Diels.]
[57\11: 462 ff. _fr._ 111.]
[58\11: Satyros ap. D.L. viii, 59; _Vors._ 195, 26.--Especially
famous was his feat of driving away adverse winds from Akragas (cf.
_fr._ 111, 3); see also Welcker, _Kl. Schr._ iii, 60-1.--The asses'
skins with which Emped. kept the north winds away from Akragas were
at any rate intended as _apotropaic_ materials--magic means of
driving away spirits. In the same way protection against hail and
lightning is obtained by hanging up the skin of a hyena, a seal,
etc. (see _Geop._ i, 14, 3-5; i, 16, and Niclas' notes there). These
skins ~e/chousi du/namin antipathê=~: Plu., _Smp._ 4, 2, 1, p. 664
C.--Other magic charms against hail--the ~chalazophu/lakes~, Plu.,
_Smp._ 7, 2, 2, p. 700 F; Sen., _NQ._ 4b, 6.]
[59\11: ~. . . egô\ d' humi=n theo\s a/mbrotos, ouke/ti thnêto/s,
pôleu=mai meta\ pa=si tetime/nos ktl.~ 400 f. (_fr._ 112, 4 f.).]
[60\11: A late echo is to be found in the inspired lines of
Lucretius in praise of Empedokles, i, 717 ff.]
[61\11: The well-known story of Empedokles' leap into the crater of
Mt. Aetna--intended by his complete disappearance to call forth the
belief that he had not died (Luc., _DM._ xx, 4), but had been
_translated_ {402} alive--is a parody of a serious translation
legend and presupposes the existence of one. The parodists' version
was contradicted early by Empedokles' follower, the physician
Pausanias: D.L. viii, 69 (this does not come from the fabulously
conceived narrative of Herakleides Pont. It does not follow, from
the epigram quoted by D.L. viii, 61, _fr._ 156; _AP._ vii, 508, that
Paus. died before Emped.; the authorship of that ep. is uncertain
and in any case it is not very worthy of credit). The seriously
intended legend must then have arisen soon after the disappearance
of Empedokles: it was founded upon the fact that no one did know
where Emp. had died (~tha/natos a/dêlos~, Timaeus ap. D.L. viii,
71), or could point to the grave which covered his remains. (This is
expressly stated by Timaeus, who, in other respects, contradicts the
translation-fable as well as the story of the leap into Mt. Aetna:
D.L. viii, 72. In the face of this no importance need be attached to
what some one--Neanthes apparently--states ap. D.L. viii, 73; that
there was a grave of Emped. at Megara.) Free elaboration was given
to the translation story by Herakleides Pont. ~p. no/sôn~: D.L.
viii, 67-8 (in return, his philosophic rivals contemptuously applied
a malicious story of feigned translation to Herakleides himself, who
in this way wished to legitimize his own claim to be god or Hero:
D.L. v, 89 ff. From other sources comes Suid. ~Hêrakl.
Euthu/phronos~; cf. Marx, _Griech. Märchen v. dankb. Thieren_, p. 97
ff.). All kinds of stupid variations of the story of Empedokles' end
ap. D.L. viii, 74.]
[62\11: See above, chap. ii, and p. 129.]
[63\11: Cf. 113 ff.; _fr._ 9.]
[64\11: ~sarkô=n chitô/n~, 414, _fr._ 126.]
[65\11: His treatment of the woman who seemed to be dead (~a/pnous~,
D.L. viii, 60) has quite the appearance of a psychophysical
_experiment_; one, however, that was intended to prove the
correctness of precisely the irrational side of his doctrine of the
soul.]
[66\11: ~gui/ôn pi/stis~ is distinguished from ~noei=n~ in v, 57
(_fr._ 4, 13), and ~no/ô| de/rkesthai~ from ~de/rkesthai o/mmasin~
in 82 (_fr._ 17, 21); cf. ~ou/t' epi/derkta ta/d' a/ndrasin ou/t'
epakousta/, ou/te no/ô| peri/lêpta~, 42 f. (_fr._ 2, 7).--Elsewhere
it is true that Emped. (who throughout avoids prosaic exactitude in
the use of technical terms) uses ~noê=sai~ as simply =
sense-perception following epic idiom: e.g. 56 (_fr._ 4, 12; but it
is not quite correct to say that Emped. ~to\ phronei=n kai\ to\
aistha/nesthai tauto/ phêsi~, as Arist. declares: _An._ 427a, 22).]
[67\11: 378 ff.; _fr._ 109: ~gai/ê| me\n ga\r gai=an opô/pamen~,
etc. (~hora=n~ is here used in its widest sense, ~ei=dos anti\
ge/nous~, and = ~aistha/nesthai~. Thus, ~no/ô| de/rkesthai~ in 82
[17, 21] = ~aistha/nesthai~, and very commonly words denoting one of
the modes of perception are used instead of those of another
~ei=dos~, or for the whole ~ge/nos~ of ~ai/sthêsis~. Lob., _Rhemat._
334 ff.).]
[68\11: 372 ff. Mull.; _fr._ 105: ~hai/matos en pela/gessi . . .
tê=| te no/êma ma/lista kukli/sketai anthrô/poisin; hai=ma ga\r
anthrô/pois perika/rdio/n esti no/êma~.--The blood is the seat of
~to\ phronei=n; en tou/tô| ga\r ma/lista kekra=sthai ta\
stoichei=a~, Thphr., _Sens._ 10, 23 f.]
