_Socr._ It would not be so, my friend, I think, if the father of the
other fable were alive, but he would defend it stoutly: but now, as it
is an orphan, we have insulted it. For not even the guardians, whom
Protagoras left, are willing to assist it, in the number of whom is
Theodorus here. We ourselves, however, for justice sake, will venture to
assist it.
_Theo._ It is not I, Socrates, but rather Callias son of Hipponicus who
is guardian of his doctrine; for I very quickly turn aside from mere
disputations to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be obliged to you if you
will assist him.
_Socr._ You say well, Theodorus. Observe, then, what assistance I give.
For any one would make more strange admissions than those just now, if
he did not attend carefully to the meaning of words, in what way we are
generally accustomed to employ them in affirming and denying. Shall I
tell you or Theætetus, in what way?
_Theo._ Tell us both together, but let the younger answer. For if he
makes a mistake, it will be less disgraceful.
58. _Socr._ I am going to propose then a very strange question; it is, I
think, something of this kind: Is it possible that he who knows any
thing should not know the thing that he knows?
_Theo._ What shall we answer, Theætetus?
_Theæ._ Impossible without doubt, I think.
_Socr._ Not so, if you maintain that to see is to know. For how will you
deal with this inexplicable question, as the saying is, you will be
caught in a well, if an imperturbable opponent should ask you, closing
one of your eyes with his hand, whether you see his dress with the
closed eye?
_Theæ._ I should say, I think, Not with this, but I do with the other.
_Socr._ Would you not, therefore, see, and not see the same thing at the
same time?
_Theæ._ In some respects.
_Socr._ I do not require this, he will say, nor did I ask in what
respect, but whether, what you know, this you also do not know. But now
what you do not see, you are found to see: and you have already
admitted, that to see is to know, and not to see, not to know. Infer
then, what conclusion follows from this.
_Theæ._ I infer the very contrary to what I supposed.
59. _Socr._ But perhaps, my admirable youth, many things of this kind
would happen to you, if any one should further ask you whether it is
possible to know sharply and dully, and near, but not at a distance,
intensely and slightly as well, and ten thousand other questions, which
a cunning mercenary light-armed combatant would put to you in
discussion, when you asserted science and perception to be the same,
attacking the hearing, smelling, and such other channels of perception,
and he would confute you, keeping you to it and not letting you off,
until through admiration of his exquisite wisdom you are completely
caught in his toils, from whence, after he had conquered and bound you,
he would at length set you free on payment of such a ransom as you and
he could agree on. What argument, should you probably say, would
Protagoras adduce in support of his own opinions? Shall we endeavour to
say?
_Theæ._ By all means.
60. _Socr._ He will, then, both say all that we have said in his
defence, and besides, I think, he will come to the encounter, despising
us and saying; “This fine fellow Socrates, because a boy, when asked by
him, whether it were possible for the same person to remember the same
thing, and at the same time not to know it, was frightened, and being
frightened, answered in the negative, through being unable to look on to
results, has made me appear ridiculous by his arguments. But, most
stupid Socrates, the case is thus, when you examine any of my opinions
by questioning, if he to whom the questions are put gives the same
answers that I should give and is proved wrong, I am confuted, but if he
gives different answers, then he that is questioned _is confuted_. For,
to the point, do you think that any one would grant you, that memory is
present to any one, of the things by which he has been affected, as if
memory were such an affection as he then experienced, though now he
experiences it no longer? Far from it. Do you think, again, that he
would hesitate to allow, that it is possible for the same person to know
and not to know the same thing? or if he should be afraid to say this,
do you think he would ever grant that a person who has become changed is
the same as he was before he was changed? but rather that he is one
person, and not several, and those infinite in number, since change is
constantly going on, for we must beware of catching at one another’s
words. 61. But my good sir,” he will say, “attack my system in a more
generous spirit, confute what I say, if you can, and shew that we have
not perceptions peculiar to each of us, or that, if they are peculiar,
it does not follow that what appears to any one becomes, or if we must
use the word existence, exists to him alone to whom it appears. But when
you speak of pigs and cynocephali, you not only act like a pig yourself,
but you persuade those that hear you to treat my writings in the same
