_Socr._ We appear to have. And I have often at other times observed, my
excellent friend, and especially now, with what good reason those who
have spent much time in philosophical studies, are found to be
ridiculous orators when they enter courts of justice.
_Theo._ What mean you by this?
_Socr._ They that have been from their youth in courts of justice, and
places of that kind, when compared with those who have been nurtured in
philosophy and such-like studies, appear to have been educated like
slaves compared with freemen.
_Theo._ In what respect?
_Socr._ In this, that these, as you said, have always leisure, and
converse in peace at their leisure, just as we now are taking up our
third topic in succession, so they too, if any question occurs to them
that pleases them better than the one in hand, as is the case with us,
are not at all concerned whether they speak at length or briefly, if
they can but arrive at the truth. But the others always speak in a
hurry, for the running water presses them on, nor are they allowed to
speak on whatever subject they wish, but their opponent stands by them
with this instrument of compulsion[158], and the record (which they call
the pleadings) read aloud, out of which they must not travel; and their
speeches are always about a fellow slave before the master who is seated
holding the scales of justice in his hand, their contests too, are never
unrestrained, but are always to the point before them, and oftentimes it
is a race for life. 77. So that, from all these causes they become
vehement and keen, knowing how to flatter the master by words, and to
conciliate him by actions, being mean and not upright in soul. For
slavery from childhood has taken away their growth, and rectitude, and
freedom, compelling them to do crooked actions, by exposing their yet
tender souls to great dangers and fears, which not being able to bear up
against with justice and truth, they immediately have recourse to lying
and injuring one another, and become so bent and distorted, that they
pass from youth to manhood without having any solidity in their minds,
but have become clever and wise, as they think. Such then are these,
Theodorus. But are you willing that I should describe the men of our
band, or that, passing them by, we should return again to our subject,
lest we abuse too much our liberty and powers of digression, which we
just now spoke of.
-----
Footnote 158:
I have followed Stallbaum in giving this meaning to ἀνάγκη. See his
note on this passage. I have perhaps taken a liberty in translating
ἀντωμοσίαν in the next line “pleadings,” but I know of no other word
that will convey our author’s meaning to an English reader, and in the
passage before us technicality is unnecessary.
-----
78. _Theo._ By no means, Socrates, but describe them. For you observed
very well, that we who are members of this band, are not the servants of
topics of discussion, but they are our servants as it were, and each of
them must wait for its completion until we think proper. For neither
does a judge nor a spectator preside over us, to rebuke and keep us in
order, as is the case with the poets.
_Socr._ Let us speak then, as we ought, since it is agreeable to you,
about the chiefs; for why should any one speak of those who spend their
time in philosophy to but little purpose? These then from early youth do
not know the way to the forum, nor where the law-court, or senate house,
or any other public place of assemblage in the city is situated; and
they neither see nor hear laws or decrees, proclaimed or written. And
canvassing of partisans for magistracies, and meetings, and banquets,
and revelry with flute-players, they never think of even in a dream.
Whether any one in a city is well or ill born, or what evil has befallen
any one from his ancestors, whether men or women, is as little known to
him as how many measures of water there are in the sea, as the saying
is. 79. And he does not know that he is ignorant of all this; for he
does not keep aloof from them for vanity’s sake, but in reality his body
only is situated and dwells in the city, but his mind, considering all
these things as trifling and of no consequence, holds them in contempt,
and is borne every where, according to the expression of Pindar,
measuring things beneath the earth and upon its surface, contemplating
the stars in heaven above, and searching thoroughly into the entire
nature of every thing in the universe, and not stooping to any thing
that is near.
_Theo._ What mean you by this, Socrates?
_Socr._ Just, Theodorus, as a smart and witty Thracian servant-girl is
related to have joked Thales, when, contemplating the stars and looking
upwards, he fell into a well, that he was anxious to know what was going
on in heaven, but forgot to notice what was before him, and at his feet.
80. The same joke is applicable to all who devote themselves to
philosophy; for, in reality, such a one is ignorant about his near
neighbour, not only what he is doing but almost whether he is a man or
some other animal. But what man is, and what such a nature ought to do
or suffer beyond others, he enquires and takes pains to investigate. You
understand me surely, Theodorus; do you not?
_Theo._ I do: and you say truly.
