THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1795-1805
With the temporary shelving of British antagonism, the Federalist
administration passed its second great crisis; but it was immediately
called upon to face new and equally serious differences with France
which were ultimately to prove the cause of its downfall. The
fundamental difficulty in the political situation in America was that
the two parties were now so bitterly opposed as to render every
governmental act a test of party strength. The Republicans, who
accepted the leadership of Jefferson or of Clinton of New York,
comprised all who favoured democracy in any sense--whether that of
human equality, or local self-government, or freedom from taxes, or
sympathy with France--and all who had any grievance against the
administration, from frontiersmen whose cabins had not been protected
against Indians or who had been forced to pay a whisky tax, to seamen
whose ships had not been protected by the Jay treaty. In short, all in
whom still persisted the deep-rooted colonial traditions of opposition
to strong government and dislike of any but local authorities were
{170} summoned to oppose an administration on the familiar ground that
it was working against their liberties by corruption, usurpation,
financial burdens, and gross partisanship for England and against
France.
On the other side, the Federalists were rapidly acquiring a state of
mind substantially Tory in character. They were coming to dread and
detest "democracy" as dangerous to the family and to society as well as
to government, and to identify it with the guillotine and the
blasphemies of the Worship of Reason. In the furious attacks which,
after the fashion of the day, the opposition papers hurled against
every act of the Federalist leaders, and which aimed as much to defile
their characters as to discredit their policies, they saw a pit of
anarchy yawning. Between parties so constituted, no alternative
remained but a fight to a finish; and, from the moment the Federalists
became genuinely anti-democratic, they were doomed. Only accident or
conspicuous success on the part of their leaders could delay their
destruction. A single false step on their part meant ruin.
With the ratification of the Jay treaty, a long period of peaceful
relations began between England and the United States. The American
shipowners quickly adapted themselves to the situation, and were soon
{171} prosperously occupied in neutral commerce. In England, American
affairs dropped wholly out of public notice during the exciting and
anxious years of the war of the second coalition. The Pitt Ministry
ended, leaving the country under the grip of a rigid repression of all
liberal thought or utterance, and was followed by the commonplace
Toryism of Addington and his colleagues. Then came the Treaty of
Amiens with France, the year of peace, the renewed war in 1803, and,
after an interval of confused parliamentary wranglings, the return to
power of Pitt in 1804, called by the voice of the nation to meet the
crisis of the threatened French invasion. The United States was
forgotten, diplomatic relations sank to mere routine. Such were the
unquestionable benefits of the execrated treaty made by Jay and
Grenville.
With France, however, American relations became suddenly strained, as a
result of the same treaty. The French Republic, in the year 1795, was
finally reorganized under a definite constitution as a Directorate--a
republic with a plural executive of five. This government, ceasing to
be merely a revolutionary body, undertook to play the game of grand
politics and compelled all the neighbouring smaller States to submit to
democratic revolutions, accept a constitution on the French model, and
become {172} dependent allies of the French Republic. The local
democratic faction, large or small, was in each case utilized to carry
through this programme, which was always accompanied with corruption
and plunder to swell the revenues of France and fill the pockets of the
directors and their agents. Such a policy the Directorate now
endeavoured, as a matter of course, to carry out with the United
States, expecting to ally themselves with the Jeffersonian party and to
bribe or bully the American Republic into a lucrative alliance. The
way was prepared by the infatuation with which Randolph, Jefferson,
Madison, and other Republican leaders had unbosomed themselves to
Fauchet, and also by an unfortunate blunder which had led Washington to
send James Monroe as Minister to France in 1794. This man was known to
be an active sympathizer with France, and it was hoped that his
influence would assist in keeping friendly relations; but his conduct
was calculated to do nothing but harm. When the news of the Jay treaty
came to France, the Directorate chose to regard it as an unfriendly
act, and Monroe, sharing their feelings, exerted himself rather to
mollify their resentment than to justify his country.
