there are certain further facts to be considered in connection with it
which have indeed already come under our view, but which, in order to
simplify the course of our argument, have been put out of sight in the
two preceding chapters. I shall return to these facts presently; but it
will be well, before doing so, to take the conclusion as it stands in
this simple and broad form, and see, by reference to those principles
which were explained at starting, and in which all classes and parties
agree, what is the broad lesson which it forces on us, underlying all
party differences.
[Sidenote ◆1 If we sum up all that has been said thus far, it may
seem at first sight that it teaches nothing but the
negative lesson, that we should let Ability have its own
way unchecked.]
◆¹ I started with pointing out that, so far as politics are concerned,
the aim of all classes is to maintain their existing incomes; and that
the aim of the most numerous class is not only to maintain, but to
increase them. I pointed out further that the income of the individual
is necessarily limited by the amount of the income of the nation; and
that therefore the increase, or at all events the maintenance, of the
existing income of the nation is implied in all hopes of social and
economic progress, and forms the foundation on which all such hopes
are based. I then examined the causes to which the existing income of
the nation is due; and I showed that very nearly two-thirds of it is
due to the exertions of a small body of men who contribute thus to
the productive powers of the community, not primarily because they
possess Capital, but because they possess Ability, of which Capital is
merely the instrument; that it is owing to the exercise of Ability only
that this larger part of the income has gradually made its appearance
during the past hundred years; and that were the exercise of Ability
interfered with, the increment would at once dwindle, and before long
disappear.
Thus the two chief factors in the production of the national income—in
the production of that wealth which must be produced before it can
be distributed—are not Labour and Capital, which terms, as commonly
used, mean living labourers on the one hand, and dead material on the
other; but they are two distinct bodies of living men—labourers on the
one hand, and on the other men of Ability. The great practical truth,
then, which is to be drawn from the foregoing arguments is this—and it
is to be drawn from them in the interest of all classes alike—that the
action of Ability should never be checked or hampered in such a way as
to diminish its productive efficacy, either by so interfering with its
control of Capital, or by so diminishing its rewards, as to diminish
the vigour with which it exerts itself; but that, on the contrary, all
these social conditions should be jealously maintained and guarded
which tend to stimulate it most, by the nature of the rewards they
offer it, and which secure for it also the most favourable conditions
for its exercise. By such means, and by such means only, is there any
possibility of the national wealth being increased, or even preserved
from disastrous and rapid diminution.
[Sidenote ◆1 But this is very far from being the whole lesson
taught, or indeed the chief part of it.]
◆¹ This, however, is but one half of the case; and, taken by itself,
it may seem to have no connection with the problem which forms the
main subject of this volume, namely, the social hopes and interests,
not of Ability, but of Labour. For, taken by itself, the conclusion
which has just been stated may strike the reader at first sight as
amounting merely to this: that the sum total of the national income
will be largest when the most numerous minority of able men produce the
largest possible incomes,—incomes which they themselves consume; and
that, unless they are allowed to consume them, they will soon cease
to produce them. From the labourer’s point of view, such a conclusion
would indeed be a barren one. It might show him that he could not
better himself by attacking the fortunes of the minority; but it would,
on the other hand, fail to show him that he was much interested in
their maintenance, since, if Ability consumes the whole of the annual
wealth which it adds to the wealth annually produced by Labour, the
total might be diminished by the whole of the added portion, and
Labour itself be no worse off than formerly. But when I said just
now that it was to the interest of all classes alike not to diminish
the rewards which Ability may hope for by exerting itself, this was
said with a special qualification. I did not say that it was to the
interest of the labourers to allow Ability to retain the whole of what
it produced, or to abstain themselves from appropriating a certain
portion of it; but what I did say was that any portion appropriated
thus should not be so large, nor appropriated in such a way, as to make
what remains an object of less desire, or the hope of possessing it
less powerful as a stimulus to producing it. This qualification, as the
reader will see presently, gives to the conclusion in question a very
different meaning from that which at first he may very naturally have
attributed to it.
[Sidenote ◆1 The chief lesson to be learnt is that, whilst Ability
is the chief producer of wealth, Labour may appropriate
a large share of its products.]
◆¹ For the precise point to which I have been leading up, from the
opening page of the present volume to this, is that a considerable
portion of the wealth produced by Ability may be taken from it and
handed over to Labour, without the vigour of Ability being in the
least diminished by the loss; that such being the case, the one great
aim of Labour is to constantly take from Ability a certain part of its
product; and that this is the sole process by which, so far as money
is concerned, Labour has improved its position during the past hundred
years, or by which it can ever hope to improve it further in the future.
[Sidenote ◆1 The question is, How much may it appropriate without
paralysing the Ability which produces it?]
◆¹ The practical question, therefore, for the great mass of the
population resolves itself into this: What is the extent to which
Ability can be mulcted of its products, without diminishing its
efficacy as a productive agent? An able man’s hopes of securing _nine
hundred thousand pounds_ for himself would probably stimulate his
Ability as much as his hopes of securing a _million_. Indeed the fact
that, before he could secure a _million pounds_ for himself, he had to
produce a _hundred thousand_ for other people, might tend to increase
his efforts rather than to relax them. But, on the other hand, if,
before he could secure a _hundred thousand pounds_ for himself, he had
to produce a _million_ for other people, it is doubtful whether either
sum would ever be produced at all. There must therefore be, under any
given set of circumstances, some point somewhere between these two
extremes up to which Labour can appropriate the products of Ability
with permanent advantage to itself, but beyond which it cannot carry
the process, without checking the production of what it desires to
appropriate. But how are we to ascertain where that precise point is?
[Sidenote ◆1 This is a question which can be answered only by
experience; and we have the experience of a century to
guide us.]
◆¹ To this question it is altogether impossible to give any answer
based upon _à priori_ reasoning. The very idea of such a thing is
ridiculous; and to attempt it could, at the best, result in nothing
better than some piece of academic ingenuity, having no practical
meaning for man, woman, or child. But what reasoning will not do,
industrial history will. Industrial history will provide us with an
answer of the most striking kind—general, indeed, in its character;
but not, for that reason, any the less decided, or less full of
instruction. For industrial history, in a way which few people realise,
will show us how, during the past hundred years, Labour has actually
succeeded in accomplishing the feat we are considering; how, without
checking the development and the power of Ability, it has been able to
appropriate year by year a certain share of what Ability produces. When
the reader comes to consider this,—which is the great industrial object
lesson of modern times,—when he sees what the share is which Labour
has appropriated so triumphantly, he will see how the conclusions we
have here arrived at, with regard to the causes of production, afford
a foundation for the hopes and claims of Labour, as broad and solid as
that by which they support the rights of Ability.
Let us turn, then, once more to the fact which I have already so
often dwelt upon, that during the closing years of the last century
the population of Great Britain was about _ten millions_, and the
national income about a _hundred and forty million pounds_. It has been
shown that to reach and maintain that rate of production required the
exertion of an immense amount of Ability, and the use of an immense
Capital which Ability had recently created. But let me repeat what
I have said already: that we will, for the purpose of the present
argument, attribute the production of the whole to average human
Labour. It is obvious that Labour did not produce more, for no more
was produced; and it is also obvious that if, since that time, it
had never been assisted and never controlled by Ability, the same
amount of Labour would produce no more now. We are therefore, let me
repeat, plainly understating the case if we say that British Labour
by itself—in other words, Labour shut out from, and unassisted by the
industrial Ability of the past ninety years—can, at the utmost, produce
annually a _hundred and forty million pounds_ for every _ten millions_
of the population.
[Sidenote ◆1 In 1860 Labour took at least twenty-five per cent
more than it produced itself, out of the products of
Ability; and it now takes about forty-five per cent.]
And now let us turn from what Labour produces to what the labouring
classes[43] have received at different dates within the ninety or
hundred years in question. ◆¹ At the time of which we have just been
speaking, they received about half of what we assume Labour to have
produced. A labouring population of _ten million_ people received
annually about _seventy million pounds_.[44] Two generations later,
the same number of people received in return for their labour about a
_hundred and sixty million pounds_.[45] They were twenty-five per cent
richer than they possibly could have been if, in 1795, they had seized
on all the property in the kingdom and divided it amongst themselves.
In other words, Labour in 1860, instead of receiving, as it did two
generations previously, half of what we assume it to have produced,
received twenty-five per cent more than it produced. If we turn from
the year 1860 to the present time, we find that the gains of Labour
have gone on increasing; and that each _ten millions_ of the labouring
classes to-day receives in return for its labour _two hundred million
pounds_, or over forty per cent more than it produces. And all these
calculations are based, the reader must remember, on the ridiculously
exaggerated assumption which was made for the sake of argument, that
in the days of Watt and Arkwright, Capital, Genius, and Ability had no
share in production; and that all the wealth of the country, till the
beginning of the present century, was due to the spontaneous efforts of
common Labour alone.
