_Socr._ For my part, Phædrus, I am not only myself a lover of these
divisions and generalisations, in order that I may be able both to speak
and think; but if I perceive any one else able to comprehend the one and
the many, as they are in nature, him “I follow behind as in the
footsteps of a god[132].” But whether I designate those who are able to
do this, rightly or not, God knows, however I have hitherto called them
dialecticians. But now, tell me by what name ought we to call those who
take lessons from you and Lysias? is this that art of speaking, by the
use of which Thrasymachus and others have become able speakers
themselves, and make others so who are willing to bring presents to
them, as to kings?
-----
Footnote 132:
See Homer’s Odyssey, v. 193.
-----
_Phæ._ They are indeed royal men, yet not skilled in the particulars
about which you enquire. However you appear to me to call this method
rightly, in calling it dialectical; but the rhetorical appears to me
still to escape us.
112. _Socr._ How say you? A fine thing indeed that must be, which is
destitute of this and yet can be apprehended by art. It must on no
account be neglected by you and me; but we must consider what is the
remaining part of rhetoric.
_Phæ._ There are indeed very many things, Socrates, which you will find
in the books written on the art of speaking.
_Socr._ You have reminded me very opportunely. The exordium, I think,
must first be spoken at the beginning of the speech. You mean these, do
you not? the refinements of the art?
_Phæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ And secondly a kind of narration, and evidence to support it;
thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities; and I think that a famous
Byzantian tricker-out of speeches mentions confirmation and
after-confirmation.
_Phæ._ Do you mean the excellent Theodorus?
_Socr._ I do. He says, too, that refutation and after-refutation must be
employed both in accusation and defence. And must we not adduce the most
illustrious Parian, Evenus, who first discovered subordinate intimations
and bye-praises? and some say that he put into metre bye-censures, to
assist the memory: for he is a wise man. 113. But shall we suffer Tisias
and Gorgias to sleep, who found out that probabilities were more to be
valued than truths, and who by force of words make small things appear
great, and great things small, and new things old, and the contrary new,
and who discovered a concise method of speaking and an infinite
prolixity on all subjects? When Prodicus once heard me tell this, he
laughed, and said that he alone had discovered what speeches are
required by art; that we require them neither long nor short, but of a
moderate length.
_Phæ._ Most wisely, Prodicus.
_Socr._ But do we not mention Hippias? for I think our Elean friend was
of the same opinion with him.
_Phæ._ Why not?
114. _Socr._ But how shall we describe Polus’s new-fangled method of
speaking, as his reduplication of words, his sentences, his similitudes,
and the words which Licymnius made him a present of, in order to produce
a graceful diction.
_Phæ._ But was not the system of Protagoras, Socrates, something of this
kind?
_Socr._ His was a correctness of diction, my boy, and many other fine
things besides, but in the art of dragging in speeches to excite
commiseration for old age and poverty, the Chalcedonian hero appears to
me to have carried off the palm. He was moreover a powerful man to rouse
the anger of the multitude, and again, when enraged, to soothe them by
enchantment, as he used to say; he was most skilful in raising and
removing calumnies, on any ground whatever. But all seem to agree in the
same opinion with respect to the conclusion of speeches, to which some
have given the name of recapitulation, others a different name.
_Phæ._ You mean the summarily reminding the hearers, at the conclusion,
of the several things that have been said.
115. _Socr._ I mean that, and now consider if you have any thing else to
say about the art of speaking.
_Phæ._ Only some trifling things, and not worth mentioning.
_Socr._ Let us pass over trifles; and rather examine these things in the
clear light, and see what influence they have in art, and on what
occasion.
_Phæ._ A very powerful influence, Socrates, at least in assemblies of
the people.
_Socr._ They have indeed. But, my admirable friend, do you also observe
whether their web does not appear to you to be very wide as it does to
me.
_Phæ._ Explain what you mean.
_Socr._ Tell me then: If any one should go to your friend Eryximachus,
or his father Acumenus, and should say, “I know how to apply such things
to the body, as will make it warm or cold, as I please, and if I think
proper, I can produce vomitings, and again purgings, and many other
things of the kind, and as I know these things I consider myself a
physician, and that I can make any one else so, to whom I impart the
knowledge of these particulars:” what do you think they would say on
hearing this?