way, herein not doing well. For I affirm that the truth is, as I have
written; for that each of us is the measure both of things that do and
do not exist; though there is an infinite difference between one man and
another, in this very circumstance, that they are and appear different
to one person from what they are and do to another. And I am far from
denying that there is such a thing as wisdom and a wise man, but I call
that man wise, who, changing the aspect of objects to any of us, to whom
they appear and are evil, causes them to appear and to be good. 62. But
do not, again, follow out my arguments, attending to the words only, but
thus in a still clearer manner understand what I mean. For call to mind
what was said in a former part of the discussion, that to a sick man
what he eats appears and is bitter, but to a man in health it is and
appears the contrary. But there is no need to make either of them wiser
than the other; for that is not possible; nor must we allege that the
sick man is ignorant, because he is of a different opinion, and that he
who is in health is wise, because he thinks differently; but we must
endeavour to make him change over to the other side; for the other habit
is better. In like manner, in education, we should endeavour to make a
man change from one habit to a better. But the physician effects a
change by medicines, and the sophist by arguments. 63. For no one ever
makes one who entertains false opinions, afterwards entertain true ones;
for it is not possible for a man to have an opinion on things that do
not exist, or on any others than those by which he is affected, and
these are always true. And I think that a man, who from a depraved habit
of soul forms opinions corresponding to it, a good habit causes to form
different opinions of the same character, but these appearances some
people, through ignorance, call true, but I say that some things are
better than others, but not at all more true. Moreover, my dear
Socrates, I am far from calling the wise, frogs, but as regards bodies,
I call them physicians, and as regards plants, husbandmen. For I say
that these last produce in plants, when they are at all diseased,
instead of depraved perceptions, good and wholesome perceptions and
truths, and that wise and good orators cause good instead of depraved
things to appear to be just to states. For whatever things appear just
and honourable to each city, these are so to that city, so long as it
thinks them so; but a wise man, instead of the several depraved things
that they have, makes good things to be and to appear. 64. By the same
reason a sophist, who is thus able to instruct his pupils, is wise, and
deserves large pay from those whom he instructs. And thus some are wiser
than others, and yet no one entertains false opinions, and you must
admit, whether you will or not, that you are the measure of things; for
this principle is maintained throughout, if then you are able to
controvert this from the beginning, do so, by answering it in a
consecutive speech, or if you had rather by questioning, do it by
questioning; for neither is this to be avoided, but most of all pursued
by a man of sense. However do it thus; don’t act unfairly in your
questions. For it is a great inconsistency for one who pretends to be a
lover of virtue, to persevere in doing nothing else but act unfairly in
argument. But it is to act unfairly in a matter of this kind, when a man
does not make a difference between disputation and discussion, and in
the former jests and leads into error as far as he can, but in the
latter speaks seriously, and sets the person with whom he is conversing
right, pointing out to him those errors only into which he has been led
by himself and his former conversations. 65. If, then, you act thus,
those who converse with you will have to blame themselves for their own
confusion and perplexity, but not you, and they will follow and love
you, but hate themselves, and fly from themselves to philosophy, that,
becoming different, they may be changed from what they formerly were:
but if you act the contrary to this, as most men do, the very contrary
will befal you, and you will make those who associate with you, instead
of being philosophers, hate this pursuit, when they are more advanced in
life. If, then, you will be persuaded by me, as I said before, applying
yourself to it not hostilely or pugnaciously, but in a favourable
spirit, you will truly consider what I have said, in maintaining that
all things are moved, and that whatever appears to every one, also
exists, both to an individual and a city; and from hence you will
further consider, whether science and perception are the same or
different, and you will not, as just now, depart from the usual meaning
of words and names, which most men forcing wherever it suits them,
occasion one another all kinds of perplexity.” 66. These things,
Theodorus, I have advanced by way of assistance to your friend,
according to my ability, trifling from trifling means; but, if he were
alive, he would defend his own opinions in a more noble manner.
