_Socr._ I know it, my friend. One thing, however, happens to them; it
is, that if they have to give and listen to reasons privately respecting
the things that they blame, and if they are willing to persevere
manfully for a length of time, and not fly like cowards, then at length,
my excellent friend, they are very absurdly displeased with themselves
for what they have said, and that rhetoric of theirs becomes somehow so
weak that they appear to be no better than boys. However, let us quit
this subject, since what we have been saying was only a digression; if
we do not, more topics constantly flowing in will shut out the subject
with which we began. Let us, then, return to our former subject, if it
is agreeable to you.
_Theo._ Such things, Socrates, are not at all unpleasing to me to hear;
for it is easier for one of my age to follow them; if you please,
however, let us return to our subject.
_Socr._ If I mistake not, then, we were at that part of our discussion
in which we said that those who maintain motion to be essence, and that
whatever appears to each person exists also to him to whom it appears,
would in other things persist, and especially with regard to justice,
that on every account what a city enacts as appearing just to itself,
this also is just to the city that enacts it, so long as it continues in
force: but that with respect to what is good, no one is so hardy as to
venture to contend that whatever things a city has enacted, thinking
that they are advantageous to itself, are also advantageous so long as
they continue in force, except one should speak only of the name: but
this would be a mere mockery on such a subject as we are speaking on;
would it not?
_Theo._ Certainly.
88. _Socr._ Let him not, then, speak of the name, but of the thing
designated by it.
_Theo._ Just so.
_Socr._ But the thing that the name designates is doubtless that which
the city aims at in enacting laws, and enacts all laws, as far as it
thinks and is able, to be as advantageous to itself as possible. Does it
look to any thing else in enacting laws?
_Theo._ By no means.
_Socr._ Does it, then, always accomplish its purpose, or is every city
often mistaken?
_Theo._ I think it is often mistaken.
_Socr._ Still more then would every one allow this very thing, if the
question should be asked with reference to the whole genus, to which the
advantageous belongs: but surely it regards also the future; for, when
we enact laws, we enact them that they may be advantageous for the time
to come; and this we should correctly call the future.
_Theo._ Certainly.
89. _Socr._ Come then, let us thus question Protagoras, or some one else
who holds the same opinions with him, Man, as you say, Protagoras, is
the measure of all things, white, heavy, light, and every thing of that
kind: for, as he contains the criterion of them within himself, in
thinking they are such as he feels them to be, he thinks what is true to
himself, and really is? Is it not so?
_Theo._ It is.
_Socr._ Shall we also say, Protagoras, that he contains within himself
the criterion of things about to happen, and that such things as he
thinks will happen, do become such to him who thinks so? For instance,
with regard to heat, when any particular person thinks that he shall
catch a fever, and that this kind of heat will happen to him, and
another, a physician, thinks differently, according to the opinion of
which of the two shall we say will the result prove? or will it be
according to the opinion of both of them, and to the physician will he
be neither hot nor feverish, but to himself both?
_Theo._ That, indeed, would be ridiculous.
_Socr._ And I think the opinion of the husbandman, and not that of the
harper, respecting the future sweetness or roughness of wine, would
prevail.
_Theo._ How not?
_Socr._ Nor again would a teacher of gymnastics form a better opinion
than a musician respecting what will be inharmonious and harmonious, and
what will afterwards appear to the teacher of gymnastics himself to be
harmonious.
_Theo._ By no means.
90. _Socr._ Therefore also, when a banquet is prepared, the judgment of
one who, not being skilled in cookery is about to feast on it, is less
sound than that of the cook, respecting the pleasure that will ensue.
For we are not arguing at all about that which now is or has been
pleasant to each person, but about that which will hereafter both appear
and be so, whether every one is the best judge for himself? Could not
you, Protagoras, judge beforehand better than any private person what
arguments are likely to be available for us in a court of justice?
_Theo._ Indeed, Socrates, in this he himself professes to excel all men
by far.
_Socr._ By Jupiter, he does, my friend; otherwise no one would pay him
large sums for his instructions, if he had not persuaded his pupils that
no prophet or other person would be able to judge better than he could
for himself, as to what in future would both be and appear to be.
_Theo._ Most true.
_Socr._ But do not legislation and the useful regard the future, and
would not every one acknowledge, that a city, in enacting laws, of
necessity often misses that which is most useful?
_Theo._ Assuredly.
91. _Socr._ We have, therefore, rightly urged against your master, that
he must needs confess, that one man is wiser than another, and that such
a one is the true measure, but that there is no necessity at all for me
who am ignorant, to become a measure, as the argument advanced on his
behalf just now compelled me to be, whether I would or not.
_Theo._ In that way, Socrates, his argument appears to me to be
effectually refuted, and it was also refuted by this, that he makes the
opinions of others sound; and these were found to consider his arguments
as by no means to be true.
_Socr._ In many other ways, too, Theodorus, this may be demonstrated,
that not every opinion of every man is true. But, with respect to the
manner in which each person is affected, whence perceptions and
corresponding opinions are produced, it is more difficult to demonstrate
that they are not true. But perhaps I should say, it is quite
impossible: for probably they cannot be refuted, and those who say that
they are certain and sciences, may possibly say the truth, and in that
case Theætetus here did not speak amiss in asserting that perception and
science are the same. 92. Let us, then, approach nearer to it, as the
argument advanced in behalf of Protagoras enjoined us, and examine this
essence, that is said to consist in motion[159], by knocking it, and see
whether it sounds whole or cracked. For the contest about it is neither
mean nor among a few.
