VI.--THE SYNTHETIC OR CONSTRUCTIVE METHOD

We now reach the fifth stage of progressive understanding. The coming

to terms with the unconscious is a technical performance to which

the name of _transcendental function_ has been given because a new

function is produced, which being based upon both real and imaginary,

or rational and irrational data, makes a bridge between the rational

and irrational functions of the psyche. The basis of the transcendental

function is a _new method of treating psychological materials_ such as

dreams and phantasies. The theories previously discussed were based upon

an exclusively causal-reductive procedure, which reduces the dream or

phantasy to its component reminiscences, and the instinctive processes

that underlie them. I have already stated the justification as well as

the limitations of this proceeding. It reaches the end of its usefulness

at the moment when the dream symbols no longer permit of a reduction

to personal reminiscences or aspirations; that is when the images

of the absolute unconscious begin to be produced. It would be quite

inappropriate to reduce these collective ideas to what is personal,

and not only inappropriate but even actually pernicious, a fact that

has been impressed upon me by disagreeable experiences. The values of

the images or symbols of the absolute unconscious are only disclosed if

they are subjected to a synthetic (not analytical) treatment. Just as

analysis (the causally reductive procedure) disintegrates the symbol

into its components, so the synthetic procedure synthesises the symbol

into a universal and comprehensible expression. The synthetic procedure

is by no means easy; I will therefore give an example, by means of which

I can explain the whole process.

A patient had the following dream. She was just at the critical juncture

between the analysis of the personal unconscious and the commencement

of the production of the absolute unconscious. "_I am on the point of

crossing a broad and rapid stream. There is no bridge, but I find a ford

where I can cross. As I am just on the point of doing so, a big crab

that lay hidden in the water seizes my foot and does not let it go._"

She awoke in fear. Associations with the dream were as follows:--

1. _Stream._--It forms a boundary that is difficult to cross. I must

surmount an obstacle; I suppose it refers to the fact that I am getting

on very slowly; I suppose I ought to reach the other side.

2. _Ford._--An opportunity for getting safely across, a possible

way; otherwise the stream would be too difficult. The possibility of

surmounting the obstacle lies in the analytical treatment.

3. _Crab._--The crab lay quite hidden in the water; I did not see it at

first. Cancer is a fearful incurable illness. (A series of recollections

of Mrs. X., who died of cancer, followed.) I am afraid of this illness.

A crab[242] is an animal that walks backwards; obviously it wants to

pull me down into the stream. It clutched me in a gruesome way, and

I was awfully afraid. What prevents my getting across? Oh yes, I had

another great scene with my friend.

It must be explained that there is something special about this

friendship. We have here an ardent attachment, bordering on the

homosexual. It has been going on for years. The friend is in many

respects like the patient, and is also nervous. They have pronounced

artistic interests in common. But the patient is the stronger

personality of the two. They are both nervous, and their mutual relation

being too engrossing, cuts them off too much from other possibilities of

life. In spite of an "ideal friendship" they have at times tremendous

scenes, owing to their mutual irritability. Evidently the unconscious

wishes to put some distance between them, but they refuse to pay

attention to it. A "scene" usually begins by one of them finding that

she does not yet understand the other well enough, and that they

ought to talk more openly together; whereupon both make enthusiastic

endeavours to talk things out. Misunderstandings supervene almost

directly, provoking fresh scenes, each worse than the last. The quarrel

was in its way and _faute de mieux_ a pleasure to both of them, which

they were unwilling to relinquish. My patient, especially, was unable

for a very long time to renounce the sweet pain of not being understood

by her best friend, although, as she said, every scene "tired her to

death." She had long since realised that this friendship had become

superfluous, and that it was only from mistaken ambition that she clung

to the belief that she could yet make something ideal out of it. The

patient had formerly had an extravagant, fantastic relation to her

mother, and after her mother's death had transferred her feelings to her

friend.

VII.--ANALYTICAL (CAUSAL-REDUCTIVE) INTERPRETATION.[243]

This interpretation may be summed up in a sentence: "I understand

that I ought to get to the other side of the stream (that is, give up

the relation with the friend), but I would much rather that my friend

did not let me out of her claws (embrace)." That is, expressed as an

_infantile wish_: Mother would like to attract me to herself again

by the well-known mode of enthusiastic embraces. The incompatibility

of the wish lies in the strong under-current of _homosexuality_, the

existence of which had been abundantly proved by obvious facts. The

crab seizes her foot. The patient having big, "manly" feet, she plays

a masculine part towards her friend, having also corresponding sexual

fantasies. The foot is known to have phallic significance. (Detailed

evidence of this is to be found in _Aigremont's_ writings.) The complete

interpretation would run as follows: The reason why she will not let

her friend go is because her unconscious homosexual wishes are set upon

her. As these wishes are morally and æsthetically incompatible with the

tendency of the conscious personality, they are repressed, and therefore

unconscious. The fear is an expression of this repressed wish.

This interpretation is exceedingly depreciative of the patient's

high-pitched conscious ideal of friendship. It is true at this point

in analysis she would no longer have taken this interpretation amiss.

Some time before certain facts had sufficiently convinced her of her

homosexual tendency, so that she was able to acknowledge the existence

of this inclination frankly, although it was of course painful for her

to do so. Therefore if, at this stage of the treatment, I had informed

her that this was the interpretation, I should not have encountered

resistances from her. She had already overcome the painfulness of this

unwelcome tendency by understanding it. But she would have said to me:

"Why do we analyse this dream at all? It is only repeating what I have

now known for a long while." It is true this interpretation does not

reveal anything new to the patient, and it is therefore uninteresting

and ineffective. This kind of interpretation would at the beginning of

the treatment have been impossible in this case, because the patient's

prudishness would under no circumstances have acknowledged it. The

"venom" of understanding had to be instilled very carefully, and in the

smallest of doses, until the patient gradually became more enlightened.

But when the analytical or causal-reductive interpretation, instead

of furnishing something new, persistently brings the same material in

different variations, then the moment has come when another mode of

interpretation is called for. The causal-reductive procedure has certain

drawbacks. First, it does not take strictly into account the patient's

associations--_e.g._ in this case the association of the illness

("cancer") with "crab" (Krebs = cancer). Second, the particular choice

of symbol remains obscure. For instance, why does the friend-mother

appear as a crab? A prettier and more plastic representation would have

been a nymph. ("Half dragged she him, half sank he down,"[244] etc.)

An octopus, a dragon, a serpent, or a fish could have performed the

same services. Third, the causal-reductive procedure completely ignores

that a dream is a subjective phenomenon, and that consequently even an

exhaustive interpretation can never connect the crab with the mother or

the friend, but only with the dreamer's idea of them. The whole dream

is the dreamer; she is the stream, the crossing, and the crab. That is

to say these details are expressions of psychological conditions and

tendencies in the subject's unconscious.

I have therefore introduced the following terminology. I call

interpretations in which the dream symbols are treated as

representations of the real objects _interpretation upon the objective

plane_. The opposite interpretation is that which connects every

fragment of the dream (_e.g._ all the persons who do anything) with the

dreamer himself. This is _interpretation upon the subjective plane_.

Objective interpretation is _analytical_, because it dissects the dream

contents into complexes of reminiscence, and finds their relation to

real conditions. Subjective interpretation is _synthetic_, because it

detaches the fundamental underlying complexes of reminiscence from their

actual causes, regarding them as tendencies or parts of the subject, and

reintegrating them with the subject. (In experiencing something I do not

merely experience the object, but in the first place myself, although

this is only the case if I render myself account of the experience.)

The synthetic or constructive procedure of interpretation[245] is

therefore based upon the version on the subjective plane.

VIII.--THE SYNTHETIC (CONSTRUCTIVE) INTERPRETATION.

The patient is unconscious of the fact that it is in herself that the

obstacle lies which should be overcome, the boundary that is difficult

to cross which impedes further progress. But it is possible to cross

the boundary. It is true that just here a peculiar and unexpected peril

threatens, namely, something "animal" (non-human or super-human) which

moves backwards and goes into the depths of the stream, wanting to draw

down the dreamer as a whole personality. This danger is, moreover,

like the deadly disease of cancer, which begins secretly somewhere,

and is incurable (overpowering). The patient imagines that her friend

hinders her, pulling her down. So long as this is her belief she must

perforce influence her friend, "draw her up," teach, improve, educate

her, and make futile and impractically idealistic efforts in order to

avoid being dragged down herself. Of course, the friend makes similar

endeavours, being in a like case with the patient. So both of them keep

jumping upon each other like fighting cocks, each trying to fly over

the other's head. The higher the point to which the one screws herself,

the higher must the other also try to get. Why? Because each thinks the

fault lies in the other, in the object. Interpretation of the dream on

the subjective plane brings deliverance from this absurdity, for it

shows the patient that she has something in herself that is hindering

her from crossing the boundary; that is, from getting out of the one

position or attitude into another. To interpret change of place as

change of attitude is supported by the mode of expression in certain

primitive languages, where, _e.g._, the phrase "I am on the point of

going," is "I am at the place of going." In order to understand the

language of dreams, we need plenty of parallels from the psychology of

primitive peoples, as well as from historical symbolism. This is so

because dreams originate in the unconscious, which contains the residual

potentialities of function of all preceding epochs of the history of the

evolution of man.

Obviously, in our interpretation everything now depends upon

understanding what is meant by the crab. We know that it symbolizes

something that comes to light in the friend (she connects the crab

with the friend), and also something that came to light in the mother.

Whether both mother and friend really have this quality in them is

irrelevant as regards the patient. The situation will only be changed

when the patient herself has changed. Nothing can be changed in the

mother because she is dead. The friend cannot be urged to alter; if

she wants to alter herself, that is her own affair. The fact that

the quality in question is associated with the mother indicates that

it is something infantile. What is there in common in the patient's

relation both to her mother and her friend? What is common to both is

a violently extravagant demand for love, the patient feeling herself

overwhelmed by its passion. This claim is an overpowering infantile

craving which is characteristically blind. What is in question here is

a part of her libido that has not been educated, differentiated, nor

humanized, retaining still the compulsive character of an instinct,

because it has not yet been tamed by domestication. An _animal_ is a

perfectly appropriate symbol for this rôle of libido. But why is the

animal a crab in this particular instance? The patient associates cancer

with it, of which disease Mrs. X. died at the age the patient has just

reached. It may, therefore, well be that this is an allusion to an

identification with Mrs. X. We must therefore make inquiries about this

Mrs. X. The patient relates the following facts about her: Mrs. X. was

widowed early; she was very cheerful and enjoyed life. She had a number

of adventures with men, especially with one particular man, a gifted

artist, who the patient herself knew personally and who always impressed

her as very fascinating and weird.