[69\11: A kind of ~suggumnasi/a tô=n aisthê/seôn~ as the physician
Asklepiades defines the idea of the ~psuchê/~ (_Dox._ 378a, 7).--It
resembles what Arist. calls the ~prô=ton aisthêtê/rion~.--This
function which Emped. calls ~phronei=n~ would probably be the
~henopoiou=n~ of the perceptions which Aristot. found wanting in
Emp. (_An._ 409b, 30 ff.; 410a, 1-10; b, 10).]
[70\11: ~to\ noei=n~ is ~sômatiko\n hô/sper to\ aistha/nesthai~,
Arist., _An._ 427a, 26.]
[71\11: Arist., _Metaph._ 1009b, 17 ff.]
[72\11: 298 Mull.; _fr._ 110, 10: ~pa/nta ga\r i/sthi phro/nêsin
e/chein kai\ nô/matos hai=san~. The ~pa/nta~ must be understood
quite literally; for it is the {403} elements in which the powers of
perception inhere (~he/kaston tô=n stoichei/ôn psuchê\n ei=nai~ is
the opinion attributed to Emped. by Arist., _An._ 404b, 12). But
elements are present in the mixture of all things, and thus stones,
etc., have ~phro/nêsis~ and a "portion of mind" in them (though the
statement that it is ~hai/ma~ that first produces ~phro/nêsis~ will
not square with this: Thphr., _Sens._ 23). Emped. attributed
complete sensation and perception to plants, and even gave them
~nou=s~ and ~gnô=sis~ (without blood?): [Arist.] _Plant._ 815a, 16
ff.; b, 16 f. That is why they, too, are capable of harbouring
fallen daimones.]
[73\11: Emped. himself does not use the word ~psuchê/~ at all in the
fragments that have been preserved to us; and it is hardly probable
that he himself would have used the term of the psychical faculties
of the body even if he regarded these as gathered together to a
substantive unity. Later authorities, on the other hand, in their
accounts of the doctrine of Emped. give the name of ~psuchê/~
precisely to these "somatic" intellectual faculties; thus Arist.,
_An._ 404b, 9 ff.; 409b, 23 ff.: ~hai=ma phêsin ei=nai tê\n
psuchê/n~, Gal., _Hipp. et Pla._ 2 = v, 283 K.; cf. Cic., _TD._ i,
19; Tert., _An._ 5.]
[74\11: 113-19 Mull.; _frr._ 11, 15, do not (as Plu., _adv. Col._
12, p. 1113 D, understood them) teach the pre-existence and
persistence after death of the psychic powers within the world of
the elements, but merely speak of the indestructibility of the
elements that are the component parts of the human body, even when
the latter has suffered dissolution.]
[75\11: ~a/tês leimô/n~, _fr._ 121, 4 (21 Mull.; cf. 16) is the name
given by Empedokles to the earth; and not to Hades (as has been
supposed), of which--as an intermediate place of purgation between
two births--there is nowhere any mention in his verses. That the
~aterpê\s chô=ros~ (_fr._ 121, 1) to which Emped. is cast down, the
realm of ~Pho/nos ktl.~ (_fr._ 121) and the ~A/tês leimô/n~, all
refer to the _earth_, ~ho e/ggeios to/pos, ta\ peri\ gê=n~, is
expressly stated by Themistios, _Or._ 13, and Hierocl. _in C. Aur._
24 (_fr._ 121), p. 470 Mull. [_FPG._ i]; Synes. also implies it
(_Ep._ 147, p. 283 C; _Prov._ i, 89 D); the same is distinctly
implied for _fr._ 121, 4, and by Jul., _Or._ vii, 226 B; Philo, ii,
p. 638 M.--Procl., _in _Crat.__, p. 103 Boiss., connects _fr._ 121,
3, ~auchmêrai/ te no/soi kai\ sê/psies e/rga te rheusta/~
immediately with _fr._ 121, 2, and both lines acc. to him apply to
~ta\ hupo\ tê\n selê/nên~; i.e. not to any kind of underworld but to
the region of the earth (cf. Emp. ap. Hippol., _RH._ i, 4; _Vors._
210, 27; _Dox._ 559). The idea that Hades is being spoken of in
these lines is a view peculiar to moderns who have misunderstood the
poet and set aside the clear testimony of Themistios and the rest.
Maass, _Orpheus_, 113, speaks as though the interpretation in favour
of Hades rested upon a tradition which I "contradicted". On the
contrary, that interpretation is itself contradicted by definite
tradition and by common sense (for Emp. falls from Heaven to earth
and not, please God, to Hades!). The view is quite baseless (though
Maass himself finds in the ~e/rga rheusta/~ of _fr._ 121 [20
M.]--the inconstant, transitory works of men upon earth--a support
for his Hades-view: these "fluid works" or things are, he thinks,
nothing else but the stream of filth, the ~skô\r aei/nôn~, in Hades
of which pious invention rumoured: certainly an ingenious
interpretation). Emp. is, in fact, the first to regard this earthly
sojourning as the real Hell--the ~asunê/thês, aterpê\s chô=ros~
(_fr._ 118, 121, 1, the latter a parodying reminiscence of ~l~ 94)--
an ~a/ntron hupo/stegon~ (_fr._ 120) filled with all the plagues and
terrors of the original Hades (121). Stoics and Epicureans (see
below) took up the idea after him and elaborated it in detail. The
daimones that are shut up in this life here below--a ~zôê\ a/bios~
(_fr._ 2, 3)--are as if dead: {404} _frr._ 125 (?), 35, 14. The
Orphic idea of the ~sô=ma--sê=ma~ (see above, p. 345) was thus
thoroughly and energetically carried out. (Macr., _in S. Scip._ 1,
10, 9 ff., attributed the idea that the _inferi_ are nothing else
but the material world of earth to the old _theologi_ (§ 17) who, he
says, lived _before_ the development of a philosophic science of
nature.)]