_Phæ._ What else, but ask him if he knew besides to what persons, and
when, and how far, he ought to do each of these things?
116. _Socr._ If then, he should say, “Not in the least; but I expect
that he who should learn these things from me, would be able to do what
you ask?”
_Phæ._ He would say, I think, that the man is mad; and that, having
heard from some book or other, or having met with certain drugs, he
fancies that he has become a physician, though he knows nothing at all
about the art.
_Socr._ But what if any one were to go to Sophocles and Euripides, and
tell them, that he knew how to make very long speeches on a trifling
subject, and very short ones on a great subject, and whenever he
pleased, piteous and contrariwise, terrible and threatening speeches,
and other things of the kind, and that by teaching these he thought he
could impart the power of writing tragedy?
117. _Phæ._ They too, I think, Socrates, would laugh, if any one should
suppose that tragedy was any thing else than the composition of all
these, so disposed as to be consistent with each other and the whole.
_Socr._ But, I think, they would not upbraid him rudely, but as a
musician, who happened to meet with a man who believes himself to be
skilled in harmony, because he knows how to make the highest and lowest
note, would not harshly say to him, “Miserable fellow, you are stark
mad;” but, being a musician, he would speak more mildly; “My excellent
man, it is indeed necessary for one who means to be skilled in harmony,
to know these things, but at the same time there is nothing to hinder a
person from possessing the knowledge you have without his understanding
harmony in the least; for you know what is necessary to be learnt before
harmony, but not harmony itself.”
_Phæ._ Most correctly.
118. _Socr._ In like manner, Sophocles might reply to the person who
displayed his learning to them, that he knew the things before tragedy,
but not tragedy itself; and Acumenus, that the medical pretender knew
things before medicine, but not medicine itself.
_Phæ._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ But what must we think the sweet-voiced Adrastus, or even
Pericles would do, if they were to hear of the beautiful contrivances
which we have just now enumerated, the short sentences and similitudes,
and all the rest, which when we went through them, we said must be
examined by the clear light, whether they, as you and I did, would
rudely make some ill-mannered remark against those who had written and
who teach such things as if they constituted the art of rhetoric, or, as
being wiser than we are, would they not reprove us, saying, 119.
“Phædrus and Socrates, you ought not to be angry with, but rather to
excuse those who, through being ignorant of dialectics, are unable to
define what rhetoric is, and who, in consequence of this ignorance,
possessing the things necessary to be learnt preparatory to the art,
think that they have discovered rhetoric itself, and, suppose that by
teaching these things to others, they can teach them rhetoric in
perfection; but how each of them is to be used persuasively, and the
whole combined together, this, as being of no consequence in the world,
they think their pupils ought to acquire for themselves in composing
their speeches.”
_Phæ._ Such indeed, Socrates, appears to be the case with the art which
these men teach and write about as rhetoric; and you seem to me to have
spoken the truth: but how and from whence can one acquire the art of
true rhetoric and persuasion?
120. _Socr._ The ability, Phædrus, to become a perfect proficient,
probably, or rather necessarily, depends on the same things as in other
cases: for, if you naturally possess rhetorical abilities, you will be a
distinguished orator by adding science and practice; but in whichever of
these you are deficient, in that respect you will be imperfect. But so
far as it is an art, its method, I think, will not be found in the way
that Lysias and Thrasymachus are proceeding.
_Phæ._ In what way then?
_Socr._ Pericles, my excellent friend, appears, with good reason, to
have been the most perfect of all men in rhetoric.
_Phæ._ How so?
_Socr._ All the great arts require a subtle and speculative research
into the law of nature: for that loftiness of thought and perfect
mastery over every subject seems to be derived from some such source as
this; which Pericles possessed in addition to a great natural genius.
For meeting, I think, with Anaxagoras, who was a person of this kind,
and being filled with speculative research, and having arrived at the
nature of intelligence and want of intelligence, about which Anaxagoras
made that long discourse, he drew from thence to the art of speaking
whatever could contribute to its advantage.