An identification can only result from an unrecognized unconscious

resemblance. Now what is the resemblance between our patient and

Mrs. X.? I was able here to remind the patient of a series of former

fantasies and dreams, which had shown plainly that she also had a

frivolous vein in her, although anxiously repressing it, because she

vaguely feared it might seduce her to an immoral life. We have now

gained a further essential contribution for a right understanding of the

"animal" rôle, which evidently represents an untamed, instinctive greed,

which in this case is directed to men. At the same time we understand

a further reason why she cannot let go of her friend. She must cling

to her in order not to fall a prey to this other tendency, which seems

so much more dangerous. By these means she remains at an infantile

homosexual stage, which serves her as a defence. (Experience proves this

erection of defences to be one of the most effective motives for the

retention of unadapted, infantile relations.) But in this missing libido

in the animal rôle lies her well-being, the germ of her future healthy

personality, which does not shrink from the hazards of human life.

But the patient had drawn another conclusion from the fate of Mrs. X.,

having conceived her severe illness and early death as a punishment

of fate for her gay life which the patient, although certainly not

confessing to this feeling, always envied her. When Mrs. X. died, the

patient pulled a long face, beneath which a "human, all too human,"

malicious satisfaction was hidden. As a punishment for this tendency

the patient, taking Mrs. X.'s example as a warning, deterred herself

from living and from further development, and burdened herself with the

misery of this unsatisfying friendship. Of course this concatenation

had not been consciously clear to her, otherwise she would never have

acted as she had done. The truth of this conclusion can be proved by the

material.

The history of this identification by no means ends here. The patient

subsequently emphasized the fact that Mrs. X. had a not inconsiderable

artistic capacity which developed only after her husband's death and

which led to her friendship with the artist. This fact seems to be

one of the essential incentives to the identification, if we call to

mind that the patient had already told us what a striking impression

she had received from the artist. A fascination of this kind is

never exclusively exercised by one person only upon the other. It is

a phenomenon of reciprocal relation between two persons in so far as

the fascinated person must provide a suitable predisposition. But

she must be unconscious of this predisposition, otherwise there will

be no fascination. Fascination is a phenomenon of compulsion which

lacks conscious ground; that is, it is not a process of the will, but

a phenomenon coming to the surface from the unconscious, and forcing

itself compulsorily upon consciousness. All compulsions arise from

unconscious motives. It must therefore be assumed that the patient

possesses a similar unconscious predisposition to that of the artist.

She becomes identified with this artist, and is also identified with him

_as man_. Here we are at once reminded of the analysis of the dream,

where we met an allusion to the "masculine" foot. As a matter of fact,

the patient plays a thoroughly masculine part towards her friend, being

the active one who continually takes the lead, commanding her friend and

occasionally even forcing her somewhat violently to some course that

only the patient desires. Her friend is distinctly feminine both in her

external appearance and otherwise, whilst the patient is also externally

of a somewhat masculine type. Her voice is stronger and deeper than

that of her friend. She now describes Mrs. X. as a very feminine woman,

her gentleness and amiability being comparable to that of her friend,

so she thinks. This gives us a new clue. The patient is obviously

playing towards her friend the artist's part towards Mrs. X. Thus she

unconsciously completes her identification with Mrs. X. and her lover.

In this way she is giving expression to her frivolous vein which she had

repressed so carefully. She is not living it consciously, however, but

is herself played upon by her own unconscious tendency.

We now know a great deal about the crab: it represents the inner

psychology of this untamed part of the libido. The unconscious

identifications always keep drawing her on. They have this power because

being unconscious they cannot be subjected to insight and correction.

The crab is the symbol of the unconscious contents. These contents are

always seducing the patient to retain her relation to the friend. (The

"crab goes backwards.") But the relation to the friend is synonymous

with illness, she became nervous through it (hence the association of

illness).

Strictly speaking, this really belongs to the analysis on the objective

plane. But we must not forget that we only arrive at understanding by

applying the _subjective_ interpretation, which thereby proves itself

to be an important heuristic principle. For practical purposes we might

rest quite satisfied with the result we have already reached. But we

seek here to satisfy all the requirements of the theory. Not all the

associations have yet been used; neither is the significance of the

choice of symbols yet demonstrated sufficiently.

We will now recur to the patient's remark that the crab lay hidden

under the water in the stream, and that she had not seen it at first.

She had not at first perceived the unconscious relations that have

just been elucidated; they lay hidden in the water. But the stream is

the obstacle preventing her from going across. It is precisely the

unconscious relations binding her to her friend that have been hindering

her. The unconscious was the obstacle. In this case, therefore, the

water signifies the unconscious, or, it were better to say, the

_being unconscious_ the being hidden, for the crab is also something

unconscious, namely, the portion of the libido that was hidden in the

unconscious.

IX.--THE DOMINANTS OF THE SUPER-PERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS.

The task now lies before us of raising the unconscious data and their

relations that have been hitherto understood upon the objective plane,

to the _subjective_ plane. To this end we must once more separate them

from their objects, conceiving them as images, related in a subjective

way to function-complexes in the patient's own unconscious. Raised to

the subjective plane, Mrs. X. is the person who showed the patient the

way to do something that the patient herself feared while unconsciously

desiring it. Mrs. X. therefore represents that which the patient would

like to become, and yet does not quite want to. In a certain sense Mrs.

X. is a picture of the patient's future character. The fascinating

artist cannot be raised to the subjective plane, because the unconscious

artistic gift lying dormant in the patient has already been covered over

by Mrs. X. It would be quite right to say that the artist is the image

of the masculine element in the patient, which not being consciously

realised, is still lying in the unconscious. In a certain sense this

is indeed true, the patient actually deluding herself as regards this

matter. That is, she seems to herself to be particularly tender,

sensitive and feminine, with nothing in the least masculine about her.

She was indignantly amazed when I drew her attention to her masculine

traits. But the reason why she is fascinated by something mysterious in

the artist cannot be attributed to what is masculine in her. That seems

to be completely unknown to her. And yet it must be hiding somewhere,

for she has produced this feeling out of herself.

Whenever a part of libido similar to this cannot be found, experience

teaches us that it has always been _projected_. But into whom? Is it

still attached to the artist? He has long ago disappeared from her

horizon, and can hardly have taken the projection with him, because it

was firmly fixed in the patient's unconscious. A similar projection is

always actually present, that is, there must somewhere be some one upon

whom this amount of libido is actually projected, otherwise she would

have felt it consciously.

Thus we once more reach the objective plane, for we cannot discover

this missing projection in any other way. The patient does not know any

man except myself who means anything at all to her, and as her doctor I

mean a good deal to her. Therefore she has probably projected this part

upon me. It is true I had never noticed anything of the kind. But the

exquisitely deceptive rôles are never presented to the analyst on the

surface, coming to light always only outside the hour of treatment. I

therefore carefully inquire: "Tell me what do I seem like to you when

you are not with me? Am I just the same then?" Reply: "When I am with

you, you are very pleasant and kind; but when I am alone, or have not

seen you for rather a long time, then the picture I have in my mind of

you changes in an extraordinary way. Sometimes you seem quite idealized,

and then again different." She hesitates; I help by saying: "Yes, what

am I like then?" Reply: "Sometimes quite dangerous, sinister like an

evil magician or demon. I do not know how I get hold of such ideas. You

are not really a bit like that."

So this part was attached to me as part of a transference; that is

why it was lacking in her inventory. Therewith we recognize a further

important thing. I was confused with (identified with) the artist, and

in her unconscious fantasy she is Mrs. X. I was easily able to prove

this fact by means of material that had previously been brought to

light (sexual fantasies). But I myself then am the obstacle, the crab,

that is hindering her from getting across. The state of affairs would

be critical if at this particular point we were to limit ourselves to

the objective plane of interpretation. What would be the use of my

explaining: "But I am not this artist at all, I am not in the least

weird as he is, nor am I like an evil magician." That would leave the

patient quite unconvinced because she would know as well I do that the

projection would continue to exist all the same, and that it is really

I who am hindering her further progress. It is at this point that many

a treatment has come to a standstill. For there is no other way for

the patient here of escaping from the embrace of the unconscious, but

for the physician to raise himself to the subjective plane, where he

is to be regarded as an image. But an image of what? This is where the

greatest difficulty lies. The doctor will say: "An image of something

in the patient's unconscious." But the patient may object: "What, am

I to suppose myself to be a man, a mysteriously fascinating one to

boot, a wicked wizard and a demon? No, I cannot accept that; it is

nonsense. I'd sooner believe that you are all that." She is really, so

to speak, quite right. It is too preposterous to want to transfer such

things to herself. She cannot permit herself to be made into a demon,

any more than can the physician. Her eyes flash, a wicked expression

appears upon her face, a glimmer of an unknown hate never seen before,

something snake-like seeming to creep into her. I am suddenly faced

by the possibility of a fatal misunderstanding with her. What is it?

Is it disappointed love? Is she offended? Does she feel depreciated?

There seems to lurk something of the beast of prey, something really

demoniac in her glance. Is she then after all a demon? Or am I myself

the beast of prey, the demon, and is this a terrified victim sitting

before me, who is trying to defend herself with the brute force of

despair against my wicked spells? But either idea must be nonsense,

phantastical delusion. What have I come in contact with? What new string

is vibrating? But it is only for a passing moment. The expression upon

the patient's face becoming quiet again, she says, as if relieved: "It

is extraordinary. I feel as if you had touched the point which I could

never get over in relation to my friend. It is a horrible feeling,

something non-human, wicked, and cruel. I cannot describe how queer this

feeling is. At such moments it makes me hate and despise my friend,

although I struggle against it with all my might and main."

An explanatory light is thrown upon what has happened by this

observation. I have now taken the friend's place. The friendship has

been overcome, the ice of repression is broken. The patient has without

knowing it entered upon a new phase of her existence. I know that now

upon me will fall everything painful and bad in the relation to the

friend. So also will whatever was good in it, although in violent

conflict with the mysterious unknown quantity X, about which the patient

could never get clear. A new phase, therefore, of the transference

supervenes, which, however, does not as yet make clearly apparent what

the X that is projected upon me consists of.