In 1796 a new Minister, Adet, was sent to the United States to remain
only in case {173} the government should adopt a just policy toward
France. This precipitated a party contest squarely on the issue of
French relations. In the first place Congress, after a bitter struggle
and by a bare majority, voted to appropriate the money to carry the Jay
treaty into effect. This was a defeat for the French party. In the
second place, in spite of a manifesto issued by Adet, threatening
French displeasure, the presidential electors gave a majority of three
votes for Adams over Jefferson to succeed Washington. The election had
been a sharp party struggle, the whole theory of a deliberate choice by
electors vanishing in the stress of partisan excitement. After this
second defeat, the French Minister withdrew, severing diplomatic
relations; and French vessels began to capture American merchantmen, to
impress the country with the serious results of French irritation. The
Washington administration now recalled Monroe and sent C. C. Pinckney
to replace him, but the Directory, while showering compliments upon
Monroe, refused to receive Pinckney at all and virtually expelled him
from the country. In the midst of these annoying events, Washington's
term closed, and the sorely tried man, disgusted with party abuse and
what he felt to be national ingratitude, retired to his Virginia
estates, no longer {174} the president of the whole country, but the
leader of a faction. His Farewell Address showed, under its stately
phrases, his detestation of party controversy and his fears for the
future.
Washington's successor, Adams, was a man of less calmness and
steadiness of soul; independent, but with a somewhat petulant habit of
mind, and nervously afraid of ceasing to be independent; a man of sound
sense, yet of a too great personal vanity. His treatment of the French
situation showed national pride and dignity as well as an adherence to
the traditional Federalist policy of avoiding war. Unfortunately, his
handling of the party leaders was so deficient in tact as to assist in
bringing quick and final defeat upon himself and upon them.
The relations with France rapidly developed into an international
scandal. Adams, supported by his party, determined to send a mission
of three, including Pinckney, in order to restore friendly relations,
as well as to protest against depredations and seizures which the few
French cruisers at sea were now beginning to make. In the spring of
1798, however, the commission reported that its efforts had failed, and
Adams was obliged to lay its correspondence before Congress. This
showed that the great obstacle in the way of carrying on {175}
negotiations with the French had been the persistent demands on the
part of Talleyrand--the French Minister of Foreign Affairs--for a
preliminary money payment, either under the form of a so-called "loan"
or as a bribe outright. Such a revelation of venality struck dumb the
Republican leaders who had kept asserting their distrust of Adams's
sincerity and accusing the administration of injustice toward France.
It took all heart out of the opposition members of Congress, and
encouraged the Federalists to commit the government to actual
hostilities with the hated Democrats and Jacobins. Declaring the
treaties of 1778 to be abrogated, Congress authorized naval reprisals,
voted money and a loan, and so began what was called a "quasi-war,"
since neither side made a formal declaration. Adams, riding on the
crest of a brief wave of popularity, declared in a message to Congress
that he would never send another Minister to France without receiving
assurances that he would be received as "befitted the representative of
a great, free, powerful, and independent nation." "Millions for
defence, but not a cent for tribute!" became the Federalist watch-word;
and, when the little navy of a few frigates and sloops began to bring
in French men-of-war and privateers as prizes, the country actually
felt a thrill of pride and {176} manhood. For the moment, the United
States stood side by side with England in fighting the dangerous enemy
of civilization. American Federalist and British Tory were at one;
Adams and Pitt were carrying on the same war.
Unfortunately for the Federalists, they failed to appreciate the
fundamental differences between the situation in England and in the
United States, for they went on to imitate the mother country not
merely in fighting the French, but in seeking to suppress what they
felt to be dangerous "Jacobinical" features of American politics. In
the summer of 1798, three laws were enacted which have become
synonymous with party folly. Two--the Alien Acts--authorized the
President at his discretion to imprison or deport any alien, friend or
enemy; the third--the Sedition Act--punished by fine and imprisonment
any utterance or publication tending to cause opposition to a federal
law or to bring into contempt the federal government or any of its
officers. Such statutes had stood in England since 1793 and were used
to suppress democratic assailants of the monarchy; but such a law in
the United States could mean nothing more than the suppression by
Federalist courts of criticisms upon the administration made by
Republican newspapers. {177} It furnished every opposition agitator
with a deadly weapon for use against the administration; and when the
Sedition Law was actually enforced, and a half-dozen Republican editors
were subjected to fine or imprisonment for scurrilous but scarcely
dangerous utterances, the demonstration of the inherently tyrannical
nature of the Federalists seemed to be complete. It was an
unpardonable political blunder.