-----
Footnote 159:
See § 87.
-----
_Theo._ It is very far from being mean, but is spreading very much
throughout Ionia. For the partisans of Heraclitus advocate this doctrine
very strenuously.
_Socr._ Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we should the rather examine it
from the beginning, as they propound it.
_Theo._ Assuredly. For, Socrates, with respect to these Heraclitian, or,
as you say, Homeric, and even older doctrines, it is no more possible to
converse about them with the people of Ephesus who pretend to be
acquainted with them, than with persons who are raving mad. For, just as
their written doctrines, they are truly in constant motion, but to keep
to an argument and a question, and quietly to answer and ask in turn, is
less in their power than any thing; or rather the power of rest in these
men is infinitely less than nothing. But if you ask any one of them a
question, they draw out, as from a quiver, certain dark enigmatical
words, and shoot them off, and if you wish to get from him a reason for
what he has said, you will be forthwith stricken with another newly
coined word, but will never come to any conclusion with any one of them;
nor do they with one another, but they take very good care not to allow
any thing to be fixed, either in their discourse, or in their souls,
thinking, as it appears to me, that this very thing is stationary[160];
and they make constant war upon it, and as far as they are able, expel
it from every where.
-----
Footnote 160:
And so opposed to their doctrine of constant motion.
-----
93. _Socr._ Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these men contending, but
have never been in their company when peaceable, for they are no friends
of yours. But I think they say such things when at leisure, to their
disciples, whom they wish to render like themselves.
_Theo._ What disciples, my good friend? Amongst such men, one is not the
disciple of another, but they spring up spontaneously, from whatever
place each of them happens to be seized with a frenzy, and each thinks
that the other knows nothing. From these, therefore, as I was just now
saying, you will never get a reason either willingly or unwillingly: but
we must take the matter up as if it were a problem and examine it
ourselves.
_Socr._ You say right. But have we not received this problem from the
ancients, who by the aid of poetry concealed it from the multitude, that
Ocean and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that
nothing is at rest, and from the moderns, as being wise, who have
declared openly, so that even cobblers on hearing them learn wisdom, and
give up their foolish opinion, that some things are at rest and others
in motion, and learning that all things are in motion, they pay great
respect to their teachers. 94. But I had almost forgotten, Theodorus,
that others have declared the very contrary to this, that “that which is
called the universe is Immoveable,” and every thing else that the
followers of Melissus and Parmenides maintain in opposition to all this,
as, that all things are one, and that this is at rest in itself, and has
no place in which it can be moved. What then shall we do with all these
people, my friend? For advancing by little and little, we have unawares
fallen between both of them, and if we do not defend ourselves and
escape, we shall be punished like those who in the wrestling grounds
play on the line, who, when they are caught by both parties, are dragged
in contrary directions. It appears therefore to me, that we should first
of all consider those with whom we set out, the advocates of perpetual
motion, and, if they shall prove to speak to the purpose, we will join
with them, and endeavour to escape from the others; but if those who say
that the universe is at rest appear to speak more truly, we will on the
other hand fly to them from those who move even things immoveable. 95.
And if both shall be found to speak nothing right, we shall be
ridiculous for thinking that we, mean as we are, can say any thing to
the purpose, after we have condemned men of great antiquity and wisdom.
Consider therefore, Theodorus, whether it is for our interest to venture
on so great a danger.
_Theo._ It would be unpardonable, Socrates, not thoroughly to examine
what each of these men say.
_Socr._ We must examine it, since you are so anxious to do so. It
appears to me then, that the first thing to be done in an enquiry about
motion, is to find out what they mean by saying that all things are in
motion. I mean this: whether they say that there is one species of
motion, or, as it appears to me, two. Nor should it appear to me only,
but do you also join with me, that we may both fall into the same error,
if we must err. Tell me, therefore, do you call it being in motion, when
a thing passes from one place to another, or is turned round in the same
place?
_Theo._ I do.
96. _Socr._ Let this, therefore, be one species. But when it remains in
the same place, and grows old, and either becomes black from white or
hard from soft, or undergoes any other change, is it not right to say
that this is another species of motion?
_Theo._ It appears so to me.
_Socr._ It must be so: I say, then, that there are these two species of
motion, change and removal.
_Theo._ You say right.
_Socr._ Having, therefore, made this distinction, let us now address
ourselves to those who say that all things are in motion, and ask them:
Whether do you say that every thing undergoes both kinds of motion, and
is both removed and changed, or that one thing is moved both ways, and
another only in one way?
_Theo._ By Jupiter, I know not what to answer; but I think they would
say, both ways.
_Socr._ Otherwise, my friend, the same things would appear to them to be
both in motion and at rest, and it would not be at all more correct to
say that all things are in motion, than that they are at rest.
_Theo._ You speak most truly.
_Socr._ Since, therefore, it is necessary that every thing should be in
motion, and that the absence of motion should be in nothing, all things
must always be moved with every kind of motion.