It is quite certain, that the most troublesome misunderstandings

threaten if the patient should stick at this stage of the transference.

In that case she will necessarily treat me as she treated her friend;

that is the X will continually be somewhere in the air giving rise to

misunderstandings. The end would probably be that she would see the evil

demon in me, because she is quite unable to accept the fact that she

is herself the demon. All insoluble conflicts are brought about in this

way. And an insoluble conflict signifies a standstill in life.

Another possibility is, that the patient should disregard the obscure

point by applying her old preventative against this new difficulty. That

is, she would repress it again, instead of keeping it conscious, which

is the necessary and obvious demand of the whole method. Nothing is

gained by such repression; on the contrary, the X threatens more from

the unconscious where it is considerably more unpleasant.

Whenever such an unacceptable image emerges, one must decide whether

at bottom it is destined to represent a human quality or not.

"Magician" and "demon" may represent qualities that are described in

this particular fashion, in order that they may speedily be recognized

as _not human but mythological qualities_. Magician and demon being

mythological figures aptly express the unknown "non-human" feelings

which had surprised the patient. These attributes are not applicable

to a human personality; being as a rule judgments of character

_intuitively_ and not critically approved, which are projected upon our

fellow-beings, inevitably doing serious injury to human relations.

_Such attributes always indicate that contents of the super-personal or

absolute unconscious are being projected._ Neither demons nor wicked

magicians are reminiscences of personal experiences, although every one

has, of course, at some time or other heard or read of them. Although

one has heard of a rattle-snake, it would hardly be appropriate to

describe a lizard or a blind-worm as a rattle-snake, simply because

one was startled by their rustling. Similarly, one would hardly term

a fellow-being a demon, unless some kind of demoniacal influence were

closely associated with him. If, however, the demoniacal influence were

really part of his personal character, it would show itself everywhere,

and then this human being would be a demon, a kind of werwolf. But such

an ascription is mythology; in other words, it is from the collective

and not from the individual psyche. Inasmuch as through our unconscious

we have a share in the historical collective psyche, we naturally

dwell unconsciously in a world of werwolves, demons, magicians, etc.,

these being things which have always affected man most profoundly. We

have just as much a part in gods and devils, saviours and criminals.

But it would be absurd to want to ascribe to one's personal self the

possibilities that are potentially existing in the human unconscious.

It is, therefore, essential to make as clear a distinction as possible

between the personal and the impersonal assets of our psyche. This is

by no means intended to nullify the occasional great effects due to

the existence of the contents of the absolute unconscious; but these

contents of the collective psyche should be differentiated from those

belonging to the individual psyche. For simple-minded people, of course,

these things were never separated, the projection of gods, demons, etc.,

not having been understood as a psychological function were simply

accounted concretistical realities. Their projectional character was

never perceived. It was only with the advent of the epoch of scepticism

that it was realized that the gods did not really exist except as

projections. With that the matter was set at rest. But the psychological

function corresponding to it was by no means set at rest, for it lapsed

into the unconscious and began to poison men with a surplus of libido

that had hitherto been invested in the cult of idols or gods. Obviously,

the depreciation and repression of such a powerful function as that of

religion has serious consequences for the psychology of the individual.

The reflux of this libido strengthens the unconscious prodigiously,

so that it begins to exercise a powerful compulsory influence upon

consciousness and its archaic collective contents. One period of

scepticism came to a close with the horrors of the French Revolution.

At the present time we are again experiencing an ebullition of the

unconscious destructive powers of the collective psyche. The result is

an unparalleled general slaughter. That is just what the unconscious

was tending towards. This tendency had previously been inordinately

strengthened by the rationalism of modern life, which by depreciating

everything irrational, caused the function of irrationalism to sink into

the unconscious. But the function once in the unconscious will from

thence work unceasing havoc, like an incurable disease whose centre

cannot be eradicated. For then the individual and the nation alike are

compelled to live irrationally, and even to apply their highest idealism

and their best wit to make this madness of irrationalism as complete as

possible. We see examples of this on a small scale in our patient. She

turned from a possibility of life that seemed to her irrational (Mrs.

X.) in order to live it in a pathological form, to her own loss, and

with an unsuitable object.

There is, indeed, no possible alternative but to acknowledge

irrationalism as a psychological function that is necessary and always

existent. Its results are not to be taken as concrete realities (that

would involve repression), but as _psychological realities_. They

are realities because they are _effective_ things, that is, they are

_actualities_.

The collective unconscious is the sediment of all the experience of the

universe of all time, and is also an image of the universe that has

been in process of formation for untold ages. In the course of time

certain features have become prominent in this image, the so-called

_dominants_. These dominants are the ruling powers, the gods; that is,

the representations resulting from dominating laws and principles, from

average regularities in the issue of the images that the brain has

received as a consequence of secular processes.

In so far as the images formed in the brain are relatively faithful

portrayals of psychic happenings they will correspond to their

dominants; that is, their general characteristic features, made

prominent by the accumulation of similar experiences, will correspond

to certain physical fundamental facts that are also universal. Hence it

is possible to transfer unconscious images to physical events direct as

intuitive ideas; _e.g. ether_ the primeval breath or soul-substance

appears in man's conceptions the whole world over; so, too, _energy_,

the magic force, which is equally widespread.

On account of their connection with physical things the dominants

usually make their appearance as projections, appearing,

indeed--if the projections are unconscious--in the persons of the

immediate environment, as a rule in the form of abnormal under- or

over-valuations, which excite misunderstandings, conflict, infatuations,

and various kinds of folly. People say: "He makes a god of So-and-so,"

or "So-and-so is X.'s _bête noire_." They also give rise to the

formation of modern myths, that is, fantastic rumours, suspicions and

prejudices.

The dominants of the collective unconscious are therefore extremely

important things of significant effect, to which great attention should

be paid. They must not be repressed, but must be given most careful

consideration. They usually appear as projections, and since projections

are only attached where there is some external stimulus, it is very

difficult to appraise them aright, on account of the relation of the

unconscious images with the object. If some one projects the dominant

of "devil" into a fellow-being, this occurs because this other person

has something in him that makes the attachment of the devil dominant

possible. But that is by no means to say that this person is therefore,

so to speak, a devil; on the contrary, he may be a particularly good

fellow, but being antipathetic to the one who projects, a "devilish

effect" is brought about between the two. This does not mean that the

one who projects is a devil, although he must recognize that he too,

just as much, has something devilish in him, and has been gulled by

it, inasmuch as he projected it; but that does not make him a devil;

indeed, he may be just as decent a man as the other. In such a case the

appearance of the devil dominant means: the two persons are incompatible

(for the moment and for the near future), wherefore the unconscious

splits them asunder and holds them apart from each other.

One of the dominants that is almost always met in the analysis of

projections of collective unconscious contents is the "magical demon;"

it is of preponderating sinister effect. "The Golem," by _Meyrink_,

is a good example of this; also the Thibetan wizard in Meyrink's

"Fledermäusen," who lets the world-war loose by magic. Obviously Meyrink

formed this image independently and freely out of his unconscious,

by giving word and picture to a feeling similar to the one that my

patient had projected upon me. The dominant of magic also appears in

"Zarathustra," whilst in "Faust" it is, so to say, the hero himself.

The picture of this demon is the lowest and most elementary concept

of God. It is the dominant of the primitive tribal magic-man, or a

singularly gifted personality endowed with magic power. This figure

very frequently makes an appearance in my patient's unconscious as a

_dark-skinned being of Mongolian type_.

An important step forward has been taken by the recognition of the

dominants of the absolute unconscious. The magical or demoniac effect

of the fellow-being is made to disappear by the feeling being realised

as a definite projection of the absolute unconscious. On the other

hand, a completely new and unsuspected task now lies before us: namely,

the question in what way the ego should come to terms with this

psychological non-ego. Should one rest satisfied with having verified

the effective existence of unconscious dominants, leaving the matter to

take care of itself?

To leave it at this point would be the means of creating a permanent

state of dissociation in the subject, a conflict between the individual

psyche and the collective psyche. Upon the one side we should have the

differentiated modern ego, whilst upon the other a kind of uncivilized

negro representative of a thoroughly primitive state. That would mean

that we should have what really does exist, a crust of civilization over

a dark-skinned brute; the cleavage would be distinct and demonstrable

before our very eyes. But such a dissociation requires immediate

synthesis and cultivation of what is undeveloped. There must be a union

of these two aspects.

Before entering upon this new question let us first return to the

dream from which we started. The discussion has given us a broader

understanding of the dream, and especially of an essential part of it,

namely, the fear. This fear is a demoniac fear of the dominants of the

collective unconscious. We saw that the patient identifies herself

with Mrs. X., expressing thereby that she also has some relation to

the mysterious artist. It was apparent also that she identified the

physician (myself) with the artist; and further that when taken upon the

subjective plane, the image of the wizard dominants of the collective

unconscious represented me.

All this is covered in the dream by the symbol of the crab which walks

backwards. The crab stands for the living content of the unconscious

that can by no means be exhausted or rendered inoperative by analysis

on the objective plane. But what we were able to do was to _detach the

mythological or collective psychological contents from the objects

of consciousness, and to consolidate them as psychological realities

outside the individual psyche_.

So long as the absolute unconscious and the individual psyche are

coupled together without differentiation, no progress can be made,

or, as the dream expresses it, no boundary be crossed. If the dreamer

does nevertheless prepare to cross the boundary, the unconscious that

was hitherto unnoticed becomes animated, seizing her and dragging her

down. The dream and its material characterize the absolute unconscious,

on the one side as a lower animal living hidden in the depths of the

water; and on the other side, as a dangerous disease that can only be

cured by a timely operation. To what extent this characterization is

appropriate has already been seen. As was pointed out, the animal symbol

specially refers to what is _extra_ human, that is super-personal; for

the contents of the absolute unconscious are not merely the residue of

archaic human functions, but also the residue of functions of the animal

ancestry of mankind, whose duration of life was indeed vastly greater

than the relatively brief epoch of specifically human existence. If such

residues are active, they are apt, as nothing else is, not merely to

arrest the progress of development, but also to divert the libido into

regressive channels, until the quantity which the absolute unconscious

has activated has been absorbed. The energy becomes profitable again

after it has been consciously contrasted with the absolute unconscious,

a process which enables it to be converted into a valuable source from

which to draw. This transference of energy was established by religions

in a concretistic manner through cultural communication with the gods

(the dominants of the absolute unconscious). But these modes and customs

are too much at variance with our intellect and our moral sense for us

to be able to declare this solution of the problem as still binding,

or even possible. If, on the other hand, we apprehend the images of

the unconscious as collective unconscious dominants, therefore as

collective-psychological phenomena or functions, this hypothesis is

in no way opposed to our intellect and conscience. This solution is

rationally acceptable. We have thus gained the possibility of coming to

terms with the activated residues of our ancestral history. This mode

of settlement makes it possible to traverse the boundary line hitherto

limiting us, and is therefore appropriately termed the _transcendental

function_, which is synonymous with progressive development to a new

attitude. In the dream this development is indicated by the other side

of the stream.