[Sidenote ◆1 The gains of Labour are put in a yet more striking
light by comparing the present income of Labour with the
total income of the country fifty years ago.]
◆¹ And now let us look at the matter from a point of view slightly
different, and compare the receipts of Labour not with what we assume
it to have itself produced, but with the total product of the community
at a certain very recent date.
In 1843, when Queen Victoria had been six or seven years on the throne,
the gross income of the nation was in round numbers _five hundred and
fifteen million pounds_. Of this, _two hundred and thirty-five million
pounds_ went to the labouring classes, and the remainder, _two hundred
and eighty million pounds_, to the classes that paid income-tax. Only
fifty years have elapsed since that time, and, according to the best
authorities, the income of the labouring classes now is certainly not
less than _six hundred and sixty million pounds_.[46] That is to say,
it exceeds, by a _hundred and forty-five million pounds_, the entire
income of the nation fifty years ago.
An allowance, however, must be made for the increase in the number of
the labourers. That is of course obvious, and we will at once proceed
to make it. But when it is made, the case is hardly less wonderful.
The labouring classes in 1843 numbered _twenty-six millions_; at the
present time they number _thirty-three millions_.[47] That is to say,
they have increased by _seven million_ persons. Now assuming, as we
have done, that Labour by itself produces as much as _fourteen pounds_
per head of the population, this addition of _seven million_ persons
will account for an addition of _ninety-eight million pounds_ to the
_five hundred and fifteen million pounds_ which was the amount of
the national income fifty years ago. We must therefore, to make our
comparisons accurate, deduct _ninety-eight million pounds_ from the
_hundred and forty-five million pounds_ just mentioned, which will
leave us an addition of _forty-seven million pounds_. We may now say,
without any reservation, that the labouring classes of this country, in
proportion to their number, receive to-day _forty-seven million pounds_
a year more than the entire income of the country at the beginning of
the reign of Queen Victoria.
[Sidenote ◆1 Every labourer anxious for his own welfare should
reflect on these facts.]
◆¹ To any labourer anxious for his own welfare, to any voter or
politician of any kind, who realises that the welfare of the labourers
is the foundation of national stability, and who seeks to discover by
what conditions that welfare can be best secured and promoted, this
fact which I have just stated is one that cannot be considered too
closely, too seriously, or too constantly.
Let the reader reflect on what it means.
[Sidenote ◆1 They show him that the existing system has done, and
is doing for him far more than any Socialist ever
promised.]
Dreams of some possible social revolution, dreams of some division of
property by which most of the riches of the rich should be abstracted
from them and divided amongst the poor—these were not wanting fifty
years ago. ◆¹ But even the most sanguine of the dreamers hardly
ventured to hope that the then riches of the rich could be taken
away from them completely; that a sum equal to the rent of the whole
landed aristocracy, all the interest on Capital, all the profits of
our commerce and manufactures, could be added to what was then the
income of the labouring classes. No forces of revolution were thought
equal to such a change as that. But what have the facts been? What has
happened really? Within fifty years the miracle has taken place, or,
indeed, one greater than that. The same number of labourers and their
families as then formed the whole labouring population of the country
now possess among them every penny of the amount that then formed the
income of the entire nation. They have gained every penny that they
possibly could have gained if every rich man of that period—if duke,
and cotton lord, and railway king, followed by all the host of minor
plutocrats, had been forced to cast all they had into the treasury
of Labour, and give their very last farthing to swell the labourer’s
wages. The labourers have gained this; but that is not all. They have
gained an annual sum of _forty-seven million pounds_ more. And they
have done all this, not only without revolution, but without any
attack on the fundamental principles of property. On the contrary, the
circumstances which have enabled Labour to gain most from the proceeds
of Ability, have been the circumstances which have enabled Ability to
produce most itself.
[Sidenote ◆1 But before proceeding with this argument, there are
two side points to dispose of.]
◆¹ Before, however, we pursue these considerations further, it is
necessary that we should deal with two important points which have
perhaps already suggested themselves to the reader as essential to the
problem before us. They are not new points. They have been discussed in
previous chapters; but the time has now arrived to turn to them once
again.
CHAPTER II
_Of the Ownership of Capital, as distinct from its
Employment by Ability._
[Sidenote ◆1 In the foregoing argument, all mention of Land has
been omitted, for simplicity’s sake.]
[Sidenote ◆2 But rent, especially the rent of the large owners, is
so small a part of the national income that the omission
is of no practical importance.]
The first of the points I have alluded to can be disposed of very
quickly. It relates to Land. In analysing the causes to which our
national income is due, I began with showing that Land produced a
certain definite part of it. ◆¹ For the sake, however, of simplicity,
in the calculation which I went on to make, I ignored Land, and the
fact of its being a productive agent; and treated the whole income as
if produced by Labour, Capital, and Ability. I wish, therefore, now to
point out to the reader that this procedure has had little practical
effect on the calculation in question, and that any error introduced
by it can be easily rectified in a moment. ◆² The entire landed rental
of this country is, as I have already shown, not so much as one
thirteenth of the income; whilst that of the larger landed proprietors
is not so much as one thirty-ninth. Now my sole object in dealing with
the national income at all is to show how far it is susceptible of
redistribution; and it is perfectly certain that no existing political
party would attempt, or even desire, to redistribute the rents of any
class except the large proprietors only. The smaller proprietors,—_nine
hundred and fifty thousand_ in number,—who take between them two-thirds
of the rental, are in little immediate danger of having their rights
attacked. The only rental therefore—namely, that of the larger
proprietors—which can be looked on, even in theory, as the subject of
redistribution, is too insignificant, being less than _thirty million
pounds_, to appreciably affect our calculations when we are dealing
with _thirteen hundred millions_. The theory of Land as an independent
productive agent, and of rent as representing its independent product,
is essential to an understanding of the theory of production generally;
but in this country the actual product of the Land is so small, as
compared with the products of Labour, Capital, and Ability, that for
purposes like the present it is hardly worth considering. Its being
redistributed, or not redistributed, would, as we have seen already,
make to each individual but a difference of three farthings a day.
[Sidenote ◆1 Capital, as distinct from the Ability that uses it,
has been omitted also.]
[Sidenote ◆2 We must now again consider it in connection with the
classes which never themselves employ it, but live on
the interest of it.]
[Sidenote ◆3 What place do these classes hold in the productive
system?]
◆¹ The second point I alluded to must be considered at greater length.
In dealing with Capital and Ability, I first treated them separately. I
then showed that, regarded as a productive agent, Capital _is_ Ability,
and must be treated as identical with it. But it is necessary, now that
we are dealing with distribution, to disunite them for a moment, and
treat them separately once more. ◆² For even though it be admitted that
Ability, working by means of Capital, produces, as it has been shown to
do, nearly two-thirds of the national income, and though it be admitted
further that a large portion of this product should go to those able
men who are actively engaged in producing it,—the men whose Ability
animates and vivifies Capital,—it may yet be urged that a portion of it
which is very large indeed goes, as a fact, to men who do not exert
themselves at all, or who, at any rate, do not exert themselves in
the production of wealth. These men, it will be said, live not on the
products of Ability, but on the interest of Capital which they have
come accidentally to possess; ◆³ and it will be asked on what grounds
Labour is interested in forbearing to touch the possessions of those
who produce nothing? If it has added to its income, as it has done,
during the past hundred years, why should it not now add to it much
more rapidly, by appropriating what goes to this wholly non-productive
class?
To this question there are several answers. One is that a leisured
class—a class whose exertions have no commercial value, or no
value commensurate with the cost of its maintenance—is essential
to the development of culture, of knowledge, of art, and of mental
civilisation generally. But this is an answer which we need not dwell
on here; for, whatever its force, it is foreign to our present purpose.
We will confine ourselves solely to the material interests that are
involved, and consider solely how the plunder of a class living on
the interest of Capital would tend to affect the actual production of
wealth.
It would affect the production of wealth in just the same way as would
a similar treatment of that class on whose active Ability production is
directly dependent; and it would do this for the following reasons.
[Sidenote ◆1 They are the heirs of Ability, and represent, by
their possession of Capital, the main object with which
that Capital was originally created.]
