As Socrates was one day going from the Academy to the Lyceum he met with
Hippothales, Ctesippus, and other youths, who were on that day
celebrating the Hermæan festival in a newly-erected palæstra hard by.
They invite him to come in and join their conversation; he promises to
do so on condition that they will first tell him who is the beauty among
them. Hippothales, to whom he first puts the question, shews, by his
embarrassment, that he is himself far gone in love; and on being taxed
with it by Socrates blushes still more, whereupon Ctesippus says that he
is constantly overwhelming them with his poems and speeches on his
favourite Lysis. Socrates, on hearing this, begs Hippothales to inform
him how a lover ought to speak of or address his favourite. Hippothales,
though he does not deny his being in love, does deny that he makes
verses or speeches; but Ctesippus shews that he is constantly giving
utterance to the most extravagant praises of his favourite and his
family; on which Socrates remarks that he should not celebrate his
victory before it is won; for that it is not wise to praise the object
of one’s affection before a return of affection on his part is secured,
and moreover such as are beautiful when highly praised are apt to become
arrogant, and so are more difficult to be won. Hippothales takes these
suggestions in good part, and begs Socrates to advise him how to address
his favourite so as to win his affection, which Socrates readily
promises to do if they will give him an opportunity of conversing with
Lysis. To this end they all enter the palæstra, and almost as soon as
Socrates, Ctesippus, Menexenus and others had seated themselves down in
a quiet corner, Lysis, who is very fond of listening to conversations,
comes and takes his seat next his friend Menexenus, while Hippothales is
concealed in the back-ground out of sight of his favourite[166].
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Footnote 166:
§ 1-10.
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Socrates begins by addressing a few words to the latter, but on
Menexenus being called out by the master of the palæstra, he turns to
Lysis, and asks him whether his parents do not love him very much. On
Lysis replying that they certainly do, Socrates shews him that though,
since they love him, they must needs wish to make him as happy as
possible, yet they are so far from letting him do whatever he pleases,
that they put him under the government of others, even of slaves, and
this not on account of his youth, but because he has not yet acquired
sufficient experience and knowledge to be entrusted with the government
of himself; but that whenever he is wise enough, not only his father,
but all others, will entrust him with the management of themselves and
their affairs[167].
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Footnote 167:
§ 10-18.
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At this point of the conversation Menexenus returned and resumed his
seat near Lysis, who begs of Socrates to say over again to Menexenus
what he had been saying to him; but Socrates desires him to tell it
himself on some future occasion, and for the present engages to converse
on some other subject with Menexenus. Having observed, therefore, the
friendship that subsisted between Lysis and Menexenus, he asks the
latter, when any one loves another, which of the two becomes a friend of
the other, the lover or the beloved? Menexenus replies that there is no
difference. But Socrates shews that it frequently happens that a lover
is not only not loved in turn, but is even hated. In that case, then,
which is the friend? Menexenus is forced to admit that unless both love
neither can be a friend to the other. But here Socrates interposes this
difficulty; he remarks that men often love horses, dogs, and other
things which cannot love in turn; and the poet, as Menexenus admits,
speaks truly who says, “Happy the man who has boys for his friends and
horses and dogs,” so that the beloved now appears to be a friend of the
lover, and not the lover of the beloved; and by the same reasoning he
who is hated is an enemy, and not he who hates, whence the absurd
conclusion follows that people are beloved by their enemies and hated by
their friends. This, however, is impossible; therefore the reverse must
be the case, and the lover must be a friend of the beloved. “If, then,
neither those who love are to be friends, nor those who are loved, nor
yet those who both love and are loved,” who are to be called friends?
Lysis interposes with the remark that they do not appear to him to have
conducted their enquiries aright; so Socrates avails himself of the
opportunity thus offered him, and directs his discourse to Lysis[168].
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Footnote 168:
§ 18-24.
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“The poets say,” he observes, that “God ever conducts like to like,” and
the wisest among men say the same, “that like must ever needs be
friendly to like.” Lysis agrees to this. But, objects Socrates, only
half of this appears to be true, for the more wicked men are the more
hostile are they to each other; so that it appears that the good man
only is a friend to the good man only, but that the bad man never
arrives at true friendship. But here again a new doubt is started.
The like can derive no benefit from the like; how, therefore, can they
be held in regard by each other? and how can that which is not held in
regard be a friend? In like manner, the good man is sufficient for
himself; but he who is sufficient needs nothing, and so will not regard
any thing, and therefore not love. So that from this it appears, that
not even the good will be friends to each other[169].
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Footnote 169:
§ 24-27.
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Socrates then remarks, that he once heard some one say that like is most
hostile to like, and the good to the good; and generally that things
most like each other are most full of envy, strife and hatred, but such
as are most unlike are most disposed to friendship, just as the dry
desires the moist, the cold heat, and so on. Menexenus admits the truth
of this, and of its consequence, that the contrary is most friendly to
its contrary. But again Socrates drives him to this absurd conclusion,
that since enmity is most contrary to friendship, therefore an enemy
must be a friend to a friend, or a friend a friend to an enemy[170].
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Footnote 170:
§ 27-29.
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Since it appears, then, that neither is the like friendly to the like,
nor the contrary to the contrary, Socrates next proposes to enquire
whether that which is neither good nor evil can be the friend of the
good. According to an ancient proverb, the beautiful is friendly, and
the good is beautiful, whence he would conclude that that which is
neither good nor evil is friendly to the beautiful and the good. There
are three several classes of things, he says, the good, the evil, and
that which is neither good nor evil. It has already been proved that the
good is not friendly to the good, nor the evil to the evil, nor yet the
good to the evil, nor the evil to the good; it remains, therefore, that
that which is neither good nor evil must be friendly to the good. But a
little further discussion leads to the more narrow conclusion, that that
which is neither evil nor good is friendly to the good, on account of
the presence of evil[171].
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Footnote 171:
§ 29-33.
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Both Lysis and Menexenus agree to this conclusion; but Socrates soon
raises new difficulties, and shews the fallaciousness of their former
reasoning. A friend, he says, is a friend to some one, and for the sake
of something, and on account of something; for a rich man is a friend to
a physician on account of disease, which is an evil, and for the sake of
health, which is a good, so that that which is friendly is a friend for
the sake of a friend, on account of an enemy. By proceeding in this way,
he argues, we shall at length arrive at some principle, which will not
have to be referred to another friend, but will arrive at the first
friend, for the sake of which all other things are friends, and which is
friendly for its own sake. Now it has already appeared that we are
friendly to that which is good, and that we love the good on account of
evil; if, therefore, evil were to be done away with the good would be of
no use to us, and we should not love it. In this, too, his young friends
are willing to acquiesce, but Socrates dispels this delusion also, and
shews that evil cannot be the cause of love, since if evil were done
away with the desires would still remain, which in reality are the
causes of friendship; for that which desires desires what it stands in
need of, and that which stands in need is friendly to that of which it
stands in need: and so love, desire, and friendship respect that which,
in a manner, belongs to a man; but then evil belongs to evil and good to
good, consequently they will each severally be friendly to their fellow,
and the evil will be no less a friend to the evil than the good to the
good; but both these positions have already been shewn to be erroneous,
and so no positive solution of the question proposed is arrived at[172].
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Footnote 172:
§ 34-43.
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