The similarity to hero-myths is striking. The typical combat of the hero

with the monster (the unconscious content) frequently takes place on the

banks of some water; sometimes at a ford. This circumstance is prominent

in legends of Red Indians, as, for example, in Longfellow's "Hiawatha."

In the decisive battle the hero is swallowed by a monster (_cf._ story

of Jonah), as Frobenius[246] has shown by means of extensive material.

But inside the monster the hero begins to come to terms with the beast

in his own way: whilst the creature swims with him towards the sunrise,

he cuts off a valuable piece of the viscera, _e.g._ the heart, by which

the monster lived, that is, the valuable energy by which the unconscious

was activated. Through this deed he kills the monster, who then drifts

to land, where the hero, born anew through the transcendental function

(the "night-journey under the sea" of Frobenius), steps forth, often in

company with all those beings whom the monster had previously swallowed.

This enables the normal state to be restored, as the unconscious having

been robbed of its energy no longer occupies a preponderating position.

In this way the myth--which is the dream of a people--graphically

describes the problem with which our patient is concerned.[247]

The problem of how to come to terms with the absolute unconscious is a

question apart. I must content myself here with a general survey of the

new theory of the unconscious up to the transcendental function, leaving

the presentation of the transcendental function itself to a later work.

X.--THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TYPES OF INTROVERSION AND EXTROVERSION IN THE

ANALYTICAL PROCESS.

The description of the analysis of the unconscious would be incomplete

if a word were not said about the question whether this method is

equally applicable to the two types. As a matter of fact, both the

development and the conception of the unconscious are different for

each type. Although making every effort to find out a formulation that

shall be as universally valid as possible, we must emphatically impress

upon our minds the fact that the two modes of conception of the types

are essentially different; a universal formulation that is just, only

becomes possible when both standpoints are given equal consideration.

I do not conceal from myself the fact that this subject is of less

interest to the layman than to the specialist. Nevertheless, certain

aspects of the question are of such a general character that the layman

should not find the perusal of this last section entirely without

interest.

Let us first consider the concept of the unconscious. I have here

introduced the unconscious under the conception of a psychological

function, namely, the function of the sum of all those psychic contents

which do not reach the threshold of consciousness. I have divided

the unconscious materials into _personal_--that is to reminiscences

attributable to personal experiences, combinations and tendencies--and

into _impersonal_ collective contents, that is, those whose contents

cannot be attributed to personal experiences.

The contents of the psyche are fundamentally images indicating function

on the one hand, and upon the other objects and the world generally. The

conscious contains the recent object-images; the personal unconscious,

the object-images of the individual past, so far as they have either

been forgotten or repressed; whilst the absolute or collective

unconscious contains the inherited world-images generally, under the

form of primordial images or mythical themes. All psychic images have

two sides: the one, being directed towards the object, is as faithful

a likeness of the object as possible, framed without any intention or

obligation to be anything else. The other side is directed towards the

soul, that is towards the psychic function and the laws peculiar to it.

Let us take as an example, a primordial image out of a hero-myth. There

is in the West a demon ancestress with a large mouth. The hero creeps

into it, and at the same moment a certain little bird sings; the ancient

dame shuts her mouth with a bang, and the hero disappears.

The side of the image directed towards the physical object means, the

sun goes down in the evening into the mouth of the ocean. At this hour

a certain little bird sings (which is an objective fact), and the sun

disappears into the depths of the sea.

The side of the image directed towards the soul, that is the _idea_,

signifies: The energy contained in consciousness disappears (like the

sun in the evening) into the monster of the unconscious.

If we consider the collective-unconscious from the side of the

soul or idea, it is something entirely distinct, and it must be

differentiated, _abstracted_ from the object, if its contents are to

attain the perfection of an idea. If, on the other hand, we consider the

collective-unconscious from the side of the physical object, that is

as an image of the object, it is weaker and less clear than the object

itself, and can only be brought to perfection if it is objectified, that

is projected on to the object itself.

As previously explained, there are two types of human psychology that

can be clearly distinguished, viz. introversion and extroversion. The

introvert is characterised by the thought standpoint; the extrovert

by the feeling standpoint. As I showed, they are quite different in

their relation to the object: the introvert abstracting from the

object and thinking about it, whilst the extrovert goes to the object

and feels himself into it. The accent of value lies upon the ego for

the introvert, but upon the object for the extrovert. The former's

chief concern is the preservation of the ego; that of the latter the

preservation of the object. The two types will adopt a different

attitude towards the unconscious, namely, the introvert will and must

seize the idea-side of the unconscious image; the extrovert, on the

other hand, seizing the side of the physical reflection. The introvert

will purify as far as possible the idea-side from the "alloy" of the

concretistic admixture of the physical image, in order to arrive at the

abstract idea; whilst, on the other hand, the extrovert will purify the

physical image as far as possible from the "phantastic" admixture of the

enveloping ideas. The former, by raising himself to a world of idea,

will endeavour to overcome the disturbing influence of the unconscious;

whilst the latter will approach the object as near as possible and

project the unconscious image into the physical object, thus freeing

himself from the grip of the unconscious.

What for the extrovert is a phantastic and disturbing admixture in the

unconscious picture, is for the introvert precisely that which has the

most value, for it is the germ of the pure idea, and _vice versâ_; what

for the introvert are merely concretistical "imperfections," survivals

of a physical origin, are for the extrovert a most valuable hint, the

bridge by which the unconscious can be united with the object.

This description makes it manifest that the two types go contrary

ways in the course of the development of their unconscious, arriving

therefore at opposite extremes: the one at the idea, the other at the

object of his feeling. The psychological characteristics of the types

are eventually pushed to extremes, where according to the enantiodromic

law the moment has arrived when in each case the "other" function

enters into its fully acknowledged right, that is, feeling in the case

of the introvert, and thought in that of the extrovert. The introvert

attains the lacking function of autonomous feeling by means of a

differentiation and enhancement of his thought; whilst the extrovert,

on the other hand, attains his thinking by the way of an increasingly

differentiated love. These functions that hitherto were secondary are

found at first in the unconscious, gradually reaching consciousness in

the course of development. At first they are unconscious functions in a

state that is more or less incompatible with consciousness and have the

typical qualities of unconscious contents. These qualities are such as

are not tolerated in consciousness. The lunatic Schreber[248] says most

aptly that the language of God (the unconscious) is a somewhat archaic

but vigorous German, of which he gives a few striking examples. As the

contrary function that emerges from the unconscious into consciousness

differs to such an extent from what appears to be acceptable to

consciousness, the necessity arises of a technique for coming to terms

with the contrary function. It is impossible to accept the contrary

function as it stands, as it always drags extraneous qualities and

accompanying circumstances with it from the absolute unconscious.

Through the above-described development the extrovert has acquired an

adaptation to the object that is absolutely real and free from all

phantasies; he will therefore be able to turn his attention towards the

"alloy" which for the introvert was the valuable germ of idea. From this

he will then develop similar ideas to those which the introvert has

already developed. _Vice versâ_, the introvert will now be able to turn

his attention to those materials which before he was obliged to reject,

as being side-tracks on the road to physical reality; that is, he will

carry out the same clearing and winnowing in his feeling-relations, that

the extrovert has already completed.

The development of the contrary function that was hitherto unconscious,

leads to individuation beyond the type, and thereby to a new relation

to the world and mind. The process which begins with the complementation

of the types is the transcendental function, which leads to the new

adaptation by means of the clearing and winnowing of unconscious

feelings and thoughts that have been brought up by the contrary function

that had been neglected.

Following the old maxim: "naturam si sequemur ducem nunquam

aberrabimus," we have obeyed the natural impulse of the thinker to carry

the principle of thought through to its utmost perfection attainable, as

also that of the feeler, of carrying the principle of feeling through

to the end. By these means the salutary extreme was produced, to wit,

the hunger, the desire for the compensatory function. For, by means of

thought, the one is landed in a lifeless ice-cold world of crystalline

ideas; whereas, by means of feeling, the other reaches a limitless

ocean of never ending flood of sentiment. The former will, therefore,

yearn for living warmth of feeling, and the latter for the restrictive

precision and solidity of thought.

An enrichment of the individual is attained by this compensatory

process, giving him greater decision and the possibility of a harmony

that is complete in itself. The assimilation of the contrary function

discloses new inner springs, which guarantee to the individual

considerably greater independence from external conditions. This

acquisition is an indisputable advantage that none would like to

surrender in face of the fact so unavoidably connected with it, that a

new adaptation and orientation of this kind places the individual in

a certain contrast to the great bulk of people who yet have the old

attitude. This contrast is no drawback; it is rather a welcome and

effective spur to life and work, for thereby is created the channel

required by our psychic energy for its development.

XI.--GENERAL REMARKS ON THE THERAPY.

I have still to draw the reader's attention to an important fact.

Throughout the course of this paper, I have seemed to associate the

idea of disturbance or even of peril with the unconscious. But it would

give a false impression if we were only to emphasize the dangerous side

of the unconscious. _The unconscious is a source of danger when the

individual is not at one with it._ If we succeed in establishing the

function or attitude that I call transcendental, the disharmony ceases,

and we are permitted to enjoy the favourable side of the unconscious. In

such case the unconscious vouchsafes us that furtherance and assistance

which bountiful Nature is always ready to give to man in overflowing

abundance. The unconscious possesses possibilities of wisdom that are

completely closed to consciousness, for the unconscious has at its

disposal not only all the psychic contents that are under the threshold

because they had been forgotten or overlooked, but also the wisdom of

the experience of untold ages, deposited in the course of time and lying

potential in the human brain. The unconscious is continually active,

creating combinations of its materials; these serve to indicate the

future path of the individual. It creates prospective combinations just

as our consciousness does, only they are considerably superior to the

conscious combinations both in refinement and extent. The unconscious

may therefore be an unparalleled guide for human beings.