_Socr._ Therefore, my friend, a man of this kind dealing privately with
each person, or publicly, as I said at the outset, when he is compelled,
in a court of justice or any where else, to speak about things at his
feet and before his view, affords laughter not only to Thracian damsels,
but to the rest of the crowd, by falling into wells and all kinds of
perplexities through inexperience, and his strange awkwardness gives him
a character of stupidity. 81. For when he is reviled he has nothing
personal to retort against any one, as he does not know any evil of any
one from not having troubled himself about such matters therefore, not
having any thing to say, he appears to be ridiculous: and when he hears
others praise and boast of themselves, being seen to laugh not feignedly
but really he is considered to be a simpleton. For when encomiums are
passed on a tyrant or king, he thinks that he hears a herdsman, a
swineherd for instance, or a shepherd, or a cowkeeper pronounced happy
for milking abundantly: but he thinks that they feed and milk an animal
that is more hard to manage and more cunning than the others do; and
that such a one must necessarily, from their occupations, be not at all
less rustic and uneducated than herdsmen, being shut up within walls as
in a mountain pen. But when he hears that any one who possesses ten
thousand acres of land or even more, is possessed of vast property, it
appears to him very trifling, as he has been accustomed to survey the
whole earth. 82. And when they extol nobility of birth, accounting any
one noble from being able to shew seven rich ancestors, he thinks that
this praise proceeds from men of dull minds, and who look at trifles,
being unable through want of education to look at the succession of ages
and compute that every man has had innumerable myriads of grandsires and
ancestors, amongst whom there must have been an innumerable multitude of
rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks; but when they
pride themselves in a catalogue of five-and-twenty ancestors, and refer
their origin to Hercules son of Amphitryon, it appears to him absurd
from its littleness; and he laughs at their being unable to compute and
so rid themselves of the vaunting of a silly mind, that the
five-and-twentieth ancestor from Amphitryon and the fiftieth from him
was such as fortune happened to make him. In all these things,
therefore, such a man is ridiculed by the multitude, partly from bearing
himself haughtily, as it seems, and partly from not knowing what is at
his feet, and being on all occasions embarrassed.
_Theo._ You say exactly what takes place, Socrates.
83. _Socr._ But when he is able, my friend, to draw any one upwards, and
any one is willing to leave those questions, of “What injury do I do
you?” or “What injury do you do me?” for the consideration of justice
and injustice themselves, what each of them is, and in what respect they
differ from all other things, or from each other, or the inquiry,
Whether a king is happy, and again, he who possesses abundance of gold,
for the consideration of royalty and human happiness and misery in
general; what they both are, and in what way it is proper for the nature
of man to seek the one and shun the other,—when, therefore, it is
requisite for that little-minded, sharp, and pettifogging fellow to give
an account of all these things, he then shews the opposite side of the
picture; becoming dizzy through being suspended aloft and looking so
high up, from want of use, and becoming stupified, and perplexed, and
stammering, he does not, indeed, afford laughter to the Thracian damsels
or any other uneducated person, (for they do not perceive any thing,)
but to all who have been brought up otherwise than as slaves. 84. This,
then, is the character of each of them, Theodorus, the one, that of him
who is truly brought up in liberty and leisure, whom you call a
philosopher, to whom it is no disgrace to be thought simple and to be
good for nothing, when he has to attend to servile offices, for
instance, that he does not know how to pack and tie up luggage, or
season viands or make flattering speeches; the other, that of him who is
able to perform all such offices dexterously and quickly, but knows not
how to gather up his cloak with his right hand like a well-bred person,
nor perceiving harmony of language to celebrate the life of gods and
happy men such as it really is.
_Theo._ If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of what you say, as you
have me, there would be more peace and less evil among men.
_Socr._ But it is not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be
destroyed; for it is necessary that there should be always something
contrary to good; nor can it be seated among the gods, but of necessity
moves round this mortal nature and this region. Wherefore we ought to
endeavour to fly hence thither as quickly as possible. But this flight
consists in resembling God as much as possible, and this resemblance is
the becoming just and holy with wisdom. 85. But, my excellent friend, it
is not very easy to persuade men, that not for the reasons for which
most men say we ought to flee from vice and pursue virtue, ought we to
study the one and not the other, namely, that a man may not seem to be
vicious, but may seem to be good; for these are, as the saying is, the
drivellings of old women, as it appears to me. But let us describe the
truth as follows. God is never in any respect unjust, but as just as
possible, and there is not any thing that resembles him more than the
man amongst us who has likewise become as just as possible. And on this
depends the true excellence of a man, and his nothingness and
worthlessness. For the knowledge of this is wisdom and true virtue, but
the not knowing it is manifest ignorance and vice, but all other seeming
excellencies and wisdoms, when they are found in political government,
are abject, but in arts sordid. It is therefore by far the best not to
allow him who acts unjustly, and who speaks or acts impiously, to excel
by reason of his wickedness; for they delight in this reproach, and
think they hear that they are not valueless, mere burdens on the earth,
but men such as they ought to be who will be safe in a city. The truth,
therefore, must be spoken, that they are so much the more what they
think they are not, from not thinking that they are such. For they are
ignorant of the punishment of injustice, of which they ought to be least
of all ignorant: for it does not consist in what they imagine, stripes
and death, which they sometimes suffer who do not commit injustice, but
in that which it is impossible to avoid.