[Sidenote ◆2 For Capital is created and saved in order that it may
yield interest, firstly, to the man who himself created
and saved it;]
◆¹ The greater part of the Capital that has been accumulated in the
modern world is the creation of active Ability, as I have pointed out
already. It has been saved not from the product of Labour, but from
the product which Ability has added to this. It is Ability congealed,
or Ability stored up. And the main motive that has prompted the men
of Ability to create it has not consisted only of the desire of
enjoying the income which they are enabled to produce by its means,
when actually employing it themselves, but the desire also of enjoying
some portion of the income which will be produced by its means if it
is employed by the Ability of others. ◆² In a word, the men who create
and add to our Capital are motived to do so by expectation that the
Capital shall be their own property; that it shall, when they wish
it, yield them a certain income independent of any further exertions
of their own. Were this expectation rendered impossible, were Capital
by any means prevented from yielding interest either to the persons
who made and saved it, or those to whom the makers might bequeath it,
the principal motive for making or saving it would be gone. If a man,
for instance, makes _one thousand pounds_ he can, as matters stand, do
three things with it, any one of which will gratify him. He can spend
it as income, and enjoy the whole of it in that way; he can use it
himself as Capital, and so enjoy the profits; or he can let others use
it as Capital, and so enjoy the interest. But if he were by any means
precluded from receiving interest for it, and desired for any reason
to retire from active business, he could do with his _thousand pounds_
one of two things only—he could spend it as income, in which case it
would be destroyed; or let others use it as Capital, in which case he
himself could derive no benefit whatever from it, and would, in effect,
be giving it or throwing it away. Were the first course pursued, no
Capital would be saved; were the second course obligatory, no Capital
would be created.[48]
[Sidenote ◆1 And secondly, to his family and his immediate heirs.]
[Sidenote ◆2 The bulk of the Capital owned now by those who do not
employ it themselves has come to them from their fathers
or grandfathers who created it;]
[Sidenote ◆3 As the history of the growth of Capital during the
present century shows.]
[Sidenote ◆4 A man’s desire to leave money to his family is shown
by history to be as strong a motive as the desire to
enjoy it himself.]
I have spoken thus far as though in creating Capital a man’s motive
were the hope of enjoying the interest of it himself. ◆¹ But there is
another motive almost equally powerful—in some cases more powerful—and
that is the hope of transferring or transmitting it to his family or to
his children. ◆² Now four-fifths of the Capital of the United Kingdom
has been created within the last eighty years. The total Capital in
1812 amounted to about _two thousand millions_; now it amounts to
almost _ten thousand millions_. Therefore _eight thousand millions_
of the Capital of this country has been created by the Ability of
the parents and of the grandparents of those who now possess it,
supplemented by the Ability of many who now possess it themselves. The
most rapid increase in it took place between 1840 and 1875. ◆³ If we
regard men of fifty as representing the present generation of those
actively engaged in business, we may say that their grandfathers made
_two thousand millions_ of our existing Capital, their parents _four
thousand millions_, and themselves _two thousand millions_. It will
thus be easily realised how those persons who own Capital which they
leave others to employ, and which personally they have had no hand in
making, are for the most part relatives or representatives of the very
persons who made it, and who made it actuated by the hope that their
relations or representatives should succeed to it. ◆⁴ All history shows
us that one of the most important and unalterable factors in human
action is a certain solidarity of interest between men—even selfish
men—and those nearly connected with them; and just as parents are, by
an almost universal instinct, prompted to rear their children, so are
they prompted to bequeath to them—or, at all events, to one of them—the
greater part of their possessions. We might as well try to legislate
against the instincts of maternity, as against the instinct of bequest.
Therefore, that the ownership of much of the Capital of the country
should be separated from the actual employment of it, is a necessary
result of the forces by which it was called into existence; and in
proportion as such a result was made impossible in the future, the
continued operation of these forces would be checked.
[Sidenote ◆1 Further, it is impossible to prevent interest being
both offered and taken for the use of Capital.]
◆¹ But interest depends also on a reason that is yet stronger and more
simple than these. The owner of Capital receives interest for the use
of it, because it is, in the very nature of things, impossible to
prevent its being offered him, and impossible to prevent his taking it.
If a man who possesses _one hundred thousand pounds_, by using it as
Capital makes _ten thousand pounds_ a year, and could, if he had the
use of another _one hundred thousand pounds_, add another _ten thousand
pounds_ to his income, no Government could prevent his making a bargain
with a man who happened to possess the sum required, by which the
latter, in return for lending him that sum, would obtain a part of the
income which the use of it would enable him to produce.
The most practical aspect of the matter, however, yet remains to be
considered. I have spoken of interest as of a thing with whose nature
we are all familiar. But let us pause and ask, What is it? It is merely
a part of the product which active Ability is enabled to produce by
means of its tool, Capital. It is the part given by the man who uses
the tool to the man who owns it. But the tool, or Capital, is, as we
have seen already, itself the product of the Ability of some man in the
past; so that the payment of interest, whether theoretically just or
no, is a question which concerns theoretically two parties only: the
possessor of living Ability, and the possessor of the results of past
Ability. Thus, whatever view we may happen to take about it, Labour,
in so far as theoretical justice goes, has no concern in the matter,
one way or the other. For if interest is robbery, it is Ability that is
robbed, not Labour.
[Sidenote ◆1 And whether interest be just or no, it at all events
represents no injustice to Labour.]
[Sidenote ◆2 For it will modify, though not extinguish, their
desire to appropriate a part of what is paid as
interest.]
◆¹ It is important to take notice of this truth; for a knowledge of
what is theoretically just, though it can never control classes so
far as to prevent their seizing on whatever they can obtain and keep,
exercises none the less a very strong influence on their views as to
how much of the wealth of other classes is obtainable, and also on
the temper in which, and the entire procedure by which, they will
endeavour to obtain it. ◆² For this reason it is impossible to insist
too strongly on the fact that, as a matter of theoretical justice,
Labour, as such, has no claim whatever on any of the interest paid
for the use of Capital; and that if it succeeds in obtaining any part
of this interest, it will be obtaining what has been made by others,
not what has been made by itself. It is not that such arguments as
these will extinguish the desire of Labour to increase its own wages
at the expense of interest, if possible; for might—the might that can
sustain itself, not the brute force of the moment—will always form in
the long run the practical rule of right; but they will disseminate a
dispassionate view of what the limits of possibility are, and on what
these limits depend.
[Sidenote ◆1 History shows us that they have been doing this
already,]
◆¹ And now let us turn to the facts of industrial history, and see
what light they throw on what has just been said. I have pointed out
that if Capital is to be made or used at all, it must necessarily,
for many reasons, be allowed to yield interest to its owners; but the
amount of interest it yields has varied at various times; and, although
to abolish it altogether would be impossible, or, if possible, fatal
to production, it is capable, under certain circumstances, of being
reduced to a minimum, without production being in any degree checked;
and every _pound_ which the man who employs Capital is thus relieved
from paying to the man who owns it constitutes, other things being
equal, a fund which may be appropriated by Labour. To say this is to
make no barren theoretical statement. The fund in question not only
may, under certain circumstances, be appropriated by Labour; but these
circumstances are the natural result of our existing industrial system;
and the fund, as I will now show, has been appropriated by Labour
already, and forms a considerable part of that additional income which
Labour, as we have seen, has secured from the income created by Ability.
[Sidenote ◆1 to an increasing extent.]
[Sidenote ◆2 Interest now forms but a small part of the income of
the nation,]
◆¹ In days preceding the rise of the modern industrial system, the
average rate of interest was as high as ten per cent. As the modern
system developed itself, as Ability more and more was diverted from
war, and concentrated on commerce and industry, and produced by the use
of Capital a larger and more certain product, ◆² the price it paid for
the use of Capital fell, till by the middle of this century it was not
more than five per cent. During the past forty years it has continued
to sink still further, and can hardly be said now to average much more
than three.
[Sidenote ◆1 In spite of appearances to the contrary;]
◆¹ This fact is sufficiently well known to investors; but there are
other facts known equally well which tend to confuse popular thought
on the subject, and which accordingly, in a practical work like this,
it is very necessary to place in their true light. For, in spite of
what has been said of the fall in the rate of interest from ten to six,
and to five, and from five to three per cent, it is notorious that
companies, when successful, often pay to-day dividends of from ten to
twenty per cent, or even more; and founders’ shares in companies are
constantly much sought after, which are merely shares in such profits
as result over and above a return of at least ten per cent on the
capital.
[Sidenote ◆1 As much of what is vulgarly considered interest is
something quite different.]
But the explanation of this apparent contradiction is simple. Large
profits must not be confounded with high interest. ◆¹ Large profits are
a mixture of three things, as was pointed out by Mill, though he did
not name two of them happily. He said that profits consisted of wages
of superintendence, compensation for risk, and interest on Capital. If,
instead of wages of superintendence, we say the product of Ability, and
instead of compensation for risk, we say the reward of sagacity, which
is itself a form of Ability, we shall have an accurate statement of the
case. A large amount of the Capital in the kingdom is managed by the
men who own it; and when they manage it successfully, the returns are
large. Sometimes a man with a Capital of _a hundred thousand pounds_
will make as much as _fifteen thousand pounds_ a year; but that does
not mean that his Capital yields fifteen per cent of interest. Let such
a man be left another _hundred thousand pounds_, which he determines
not to put into his own business, but invests in some security held to
be absolutely safe, and he will find that interest on Capital means not
more than three and a half per cent. If he is determined to get a large
return on his Capital, and if he does this by investing it in some
new and speculative enterprise, this result, unless it be the mere
good luck of a gambler, is mainly the result of his own knowledge and
judgment, as the following facts clearly enough show.