The reader must on no account suppose that the complicated psychological

changes described must all be passed through in every individual case.

In practice the treatment is adjusted according to the therapeutic

result attained. The particular result arrived at may be reached

at any stage of the treatment, quite apart from the seriousness or

duration of the malady. The treatment of a serious case may last a long

time, without the higher phases of the evolution ever being reached,

or needing to be reached. There are comparatively few people who,

after attaining the desired therapeutical result, pursue the further

stages of evolution for the sake of their own development. It is,

therefore, not the seriousness of the case which obliges one to pass

through the whole development. In any case, only those people attain

a higher degree of differentiation who are by nature destined and

called to it, that is, who have both a capacity and tendency towards

the higher differentiation. This is a matter in which people are

extremely different, just as among species of animals there are some

that are stationary and conservative, and others that are evolutionary.

Nature is aristocratic, but not in the sense of having reserved the

possibility of differentiation exclusively for those species that stand

high. Similarly, the possibility of the psychological development of

human beings is not reserved for specially _gifted_ individuals. In

other words: neither special intelligence nor any other talent is

necessary in order to achieve a far-reaching psychological development,

inasmuch as in this development moral qualities step in to supplement

where intellect does not suffice. But it must not be supposed under

any circumstances that the treatment consists in grafting general

formulas and complicated doctrines on to people; this is not so. Each

one can acquire that which he needs, after his own fashion and in his

own language. What I have here presented is only the intellectual

formulation of the subject, founded upon preliminary scientific study of

an empirical as well as a theoretical nature; but this formulation does

not become a subject of discussion in the ordinary practical analytical

work. The brief notes of cases that I have inserted give an approximate

idea of the practical side of analysis.

The reader should realize that our new understanding of psychology

has a side that is entirely practical, and another that is entirely

theoretical. It is not merely a practical method of treatment or

education, but it is also a scientific theory, that is closely related

to other co-ordinated sciences.

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion, I must beg the reader to pardon me for having ventured

to say so many new and abstruse things in such a brief compass. I lay

myself open to adverse criticism, because I conceive it to be the duty

of every one who isolates himself by taking his own path, to tell others

what he has found or discovered, whether it be a refreshing spring for

the thirsty, or a sandy desert of sterile error. The one helps, the

other warns. Not the opinion of any individual contemporary will decide

the truth and error of what has been discovered, but rather future

generations and destiny. There are things that are not yet true to-day,

perhaps we are not yet permitted to recognize them as true, although

they may be true to-morrow. Therefore every pioneer must take his own

path, alone but hopeful, with the open eyes of one who is conscious

of its solitude and of the perils of its dim precipices. Our age is

seeking a new spring of life. I found one and drank of it and the water

tasted good. That is all that I can or want to say. My intention and my

duty to society is fulfilled when I have described, as well as I can,

the way that led me to the spring; the reproaches of those who do not

follow this way have never troubled me, nor ever will. New ideas always

encounter resistance from the old. That always was and always will be

the case; it appertains to the self-regulation of mental progress.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 216: New Edition, 1917. Translated by Miss Dora Hecht.]

[Footnote 217: Bleuler, "Die Psychoanalyse Freuds." _Jahrbuch für

psychoanalytische Forschungen_, vol. II., 1910.]

[Footnote 218: Breuer and Freud, "Selected Papers on Hysteria and other

Psychoneuroses." "Nervous and Mental Disease," Monograph series, No. 4.]

[Footnote 219: Freud, "Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre."

Deuticke: Wien.]

[Footnote 220: Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams," George Allen.]

[Footnote 221: Freud, "Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory."

Monograph Series.]

[Footnote 222: Cp. Breuer and Freud, "Selected Papers on Hysteria."]

[Footnote 223: Breuer and Freud, "Selected Papers on Hysteria and other

Psychoneuroses."]

[Footnote 224: For further particulars of this case see Jung, "The

Theory of Psychoanalysis."]

[Footnote 225: We may still apply to love the saying: "The heaven above,

the heaven below, The sky above, the sky below, All things above,

all things below, Succeed and prosper" (Old Mystic). Mephistopheles

expresses the idea when he describes himself as "Part of that power

which still produceth good, whilst ever scheming ill."]

[Footnote 226: "Love" is used in that larger sense of the word, which

indeed belongs to it by right; it does not mean "mere sexuality."]

[Footnote 227: Compare Jung, "Diagnostiche Associationsstudien."

Leipzig: J. A. Barth. 2 volumes.]

[Footnote 228: The theory of "Complexes" is set out in "Psychology of

Dementia præcox," Jung.]

[Footnote 229: Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams." James Allen.]

[Footnote 230: The rules of dream-analysis, the laws of the structure

of the dream and its symbolism, form almost a science; this is one of

the most important chapters of the psychology of the unconscious whose

comprehension requires very arduous study.]

[Footnote 231: Compare Jung, "The Psychology of the Unconscious."]

[Footnote 232: Thus spake Zarathustra, p. 40.]

[Footnote 233: The German "Auslebetheorie."]

[Footnote 234: "Ueber den nervösen Charakter."]

[Footnote 235: For a preliminary communication upon the subject see page

287.]

[Footnote 236: "The Philosophy of Values."]

[Footnote 237: "Pragmatism."]

[Footnote 238: "Grosse Männer" ("Great Men").]

[Footnote 239: _Furneaux Jordan_: "Character as seen in Body and

Parentage." London, 1896.]

[Footnote 240: I purposely describe only the two types here. Obviously,

the possibility of the existence of other types is not thereby excluded.

Other possibilities are known to us. I refrain from mentioning them,

with a view to limiting the material.]

[Footnote 241: The _Monist_, vol. xvi. p. 363.]

[Footnote 242: The German name for crab (Krebs) is the same as that for

cancer.]

[Footnote 243: A parallel conception of the two kinds of interpretation

is found in a commendable book by _Silberer_: "Probleme der Mystik und

ihrer Symbolik" ("Problems of Mysticism and their Symbolism").]

[Footnote 244: "Halb zog sie ihn, halb sank er hin," etc.]

[Footnote 245: I have also termed this procedure the "hermeneutic

method." See page 468-9.]

[Footnote 246: "Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes" ("The Age of the

Sun-god").]

[Footnote 247: I have treated the parallels of hero-myths in great

detail in "The Psychology of the Unconscious."]

[Footnote 248: "Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken" ("Memoirs of a

Neurasthenic Patient").]

CHAPTER XV

THE CONCEPTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS[249]

I.--THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PERSONAL AND THE IMPERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS

Since the breach with the Viennese school upon the question of the

fundamental explanatory principle of analysis--that is, the question

if it be sexuality or energy--our concepts have undergone considerable

development. After the prejudice concerning the explanatory basis had

been removed by the acceptance of a purely abstract view of it, the

nature of which was not anticipated, interest was directed to the

concept of the unconscious.

According to Freud's theory the contents of the unconscious are limited

to infantile wish-tendencies, which are repressed on account of the

incompatibility of their character. Repression is a process which

begins in early childhood under the moral influence of environment;

it continues throughout life. These repressions are done away with by

means of analysis, and the repressed wishes are made conscious. That

should theoretically empty the unconscious, and, so to say, do away with

it; but in reality the production of infantile sexual wish-fantasies

continues into old age.

According to this theory, the unconscious contains only those parts of

the personality which might just as well be conscious, and have really

only been repressed by the processes of civilisation. According to Freud

the essential content of the unconscious would therefore be _personal_.

But although, from such a view-point the infantile tendencies of the

unconscious are the more prominent, it would be a mistake to estimate

or define the unconscious from this alone, for it has another side.

Not only must the repressed materials be included in the periphery of

the unconscious, but also all the psychic material that does not reach

the threshold of consciousness. It is impossible to explain all these

materials by the principle of repression, for in that case by the

removal of the repression a phenomenal memory would be acquired, one

that never forgets anything. As a matter of fact repression exists, but

it is a special phenomenon. If a so-called bad memory were only the

consequence of repression, then those persons who have an excellent

memory should have no repression, that is, be incapable of being

neurotic. But experience teaches us that this is not the case. There

are, undoubtedly, cases with abnormally bad memories, where it is clear

that the main cause must be attributed to repression. But such cases are

comparatively rare.

We therefore emphatically say that the unconscious contains all that

part of the psyche that is found under the threshold, including

subliminal sense-perceptions, in addition to the repressed material.

We also know--not only on account of accumulated experience, but also

for theoretical reasons--that the unconscious must contain all the

material that has _not yet_ reached the level of consciousness. These

are the germs of future conscious contents. We have also every reason to

suppose that the unconscious is far from being quiescent, in the sense

that it is inactive, but that it is probably constantly busied with the

formation and re-formation of so-called unconscious phantasies. Only in

pathological cases should this activity be thought of as comparatively

autonomous, for normally it is co-ordinated with consciousness.

It may be assumed that all these contents are of a personal nature in

so far as they are acquisitions of the individual life. As this life

is limited, the number of acquisitions of the unconscious must also be

limited, wherefore an exhaustion of the contents of the unconscious

through analysis might be held to be possible. In other words, by the

analysis of the unconscious the inventory of unconscious contents might

be completed, possibly in the sense that the unconscious cannot produce

anything besides what is already known and accepted in the conscious.

Also, as has already been said, we should have to accept the fact that

the unconscious activity had thereby been paralysed, and that by the

removal of the repression we could stop the conscious contents from

descending into the unconscious. Experience teaches us that is only

possible to a very limited extent. We urge our patients to retain their

hold upon repressed contents that have been brought to consciousness,

and to insert them in their scheme of life. But, as we may daily

convince ourselves, this procedure seems to make no impression upon

the unconscious, inasmuch as it goes on producing apparently the same

phantasies, namely, the so-called infantile-sexual ones, which according

to the earlier theory were based upon personal repressions. If in such

cases analysis be systematically continued, an inventory of incompatible

wish-phantasies is gradually revealed, whose combinations amaze us.

In addition to all the sexual perversions every conceivable kind of

crime is discovered, as well as every conceivable heroic action and

great thought, whose existence in the analysed person no one would have

suspected.