[76\11: 3 Mull.; _fr._ 115, 3: ~eu=te/ tis (tô=n daimo/nôn)
amplaki/ê|si _pho/nô|_ phi/la gui=a miênê|~. He means ~brô=sis
sarkô=n kai\ allêlophagi/a~ as Plu. paraphrases it, _Es. Carn._ 1,
p. 996 B (for this must always imply acc. to Emp. the "murder" of a
spirit of the same race: _fr._ 136). Even for God it is a crime to
taste of a meat ("blood")-offering and, in fact, there were only
bloodless offerings made in the Golden Age (which was described by
Emp. not in the ~Phusika/~--the principle of which work denied that
there had ever been such a period--but in some other poem in which
he left his philosophic doctrine out of account; perhaps the
~Katharmoi/~): 420 ff. M; _fr._ 128, 3 ff.]
[77\11: _fr._ 115, 4. The earth then becomes the place of their
banishment and punishment for gods that have broken their oath. This
is a version of the impressive picture in Hes., _Th._ 793 ff. _Dei
peierantes_ were punished for nine years (cf. Hes., _Th._ 801) in
Tartaros: Orpheus (not Lucan in his "Orpheus") ap. Serv., _A._ vi,
565. (To this also alludes the poet from whose elegiac verses came
the frag. ap. Serv., _A._ vi, 324: ~tou=~ [sc. ~Stugo\s hu/datos]
stugno\n pô=ma kai\ athana/tô|~: this is probably how the words
should be read.) So that instead of the "underworld" or Tartaros,
the world is for Emp. the worst place of sorrows. From Emp. is
derived the conception that the realm of the _inferi_ is our world,
that inhabited by men, and that there is no other, nor any need of
another ~ha/|dês~--a conception often alluded to and improved upon
by Stoic and other semi-philosophers (esp. clear in Serv., _A._ vi,
127, often only in allegorical sense: Lucr. iii, 978 ff. [See also
Bevan, _Stoics and Sceptics_, p. 107.]).]
[78\11: 30,000 ~hô=rai~: which means probably "years" (hardly
"seasons" as Dieterich, _Nekyia_, 119, takes it). The figure 30,000
has no special meaning (e.g. 300 periods of a life-time each): it is
merely a concrete phrase for "innumerable" (and is frequent: Hirzel,
_Ber. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss._ 1885, p. 64 ff.). This enormous period
of time is the divine counter-part, as measured by divine standards
of time, of the ~me/gas eniauto/s~, the _ennaëteris_ during which
the earthly murderer had to fly from the land of his violent deed.
The fiction of Emp. clearly shows the influence of this expiation of
murder by ~apeniautismo/s~.]
[79\11: _fr._ 121 (22 ff.).]
[80\11: ~argale/as bioi/toio keleu/thous . . . ~ _fr._ 115, 8 (8).]
[81\11: Emp. does not even use the word ~psuchê/~ of these
~dai/mones~ confined within corporeality. They are so named,
however, regularly and without qualification by the later authors
who quote verses from the _Prooimion_ of the ~Phusika/~, Plutarch,
Plotinos, Hippolytos, etc.]
[82\11: Peculiar to Emp. is the attempt to give actual details of
the crimes for which the spirits are condemned to ~ensôma/tôsis~;
and also the extension of metempsychosis to plants (which is
occasionally attributed, but by late authorities only, to the
Pythagoreans as well).]
[83\11: The entirely unpurified seem not to have been condemned to
everlasting punishment in Hades, of which in general he shows no
knowledge, by Emp. (as by the Pythagoreans sometimes). He merely, it
seems, threatens them with ever-renewed rebirth upon earth and the
impossibility of ~to\ ku/klou lê=xai~ (until the complete ascendency
of ~phili/a~). This appears to be the meaning of _fr._ 145 (455 f.)
from the way in which Cl. Al., _Protr._ ii, 27, p. 23 P., cites the
lines.] {405}
[84\11: As we may paraphrase--though indeed here, too, only with
reservations--the ~kako/tês~ and ~kako/têtes~ of Emp. _fr._ 145 (454
f.).]