Between the years 1862 and 1885 there were registered in the United
Kingdom about _twenty-five thousand_ joint stock companies, with an
aggregate Capital of about _two thousand nine hundred million pounds_.
Of these companies, by the year 1885, more than _fifteen thousand_
had failed, and less than _ten thousand_ were still existing. During
the following four years the proportion of failures was smaller; but
a return published in 1889 shows that of all the companies formed
during the past twenty-seven years, considerably more than half had
been wound up judicially. Therefore a man who secures a large return
on money invested in a business not under his own control, does so by
an exercise of sagacity not only beneficial to himself, but in a still
higher degree beneficial to the country generally; for he has helped
to direct human exertion into a profitable and useful channel, whereas
those who are less sagacious do but help it to waste itself.[49]
Of large returns on Capital, then, only a part is interest; the larger
part being merely another name for what we have shown to be the actual
creation of Ability—either the Ability with which the Capital has
been employed in directing Labour, or the Ability with which some new
method of directing Labour has been selected. There is accordingly no
contradiction in the two statements that Capital may often bring more
than fifteen per cent to the original investors; and yet that interest
on Capital in the present day is not more than three or three and a
half per cent. Here is the explanation of shares rising in value. A man
who at the starting of a business takes _a hundred one pound shares_
in it, and, when it is well established, gets _twenty pounds_ a year
as a dividend, will be able to sell his shares for something like _six
hundred pounds_; which means that little more than three per cent is
the interest which will be received by the purchaser.
[Sidenote ◆1 Interest, then, has decreased, and the whole sum thus
saved has gone to the labouring classes.]
◆¹ Interest, then, or the sum which those who use Capital pay to
those who own it, having decreased, as we have seen it has done, with
the development of our industrial system, it remains to show the
reader where the sum thus saved has gone. It must have gone to one
or other of two classes of people: to the men of Ability, or to the
labourers. If it had gone to the former,—that is, to the employers of
Labour,—their gains now would be greater, in proportion to the Capital
employed by them, than they were fifty years ago; but if their gains
have not become greater, then the sum in question must obviously have
found its way to the labourers. And that such is the case will be made
sufficiently evident by the fact that Mr. Giffen has demonstrated in
the most conclusive way that, if rent and the interest taken by the
classes that pay income-tax had increased as fast as the sum actually
taken by Labour, the sum assessed to income-tax would be _four hundred
million pounds_ greater than it is, and the sum taken by Labour _four
hundred million pounds_ less.[50] In this case the wealthier classes
would be now taking _one thousand and sixty million pounds_, instead
of the _six hundred million pounds_ which they actually do take;[51]
and the labouring classes, instead of taking, as they do, _six hundred
and sixty million pounds_, or, as Mr. Giffen maintains, more, would be
taking only _two hundred and sixty million pounds_.[52] In fact, as Mr.
Giffen declares, “It would not be far short of the mark to say that the
whole of the great improvement of the last fifty years has gone to the
masses.” And the accuracy of this statement is demonstrated in a very
striking way by the fact that had the whole improvement, according to
the contrary hypothesis, gone not to the labourers, but to the classes
that pay income-tax, the remainder, namely, _two hundred and sixty
million pounds_, would correspond, almost exactly, allowing for the
increase of their numbers, with what the labouring classes received at
the close of the last century.
[Sidenote ◆1 What the social reformer should study is not the
dreams of Socialists, but the forces actually at work,
through which Labour has already gained, and is gaining
so much.]
◆¹ What, then, the social reformer, what the labourer, and the friend
of Labour, ought to study with a view to improving the condition of
the labouring classes, is not the theories and dreams of those who
imagine that the improvement is to be made only by some reorganisation
of society, but the progress, and the causes of the progress, that
these classes have actually been making, not only under existing
institutions, but through them, because of them, by means of them.
CHAPTER III
_Of the Causes owing to which, and the Means by
which Labour participates in the growing
Products of Ability._
Let me repeat in other words what I have just said. The labouring
classes, under the existing condition of things, have acquired more
wealth in a given time than the most sanguine Socialist of fifty
years ago could have promised them; and this increased wealth has
found its way into their pockets owing to causes that are in actual
operation round us. These causes, therefore, should be studied for two
reasons: firstly, in order that we may avoid hindering their operation;
secondly, in order that we may, if possible, accelerate it; and I shall
presently point out, as briefly, but as clearly as I can, what the
general character of these causes is.
[Sidenote ◆1 It is true that there are notorious facts that may
make the superficial or excitable observer doubt the
reality of this great progress of the labouring classes.]
◆¹ But before doing this,—before considering the cause of this
progress,—I must for a moment longer dwell and insist upon the reality
of it; because unhappily there are certain notorious facts which
constantly obtrude themselves on the observation of everybody, and
which tend to make many people deny, or at least doubt it. These facts
are as follows.
[Sidenote ◆1 But when these facts—viz. facts relating to the very
poor—are reduced to their true proportions,]
Speaking in round numbers, there exists in this country to-day a
population consisting of about _seven hundred thousand_ families,
or _three million_ persons, whose means of subsistence are either
insufficient, or barely sufficient, or precarious, and the conditions
of whose life generally are either hard or degrading, or both. A
considerable portion of them may, without any sentimental exaggeration,
be called miserable; and all of them may be called more or less
unfortunate. There is, further, this observation to be made. People who
are in want of the bare necessaries of life can hardly be worse off
absolutely at one period than another; but if, whilst their own poverty
remains the same, the riches of other classes increase, they do, in
a certain sense, become worse off relatively. The common statement,
therefore, that the poor are getting constantly poorer is, in this
relative sense, true of a certain part of the population; and that
part is now nearly equal in numbers to the entire population of the
country at the time of the Norman Conquest. Such being the case, it is
of course obvious that persons who, for purposes of either benevolence
or agitation, are concerned to discover want, misfortune, and misery,
find it easier to do so now than at any former period. London alone
possesses an unfortunate class which is probably as large as the whole
population of Glasgow; and an endless procession of rags and tatters
might be marched into Hyde Park to demonstrate every Sunday. But if
the unfortunate class in London is as large as the whole population of
Glasgow, we must not forget that the population of London is greater
by nearly a _million_ than the population of all Scotland; ◆¹ and the
truth is that, although the unfortunate class has, with the increase
of population, increased in numbers absolutely, yet relatively, for
at least two centuries, it has continued steadily to decrease. In
illustration of this fact, it may be mentioned that, whereas in 1850
there were _nine_ paupers to every _two hundred_ inhabitants, in 1882
there were only _five_; whilst, to turn for a moment to a remoter
period, so as to compare the new industrial system with the old, in
the year 1615, a survey of Sheffield, already a manufacturing centre,
showed that the “begging poor,” who “could not live without the charity
of their neighbours,” actually amounted to one-third of the population,
or _seven hundred and twenty-five_ households out of _two thousand two
hundred and seven_. Further, although, as I observed just now, it is
in a certain sense true to say that, relatively to other classes, the
unfortunate class has been getting poorer, the real tendency of events
is expressed in a much truer way by saying that all other classes have
been getting more and more removed from poverty.
[Sidenote ◆1 We shall find that they have no such significance,
nor disprove in any way the extraordinary progress of
the vast majority.]
[Sidenote ◆2 What then are the causes of this progress?]
◆¹ What the presence, then, and the persistence of this class really
shows us is not that the progress of the labouring classes as a whole
has been less rapid and less remarkable than it has just been said to
be, but that a certain fraction of the population, for some reason or
other, has always remained hitherto outside this general progress; and
the one practical lesson which its existence ought to force on us is
not to doubt the main movement, still less to interfere with it, but to
find some means of drawing these outsiders into it. ◆² This great and
grave problem, however, requires to be treated by itself, and does not
come within the scope of the present volume. Our business is not with
the causes which have shut out one-tenth of the poorer classes from the
growing national wealth, but with those which have so signally operated
in making nine-tenths of them sharers in it.
[Sidenote ◆1 They are of two kinds: spontaneous tendencies, and
the deliberate and concerted actions of men.]
We will accordingly return to these, and consider what they are. ◆¹ We
shall find them to be of two kinds: firstly, those which consist of
the natural actions of men, each pursuing his own individual interest;
and secondly, their concerted actions, which represent some general
principle, and are deliberately undertaken for the advantage not of an
individual but of a class. We will begin with considering the former;
as not only are they the most important, but they also altogether
determine and condition the latter, and the latter, indeed, can do
little more than assist them.