In order to give an example of this, I would like to refer to Maeder's

Schizophrenic patient who called the world his picture-book. He was a

locksmith's apprentice who fell ill very early in life; he had never

been blessed with intellectual gifts. As regards his idea that the world

was his picture-book and that he was turning its pages over when he

looked about in the world, it is just Schopenhauer's world, conceived as

will and representation, expressed in primitive picture-language. This

idea has just as universal a character as Schopenhauer's. The difference

consists in the fact that the patient's notion has stood still at an

embryonic stage in a process of growth, whereas with Schopenhauer

the same idea has been changed from a mere image into an abstraction

expressed in terms that are universally valid.

It would be false to assume that the patient's idea had a personal

character and value. That would be to attribute to him the dignity of a

philosopher. But he alone is a philosopher who raises an image that has

naturally sprung up into an abstract idea, thereby translating it into

terms of universal validity. Schopenhauer's philosophical conception

is his personal value, whereas the notion of the patient has merely

an impersonal value of natural growth, in which personal proprietary

rights can only be acquired by making an abstraction of the images, and

translating them into terms that are universally valid. But it would be

wrong if an exaggerated sense of the value of this achievement led us

to ascribe to the philosopher the merit of having made or conceived the

original image itself. The primordial image has also sprung up naturally

in the philosopher, and is nothing but a part of the universal human

heritage in which, theoretically at least, every one has a share. The

golden apples come from the same tree whether they are gathered by a

locksmith's apprentice or a Schopenhauer.

The recognition of such primordial images obliges me to differentiate

between the contents of the unconscious; a differentiation of another

kind than that between the pre-conscious and unconscious, or between

the subconscious and unconscious. The justification for those

distinctions cannot be discussed here; they have a value of their own

and probably merit to be carried further as affording a point of view.

The differentiation which I propose follows obviously from what has

previously been said, namely, that in the so-called unconscious we must

differentiate a layer which may be termed the _personal unconscious_.

The materials contained in this layer are of a personal kind, inasmuch

as on the one hand they may be characterised as acquisitions of the

individual existence, and on the other as psychological factors which

might just as well be conscious. It is, for instance, comprehensible

that incompatible psychological elements succumb to repression on

the one hand and are therefore unconscious, but on the other hand

there exists the possibility of bringing the repressed contents

into consciousness and keeping them there, once they are known and

recognised. We recognise these materials as personal contents, because

we can prove their effects, their partial appearance, or their origin

to lie in our personal past. They are integral constituents of the

personality, and belong to a complete inventory of the same. They are

constituents whose omission in consciousness implies an inferiority

in one respect or another, not indeed an inferiority bearing the

psychological character of an organic deformity or a natural defect,

but rather the character of a neglect which arouses a moral reaction.

The feeling of moral inferiority always indicates that in the portion

omitted is something that according to the feelings should not be

missing; or in other words, could be conscious if we took sufficient

trouble about it. The sense of moral inferiority is not the result

of a collision with the universal, in a certain sense arbitrary,

moral law, but rather the result of a conflict with the personal ego,

which by reason of the psychic economy demands an adjustment of the

deficiency. Wherever a feeling of inferiority appears, it reveals not

only the presence of a demand for the assimilation of an unconscious

constituent, but also the possibility of such an assimilation. It is,

after all, a person's moral qualities that make him assimilate his

unconscious self and retain it in consciousness, whether he be forced to

it by a recognition of its necessity, or by a painful neurosis. He who

continues to tread this path of the realisation of his unconscious self,

necessarily transposes the content of the personal unconscious into

consciousness, whereby the periphery of the personality is considerably

enlarged.

II--THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSIMILATION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

This process of assimilating the unconscious leads to remarkable

results. Some people build up from it an unmistakable, even unpleasantly

increased self-consciousness or self-confidence; they "know everything,"

and are completely aware of everything so far as their unconscious is

concerned. They think themselves accurately informed about everything

that comes up from the unconscious. Others are increasingly oppressed

by the contents of the unconscious, they lose their self-reliance or

their self-consciousness more and more, and come near to a state of

depressed resignation in regard to all the extraordinary things the

unconscious produces. The former undertake in the exuberance of their

self-confidence, a responsibility for their unconscious that goes much

too far, beyond every reasonable possibility; the latter ultimately

decline to accept any responsibility in the depressing recognition of

the powerlessness of the ego confronted by relentless Destiny, working

through the unconscious.

If we give the two types close analytical consideration, we shall

discover that behind the optimistic self-confidence of the former

there is hidden a just as deep, or rather a far deeper, helplessness;

a helplessness to which the conscious optimism acts as an unsuccessful

effort at compensation. Behind the pessimistic resignation of the

latter there is hidden a defiant desire for power, far exceeding in

self-confidence the conscious optimism of the former type.

This condition of the personality may well be expressed by the idea

of "God-Almightiness" (Gottähnlichkeit),[250] to which _Adler_ has

particularly drawn our attention.

When the devil wrote the serpent's words in the student's album, _Eritis

sicut Deus scientes bonum et malum_, he added:

"Follow the ancient text and the snake thou wast ordered to trample!

With all thy likeness to God, thou'lt yet be a sorry example."

The idea of "likeness to God," or "God-Almightiness," is not a

scientific one, although it characterises the psychological state of

affairs most exactly. Still we must examine whence this attitude comes,

and ask why it merits the name of "God-Almightiness." As the expression

denotes, the patient's abnormal condition is constituted by the fact

that he ascribes to himself qualities or values which obviously do not

belong to him, for "God-Almightiness" means being like the spirit which

is set above the human spirit.

If for psychological purposes we abstract from the hypostasis of

the God-idea, we find that this expression does not only include

every dynamic fact discussed in my book on "The Psychology of the

Unconscious,"[251] but also a certain mental function having a

collective character, which is of another order from that of the

individual character of the mind. In the same way as the individual is

not only an isolated and separate, but also a social being, so also the

human mind is not only something isolated and absolutely individual,

but also a collective function. And just as certain social functions or

impulses are, so to speak, opposed to the ego-centric interests of the

individual, so also the human mind has certain functions or tendencies

which, on account of their collective nature, are to some extent opposed

to the personal mental functions. This is due to the fact that every

human being is born with a highly differentiated brain, which gives him

the possibility of attaining a rich mental function that he has neither

acquired ontogenetically nor developed. In proportion as human brains

are similarly differentiated, the corresponding mental functions are

collective and universal. This circumstance explains the fact that the

unconscious of far-separated peoples and races possesses a remarkable

number of points of agreement. One example among many others which

has been demonstrated is the extraordinary unanimity shown by the

autochthonous forms and themes of myths.

The universal similarity of brains results in a universal possibility of

a similar mental function. This function is the collective psyche, which

is divided into _collective mind_ and _collective soul_.[252] In so far

as there exist differentiations corresponding to race, descent, or even

family, so, beyond the level of the "universal" collective psyche, we

find a collective psyche limited by race, descent, and family. To quote

_P. Janet_, the collective psyche contains the "parties inférieures"

of the mental function, that is, the part of the mental function

which, being fixed and automatic in its action, inherited and present

everywhere, is therefore super-personal or impersonal. The conscious

and the personal unconscious contain as personal differentiations the

"parties supérieures" of the mental function, therefore the part that

has been acquired and developed ontogenetically.

An individual therefore who joins the _a priori_ and unconsciously-given

collective psyche on to his ontogenetically acquired assets, enlarges

thereby the periphery of his personality in an unjustifiable way, with

the corresponding consequences. Inasmuch as the collective psyche

is the "partie inférieure" of the mental function, and therefore is

the fundamental structure underlying every personality, it weighs

heavily upon and depreciates the personality; a fact that is expressed

in the afore-mentioned stifling of self-confidence, and in the

unconscious increase of the ego-emphasis up to the point of a morbid

will to power. Inasmuch as the collective psyche ranks even above the

personality, because it is the mother foundation upon which all personal

differentiations are based, and because it is the common mental function

of the sum total of the individual, therefore its incorporation in the

personality may evoke inflation of self-confidence, an inflation which

is then compensated by an extraordinary sense of inferiority in the

unconscious.

_A dissolution of the pairs of opposites in the personality sets

in_ if, through the assimilation of the unconscious, the collective

psyche be included in the inventory of the personal mental functions.

Alongside the pairs of opposites already alluded to that are so

particularly evident in the neurotic, viz. megalomania and sense of

inferiority, there are also many other pairs, of which I will only

mention the specifically moral pair, that is, good and evil (_scientes

bonum et malum_). They accompany the increase or depreciation of

self-confidence. The specific virtues and vices of humanity are

contained in the collective psyche, just as everything else is. One

man ascribes all the collective virtue to himself as his own personal

merit; another accounts as personal guilt what is but collective

vice. Both are just as illusionary as the sense of greatness and of

inferiority, for imaginary virtues as well as imaginary vices are only

the pairs of moral opposites contained in the collective psyche, which

have become perceptible or have artificially been made conscious. How

far the collective psyche contains these pairs of opposites is shown

by primitive peoples, whose great virtue is praised by one observer;

whereas another observer of the same race reports only the worst

impressions. Both views are true of primitive man, whose personal

differentiation is only beginning; his mental function is essentially

collective. He is more or less identified with the collective psyche,

and therefore without any personal responsibility or inner conflict; his

virtues and vices are collective. Conflict only begins when a conscious

personal development of the mind has already started, whereby the reason

becomes aware of the irreconcilable nature of the pairs of opposites.

The struggle to repress is the consequence of this realisation. Man

wants to be good, therefore the bad must be repressed; this puts an end

to the paradise of the collective psyche.

The repression of the collective psyche, in so far as it was conscious,

was a necessity for the development of the personality, because

collective psychology and personal psychology are in a certain

sense irreconcilable. In the history of thought, whenever a fresh

psychological attitude acquires collective value the formation of

schisms begins. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the history

of religion. A collective point of view, although it may be necessary,

is always dangerous for the individual. It is dangerous because it

is apt to choke and smother personal differentiation. It has derived

this capacity from the collective psyche, which is itself a result of

psychological differentiation of the strong gregarious instincts of

humanity. Collective thought and feeling, and collective accomplishment,

are relatively easy in comparison with individual function and

performance; a fact that is only too prone to lead to a fining down

to the collective level, and is peculiarly disastrous to personal

development. The concomitant loss of personality is replaced--as

is always the case in psychology--by an unconscious all-compelling

binding to and identification with the collective psyche. It cannot

be denied, and should be warningly emphasized that in the analysis

of the unconscious, the collective psychology is merged into the

personal psychology, with the afore-mentioned unpleasant consequences.