Equally damaging to the prosperity of the Federalist party was the fact
that the French Republic, instead of accepting the issue, showed a
complete unwillingness to fight, and protested in public that it was
having a war forced upon it. Talleyrand showered upon the United
States, through every channel, official or unofficial, assurances of
kindly feelings, and, so soon as he learned of Adams's demand for a
suitable reception for an American Minister, gave the required
assurance in his exact words. Under the circumstances, the war
preparations of the Federalists became visibly superfluous, especially
a provisional army which Congress had authorized under Hamilton as
active commander. The opposition press and speakers denounced this as
a Federalist army destined to act against the liberties of the people;
and the administration could point to no real danger to justify its
existence.
{178}
So high ran party spirit that the Virginian leaders thought or affected
to think it necessary to prepare for armed resistance to Federalist
oppression; and Madison and Jefferson, acting through the State
legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky respectively, caused the adoption
of two striking series of resolutions stating the crisis in Republican
phraseology. In each case, after denouncing the Alien and Sedition
laws as unconstitutional, the legislatures declared that the
constitution was nothing more than a compact between sovereign States;
that the Federal government, the creature of the compact, was not the
final judge of its powers, and that in case of a palpable usurpation of
powers by the Federal government it was the duty of the States to
"interpose," in the words of Madison, or to "nullify" the Federal law,
as Jefferson phrased it. Such language seemed to Washington, Adams,
and their party to signify that the time was coming when they must
fight for national existence; but to the opposition it seemed no more
than a restatement of time-hallowed American principles of government,
necessary to save liberty from a reactionary faction. Party hatred now
rivalled that between revolutionary Whigs and Tories.
Under these circumstances the election of 1800 took place. The
Federalist party {179} leaders, feeling the ground quaking under them,
clung the more desperately to the continuance of the French "quasi-war"
as their sole means for rallying popular support. But at this stage
President Adams, seeing the folly of perpetuating a sham war for mere
party advantage, determined to reopen negotiations. This precipitated
a bitter quarrel, for the members of his Cabinet and the leading
congressmen still regarded Hamilton, now a private citizen in New York,
as the real leader, and followed him in urging the continuance of
hostilities. Adams, unable to manage his party opponents openly, took
refuge in sudden, secret, and, as they felt, treacherous conduct and
sent nominations for a new French mission without consulting his
advisers. The Federalist Senate, raging at Adams's stupidity, could
not refuse to ratify the appointments, and so in 1799 the new mission
sailed, was respectfully received by Bonaparte, and was promptly
admitted to negotiations.
The Federalist party now ran straight toward defeat; for, while the
leaders could not avoid supporting Adams for a second term, they hated
him as a blunderer and marplot. On his part, his patience exhausted,
Adams dismissed two of his secretaries, in a passion, in 1800. Later,
through the wiles of Aaron Burr, Republican leader in New {180} York, a
pamphlet, written by Hamilton to prove Adams's utter unfitness for the
Presidency, was brought to light and circulated. Against this
discredited and disorganized party, the Republicans, supporting
Jefferson again for the Presidency and thundering against the Sedition
Law, triumphantly carried a clear majority of electoral votes in the
autumn; but by a sheer oversight they gave an equal number for
Jefferson and for Burr, who was only intended for Vice-president.
Hence under the terms of the constitution it became necessary for the
House of Representatives to make the final selection, voting by States.
It fell thus to the lot of the Federalist House of 1800-1801 to choose
the next President, and for a while the members showed an inclination
to support Burr, as at least a Northerner, rather than Jefferson. But
better judgments ruled, and finally Jefferson was awarded the place
which he had in fairness won. The last weeks of Federalist rule was
filled with a discreditable effort to save what was possible from the
wreck. New offices were established, including a whole system of
circuit judgeships; and Adams spent his time up to the last hour of his
term in signing commissions, stealing away in the early morning in
order not to see the inauguration of his rival.