[Sidenote ◆1 We will begin with the spontaneous tendencies—_i.e._
the natural actions of individuals, each pursuing his
own interest.]
[Sidenote ◆2 There are two ways of getting rich: (1) by
abstracting from an existing income, or (2) by adding to
it. The rich class of the modern world have, as a whole,
become rich in the second way.]
◆¹ The natural causes that tend to distribute amongst Labour a large
portion of the wealth produced by Ability will be best understood if we
first consider for a moment the two ways—and the two only ways—in which
a minority can become wealthy. ◆² What these are can be easily realised
thus. Let us imagine a community of eight labouring men, who make each
of them _fifty pounds_ a year, and who represent Labour; and let us
imagine a ninth man,—a man of Ability,—who represents the minority. The
ninth man might, if he were strong enough, rob each of the eight men
of _twenty-five pounds_, compelling them each to live on _twenty-five
pounds_ instead of on _fifty pounds_, and appropriate to himself an
annual _two hundred pounds_. Or he might reach the same result in a
totally different way. He might so direct and assist the Labour of
the eight men, that without any extra effort to themselves they each,
instead of _fifty pounds_ produced _seventy-five pounds_, and if,
under these circumstances, he took _twenty-five pounds_ from each, he
would gain the same sum as before, namely _two hundred pounds_, but,
as I said, in a totally different way. It would represent what he had
added to the original product of the labourers, instead of representing
anything he had taken from it. Now whatever may have been true of rich
classes in former times and under other social conditions, the riches
now enjoyed by the rich class in this country have, with exceptions
which are utterly unimportant, been acquired by the latter of these two
methods, not by the former. They represent an addition to the product
of Labour, not an abstraction from it. This is, of course, clear from
what has been said already; but it is necessary here to specially bear
it in mind.
[Sidenote ◆1 Let us consider the nature of the process,]
[Sidenote ◆2 By first representing Labour and Ability in their
simplest imaginable forms; Ability, or the employing
class, being represented as one man.]
◆¹ Let us then take a community of eight labourers, each producing
commodities worth _fifty pounds_ a year, and each consuming—as he
easily might—the whole of them. These men represent the productive
power of Labour; ◆² and now let us suppose the advent of Ability in
the person of the ninth man, by whose assistance this productive power
is multiplied, and consider more particularly what the ninth man does.
There is one thing which it is quite plain he does not do. He does
not multiply the power of Labour for the sake of merely increasing
the output of those actual products which he finds the labourers
originally producing and consuming, and of appropriating the added
quantity; for the things he would thus acquire would be of no possible
good to him. He would have more boots and trousers than he could wear,
more bread and cheese than he could eat, and spades and implements
which he did not want to use. He would not want them himself, and
the labourers are already supplied with them. They would be no good
to anybody. He does not therefore employ his Ability thus, so as to
increase the output of the products that have been produced hitherto;
but he enables first, we will say, four men, then three, then two, and
lastly one, to produce the same products that were originally produced
by eight; and he thus liberates a continually increasing number, whom
he sets to produce products of new and quite different kinds.
Let us see how he does this. The eight labourers, when he finds
them, make each _fifty pounds_ a year, or _four hundred pounds_ in
the aggregate; and this represents the normal necessaries of their
existence. He, by the assistance which his Ability renders Labour,
enables at last, after many stages of progress, these same necessaries
to be produced by one single man, who, instead of producing, as
formerly, goods worth _fifty pounds_, finds himself, with the
assistance of Ability, producing goods worth _four hundred pounds_.
There is thus an increase of _three hundred and fifty pounds_, and this
increment the man of Ability takes.
Meanwhile, seven men are left idle, and with them the man of Ability
makes the following bargain. Out of the _three hundred and fifty
pounds_ worth of necessaries which he possesses, he offers each of
them _fifty pounds_ worth—the amount which originally they each made
for themselves, on condition that they will make other things for him,
or put their time at his disposal. They accordingly make luxuries for
him, or become his personal servants. For the _three hundred and fifty
pounds_ he pays them in the shape of necessaries, they return him
another _three hundred and fifty pounds_ in the shape of commodities or
of service; and this new wealth constitutes the able man’s income.
[Sidenote ◆1 In this case, there being no competition of
employers, there would be no natural distribution of the
increasing products amongst the labourers.]
Such, reduced to its simplest elements, is the process on which the
riches of the rich in the modern world depend. ◆¹ It will be seen,
however, that in the case we have just supposed, the labourers, by the
process in question, gain absolutely nothing. Each of them originally
made _fifty pounds_ a year. He now receives the same sum in wages. But
the total product has increased by _three hundred and fifty pounds_,
and of this the labourers acquire no share whatever. Nor, supposing
them to be inexperienced in the art of combination, is there any means
by which they could ever do so. And if our imaginary community were a
complete representation of reality, the same would be the case with the
labourers in real life.
[Sidenote ◆1 But let us introduce a second man of Ability
competing with the first, and the process of
distribution of the increased product amongst the
labourers begins at once.]
◆¹ But it must now be pointed out that in one important respect, as a
representation of reality, our community is incomplete. It represents
the main process by which the riches of the rich are produced; but it
offers no parallel to one factor in the real situation, owing to which
the labourers inevitably acquire a share in them. In that community the
rich classes are represented by a single person, who has no conflicting
interests analogous to his own to contend against. But in actual
life, so far as this point is concerned, the condition of the rich is
different altogether. As looked at from without, they are, indeed, a
single body, which may with accuracy be represented as one man; but
as looked at from within, they are a multitude of different bodies,
whose interests, within certain limits, are diametrically opposed to
each other. In order, therefore, to make our illustration complete,
instead of one man of Ability we must imagine two. The first, whose
fortunes we have just followed, and whom, for the sake of distinctness,
we will christen John, has already brought production to the state
that has been just described. He has managed to get seven men out of
eight to produce luxuries for himself,—luxuries, we will say, such
as wine, cigars, and butter,—paying these seven men with the surplus
necessaries which, with his assistance, are produced by the eighth man.
But of these luxuries the seven men keep none; nor can they give any
of them to the eighth man, their fellow. John takes all. But now let
us suppose that a second man of Ability, whom we will christen James,
appears upon the scene, just as anxious as John to direct Labour by
his Ability, and just as capable of making Labour productive. But all
the labourers are at present in the pay of John. James therefore must
set himself to detach them from John’s service; and he accordingly
engages that if they will work for him they shall not only each receive
the necessaries that John gives them, but a share of the other things
that they produce—of the butter, of the cigars, and of the wine—as
well. The moment this occurs, John has to make a similar offer; and
thus the wages of Labour at once begin to rise. When they have been
forced up to a certain point, James and John cease to bid against one
another, and each employs a certain number of labourers, till one or
other of them makes some new discovery which enables the same amount
of some commodity—we will say cigars—as has hitherto been produced by
two men, to be produced by one; and thus a new labourer is set free,
and is available for some new employment. We must assume that James and
John could both employ this man profitably—that is, that they could
set him to produce some new object of desire—let us say strawberries;
and, this being so, there is again a competition for his labour. He
is offered by both employers as much as he has received hitherto, and
as the other labourers receive; and he is offered besides a certain
number of strawberries. Whichever employer ultimately secures his
services, the man has secured some further addition to his income. He
has some share in the increasing wealth of the community; and, as John
and James continue to compete in increasing the production of all other
commodities, some share of each increase will in time go to all the
labourers.
[Sidenote ◆1 And nothing can stop this process except an increase
of population _in excess of the increase_ in the
productive powers of Ability.]
◆¹ One thing only could interfere with this process; and that has
been excluded from our supposed community: namely, an increase in its
numbers. And a mere increase in the numbers would in itself not be
enough. It must be an increase which outstrips the discovery of new
ways in which labour may be employed profitably. Let us suppose that
to our original eight labourers, eight new labourers are added, who
if left to themselves could do just what the first eight could do,
namely, produce annual subsistence for themselves to the value of
_fifty pounds_ each. If, under the management of James or John, the
productivity of these men could be multiplied eight-fold, as was the
case with the first eight, James and John would be soon competing for
their services, and the second eight, like the first eight, would share
in the increased product. But if, owing to all the best land being
occupied, and few improvements having been discovered in the methods of
any new industries, the productivity of the new men could be increased
not eight-fold, but only by one-eighth—that is to say, if what each man
produces by his unaided Labour could be raised by Ability from _fifty
pounds_, not to _four hundred pounds_, but to no more than _fifty-six
pounds ten shillings_,—_fifty-six pounds ten shillings_ would be the
utmost these men would get, even if the Ability of James or John got
no remuneration whatever. Meanwhile, however, the first set of workmen
are, as we have seen, receiving much more than this. They are receiving
each, we will say, _one hundred pounds_. The second set, therefore,
naturally envy them their situations, and endeavour to secure these
for themselves by offering their Labour at a considerably lower price.