[85\11: _frr._ 136-7, 128, 9 f. (424, 440). Very remarkable in a
thinker of such an early period is what is said (_fr._ 135) about
the ~pa/ntôn no/mimon~ which forbids ~ktei/nein to\
e/mpsuchon~.--Apart from this we have other vestiges of _kathartic_
rules: purification with water drawn from five springs: _fr._ 143
(see Append. v); abstention from the eating of beans (_fr._ 141) and
of laurel leaves (_fr._ 140). The laurel is sacred as a magic plant,
together with the ~ski/lla~ (see App. v) and ~rha/mnos~ (see above,
chap. v, n. 95). Cf. _Gp._ 11, 2, etc. Its special sacredness gives
the laurel its importance in the cult of Apollo. Emp. (like
Pythagoras) seems to have paid special honour to Apollo: it appears
from something that is said ap. D.L. viii, 57, that he wrote a
~prooi/mion eis Apo/llôna~: the exalted conception of a divinity
that is pure ~phrê\n hierê/~ in abstraction from all
sense-perception, elaborated by Emp. in _frr._ 133-4, was regarded
by him as applying particularly ~peri\ Apo/llônos~ (Amm. in Arist.,
_Interpr._ 249, 1 ed. Brand. 135a, 23).]
[86\11: In fanciful ways: _fr._ 127 (lion, laurel), 448 Mull.]
[87\11: _fr._ 146 (457) ~pro/moi~ being used probably with intention
as a vague term: regal power would hardly have seemed to possess
special merit to the democratically minded Emp. He hardly knew it in
any form but the tyrannis and to this he showed himself an energetic
opponent (even though the violent language of Timaeus, the enemy of
tyrants, is not to be taken quite literally). He himself was offered
royal power, but he refused it with contempt as one who was ~pa/sês
archê=s allo/trios~: Xanthos and Arist. ap. D.L. viii, 63; _Vors._
196, 10. He might all the same (and rightly) regard himself in
political matters, too, as one of the ~pro/moi~; it is plain that in
the enumeration of those who were ~eis te/los~ born as ~ma/nteis te
kai\ humnopo/loi kai\ iêtroi/, kai\ pro/moi anthrô/poisin
epichthoni/oisi pe/lontai~, and were never to be born again, he
includes himself especially, and, in fact, takes himself as the
model of this last and highest stage upon earth. He himself was all
these things simultaneously.]
[88\11: _frr._ 146-7 (459 ff.) ~e/nthen anablastou=si theoi\
timê=|si phe/ristoi, athana/tois a/lloisin home/stioi, e/n te
trape/zais~ (read ~_e/n te tra/pezoi_~--a tmesis, = ~entra/pezoi/
te); eu/nies andrei/ôn ache/ôn, apo/kêroi, ateirei=s~.]
[89\11: Emped. perhaps described himself as "god" also in _fr._ 23,
11 (144) ~alla\ torô=s tou=t' i/sthi~ (he is speaking to Pausanias),
~_theou= pa/ra_ mu=thon akou/sas~. See Bidez, _Biogr. d'Emp._, p.
166 (1894)--unless these words would be better taken as an
abbreviated comparison (with omission of ~hôs~): "as certainly as if
you had received these words from a god."]
[90\11: As Plu. is inclined to do: _Exil._ xvii, p. 607 D.]
[91\11: As several modern critics have attempted to do.]
[92\11: _fr._ 17, 30 (92).]
[93\11: See above, chap. i, pp. 4 ff.]
[94\11: As late again as Plotinos, who speaks of the ~ditto\n en
hêmi=n~: the ~sô=ma~ which is a ~thêri/on zô|ôthe/n~ and the
~alêthê\s a/nthrôpos~ distinct from it, etc. (1, 1, 10; 6, 7, 5).]
[95\11: At any rate Emp. spoke of the ekstasis, the _furor_ which is
an _animi purgatio_ and to be entirely distinguished from that which
is produced by _alienatio mentis_ (~phronei=n alloi=a~, _fr._ 108):
Cael. Aur., _Morb. Chron._ i, 5, p. 25 Sich. = _Vors._ 223. A
special ~enthousiastiko/n~ in the soul as its ~theio/taton~ (part):
Stoics (and Plato) acc. to _Dox._ 639, 25. A special organ of the
soul which effects the union with the divine, being the ~a/nthos
tê=s ousi/as hêmô=n~, is mentioned in Proclus (Zeller, _Phil. d.
Griech._^2 iii, 2, 738).] {406}
[96\11: ~to\ ho/lon~, the whole reality of Being and Becoming in the
world, cannot be comprehended by man through his senses nor even
with ~nou=s~: _fr._ 2 (36-43). But Empedokles has in his own
persuasion grasped it; he is situated ~sophi/ês ep' a/kroisi~ (_fr._
4, 8), ~autê\n epagge/lletai dô/sein tê\n alê/theian~ (Procl., _in
Ti._ 106 E. Proclus declares that the words ~sophi/ês ep'
a/kroisi~--and this is a further point--are meant to apply to Emped.
himself. (I do not quite understand Bidez' doubts about what is said
here, and in what follows: see _Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Phil._ ix, 203,
42.) Whence, then, did the poet obtain this knowledge of the truth
since it is revealed neither to the senses nor to the ~nou=s~? At
any rate, the ~psuchopompoi\ duna/meis~ (Porph., _Antr._ 8), who
conducted his soul-daimon out of the region of the gods, say to the
soul (_fr._ 2, 8): ~su\ d' ou=n epei\ hô=d' elia/sthês~ (i.e. "since
you have been cast up here--on the earth"--not "since you have so
desired it", as Bergk, _Opusc._ ii, 23, explains: which would be a
distorted idea expressed in distorted language)--~peu/seai ou ple/on
êe\ brotei/ê mê=tis ho/pôpen~ (thus with Panzerbieter, for
~o/rôre~). According to this we must suppose that his more profound
knowledge (insight into the ~mi=xi/s te dia/llaxi/s te mige/ntôn~ of
the elements, together with knowledge of the destiny and purpose of
the soul-daimones, etc.), which he cannot have got on earth or in
his earthly body must have been brought with him out of his divine
past-life. This knowledge is then peculiar to the daimon (or
~psuchê/~ in the older sense) that is buried in the body; and Emp.