These consequences are either bad for the individual's vital feeling

(Lebensgefühl), or they injure his fellow-beings if he have any power

over his environment. Being identified with the collective psyche he

will inevitably try to force the claims of his unconscious upon others,

for identification with the collective psyche is accompanied by a

feeling of universal validity ("God-Almightiness"), which disregards the

different psychology of his fellows.

The worst abuses of this kind may be removed by a clear understanding

and appreciation of the fact that there are totally different

psychological types, and that a psychology of one type cannot be forced

into the mould of another. It is indeed almost impossible for one

type to understand the other completely, and a perfect comprehension

of another's individuality is impossible. _Due regard for another's

individuality_ is not only advisable but is absolutely essential in

analysis, if the development of the other's personality is not to be

stifled. It should not be forgotten that the one type thinks that he is

leaving another person free when he grants him freedom of action, and

the other type when he grants him freedom of thought. In analysis both

must be conceded, in so far as reasons of self-preservation permit the

analyst to accord them. An excessive desire to understand or explain

things is just as useless and injurious as a lack of comprehension.

The collective natural propensities and primary forms of idea and

feeling which analysis of the unconscious has shown to be effective are

an acquisition for the conscious personality which cannot be admitted

unreservedly without prejudicial results.

In practical treatment[253] it is therefore of the utmost importance

to keep the aim of individual development constantly before us. If for

instance the collective psyche be conceived as a personal possession or

as a personal burden, an unbearable weight or strain is put upon the

personality. Hence we must make a clear distinction between the personal

and the collective psyche. In practice this distinction is not easy

because the personal grows out of the collective psyche, and is most

closely joined with it. It is therefore difficult to say which materials

are to be termed collective and which personal. There is no doubt, for

instance, that the archaic symbols so often found in phantasies and

dreams are collective factors. All primary propensities and forms of

thought and feeling are collective; so is everything about which men

are universally agreed, or which is universally understood, said or

done. Upon close consideration it is astonishing to note how much of

our so-called individual psychology is really collective; so much that

the individual element quite disappears. Individuation, however, is

an indispensable psychological requirement. The crushing predominance

of what is collective should make us realise what peculiar care and

attention must be given to the delicate plant "individuality," if it is

to develop.

Human beings have a capacity which is of the utmost use for purposes

of collectivism and most prejudicial to individuation, and that is

the capacity to _imitate_. Collective psychology cannot dispense with

imitation, without which the organization of the State and Society would

be impossible. Imitation includes the idea of suggestibility, suggestive

effect, and mental infection.

But we see daily how the mechanism of imitation is used, or rather

abused, for the purposes of personal differentiation; some prominent

personality, or peculiar trait or activity is simply imitated, which at

least brings about an external differentiation from the environment.

As a rule this delusive attempt to attain individual differentiation

by means of imitation comes to a standstill as mere affectation, the

individual remaining on the same plane as before, only a few degrees

more sterile than formerly, and under an unconscious compulsory bondage

to his environment.

In order to find out what is really individual in us, we should have to

give the matter deep thought, and we should certainly become aware how

exceedingly difficult such a discovery is.

III.--THE INDIVIDUAL AS AN EXCERPT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE.

We now come to a problem the overlooking of which would cause the

greatest confusion.

As I said before, the immediate result of the analysis of the

unconscious is that additional personal portions of the unconscious are

incorporated into the conscious. I called those parts of the unconscious

which are repressed but capable of being made conscious, _the personal

unconscious_. I showed moreover that through the annexation of the

deeper layers of the unconscious, which I called the _impersonal

unconscious_, an extension of the personality is brought about which

leads to the state of God-Almightiness ("Gottähnlichkeit"). This state

is reached by a continuation of the analytical work, by means of which

we have already re-introduced what is repressed to consciousness. By

continuing analysis further we incorporate some distinctly impersonal

universal basic qualities of humanity with the personal consciousness,

which brings about the aforesaid enlargement, and this to some extent

may be described as an unpleasant consequence of analysis.

From this standpoint, the conscious personality seems to be a more or

less arbitrary excerpt of the collective psyche. It appears to consist

of a number of universal basic human qualities of which it is _à priori_

unconscious, and further of a series of impulses and forms which might

just as well have been conscious, but were more or less arbitrarily

repressed, in order to attain that excerpt of the collective psyche,

which we call personality. The term _persona_ is really an excellent

one, for persona was originally the mask which an actor wore, that

served to indicate the character in which he appeared. For if we really

venture to undertake to decide what psychic material must be accounted

personal and what impersonal, we shall soon reach a state of great

perplexity; for, in truth, we must make the same assertion regarding the

contents of the personality as we have already made with respect to the

impersonal unconscious, that is to say that it is _collective_, whereas

we can only concede _individuality to the bounds of the persona_, that

is to the particular choice of personal elements, and that only to a

very limited extent. It is only by virtue of the fact that the persona

is a more or less accidental or arbitrary excerpt of the collective

psyche that we can lapse into the error of deeming it to be _in toto_

individual, whereas as its name denotes, it is only a mask of the

collective psyche; _a mask which simulates individuality_, making others

and oneself believe that one is individual, whilst one is only acting a

part through which the collective psyche speaks.

If we analyse the persona we remove the mask and discover that what

appeared to be individual is at bottom collective. We thus trace

"the Little God of the World" back to his origin, that is, to a

personification of the collective psyche. Finally, to our astonishment,

we realise that the persona was only the mask of the collective psyche.

Whether we follow Freud and reduce the primary impulse to sexuality,

or Adler and reduce it to the elementary desire for power, or reduce

it to the general principle of the collective psyche which contains

the principles of both Freud and Adler, we arrive at the same result;

namely, the dissolution of the personal into the collective. Therefore

in every analysis that is continued sufficiently far, the moment arrives

when the aforesaid God-Almightiness must be realised. This condition

is often ushered in by peculiar symptoms; for instance, by dreams of

flying through space like a comet, of being either the earth, the sun,

or a star, or of being either extraordinarily big or small, of having

died, etc. Physical sensations also occur, such as sensations of being

too large for one's skin, or too fat; or hypnagogic feelings of endless

sinking or rising occur, of enlargement of the body or of dizziness.

This state is characterised psychologically by an extraordinary loss of

orientation about one's personality, about what one really is, or else

the individual has a positive but mistaken idea of that which he has

just become. Intolerance, dogmatism, self-conceit, self-depreciation,

contempt and belittling of "not analysed" fellow-beings, and also of

their opinions and activities, all very frequently occur. An increased

disposition to physical disorders may also occasionally be observed,

but this occurs only if pleasure be taken therein, thus prolonging this

stage unduly.

The wealth of the possibilities of the collective psyche is both

confusing and dazzling. The dissolution of the persona results in

the release of phantasy, which apparently is nothing else but the

functioning of the collective psyche. This release brings materials into

consciousness of whose existence we had no suspicion before. A rich mine

of mythological thought and feeling is revealed. It is very hard to hold

one's own against such an overwhelming impression. That is why this

phase must be reckoned one of the real dangers of analysis, a fact that

should not be concealed.

As may easily be understood, this condition is hardly bearable, and one

would like to put an end to it as soon as possible, for the analogy with

a mental derangement is too close. The essence of the most frequent form

of derangement--dementia præcox or schizophrenia--consists, as is well

known, in the fact that the unconscious to a large extent ejects and

replaces the conscious. The unconscious is given the value of reality,

being substituted for the reality function. The unconscious thoughts

become audible as voices, or visible as visions, or perceptible as

physical hallucinations, or they become fixed ideas of a kind that

supersede reality. In a similar, although not in the same way, by the

resolution of the persona of the collective psyche, the unconscious is

drawn into the conscious. The difference between this state of mind and

that of mental derangement consists in the fact that the unconscious is

brought up by the help of the conscious analysis; at least that is the

case in the beginning of analysis, when there are still strong cultural

resistances against the unconscious to be overcome. Later on, after the

removal of the barriers erected by time and custom, the unconscious

usually proceeds, so to say, in a peremptory manner, sometimes even

discharging itself in torrents into the consciousness. In this phase

the analogy with mental derangement is very close. But it would only

be a real mental disorder should the content of the unconscious _take

the place of the conscious reality_, that is, in other words, if the

contents of the unconscious were believed absolutely and without reserve.

IV.--THE ENDEAVOURS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE.

1. _The Regressive Restoration of the Persona._

The unbearableness of thus being identified with the collective psyche

forces us to find a radical solution. There are two ways open. The first

possibility is the regressive one of trying to restore the persona to

its former condition, by endeavouring to restrain the unconscious by the

application of a reductive theory; for instance, by declaring it to be

nothing but long-repressed and overdue infantile sexuality, for which

it would really be best to substitute the normal sexual function. This

solution is based upon the unmistakable sexualistic symbolism of the

language of the unconscious, and upon the concretistic interpretation

of the same. Or an attempt may be made to apply the power theory,

by conceiving the God-Almightiness as a "virile protest," and as an

infantile striving for power and self-preservation: a theory for which

support is found in the unmistakable pretensions to power that the

unconscious material contains. A further possibility would be to declare

the unconscious to be the archaic collective psychology of primitive

man, an explanation that would not only cover the sexualistic symbolism

and the "God-Almighty" aiming for power of the unconscious content, but

would also apparently do justice to the religious, philosophical, and

mythological aspects and tendencies of the unconscious content. In every

case the conclusion arrived at is the same, viz. that the unconscious is

nothing but this or that, which has already been adequately recognised

and acknowledged as infantile, useless, meaningless, impossible, and out

of date. There is nothing to be done but to shrug one's shoulders and

resign one's self to the inevitable.

To the patient there seems to be no alternative, if one wishes to

continue to live sensibly, but to restore in so far as is possible

that extract of the collective psyche termed persona, to lay the fact

of analysis silently aside, and do one's utmost to forget that one

possesses an unconscious. We shall find support in Faust's words:--

"The sphere of earth is known enough to me;

The view beyond is barred immutably:

A fool, who there his blinking eyes directeth,

And o'er his clouds of peers a place expecteth!

Firm let him stand, and look around him well!

This world means something to the capable.

Why needs he through Eternity to wend?

He here acquires what he can apprehend.

Thus let him wander down his earthly day;

When spirits haunt go quietly his way;

In marching onward, bliss and torment find,

Though every moment, with unsated mind!"