They offer it at _ninety pounds_, at _seventy pounds_, or even at
_sixty pounds_; for they would be bettering their present situation by
accepting even this last sum. This being the case, the original eight
labourers have necessarily to offer their Labour at reduced terms also;
and thus the wages of Labour are diminished all round.
Such is the inevitable result under such circumstances, if each
man—employer and employed alike—follows his own interest at the bidding
of common sense. One man is not more selfish than another; indeed, in
a bad sense, nobody is selfish at all; and for the result nobody is
to blame. The average wages of Labour are diminished for this simple
reason, and for no other—that the average product is diminished which
each labourer assists in producing. The community is richer absolutely;
but it is poorer in proportion to its numbers.[53] Let us see how
this works out. The original product of the first eight labourers was
_fifty pounds_ a head, or _four hundred pounds_ in the aggregate. This
was raised by the co-operation of Ability to _four hundred pounds_ a
head, or _three thousand two hundred pounds_ in the aggregate. But the
second set of labourers, whatever Ability may do for them, cannot be
made to produce more than _fifty-six pounds ten shillings_ a head, or
an aggregate of _four hundred and fifty-two pounds_; and thus, whereas
eight labourers produced _three thousand two hundred pounds_, sixteen
labourers produce only _three thousand six hundred and fifty-two
pounds_, and the average product is lowered from _four hundred pounds_
to _two hundred and twenty-eight pounds_.[54]
[Sidenote ◆1 This natural power, however, can be regulated by
deliberate action, political and other, and made more
beneficial to the labourers;]
[Sidenote ◆2 Which action takes two chief forms—legislation, and
combinations amongst the labourers. We will discuss both
in the next chapter.]
Wages naturally decline then, owing to an increase of population, when
relatively to the population wealth declines also; but only then. ◆¹ On
the other hand,—and this is the important point to consider,—so long as
a country, under the existing system of production, continues, like our
own, to grow richer in proportion to the number of labourers, of every
fresh increase in riches the labourers will obtain a share, without any
political action or corporate struggle on their part, merely by means
of a natural and spontaneous process. And we have now seen in a broad
and general way what the character of this process is. It may seem,
however, to many people that a study of it and of its results can teach
no lesson but the lesson of _laisser faire_, which practically means
that the labourers have no interest in politics at all, and that all
social legislation and corporate action of their own is no better than
a waste of trouble, and is very possibly worse. But to think this is
to completely misconceive the matter. Even a study of this process of
natural distribution by itself would be fruitful of suggestions of a
highly practical kind; but if we would understand the actual forces
to which distribution is due, it must, as I have said already, not
be studied by itself, but taken in connection with others by which
its operation has been accelerated. I spoke of these as consisting of
deliberate and concerted actions in contradistinction to individual
and spontaneous actions; ◆² and these, speaking broadly, have been of
two kinds—the one represented by the organisation of Labour in Trade
Unions, the other by certain legislative measures, which, in a vague
and misleading way, are popularly described as “Socialistic.” Let us
proceed to consider these.
CHAPTER IV
_Of Socialism and Trade Unionism—the Extent and
Limitation of their Power in increasing the
Income of Labour._
[Sidenote ◆1 Legislation of the kind just alluded to is commonly
called Socialistic:]
[Sidenote ◆2 But this way of describing it is inaccurate;]
◆¹ I will speak first of the kind of legislation, popularly called
Socialistic, which certain people now regard with so much hope, and
others with corresponding dread; and I shall show that both of these
extreme views rest on a complete misconception of what this so-called
Socialism is. For what is popularly called Socialism in this country,
so far as it has ever been advocated by any political party, or has
been embodied in any measure passed or even proposed in Parliament, ◆²
does not embody what is really the distinctive principle of Socialism.
Socialism, regarded as a reasoned body of doctrine, rests altogether
on a peculiar theory of production, to which already I have made
frequent reference—a theory according to which the faculties of men
are so equal that one man produces as much wealth as another; or, if
any man produces more, he is so entirely indifferent as to whether
he enjoys what he produces or no, that he would go on producing it
just the same, if he knew that the larger part would at once be taken
away from him. Hence Socialists argue that the existing rewards of
Ability are altogether superfluous, and that the existing system of
production, which rests on their supposed necessity, can be completely
revolutionised and made equally efficacious without them.
[Sidenote ◆1 As all the so-called Socialistic legislation in this
country rests on the very system of production which
professed Socialists aim at destroying.]
But whatever may be the opinions of a few dreamers or theorists, or
however in the future these opinions may spread, the fundamental
principle of Socialism, up to the present time, has never been embodied
in any measure or proposal which has been advocated in this country by
any practical party. ◆¹ On the contrary, the proposals and measures
which are most frequently denounced as Socialistic—even one so extreme
as that of free meals for children at Board Schools—all presuppose
the system of production which is existing, and thus rest on the
very foundation which professed Socialists would destroy.[55] They
merely represent so many ways—wise or unwise—of distributing a public
revenue, which consists almost entirely of taxes on an income produced
by the forces of Individualism.
Now, so far as the matter is a mere question of words, we may call such
proposals or measures Socialistic if we like. On grounds of etymology
we should be perfectly right in doing so; but we shall see that in
that case, with exactly the same propriety, we may apply the word to
the institution of Government itself. The Army, the Navy, and more
obviously still the Police Force, are all Socialistic in this sense of
the word; nor can anything be more completely Socialistic than a public
road or a street. In each case a certain something is supported by a
common fund for the use of all; and every one is entitled to an equal
advantage from it, irrespective of his own deserts, or the amount he
has contributed to its support.
[Sidenote ◆1 What is called Socialism in this country is a
necessary part of every State;]
[Sidenote ◆2 And the principle may probably be extended with good
results, if not pushed too far.]
◆¹ If, then, we agree to call those measures Socialistic to which the
word is popularly applied at present, Socialism, instead of being
opposed to Individualism, is its necessary complement, as we may see
at once by considering the necessity of public roads and a police
force; for the first of these shows us that private property would be
inaccessible without the existence of social property; and the second
that it would be insecure without the existence of social servants.
The good or evil, then, that will result from Socialism, as understood
thus, depends altogether on questions of degree and detail. There is
no question as to whether we shall be Socialistic or no. ◆² We must be
Socialistic; and we always have been, though perhaps without knowing
it, as M. Jourdain talked prose. The only question is as to the precise
limits to which the Socialistic principle can be pushed with advantage
to the greatest number.
[Sidenote ◆1 That it can easily be pushed too far is obvious.]
What these limits may be it is impossible to discuss here. Any general
discussion of such a point would be meaningless. Each case or measure
must be discussed on its own merits. But, though it is impossible to
state what the limits are, it is exceedingly easy to show on what
they depend. They depend on two analogous and all-important facts,
one of which I have already explained and dwelt upon, and which
forms, indeed, one of the principal themes of this volume. This is
the fact, that the most powerful of our productive agents, namely
Ability, cannot be robbed, without diminishing its productivity, of
more than a certain proportion of the annual wealth produced by it;
and, as it is from this wealth that most of the Socialistic fund must
be appropriated, Socialistic distribution is limited by the limits of
possible appropriation. The other fact—the counterpart of this—is as
follows. Just as Ability is paralysed by robbing it of more than a
certain portion of its products, Labour may equally be paralysed by
an unwise distribution of them; and thus their continued production
be at last rendered impossible. ◆¹ For instance, quite apart from any
initial difficulty in raising the requisite fund from the wealthier
class of tax-payers, the providing of free meals for children in
Board Schools is open to criticism, on account of the effect which it
might conceivably have upon parents, of diminishing their industry
by diminishing the necessity for its exercise. Whether such would be
the effect really in this particular case, it is beside my purpose
to consider; but few people will doubt that if such a provision were
extended, and if, even for so short a time as a single six months,
free meals were provided for the parents also, half the Labour of
the country would be for the time annihilated. Labour, however, is
as necessary to production as is Ability, even though, under modern
conditions, it does not produce so much; and it is therefore perfectly
evident that there is a limit somewhere, beyond which to relieve the
individual labourer of his responsibilities by paying his expenses out
of a public fund will be, until human nature is entirely changed, to
dry up the sources from which that fund is derived.
[Sidenote ◆1 The sort of natural limit that there is to its
beneficial effects is shown by the history of our Poor
Laws.]
[Sidenote ◆2 Such Socialism, whatever good it may do, can never do
much in the way of raising money wages.]