presumably owes it to an _~ana/mnêsis~_ of his earlier life (a
faculty that is only rarely active). From what other source could he
have got his knowledge of his previous ~ensômatô/seis~ (_fr._ 117)?
He has even farther and more profound knowledge than he dares
communicate--_fr._ 4 (45-51), and says quite plainly that he is
keeping back in piety a last remnant of wisdom that is unsuited for
human ears (to this extent the authorities--~a/lloi d' ê=san hoi
le/gontes~--of S.E., _M._ vii, 122--have rightly understood
him).--The belief in a miraculous power of _~ana/mnêsis~_ that goes
beyond the present life of the individual may have been derived by
Emp. from Pythagorean doctrine or mythology. Emp. himself follows
the legend of the Pyth. school and attributes such a power of
recollection to Pythagoras: ~ho/ppote ga\r pa/sê|si . . .~ _fr._ 129
[430 ff.]. See Append. x. The eager development--indeed, the
cult--of the ~mnê/mê~ in Pythagorean circles is well known. The
invention of the myths describing the fountain of Mnemosyne in Hades
may also be Pythagorean (see below). Throughout the various
~ensômatô/seis~ of the soul it is the undying ~mnê/mê~ that alone
preserves the unity of personality which (as the ~psuchê/~) lives
through all these transformations and is bound together in this way.
It is evident how important this idea was for the doctrine of
transmigration (it occurs also in the teaching of Buddha). Plato,
like Empedokles, seems to have got the idea of an _~ana/mnêsis~_
reaching beyond the limits of the present life from the
Pythagoreans: he, then, it is true, developed the idea in connexion
with his own philosophy to unexpected conclusions (cf. further,
Dieterich, _Nekyia_, 122).]
[97\11: ~phili/a~ is for him (not indeed in his words but in his
intention as Arist. understood him): ~aiti/a tô=n agathô=n, to\ de\
nei=kos tô=n kakô=n~, _Metaph._ 985a, 4 ff.; 1075b, 1-7. Hence the
~êpio/phrôn Philo/têtos amemphe/os a/mbrotos hormê/~ (_fr._ 35) is
contrasted with ~Nei=kos maino/menon~ (115, 14), ~oulo/menon~ (17,
19), ~lugro/n~ (109). The ~sphai=ros~ in which only ~phili/a~
prevails while ~nei=kos~ is completely vanquished, is called
~moni/ê| periê/rgeï gai/ôn~, _fr._ 27, 28.] {407}
[98\11: ~theoi\ dolichai/ônes~ (_frr._ 20, 12, 23, 8). Exactly the
same is said of the ~_dai/mones_ hoi/te bi/oio lelo/gchasi
makrai/ônos~ (115, 5). In the face of these expressions, so
definitely setting a period to the lifetime of the gods, we must
suppose that the epithets which Emp. applies to himself--he is to be
in the future ~theo\s a/mbrotos ouk e/ti thnêto/s~, 112, 4--are
merely intended to assert that he shall not die any more in his
incarnation as a man (the same thing must be meant when those who
are delivered from the circle of rebirth are called ~apo/kêroi,
a/teirei=s~ (147); the gods are only called ~a/thanatoi~ by
traditional convention). Plutarch also, _Def. Or._ 16, p. 418 E,
distinctly states that the ~dai/mones~ of Emp. eventually die. That
the gods (but not ~to\ thei=on~ itself) were liable to extinction had
already been the opinion of Anaximander and Anaximenes. Acc. to Emp.
the individual ~dai/mones~ would be reabsorbed into the universal
divinity, the ~sphai=ros~ (just as the individual deities of the
Stoics are reabsorbed at the world-conflagration into Zeus who is
alone indestructible). [= ll. 131, 141, 461, 460 M.]]
[99\11: Emp., _frr._ 133, 134 (389-96), speaks of a supersensual
divinity that is entirely ~phrê\n hierê/~: he gives to this divinity
the name of Apollo, but the description is said to apply ~peri\
panto\s tou= thei/ou~. Hipp., _RH._ vii, 29, p. 386 D.-S., refers
the description to the ~sphai=ros~. The ~sphai=ros~, in which no
~nei=kos~ is left was called by Emp. ~ho theo/s, ho eudaimone/statos
theo/s~ (Arist., _An._ i, 5, 410b, 5-6; _Metaph._ ii, 4, 1000b, 3).
It is, however, certain that Emp. would not have **regarded the
~sphai=ros~ as pure ~phrê\n hierê/~. It appears, in fact, that in
the ~sphai=ros~, in which everything is together and united, even
the divine power thought of as supersensual is brought to a close.
In the world-state of multiplicity caused by ~nei=kos~ divinity
seems to be regarded as separate from the elements and the forces.
