“Shall we say, then, that the contrary is most friendly to the
contrary?”
“Certainly.”
“Be it so,” said I, “but is it not monstrous, Menexenus, and will not
those perfectly wise men, the disputants, immediately spring upon us
exultingly, and ask, if friendship is not most contrary to enmity? What
answer shall we give them? Must we not of necessity admit that they say
truly?”
“Of necessity.”
“‘Well then,’ they will ask, ‘is an enemy a friend to a friend, or is a
friend a friend to an enemy?’”.
“Neither the one nor the other,” he replied.
“But is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the
intemperate, or the good to the bad?”
“I does not appear to me to be so.”
“However,” said I, “if one thing is a friend to another by reason of
contrariety, these things must also of necessity be friendly?”
“Of necessity.”
“Neither, therefore, is the like friendly to the like, nor the contrary
to the contrary?”
“It appears not.”
“Further, let us consider this, whether it still more escapes our
observation, that a friend is in reality none of these, but that what is
neither good nor evil may sometimes become the friend of the good.”
“How mean you?” said he.
“By Jupiter,” said I, “I don’t know; for I am in reality myself dizzy
with the perplexity of the argument. It appears, however, according to
the ancient proverb, that the beautiful is friendly. 30. It certainly
resembles something soft, smooth, and plump; on which account perhaps it
slips away from us and escapes us, because it is a thing of this kind.
For I say that the good is beautiful: do you not think so?”
“I do.”
“I say, therefore, prophetically, that that which is neither good nor
evil is friendly to the beautiful and the good. But hear why I thus
prophesy. There appear to me to be as it were three several classes, one
good, a second evil, a third neither good nor evil. What think you?”
“It seems so to me also,” said he.
“Now that the good is friendly to the good, or the evil to the evil, or
the good to the evil, our former argument does not allow us to say. It
remains therefore, if any thing is friendly to any thing, that that
which is neither good nor evil, must be friendly either to the good, or
to that which is such as itself; for nothing surely can become friendly
to the evil.”
“True.”
“Neither is like friendly to like, we just now said; did we not?”
“Yes.”
“Therefore to that which is neither good nor evil, that which resembles
it will not be friendly?”
“It appears not.”
“The result then is, that that which is neither good nor evil alone
becomes friendly to the good alone?”
“Necessarily so, as it seems.”
31. “Well then, my boys,” said I, “does what is now said lead us in the
right direction? Surely if we will consider, a healthy body has no need
of the medicinal art, or of any assistance; for it is sufficient for
itself; so that no healthy person is a friend to a physician on account
of health; is it not so?”
“No one.”
“But the sick man I think is, on account of disease?”
“How not?”
“But disease is an evil, and the medicinal art beneficial and good.”
“Yes.”
“But a body surely, so far as it is body, is neither good nor evil.”
“Just so.”
“But a body is compelled, on account of disease, to embrace and love the
medicinal art.”
“It seems so to me.”
“That, therefore, which is neither evil nor good, becomes friendly to
the good, on account of the presence of evil.”
“So it seems.”
“But it is evident that it becomes so, prior to its becoming evil
through the evil which it contains; for when it has once become evil, it
will no longer desire the good, and be friendly to it: for we have said
that it is impossible for the evil to be friendly to the good.”
“It is impossible.”
“Consider, then, what I say. For I say that some things are themselves
such as that which is present with them, and some not. Thus, if any one
wishes to dye any thing with any colour, the colour that is dyed in is
surely present in the thing that is dyed.”
“Certainly.”
32. “Is then, that which is dyed, afterwards, the same as to colour, as
that which is on it?”
“I don’t understand you,” he replied.
“But thus,” said I, “If any one should dye your hairs, which are yellow,
with white lead, would they then be white, or appear so?”
“They would appear so,” he replied.
“Though whiteness would be present with them.”
“Yes.”
“And yet your hairs would not be at all the more white, but though
whiteness is present, they are neither white nor black.”
“True.”
“But when, my friend, old age has brought this colour on them, then they
become such as that which is present with them, white by the presence of
white.”
“How can it be otherwise?”
“This then I now ask, if a thing be present in any thing, will that
which contains it be such as that which is present with it, or if it be
present after a certain manner, will it be such, but otherwise not?”
“Thus, rather,” he replied.
“That then which is neither evil nor good, sometimes when evil is
present, is not yet evil, but sometimes it has already become such.”
“Certainly.”
“When, therefore, it is not yet evil, though evil be present, this very
presence of evil makes it desirous of good, but this presence which
makes it evil, deprives it at the same time of the desire and friendship
for the good. 33. For it is now no longer neither evil nor good, but
evil; evil however we saw, is not friendly to good.”
“It is not.”
“On this account we must say, that those who are already wise no longer
love wisdom, whether they are gods or men; nor again do they love wisdom
who have so much ignorance, as to be evil: for no evil and foolish
person loves wisdom. They therefore are left, who possess indeed this
evil, ignorance, but are not yet thereby stupid or foolish, but still
think that they do not know the things that they do not know. Wherefore
they who are not yet either good or evil are lovers of wisdom; but such
as are evil do not love wisdom, nor do the good: for we have seen in a
former part of our discussion, that neither is the contrary friendly to
the contrary, nor the like to the like: do you not remember this?”
“Certainly,” they both replied.
“Now then,” said I, “Lysis and Menexenus, we have certainly discovered
what it is that is friendly and what not. For we say, that with respect
to the soul, and with respect to the body, and every thing else, that
which is neither evil nor good, is friendly to the good on account of
the presence of evil.”