_Socr._ Is it possible, then, that one, who is ignorant of what is the
nature of each particular thing, should have sufficient art to bring
over any one by degrees by leading him through means of resemblances,
from each several truth to its opposite, or himself to escape from being
so led?
_Phæ._ Never.
_Socr._ He therefore, my friend, who does not know the truth, but hunts
after opinions, will, as it appears, produce but a ridiculous and
inartistic art of speaking.
_Phæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ Are you willing, then, in the speech of Lysias, which you have
with you, and in those which I delivered, to look for instances of what
I assert is inartistic and artistic?
_Phæ._ I should like it of all things; for now we are speaking in a bald
sort of way, for want of sufficient examples.
100. _Socr._ And, indeed, by some lucky chance, as it seems, two
speeches have been made which furnish examples, of how one who is
acquainted with the truth, while he is jesting in his arguments, can
lead his hearers astray. And for my part, Phædrus, I attribute that to
the deities of the spot. Perhaps, also, the interpreters of the Muses,
the songsters over head, have inspired us with this gift; for I at least
have no part in any art of speaking.
_Phæ._ Be it as you say, only make your meaning clear.
_Socr._ Come then, read out to me the beginning of Lysias’s speech.
100. _Phæ._ “You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and I
think you have heard that it would be for our advantage if this took
place. And I claim, not for this reason to fail in my request, because I
do not happen to be one of your lovers: for they repent”—
_Socr._ Stop. We are to say, then, in what he errs, and acts
inartistically: are we not?
_Phæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ Now is it not plain to every one, that in some things of this
kind we are agreed, on others at variance?
_Phæ._ I think I understand what you mean; but explain yourself still
more clearly.
_Socr._ When any one pronounces the word iron or silver, do we not all
understand the same thing?
_Phæ._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ But what when any one pronounces the word just, or good? are we
not carried different ways, and do we not differ both with one another
and with ourselves?
_Phæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ In some things, therefore, we agree, in others not.
_Phæ._ Just so.
_Socr._ In which class of things, then, are we more easily deceived? and
in which of the two has rhetoric greater power?
_Phæ._ Clearly in that in which we are easily led astray.
102. _Socr._ He, therefore, who means to pursue the art of rhetoric,
ought first of all to have distinguished these methodically, and to have
discovered a certain character of each species, both of that in which
the generality of men must necessarily be led astray, and of that in
which that is not the case.
_Phæ._ He who has attained to this, Socrates, will have devised a noble
classification of species.
_Socr._ Then, I think, when he comes to each particular case, he ought
not to be at a loss, but should perceive quickly to which of the two
classes the subject, on which he is going to speak, belongs.
_Phæ._ How not?
_Socr._ What then with respect to Love? shall we say that he belongs to
things doubtful, or to such as are not so?
_Phæ._ To things doubtful, surely; otherwise do you think he would have
allowed you to say what you just now said about him, that he is both a
mischief to the beloved and the lover, and again, that he is the
greatest of blessings?
_Socr._ You speak admirably. But tell me this too, for from being
carried away by enthusiasm, I do not quite remember whether I defined
love at the beginning of my speech.
_Phæ._ By Jupiter you did, and with wonderful accuracy.
103. _Socr._ Alas; how much more artistic in speech-making do you say
the nymphs of Acheloüs and Pan son of Mercury are than Lysias son of
Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias too, in the beginning of his
love-speech, compel us to conceive of Love, as some one particular
thing, which he wished it to be, and then complete all the rest of his
speech in accordance with this? Are you willing that we should read over
again the beginning of his speech?
_Phæ._ If you wish it; though what you seek is not there.
_Socr._ Read, however, that I may hear him in person.
104. _Phæ._ “You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and I
think you have heard, that it would be for our advantage if this took
place. And I claim, not for this reason to fail in my request, because I
do not happen to be one of your lovers: for they repent of the benefits
they have conferred, as soon as their desires cease.”
_Socr._ He seems to be far indeed from doing what we are seeking for,
since in making his speech he attempts to swim backwards, with his face
uppermost, not setting out from the beginning, but from the end, and he
begins with what the lover would say to his favourite at the close of
his speech. Have I said nothing to the purpose, Phædrus, my dear friend?
_Phæ._ It is indeed, Socrates, the end of the subject about which he is
speaking.
105. _Socr._ But what as to the rest? do not the other parts of the
speech appear to have been put together at random? or does it appear
that what is said in the second place ought from any necessity to have
been placed second, or any thing else that he said? For it seems to me,
who however know nothing about the matter, that the writer has without
any scruple said whatever came uppermost, But do you know of any rule in
speech-writing, in conformity to which he disposed his sentences in the
order he has done one after another?
_Phæ._ You are pleasant, in supposing that I am able to see through his
compositions so accurately.
_Socr._ But this at least I think you will allow, that every speech
ought to be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own,
so as to be neither without head, nor without feet, but to have both a
middle and extremities, described proportionately to each other and to
the whole.