"Furious conflict" (115, 14) then attacks even the divinity and
divides it against itself; hence the origin of individual
~dai/mones~ as a self-caused division of the divine, a desertion
from the One ~thei=on~--the individual ~dai/mones~ are ~phuga/des,
theo/then~ (115, 13). These individual ~dai/mones~ are entangled in
the world from its origin until at last, having become purified,
they rise again to the heights of divinity; and when all
individuality is again fused into one by ~phili/a~ they return once
more into the universal divinity in order with it to enter into the
~sphai=ros~.--Thus we may perhaps reconstruct the Empedoklean
fantasy. His lines do not supply sufficient evidence for the
complete reconstruction of his picture of the perpetually recurring
process. We should naturally expect a certain obscurity to cling to
this attempt to fuse together physiology and theology.]
[100\11: Lucr. iii, 370-3.]
[101\11: All that is essential on the subject of Demokritos'
doctrine of the soul is to be found in Arist., _An._ i, 2, p. 403b,
31-404a, 16; 405a., 7-13; i, 3, p. 406b, 15-22; _Resp._ iv, p. 471b,
30-472a, 17.--The air is full of the particles which Demokritos
calls ~nou=s~ and ~psuchê/~: _Resp._ 472a, 6-8 [_Vors._ ii, 36]. The
atoms hovering in the air become visible as "motes in the sunbeam";
of these some are the soul-atoms (this must be the meaning of _An._
404A, 3 ff.; Iamb. ap. Stob., _Ecl._ i, p. 384, 15 W., is only
drawing upon Arist.). This is a modification of the opinion held by
the Pythagoreans (mentioned also by Arist. 404a, 16 ff.) that the
motes in the sunbeam are "souls" (see above, chap. x, n. 34).
Inhalation of the world-stuff as a condition of life in the
individual is imitated from Herakleitos (see S.E., _M._ vii, 129).]
[102\11: The soul acc. to Dem. ~ekbai/nei me\n tou= sô/matos, en de\
tô=| ekbai/nein diaphorei=tai kai\ diaskeda/nnutai~, Iamb. ap.
Stob., _Ecl._ i, p. 384, 16 f. W.] {408}
[103\11: Dem. ~phthartê\n (ei=nai tê\n psuchê\n) tô=| sô/mati
sundiaphtheirome/nên~, _Dox._ 393a, 8 [_Vors._ A 109]. Since the
disruption of the soul-atoms is not effected at a single blow death
may, in consequence, sometimes be only apparent; i.e. when many but
not all the soul-particles have escaped. For this reason also, with
the possible re-assemblage of the soul-atoms, ~anabiô/seis~ of the
apparently dead may occur. Cases of this kind seem to have been
treated in the work ~peri\ tô=n en Ha/idou~: see Procl., _in _Rp.__
ii, 113, 6 Kr.; D.L. ix, 46; it is counted among the most famous, or
at least the most popular of Dem.'s writings in the anecdote ap.
Ath. 168 B; cf. [Hp.] _Ep._ 10, 3, p. 291 Hch. [ix, 322 Lit.];
_Vors._ 55 C, 2. This view of the retention of vitality, of course,
only applies to the period immediately following the (apparent)
death (it is fairly correctly represented by [Plu.] _Plac. Ph._ 4,
4, 4 [_Dox._ 390], it was probably attributed to Dem. on account of
a similar observation made by Parmenides; see above, p. 373).
Nevertheless, out of it grew up the assertion, which was then
attributed to Dem., that in fact ~ta\ nekra\ tô=n sôma/tôn
aistha/netai~: e.g. Alex. Aph. in Arist., _Top._ 21, 21; [_Vors._
ii, 38, 8]; Stob., _Ecl._ i, p. 477, 18 W. In the case, at least, of
those that are really "dead", i.e. of bodies that have been deserted
by all the soul-atoms, Dem. certainly never taught the presence of
~ai/sthêsis~: against the vulgarization of his opinions that would
attribute such a view as this to him (as Epicurus himself did) the
_Democritici_ spoken of by Cic. (_TD._ i, 82) made their
protest.--The work ~peri\ tô=n en Ha/idou~ can certainly not have
confined itself to considerations of a purely physical nature;
otherwise Thrasyllos (D.L. ix, 46) could not have classified it
among the ~_êthika\_ bibli/a~ of Dem. [_Vors._ ii, 19]. It is,
indeed, difficult to imagine what from Dem.'s point of view there
could have been to say about "the things in the Underworld". It is
hardly possible to suppose (as Mullach, _Dem. fr._, pp. 117-18, and
Heyne do) that Dem. would think himself obliged either to answer or
to parody the fabulous inventions of the poets about the realm of
shadows. It is difficult to be certain that Dem. was really the
author of the work: the forgery of later times was particularly fond
of turning the most clear-headed of materialists into a mage and a
jack-of-all-trades. (Dem.'s observations of the possibility of
~anabiou=n~ is in part at least the origin of the writing ~p. t. en
ha/|dou~; it is also responsible for the anecdote that makes him
promise to the Persian king that he will restore his dead wife to
life again, etc.--a variation of an ingenious story widely spread
both in the East and the West. See my Lecture on Greek
Novel-writing: _Verh. der Philologenvers. zu Rostock_, 1875, p. 68
f.)--The "fragmenta moralia" of Dem. are with rare exceptions (e.g.