{181}
So fell the Federalist party from power. It had a brilliant record in
legislation and administration; it had created a new United States; it
had shown a statesmanship never equalled before or since on the
American continent; but it ruined itself by endeavouring openly to
establish a system of government founded on distrust of the people, and
modelled after British precedents. For a few years, England and the
United States approached nearer in government and policy than at any
other time. But, while in England a large part of society--the
nobility, gentry, middle classes, the professions, the church, and all
strong political elements--supported Pitt in suppressing free speech
and individual liberty, the Federalists represented only a minority,
and their social principles were abhorrent to the vast majority of the
inhabitants of the United States.
The Republican party, which conquered by what Jefferson considered to
be a revolution no less important than that of 1776, represented a
reaction to the old ideals of government traditional in colonial
times,--namely as little taxation as possible, as much local
independence as could exist, and the minimum of Federal authority.
Jefferson professed to believe that the conduct of foreign relations
was the only important function of the central government, {182} all
else properly belonging to the States. So complete was the Republican
victory that the party had full power to put its principles into
effect. It controlled both Houses of Congress, and was blessed with
four years of peace and prosperity. Thomas Jefferson, for all his
radicalism in language, was a shrewd party leader, whose actions were
uniformly cautious and whose entire habit of mind favoured avoidance of
any violent change. "Scientific" with the general interests of a
French eighteenth-century "philosopher," he was limited in his views of
public policy by his education as a Virginia planter, wholly out of
sympathy with finance, commerce, or business. Under his guidance,
accordingly, the United States government was subjected to what he
called "a chaste reformation," rather than to a general overturning.
All expenses were cut down, chiefly at the cost of the army and navy;
all appropriations were rigorously diminished, and all internal taxes
were swept away. Since commerce continued active, there still remained
a surplus revenue, and this Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury,
applied to extinguishing the debt. A few of the more important Federal
offices were taken from embittered Federalists and given to
Republicans, but there was no general {183} proscription of
office-holders. The only action at all radical in character was the
repeal of the law establishing new circuit judgeships, a step which
legislated a number of Federalists out of office. The repeal was
denounced by fervid Federalist orators as a violation of the
constitution and a death-blow to the Union; but the appointments under
the law itself had been so grossly partisan that the country was
unalarmed. With these steps the Republican reaction ended. Jefferson
and his party carried through no alteration of the central departments;
they abandoned no Federal power except that of imposing an excise; they
did not even repeal the charter of the National Bank. The real change
lay in the more strictly economical finances and in the general spirit
of government. The Federalist opposition, criticizing every act with
bitterness and continually predicting ruin, found that under the
"Jacobins" the country remained contented and prosperous and was in no
more danger of atheism or the guillotine than it had been under Adams.
So matters went on, year after year, the Federal government playing its
part quietly and the American people carrying on their vocations in
peace and prosperity.
Jefferson's general theory of foreign affairs was based on the idea
that diplomacy was {184} mainly a matter of bargain and sale, with
national commerce as the deciding factor. He believed so firmly that
national self-interest would lead all European powers to make suitable
treaties with the United States that he considered the navy as wholly
superfluous, and would have been glad to sell it. But when
circumstances arose calling for a different sort of diplomacy, he was
ready to modify his methods; and he so far recognized the unsuitability
of peaceful measures in dealing with the Barbary corsairs as to permit
the small American navy to carry on extensive operations during 1801-3,
which ended in the submission of Tripoli and Algiers.
Simultaneously, Jefferson was brought face to face with a diplomatic
crisis, arising from the peculiar actions of his old ally, France. At
the outset of his administration, he found the treaty made by Adams's
commissioners in 1800 ready for ratification, and thus began his career
with all questions settled, thanks to his predecessor. But he had been
in office only a few months when the behaviour of the Spanish officials
at New Orleans gave cause for alarm; for they suddenly terminated the
right of deposit, granted in 1795. It was quickly rumoured that the
reason was to be found in the fact that France, now under the First
Consul, Napoleon, {185} had regained Louisiana. It was, in fact, true.