_Theo._ You are joking, Socrates: for you have defended the man very
vigorously.
_Socr._ You say well, my friend. But tell me: did you observe that
Protagoras said just now and reproached us, that in arguing with a boy,
we took advantage of the boy’s fear to oppose his principles, and giving
it the contemptuous name of cavilling, and vaunting his measure of all
things, he exhorted us to be serious in examining his doctrine?
_Theo._ How should I not have observed it, Socrates?
_Socr._ What then? Do you require us to obey him?
_Theo._ By all means.
_Socr._ Do you see, then, that all these, except you, are boys? If then
we are to obey him, it is requisite that you and I, questioning and
answering each other, should be serious in examining his doctrine, that
he may not have this to object to us that we have discussed this
question again jesting with youths.
67. _Theo._ But what? Would not Theætetus follow this investigation much
better than many who have long beards?
_Socr._ But not better than you, Theodorus. Do not, therefore, think
that I ought in every way to defend your deceased friend, but you not at
all. But come, my good sir, follow me a little, just so far as to enable
us to see whether it is right that you should be the measure of
diagrams, or whether all men equally with you are sufficient for
themselves in astronomy, and the other things in which you have the
reputation of excelling.
_Theo._ It is not easy, Socrates, for one who is sitting by you, to
refuse to answer you. But I was just now trifling when I said that you
would permit me not to strip myself, and that you would not compel me
like the Lacedæmonians. But you appear to me to resemble Sciron[156]
rather. For the Lacedæmonians bid us either depart or strip; but you
seem to me to act rather like Antæus[157], for you do not let any one go
who approaches you until you have compelled him to strip and wrestle
with you in argument.
-----
Footnote 156:
A noted robber between Megara and Corinth, who used to throw all
travellers whom he fell in with into the sea. He was slain by Theseus.
Footnote 157:
Antæus dwelt in a cave in Lybia, and compelled all strangers who came
by to wrestle with him. He met with his match in Hercules, and was
slain.
-----
68. _Socr._ You have found out an admirable comparison for my disease,
Theodorus, though I am stronger than they were; for an innumerable
multitude of Herculeses and Theseuses, who were powerful in argument,
have met with me and beaten me heartily, but I do not desist any the
more, such a strange passion for this kind of exercise has got
possession of me. Do not you, therefore, refuse to have a fall with me,
and to benefit yourself and me at the same time.
_Theo._ I hold out no longer, but lead me wherever you please: I must
needs submit to the destiny that you weave for me, and be confuted.
However I shall not be able to give myself up to you further than you
proposed.
_Socr._ So far will be sufficient. And I beg of you observe this very
closely, that we do not, unawares, get into a puerile mode of talking,
and so let any one reproach us again for that.
_Theo._ I will endeavour, as far as I can.
69. _Socr._ First of all, then, let us impugn the argument which we did
before, and see whether we correctly or incorrectly find fault with and
reprobate the assertion, that every one is sufficient to himself with
respect to wisdom. Now Protagoras has conceded to us that some men excel
others with respect to better or worse, and those too who are wise: has
he not?
_Theo._ Yes.
_Socr._ If he then being present in person had agreed to this, and we in
assisting him had not made this concession in his behalf, there would be
no need to recur to it in order to confirm it; but now, perhaps, some
one may consider us incompetent to assent on his behalf, wherefore it
will be better to come to a more clear understanding on this point; for
it makes no small difference whether it is so or otherwise.
_Theo._ You say truly.
_Socr._ Not from others, then, but from his own statements, we may in
very few words get his assent.