Mull. _frr._ 7, 23, 48, 49, etc. = 146, 159, 147, 127 D.) wholesale
fabrications of the feeblest kind. One of them, however (119 Mull.,
297 D.), agrees at least with what Dem. may very well have said
about the punishments in Hell (though in rather different words--he
was incapable of quite such a monstrosity as ~muthoplaste/ontes~,
which sounds very late Greek. Vain efforts have been made to justify
this ~muthoplaste/ô~ by reference to the older ~muthopla/stês~. But
~muthopoio/s, odophu/lax, arguroko/pos~, etc., are also old, and it
is no secret that verbs derived by further extension from such
composite verbal nouns are mostly late formations: thus
~muthopoie/ô, odophulake/ô, argurokope/ô~, and again ~petrobole/ô,
hierophante/ô, teknoktone/ô~, etc.). In another of these _falsa_ no
echo even of Dem.'s thought is to be found: _fr. moral._ 1 Mull.
[171 D.] ~psuchê\ oikêtê/rion dai/monos~.]
[104\11: Dem., whose inquiries set out from the study of inorganic
nature, {409} was led to predicate a mechanical obedience to law in
organic nature as well. Anaxagoras starting from the study of
organic nature and in particular of man, its highest development,
derived from that study the concept of purpose--purpose consciously
undertaken and carried out--and this idea affected his outlook upon
the whole of nature, including inorganic nature. This teleological
system, regarded as of universal application, is made by him to
depend on a Being modelled upon the human mind, the only source, in
fact, from which he could have derived his experience of action
carried out in accordance with pre-arranged purpose.]
[105\11: Cf. here and on what follows, Heinze, _Ber. d. Sächs. Ges.
d. Wiss._ 1890, pp. 1 ff.]
[106\11: ~nou=s~ must be omniscient if it ~gnô/mên peri\ panto\s
i/schei~ (_fr._ 6 M. = 12 D.). It has organized (~dieko/smêse~) not
only what was and is but also what is to be: _frr._ 6, 12 [12, 14
D.].]
[107\11: Arist., _Ph._ 256b. 24 ff.]
[108\11: ~ho ga\r nou=s~ (of Anaxag.) ~hei=s~: Arist., _Metaph._
1069b, 31. On the other hand, ~chrê/mata a/peira plê=thos~: Anaxag.
_fr._ 1.]
[109\11: ~Anaxago/ras phêsi to\n nou=n koino\n outhe\n outheni\ tô=n
a/llôn e/chein~. Arist., _An._ i, 2, p. 405b, 19 ff.; cf. iii, 4, p.
429b, 23 f.]
[110\11: Anaxag. _fr._ 6 [12]: ~ta\ me\n a/lla <pa/nta> panto\s
moi=ran mete/chei, no/os de/ esti a/peiron kai\ autokrate\s kai\
me/miktai oudeni\ chrê/mati, alla\ mou=nos auto\s eph, heôutou=
esti. (a/peiron~ does not seem to supply the required opposition to
what proceeds: ? ~haplo/on~. Anaxag. used the word of ~nou=s~ acc.
to Arist., _An._ 405a, 16; 429b, 23. Zeller also suggests
~haplo/on~, _Archiv f. G. d. Philos._ v, 441.)]
[111\11: ~ho/sa psuchê\n e/chei, kai\ ta\ me/zô kai\ ta\ ela/ssô,
pa/ntôn no/os _krate/ei_; kai\ tê=s perichôrê/sios tê=s sumpa/sês
no/os ekra/têse, ô/ste perichôrê=sai tê\n archê/n~, _fr._ 6 [12].
This ~kratei=n~ at the beginning of the ~perichô/rêsis~ cannot at
any rate take place by the inter-mixture of ~nou=s~ in the
~spe/rmata~ or by the entry of ~nou=s~ into these. Because ~nou=s~
is both ~apathê/s~ and ~amigê/s~s, it ~kratoi/ê a\n _amigê\s_ ô/n~,
Arist., _Ph._ 256b, 27; cf. 429a, 18. Does this also apply to
~nou=s~ when it ~tô=n psuchê\n echo/ntôn krate/ei~? And yet in this
case it appears to be divided, as ~mei/zôn~ or ~ela/ttôn~ in each
case, in the ~zô=|a~.--No one can help being reminded here of the
insoluble _aporiai_ raised in Aristotle's own doctrine of the active
~nou=s~ which, in this case too, is ~apathê/s, amigê/s, chôristo/s~
from the body; is also deprived of all attributes of individuality
(which reside entirely in the lower psychical powers) and thus
appears as a common divine spirit. And yet it is said to be a
~mo/rion tê=s psuchê=s~, present ~en tê=| psuchê=|~, dwelling inside
the body yet having nothing in common with it, and in any case is
thought of as an individual mind. In the case of Anaxagoras the same
_aporiai_ apply also to the nourishing, feeling, desiring, and
moving soul (as it is called by Arist.); for all the "parts" of the
soul are included almost indistinguishably by him under the
conception of ~nou=s~.--The difficulty of reconciling the unity and
inward continuity of the spiritual (immaterial, that cannot be
thought of as divided)--with its individuation and distribution into
the multiplicity of souls, is one which repeatedly occurs in Greek
philosophy.]