Bonaparte overthrew the Directory in 1799 and established himself,
under the thin disguise of "First Consul," as practical military despot
in France. He had immediately embraced the idea of establishing a
western colonial empire, which should be based on San Domingo, now
controlled by insurgent negroes, and which should include Louisiana.
By a treaty of October 1, 1800, he compelled Spain to retrocede the
former French province in return for a promise to establish a kingdom
of "Etruria" for a Spanish prince. During 1802 large armaments sailed
to San Domingo and began the process of reconquest. It needed only the
completion of that task for Napoleon to be ready to take over
Louisiana, and thereby to gain absolute control over the one outlet
from the interior territories of the United States.
Jefferson at once recognized the extreme gravity of the situation.
During the years after the English, Spanish, and Indian treaties,
emigrants had steadily worked their way into the inner river valleys.
Western New York and Pennsylvania were rapidly filling, Ohio was
settled up to the Indian treaty line, Kentucky and Tennessee were
doubling in population, and fringes of pioneer communities stretched
along the Ohio and {186} Mississippi rivers. In 1796 Tennessee was
admitted as a State, and Ohio was now, in 1801, on the point of asking
admission. For France to shut the only possible outlet for these
communities would be a sentence of economic death; and Jefferson was so
deeply moved as to write to Livingston, his Minister to France, that if
the rumour of the cession were true, "We must marry ourselves to the
British fleet and nation." The United States must fight rather than
submit. He sent Monroe to France, instructed to buy an outlet, but the
latter only arrived in time to join with Livingston in signing a treaty
for the purchase of the whole of Louisiana.
This startling event was the result of the failure of Napoleon's forces
to reconquer San Domingo. Foreseeing the loss of Louisiana in case of
the probable renewal of war with England, and desirous of money for
immediate use, the Corsican adventurer suddenly threw Louisiana into
the astonished hands of Livingston and Monroe. He had never, it is
true, given Spain the promised compensation; he had never taken
possession, and he had promised not to sell it; but such trifles never
impeded Napoleon, nor, in this case, did they hinder Jefferson. When
the treaty came to America, Congress was quickly convened, the Senate
voted to ratify, the money was appropriated, and the whole {187} vast
region was bought for the sum of sixty million francs. Jefferson
himself, the apostle of a strict construction of the constitution,
could not discover any clause authorizing such a purchase; but his
party was undisturbed, and the great annexation was carried through,
Jefferson acquiescing in the inconsistency.
The chagrin of the Federalists at this enormous south-westward
extension of the country was exceeded only by their alarm when an
attempt was made to eject certain extremely partisan judges from their
offices in Pennsylvania and on the Federal bench by the process of
impeachment. In the first two cases the effort was successful, one
Pennsylvania judge and one Federal district judge being ejected; but
when, in 1805, the attack was aimed at the Pennsylvania supreme
justices and at Justice Chase of the United States Supreme Court, the
process broke down. The defence of the accused judges was legally too
strong to be overcome, and each impeachment failed. With this the last
echo of the party contest seemed to end, for by this time the
Federalists were too discredited and too weak to make a political
struggle. Their membership in Congress had shrunk to small figures,
they had lost State after State, and in 1804 they practically let
Jefferson's re-election go by default. He received all but fourteen
{188} electoral votes, out of 176. Some of the New England leaders
plotted secession, but they were not strong enough for that. The party
seemed dead. In 1804 its ablest mind, Hamilton, was killed in a duel
with Burr, the Vice-president, and nobody remained capable of national
leadership.
So the year 1805 opened in humdrum prosperity and national
self-satisfaction. Jefferson could look upon a country in which he
held a position rivalled only by that of a European monarch or an
English prime minister. The principles of Republican equality, of
States' rights, of economy and retrenchment, of peace and local
self-government seemed triumphant beyond reach of attack. While Europe
resounded with battles and marches, America lived in contented
isolation, free from the cares of unhappy nations living under the
ancient ideals.
{189}