As I have said already, it is impossible, in any general way, to give
any indication of what this limit is; but the industrial history of
this country supplies a most instructive instance in which it was
notoriously overpassed, and what was meant as a benefit to Labour,
under circumstances of exceptional difficulty, ended by endangering
the prosperity of the whole community. I refer to our Poor Law at the
beginning of this century, the effects of which form one of the most
remarkable object-lessons by which experience has ever illustrated a
special point in economics. ◆¹ That Poor Law, as Professor Marshall
well observes, “arranged that part of the wages [of the labourers]
should be given in the form of poor relief; and that this should be
distributed amongst them in the inverse proportion to their industry,
thrift, and forethought. The traditions and instincts,” he adds, “which
were fostered by that evil experience are even now a great hindrance to
the progress of the working classes.”[56] Now that particular evil on
which Professor Marshall comments,—namely, that the part of the wages
coming through this Socialistic channel were in the inverse proportion
to what had really been produced by the labourer—is inherent in all
Socialistic measures, the principal object of which is to raise or
supplement wages; as is clearly enough confessed by the Socialistic
motto, “To every man according to his needs.” ◆² It may accordingly be
said that, absolutely necessary as the Socialistic principle is, and
much as may be hoped from its extension in many directions, it neither
has been in the past, nor can possibly be in the future, efficacious to
any great extent in increasing the actual income of the labourer.[57]
[Sidenote ◆1 Trade Unionism in this way can do far more. We will
see first how, and then within what limits.]
◆¹ Such being the case, then, let us now turn our attention to another
principle of an entirely different kind, which, so far as regards
this object, is incalculably more important, and which has constantly
operated in the past, and may operate in the future, to increase the
labourer’s income, without any corresponding disadvantages. I mean
that principle of organisation amongst the labourers themselves which
is commonly called Trade Unionism; and which directly or indirectly
represents the principal means by which Labour is attempting,
throughout the civilised world, to accelerate and regulate the natural
distribution of wealth. I will first, in the light of the conclusions
we have already arrived at, point out to the reader what, speaking
generally, is the way in which Trade Unionism strengthens the hands
of Labour; and then consider what is the utmost extent to which the
strength which Labour now derives from it may be developed.
[Sidenote ◆1 The operation of Trade Unionism in raising wages can
be easily seen at a glance by reference to the simple
community which was imagined in the last chapter.]
◆¹ If the reader has not already forgotten our imaginary community,—our
eight labourers with John and James directing them,—our easiest
course will be to turn again to that. We saw that when the labourers
were employed by John only,—John who found them each making _fifty
pounds_ a year, and enabled them by his Ability each to make _four
hundred pounds_—we saw that the whole of this increase, in the natural
course of things, would be kept by John himself, by whose Ability it
was practically created; for it would not be to John’s advantage to
part with any of it, and the labourers, so long as they all acted
separately, would have no means of extracting any of it from him. It
would be useless for one of them at a time to strike for higher wages.
The striker and the employer would meet on wholly unequal terms;
because the striker, whilst the strike lasted, would be sacrificing the
whole of his income, whilst depriving the employer of only an eighth
part of his. But let us alter the supposition. Let us suppose that
the labourers combine together, and that the whole eight strike for
higher wages simultaneously. The situation is now completely changed;
and the loss that the struggle will entail on both parties is equal.
The employer, like the labourer, will for a time lose all his income.
It is true that if the employer has a reserve fund on which he can
support himself whilst production is suspended, and if the labourer has
no such fund, the employer may still be sure of an immediate victory,
should he be resolved at all costs to resist the labourers’ demand.
But, in any case, the cost of resisting it will be appreciable: it is
a loss which the labourers will be able to inflict on him repeatedly;
and he may see that they would be able, by their strikes, to make him
ultimately lose more than he would by assenting to their demands, or,
at all events, making some concessions to them. It is therefore obvious
that the labourers, in such a case, will be able to extract extra wages
in the inverse proportion to the loss which the employer will sustain
if he concedes them, and in direct proportion to the loss which would
threaten him should he refuse to do so.[58]
[Sidenote ◆1 Combination amongst labourers puts them at an
advantage as against competing employers, until their
demands grow so unreasonable as to force the employers
to combine.]
There is, however, much more to be said. With each increase of their
wages which the labourers succeed in gaining, they will be better
equipping themselves for any fresh struggle in the future; for they
will be able to set aside a larger and larger fund on which to support
themselves without working, and thus be in a position to make the
struggle longer, or, in other words, to inflict still greater injury
on the employer. ◆¹ And if such will be the case when there is one
employer only, much more will it be the case when there are two—when
John and James, as we have seen, are forced by the necessities of
competition to grant part of the labourers’ demands, even before they
are formulated. It might thus seem that there is hardly any limit
to the power which a perfected system of Trade Unionism may one day
confer upon the labourers. There are, however, two which we will
consider now, in addition to others at which we will glance presently.
One is the limit with which we are already familiar, and of which in
this connection I shall again speak, namely, the limit of the minimum
reward requisite as a stimulus to Ability. The other is a limit closely
connected with this, which is constituted by the fact that if the
demands of Labour are pushed beyond a certain point against disunited
employers, the employers will combine against Labour, as Labour has
combined against them, and all further concessions will be, at all
costs, unanimously refused.
[Sidenote ◆1 The ultimate tendency of Trade Unionism is to make
any conflict between the employer and employed like a
conflict between two individuals.]
[Sidenote ◆2 The limit to which it can raise wages is fixed by the
minimum reward that suffices to make Ability operative.]
◆¹ Now a situation like this is the ultimate situation which all Trade
Unionism tends to bring about. It tends, by turning the labourers into
a single body on the one hand, and the employers into a single body on
the other, to make the dispute like one between two individuals; and
though for many reasons this result can never be entirely realised,[59]
the limits of the power of Trade Unionism can be best seen by
imagining it. What, then, is the picture we have before us? We have
Labour and Ability in the character of two men confronting each other,
each determined to secure for himself the largest possible portion of
a certain aggregate amount of wealth which they produce together. Now
we will assume, though this is far from being the case, that neither
of them would shrink, for the sake of gaining their object, from
inflicting on the other the utmost injury possible; and we shall see
also, if we make our picture accurate, that Labour is physically the
bigger man of the two. It happens, however, that the very existence
of the wealth for the possession of which they are prepared to fight
is entirely dependent on their peacefully co-operating to produce it;
so that if in the struggle either disabled the other, he would be
destroying the prize which it is the object of his struggle to secure.
Thus the dispute between them, however hostile may be their temper,
must necessarily be of the nature not of a fight, but of a bargain;
and will be settled, like other bargains, by the process of compromise
which Adam Smith calls “the higgling of the market.” ◆² When such a
bargain is struck, there will be a limit on both sides: a maximum limit
to what Ability will consent to give, and a minimum limit to what
Labour will consent to receive. There will be a certain minimum which
Ability must concede in the long run; because if it did not give so
much, it would indirectly lose more: and conversely there is a certain
maximum more than which Labour will never permanently obtain; because
if it did so the stimulus to Ability would be weakened, and the total
product would in consequence be diminished, out of which alone the
increased share which Labour demands can come.
[Sidenote ◆1 Thus the possible power of Trade Unionism in raising
wages is far more limited than it seems.]
[Sidenote ◆2 If we judge hastily by the magnitude of modern Labour
combinations, and the extent to which they can terrorise
the community.]
◆¹ Thus the extent to which Trade Unionism can assist in raising
wages, no matter how wide and how complete its development, is far
more limited than appearances lead many people to suppose. For the
labourers, not only in this country, but all over the world, are
growing yearly more expert in the art of effective combination, and
are increasing their strength by a vast network of alliances; ◆²
and from time to time the whole civilised world is startled at the
powers of resistance and destruction which they show themselves to
have acquired, and which they have called into operation with a view
to enforcing their demands. The gas-strikes and the dock-strikes in
London, and the great railway-strikes, and the strike at Homestead in
America, are cases in point, and are enough to illustrate my meaning.
They impress the imagination with a sense that Labour is becoming
omnipotent. But in all these Labour movements there is one unchanging
feature, which seems never to be realised either by those who take part
in them or by observers, but on which really their entire character
depends, and which makes their actual character entirely different
from what it seems to be. That this feature should have so completely
escaped popular notice is one of the most singular facts in the history
of political blindness, and can be accounted for only by the crude
and imperfect state in which the analysis of the causes of production
has been left hitherto by economists. The feature I allude to is as
follows.
[Sidenote ◆1 The imperfect state of economic science has allowed a
totally false idea to be formed as to the force which
Trade Unionism represents.]
[Sidenote ◆2 The force which it represents is not Labour at all,
but a power of combining in order to abstain from
labour.]
[Sidenote ◆3 And even this power could never be universal, nor
last long; and whilst it lasts it depends on Capital.]