[112\11: ~dia\ pa/ntôn io/nta~, Pl., _Crat._ 413 C.]
[113\11: ~en panti\ panto\s moi=ra e/nesti plê\n no/ou; e/sti hoi=si
de\ kai\ no/os e/ni~, _fr._ 5 [11].]
[114\11: ~no/os de\ pa=s ho/moio/s esti kai\ ho me/zôn kai\ ho
ela/ssôn~, _fr._ 6 [12].]
[115\11: Arist., _An._ i, 2, p. 404b, 1-7: Anaxag. often gives ~to\n
nou=n~ as ~to\ ai/tion tou= kalô=s kai\ orthô=s; hete/rôthi de\~ (he
says) ~_tou=ton ei=nai tê\n psuchê/n_; en ha/pasi ga\r hupa/rchein
auto\n toi=s zô/|ois, kai\ mega/lois kai\ mikroi=s {410} kai\
timi/ois kai\ atimote/rois~ (in which case the ~nou=s~ that dwells
within all the ~zô=|a~ cannot be any longer regarded as ~ho kata\
phro/nêsin lego/menos nou=s~). Anaxag. had expressed himself
indistinctly: ~hê=tton diasaphei= peri\ autôn~ (i.e, the relation
between ~nou=s~ and ~psuchê/~). Cf. 405a, 13 f. In the sense of the
words as used by Anaxagoras ~nou=s~ and ~psuchê/~ were simply
identified by Plato: _Crat._ 400 A.]
[116\11: D.L. ii, 8 [_Vors._ 375]. Acc. to Anaxag. the moon has
~_oikê/seis_ (alla\ kai\ lo/phous kai\ pha/raggas~). _Fr._ 10 [4]
probably refers to the men and other ~zô=|a~ in the moon (to whom
yet another moon gives light). Anaxag. ~tê\n selê/nên gê=n phêsi\n
ei=nai~ (i.e. an inhabitable heavenly body like the earth), Pl.,
_Ap._ 26 D; cf. Hippol., _R.H._ i, 8, 10, p. 22, 40 D.-S.--We are
reminded of the Orphico-Pythagorean fantasies about life on the moon
(see above, chap. x, n. 76).]
[117\11: Anaxag. counted the plants as ~zô=|a~ and ascribed emotions
to them: ~hê/desthai kai\ lupei=sthai~ [Arist.] _Plant._ 815a, 18.
Like Plato and Demokritos Anaxag. also regarded plants as ~zô=|a
e/ggeia~: Plu., _QN._ 1, 911 D.]
[118\11: In spite of its entry into ~chrê/mata, nou=s~ is yet said
to remain "unmixed" and unaffected by them: ~autokra/tora ga\r
auto\n o/nta kai\ oudeni\ memigme/non pa/nta phêsi\n auto\n kosmei=n
ta\ pra/gmata dia\ pa/ntôn io/nta~, Pl., _Crat._ 413 C. We thus have
at the same time ~dia\ pa/ntôn io/nta~ and denial of mixture which
is reiterated in stronger and stronger language. Thus ~nou=s~ even
so remains still ~eph' heôutou= (ei mê\ ga\r eph' heôutou ê=n,
_a/llô|_ te/ô| eme/mikto a/n; metei=che de\ a\n hapa/ntôn chrêma/tôn
ei eme/mikto/ teô|; en panti\ ga\r panto\s moi=ra he/nesti ktl.~ So
perhaps we should read _fr._ 6 [12] restoring a completed syllogism.
In the traditional text the clause ~ei eme/mikto/ teô|~ is
superfluous and in the way). It takes no particle of the others into
itself.]
[119\11: [Plu.] _Plac. Phil._ 5, 25, 2 (Aët., _Dox._ 437; _Vors._
397, 18), in the chap. ~pote/rou esti\n hu/pnos kai\ tha/natos
psuchê=s ê\ sô/matos~; Anaxag. taught: ~ei=nai de\ kai\ psuchê=s
tha/naton to\n diachôrismo/n~. Nothing else can be meant by the
words--the theme of the chapter alone shows it--than: the death of
the soul (as well as of the body) occurs with its separation (from
the body). ~to\n diachôrismo/n~ is subject and ~ei=nai tê=s psuchê=s
tha/naton~ predicate of the sentence (not the other way round as
Siebeck seems to think: _Ges. d. Psychol._ i, 285). The violent
alteration proposed by Wyttenbach (_de immort. animi_, **_Opusc._ ii,
597 f.) has not the smallest justification: ~ei=nai de\ kai\ to\n
tha/naton psuchê=s diachôrismo\n kai\ sô/matos~. There could have
been no reason at all in appealing specially to Anaxagoras for a
confirmation of the popular conception of death (it would be nothing
more). Further, in this particular connexion such a definition of
death is quite out of place; since the theme of the chap. is only to
ask the question whether death also affects the soul, not what it
is. ~psuchê/~ here must mean the individual soul, not the ~nou=s~
which is the basis of the individual souls. Anaxag. made the
individual soul perish at death--so much is certain. It must be
admitted that we cannot say for certain whether the Placita are
referring to an actual utterance of Anaxag. or are only drawing
conclusions from his teaching.]
[120\11: _fr._ 17 [17].]
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