This would be a happy solution if one really could succeed in throwing

off the unconscious to such an extent as to withdraw the libido from

it, and so render it inoperative. But experience proves that energy

cannot be withdrawn from the unconscious; it continues operative, for

the unconscious contains and is indeed itself the source of libido,

from which issue the primary psychic elements, thought-feelings, or

feeling-thoughts--undifferentiated germs of idea and sentiment. It would

therefore be a delusion to believe that by means of some, so to say,

magical theory or method, the libido could be conclusively wrested from

the unconscious, or that it could be to a certain extent disconnected.

One may yield to this illusion for a time, but some day he will be

obliged to declare with Faust:--

"Now fills the air so many a haunting shape,

That no one knows how best he may escape.

What though one day with rational brightness beams,

The night entangles us in webs of dreams.

From our young fields of life we come, elate:

There croaks a bird; what croaks he? Evil fate!

By superstition constantly ensnared,

It grows to us and warns and is declared.

Intimidated thus we stand alone.--

The portal jars, yet entrance is there none.

Is any one here?

CARE: Yes! must be my reply.

FAUST: And, thou, who art thou, then?

CARE: Well--here am I.

FAUST: Avaunt!

CARE: _I am where I should be_:

Though no ear should choose to hear me,

Yet the shrinking heart must fear me;

Though transformed to mortal eyes,

Grimmest power I exercise."

The unconscious cannot be "analysed" to a finish, and thus brought to

a standstill. No one can wrest active force from it for any length of

time. Therefore to act according to the method just described is only

to deceive one's self, and is nothing but a new edition of an ordinary

repression.

2. _The Identification with the Collective Psyche._

The second way would be that of identification with the collective

psyche. That would mean the symptom of "God-Almightiness" developed

into a system; in other words, one would be the fortunate possessor of

the absolute truth, that had yet to be discovered; of the conclusive

knowledge, which would be the people's salvation. This attitude is

not necessarily megalomania ("Grössenwahn") in a direct form, but the

well-known milder form of having a prophetic mission. Weak minds which,

as is so often the case, have correspondingly an undue share of vanity

and misplaced naïveté at their disposal, run a considerable risk of

succumbing to this temptation. The obtaining access to the collective

psyche signifies a renewal of life for the individual, whether this

renewal of life be felt as something pleasant or unpleasant. It would

seem desirable to retain a hold upon this renewal: for one person,

because it increases his feeling for life ("Lebensgefühl"); for another,

because it promises a great accretion to his knowledge. Therefore both

of them, not wishing to deprive themselves of the rich values that lie

buried in the collective psyche, will endeavour by every means possible

to retain their newly gained union with the primal cause of life.

Identification appears to be the nearest way to it, for the merging of

the persona in the collective psyche is a veritable lure to unite one's

self with this "ocean of divinity," and, oblivious of the past, to

become absorbed in it. This piece of mysticism belongs to every finer

individual, just as the "yearning for the mother"--the looking back to

the source whence one originated--is innate in every one.

As I have demonstrated explicitly before,[254] there is a special value

and a special necessity hidden in the regressive longing--which, as is

well-known, Freud conceives as "infantile fixation" or as "incest-wish."

This necessity and longing is particularly emphasized in myths, where it

is always the strongest and best of people, in other words, the hero,

who follows the regressive longing and deliberately runs into danger of

letting himself be devoured by the monster of the maternal first cause.

But he is a hero only because, instead of letting himself be finally

devoured by the monster, he conquers it, and that not only once but

several times. It is only through the conquest of the collective psyche

that its true value can be attained, whether it be under the symbol

of capture of treasure, of an invincible weapon, of a magical means

of defence, or whatever else the myth devises as the most desirable

possession. Hence whoever identifies himself with the collective psyche,

also reaches the treasure which the dragon guards, but against his will

and to his own great injury, by thus allowing himself (mythologically

speaking) to be devoured by the monster and merged with it.

Identification with the collective psyche is therefore a failure;

this way ends just as disastrously as did the first, which led to the

severance of the persona from the collective psyche.

V.--LEADING PRINCIPLES FOR THE TREATMENT OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY.

In order to solve the problem how practical treatment can overcome the

assimilation of the collective psyche, we must first of all make quite

clear to ourselves what was the error of the two ways already described.

We saw that neither the one way nor the other led to any appropriate

result. The first way simply leads the patient back to the point of

departure, having lost the vital values contained in the collective

psyche. The second way leads him straight into the collective psyche,

having lost that detached human existence which alone renders possible a

bearable and satisfying life. There are on both sides values that should

not be lost to the individual.

The mistake is, therefore, neither in the collective psyche nor in the

individual psyche, _but in allowing the one to exclude the other_.

The monistic tendency assists this propensity, for it always suspects

and looks for _one_ principle everywhere. As a general psychological

tendency, monism is a peculiarity of differentiated feeling and thought,

corresponding to the keen desire to make the one or the other function

the supreme psychological principle. The introversion type only knows

the thought principle, and the extroversion type only that of feeling.

This psychological monism--or it would be better to say monotheism--has

the advantage of simplicity, and the disadvantage of one-sidedness. On

the one hand, it signifies the exclusion of the variety and true riches

of life; whilst on the other, it means the practicability of realizing

the ideals of the present day and of the near past. But it does not in

itself signify any actual possibility of human progress.

In the same way _rationalism_ tends towards exclusiveness. Its essence

is to exclude instantly whatever is opposed to its standpoint, whether

it be intellectually logical or emotionally so. In regard to reason

it is both monistic and autocratic. Special thanks are due to Bergson

for having broken a lance for the right of the irrational to exist.

Psychology will probably be obliged to acknowledge and to submit to a

plurality of principles, in spite of the fact that this does not suit

the scientific mind. Only so can psychology be saved from ship-wreck.

But with regard to individual psychology science must waive its claims.

For to speak of a scientific individual psychology is in itself a

_contradictio in adjecto_. It is necessarily always only the collective

part of an individual psychology that can be the subject of scientific

study, for the individual is--according to definition--something unique

and incomparable. A "scientific" individual psychology is a denial

of individual psychology. It may justly be suspected that individual

psychology is indeed a projection of the psychology of him who defines

it. Every individual psychology must have its own text-book, for the

universal text-book only contains collective psychology.

These remarks are intended to prepare for what has to be said about

the treatment of the aforesaid problem. The fundamental error of both

the afore-mentioned ways is simply that the subject is collectively

identified with the one or the other part of his psychology. His

psychology is individual as well as collective, but not in such a manner

as to merge the individual with what is collective, or the collective

with what is individual. The persona must be strictly separated from the

concept of the individual, in so far as the persona can be absolutely

merged with the collective. But what is individual is just that which

can never be absorbed in the collective, and is, too, never identical

with the collective. Therefore, an identification with the collective or

an arbitrary cutting-off from the collective is equivalent to illness;

it is pathological.

As has already been indicated, what is individual appears at first as

the particular selection of those elements of the collective psyche

that contribute to the composition of the persona. As I said before,

the components are not individual but collective. It is only their

combination, or the selection as a model of particular groups that

had already been combined, which is individual. That would be the

individual nucleus which is concealed by the personal mask. By the

particular differentiation of the persona, the resistance is shown of

the individuality to the collective psyche. By analysing the persona, we

transfer a greater value to the individuality, increasing thereby its

conflict with collectivity. This conflict obviously is a psychological

conflict in the individual. The dissolution of the compromise between

the two halves of a pair of opposites increases the effectiveness of

the contrast. This conflict does not exist within the sphere of purely

unconscious natural life, although the purely physiological life of the

individual also has to comply with collective demands.

The natural unconscious attitude is harmonious; the body, with its

capacities and needs, providing immediately indications and limitations,

that prevent intemperance and lack of proportion. A differentiated

psychological function, however, always inclines towards disproportion,

on account of the one-sidedness which is cultivated by the conscious

rationality of intention. What is called mental individuality, is,

also, an expression of the individual corporeity, being, so to speak,

identical with it. This sentence might obviously also be reversed,

a fact that does not materially alter the real psychological data

concerning the intimate relation of the individuality to the body. At

the same time, the body is also that which makes the subject resemble

all others to a great extent, although it is the individual body that is

differentiated from all others.

Similarly the mental or moral individuality differs from all others,

although in every respect it is so constituted as to place one person

on an equality with all others. Every living creature that is able

freely to develop itself individually without any coercion at all, will,

through the perfecting of its individuality, soonest realize the ideal

type of its species, and therefore, figuratively speaking, will have

collective validity.

The persona is always identical with a _typical_ attitude, in which

_one_ pyschological function dominates, _e.g._ feeling, or thought, or

intuition. This one-sidedness always causes the relative repression of

the other functions. In consequence of this circumstance, the persona

is hindering to the development of the individual. The dissolution of

the persona is, therefore, an indispensable condition of individuation.

It is, therefore, to some extent impossible to achieve individuation

by means of conscious intention; for conscious intention leads to a

conscious attitude, which excludes everything that "does not suit." But

the assimilation of the unconscious contents leads, on the contrary, to

a condition in which conscious intention is excluded, being replaced by

a process of development that appears to us irrational. This process

alone signifies individuation, its _product_ being individuality as

defined above, viz. as something individual that is at the same time

universal. So long as the persona exists individuality is repressed,

betraying itself at most by the particular selection of personal

requisites, of what might be called the actor's costumes. Only when the

unconscious is assimilated does the individuality become more prominent,

and with it also that uniting psychological phenomenon between the

ego and non-ego, expressed by the word _attitude_, is now no longer a

typical attitude but an individual one.

What is paradoxical in these formulations arises from the same cause

from which the conflict about the "universalia" formerly arose. The

phrase "animal nullumque animal genus est" makes the fundamental paradox

clearly comprehensible. What exists "really" is individual: that which

is universal is existing psychologically, but being caused by the

real-existing similarities of individual things. The individual is,

therefore, the individual thing that has, to a greater or less extent,

those attributes upon which the collective conception of "collectivity"

rests; and the more individual he is, the more he develops those

attributes that are the basis of a collective concept of human nature.

If a grotesque figure, suggested by the initial situation of our problem

be permitted, it is Buridan's ass between the two bundles of hay.

His questioning is obviously wrong: the question is not whether the

hay-bundle on the right or the left be the better one, or whether he

should begin to eat on the right or the left hand, _but what he himself

would like to do, what he is eager for_--that is the point. He is

thinking of the hay and not of himself, and therefore he does not know

what he really wants.

The question is: what at this moment is the natural direction of the

growth of this individual?

Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology · 第 16 / 17 章