◆¹ These great developments of Trade Unionism which are commonly called
Labour movements do not really, in any accurate sense, represent
Labour at all. ◆² All that they represent in themselves is a power to
abstain from labouring. In other words, the increased command of the
labourers over the machinery of combination, and even their increased
command of the tactics of industrial warfare, represents no increased
command over the smallest of industrial processes, nor puts them in a
better position, without the aid of Ability, to maintain—still less
to increase by the smallest fraction—the production of that wealth in
which they are anxious to share farther. A strike therefore, however
great or however admirably organised, no more represents any part of
the power of Labour than the mutiny organised amongst the crew of
Columbus, with a view to making him give up his enterprise, represented
the power which achieved the discovery of America. And this is not
true of the average labourers only; it is yet more strikingly true of
the superior men who lead them. From the ranks of the labourers, men
are constantly rising whose abilities for organising resistance are
remarkable, and indeed admirable; but it is probably not too much to
say that no leader who has devoted himself to organising the labourers
for resistance has ever been a man capable, to any appreciable degree,
of giving them help by rendering their labour more productive. Those
who have been most successful in urging their fellows to _ask_ for
more, have been quite incompetent to help them to _make_ more. Thus
these so-called Labour leaders, no matter how considerable may be
many of their intellectual and moral qualities, are indeed leaders of
labourers; but they are no more leaders of Labour than a sergeant who
drilled a volunteer corps of art students could be called the leader
of a rising school of painting; and a strike is no more the expression
of the power of Labour than Byron’s swimming across the Hellespont was
an expression of the power of poetry, or than Burns’s poetry was an
expression of the power of ploughing. A strike is merely an expression
of the fact that the labourers, for good or ill, can acquire, under
certain circumstances, the power to cease from labouring, and can use
this as a weapon not of production, but of warfare. ◆³ The utmost that
the power embodied in Trade Unionism could accomplish would be to bring
about a strike that was universal; and although no doubt it might do
this theoretically, it could never do so much as this practically, for
the simple reason that, as I have already pointed out, Labour could
not be entirely suspended for even a single day. Further, the more
general the suspension was, the shorter would be the time for which it
could be maintained; and to mention yet another point to which I have
referred already, it could be maintained only, for no matter how short
a time, by the assistance of the very thing against which strikes are
ostensibly directed, namely Capital; and not even Capital could make
that time long. Nature, who is the arch-taskmaster, and who knows no
mercy, would soon smash like matchwood a Trade Union of all the world,
and force the labourers to go back to their work, even if no such body
as an employing class existed.
All the ideas, then, derived from the recent developments of Trade
Unionism, that Labour, through its means, will acquire any greatly
increasing power of commanding an increasing share of the total income
of the community, rests on a total misconception of the power that
Trade Unionism represents, and a total failure to see the conditions
and things that limit it. It is limited firstly by Nature, who makes
a general strike impossible; secondly by Capital, without which any
strike is impossible; and lastly by the fact that the labourers of the
present day already draw part of their wages from the wealth produced
by Ability; that any further increase they must draw from this source
entirely; and that, being thus dependent on the assistance of Ability
now, Trade Unionism, as we have seen, has not the slightest tendency to
make them any the less dependent on it in the future.
When the reader takes into account all that has just been said, he
will be hardly disposed to quarrel with the following conclusions of
Professor Marshall, who derives them from history quite as much as from
theory, and who expresses himself with regard to Trade Unions thus:
“Their importance,” he says, “is certainly great, and grows rapidly;
but it is apt to be exaggerated: for indeed many of them are little
more than eddies such as have always fluttered over the surface of
progress. And though they are now on a larger and more imposing scale
in this age than before, yet much as ever the main body of the movement
depends on the deep, silent, strong stream of the tendencies of Normal
Distribution and Exchange.”
[Sidenote ◆1 Trade Unionism, in raising wages, can do little more
than accelerate or regulate a rise that would take place
owing to other causes.]
[Sidenote ◆2 But none the less it may be of great benefit to the
labourers, and remove many evils which a general rise in
wages has not removed, and could not remove by itself.]
◆¹ But in the case of Trade Unionism, just as in that of Socialism,
because the extent is limited to which it can raise the labourers’
income, it does not follow that within these limits its action may
not be of great and increasing benefit. ◆² Thus Mill, whose general
view of the subject coincides broadly with that of Professor Marshall,
points out that though a Union will never be able permanently to raise
wages above the point to which in time they would rise naturally, nor
permanently to keep them above a point to which they would naturally
fall, it can hasten the rise, which might otherwise be long delayed,
and retard the fall, which might otherwise be premature; and the gain
to Labour may thus in the long run be enormous. Unions have done this
for Labour in the past; and with improved and extended organisation,
they may be able to do it yet more effectively in the future; and
they have done, and may continue to do many other things besides—to do
them, and to add to their number. It is beyond my purpose to speak of
these things in detail. In the next chapter, I shall briefly indicate
some of them; but the main points on which I am concerned to insist are
simpler; and the next chapter—the last—will be devoted principally to
these.
CHAPTER V
_Of the enormous Encouragement to be derived by
Labour from a true View of the Situation;
and of the Connection between the Interests
of the Labourer and Imperial Politics._
[Sidenote ◆1 Let me again remind the reader of the object of this
book.]
[Sidenote ◆2 It is to show that the labourer’s income depends on
the general forces of production firstly, and secondly
on those of distribution.]
◆¹ The object of this work, as I explained in the opening chapter, is
to point out to the great body of the people—that is to say, to the
multitude of average men and women, whose incomes consist of the wages
of ordinary Labour—the conditions which determine the possibility of
these incomes being increased, and so to enable them to distinguish
the true means from the false, which they may themselves adopt with a
view to obtaining this result. ◆² And in order to show them how their
present incomes may be increased, I have devoted myself to showing
the reader how their present incomes have been obtained. I have done
this by fixing his attention on the fact that their present incomes
obviously depend upon two sets of causes: first, the forces that
produce the aggregate income of the country; and secondly, the forces
that distribute a certain portion of this amongst the labourers. And
these last I have examined from two points of view; first exhibiting
their results, and then indicating their nature. Let me briefly
recapitulate what I have said about both subjects.
[Sidenote ◆1 I have just shown how the normal forces of
distribution are all in favour of the labourer, contrary
to the vulgar view of the matter.]
◆¹ I have shown that, contrary to the opinion which is too commonly
held, and which is sedulously fostered by the ignorance alike of the
agitator and the sentimentalist, the forces of distribution which
are actually at work around us, which have been at work for the past
hundred years, and which are part and parcel of our modern industrial
system, have been and are constantly securing for Labour a share of
every fresh addition to the total income of the nation; and have, for
at all events the past fifty years, made the average income of the
labouring man grow faster than the incomes of any other members of the
community. They have, in fact, been doing the very thing which the
agitator declared could be done only by resisting them; and they have
not only given Labour all that the agitator has promised it, but they
have actually given it more than the wildest agitator ever suggested to
it. I have shown the reader this; and I have shown him also that the
forces in question are primarily the spontaneous forces—“deep, strong,
and silent,” as Professor Marshall calls them—“of normal distribution
and exchange”; how that these have been, and are seconded by the
deliberate action of men: by extended application of what is called the
Socialistic principle, and to a far greater extent by combinations of
the labourers amongst themselves.
[Sidenote ◆1 This should encourage, and not discourage, political
action on behalf of the labourers.]
The practical moral of all this is obvious. As to the normal and
spontaneous forces of distribution, what a study of them inculcates on
the labourer is not any principle of political action, but a general
temper of mind towards the whole existing system. It inculcates general
acquiescence, instead of general revolt. Now temper of mind, being
that from which policies spring, is quite as important as the details
of any of the policies themselves. Still it must be admitted that
were the normal forces of distribution the only forces that had been
at work for the labourer’s benefit, the principal lesson they would
teach him would be the lesson of _laisser aller_. But though these
forces have been the primary, they have not been the only forces; and
the deliberate policies by which men have controlled their operation,
and have applied them, have been equally necessary in producing the
desired results. The normal forces of distribution may be compared
to the waters of the Nile, which would indeed, as the river rises,
naturally fertilise the whole of the adjacent country, but which would
do as much harm as good, and do but half the good they might do, if
it were not for the irrigation works devised by human ingenuity. And
what these works are to the Nile, deliberate measures have been to the
normal forces of distribution. The growing volume of wealth, which is
spreading itself over the fields of Labour, even yet has failed to
reach an unhappy fraction of the community; the tides and currents flow
with intermittent force, which is often destructive, still more often
wasted, rarely husbanded and applied to the best advantage. Had it not
been for the deliberate action of men,—for legislation in favour of the
labourers, and their own combinations amongst themselves,—these evils
which have accompanied their general progress would have been greater.
◆¹ Wise action in the future will undoubtedly make them less; and may,
though it is idle to hope for Utopias in this world, cause the larger
and darker part of them to disappear.
[Sidenote ◆1 Much is to be done beyond the mere raising of the
labourers’ wages; and Trade Unionism and so-called
Socialism vary much.]