Callicles and Polus, two friends of Gorgias, the famous orator of
Leontium in Sicily, happening to meet with Socrates and Chærephon, tell
the former that he has sustained a great loss in not having been just
now present when Gorgias was exhibiting his art. Chærephon admits that
the fault is his, but adds that as Gorgias is his friend he can easily
persuade him to exhibit to them either then, or at a future time. They
accordingly, all four, adjourn to the house of Callicles, where Gorgias
is staying. When arrived there, Chærephon, at the suggestion of
Socrates, proposes to question Gorgias as to the art he professes; but
Polus, his pupil, somewhat impertinently offers to answer for him, on
the ground that Gorgias is fatigued. Chærephon therefore asks, what is
the art in which Gorgias is skilled, and what he ought to be called? To
which Polus answers, “the finest of the arts.” Socrates, not satisfied
with this, as being no answer at all, begs Gorgias himself to answer. He
says, that rhetoric is the art he professes, and that he is a
rhetorician, and able to make others rhetoricians[45].
-----
Footnote 45:
§ 1-7.
-----
Socrates, having got Gorgias to promise that he would answer briefly,
proceeds to ask him about what rhetoric is employed, and of what it is
the science. Gorgias says, “of words,” but Socrates shews, that other
arts, in various degrees, make use of words, and that some, such as
arithmetic and geometry, are altogether conversant with words; he
therefore requests him to distinguish between these arts and rhetoric,
and to explain about what particular thing these words are employed.
Gorgias confidently answers, about “the greatest of all human concerns
and the best.” But the physician, the teacher of gymnastics, the
money-getter, in short all men, would say that the end which their own
art aims at is the best; what then is this good which you say is the
greatest good to men? Gorgias answers, that it is the power of
persuading by words. But Socrates objects that other arts do the same,
for that every one who teaches any thing persuades what he teaches; you
must therefore say of what kind of persuasion, and on what subject
rhetoric is the art. It is that which is produced in courts of justice,
and other public assemblies, and relates to matters that are just and
unjust. But here again Socrates makes Gorgias admit, that there are two
kinds of persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge, the
other that produces knowledge; which of these two then does rhetoric
produce? doubtless the former. But supposing the question is about the
choice of physicians or shipwrights, or the building of walls, or the
construction of ports or docks, will a rhetorician be consulted, or a
person skilled in these several matters? Here Gorgias answers that on
these and all other subjects a rhetorician will speak more persuasively
than any other artist whatever: but it is his duty to use his art
justly; though if he uses it unjustly, he and not his teacher is to
blame[46].
-----
Footnote 46:
§ 8-28.
-----
Socrates, here, perceiving an inconsistency in Gorgias’ statement, after
deprecating his being offended at the course the discussion might take,
asks whether by saying that a rhetorician can speak more persuasively to
the multitude on any art, than a person skilled in that art, he does not
mean the ignorant by the multitude; and, that being admitted, whether it
does not follow that one who is ignorant will be more capable of
persuading the ignorant, than one who possesses knowledge? Gorgias
allows this to be the case. Is the case, then, the same with respect to
what is just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil? Can a
rhetorician persuade the multitude on these subjects, himself being
ignorant of them, or must he know them before he learns rhetoric, or
will the teacher of rhetoric instruct him in these? Gorgias professes
that if a pupil does not know these things he would learn them from him.
But surely he who has learnt carpentering is a carpenter, music a
musician, medicine a physician; does it not follow then, that he who has
learnt justice, must be just, and wish to do just actions? Gorgias
admits this too: and yet he had just now allowed that a rhetorician
might make an unjust use of his art, and said, that in that case, the
teacher ought not to be blamed, but the person who acts unjustly ought
to be punished[47].
-----
Footnote 47:
§ 29-37.
-----
At this point Polus takes up the discussion, and having elected to ask
questions, instead of answering them, begins by asking Socrates what
kind of art he considers rhetoric to be. Socrates answers that he does
not think it is any art at all, but a kind of skill, employed for
procuring gratification and pleasure: in other words, a species of
flattery, of which there are many divisions. Polus asks what division it
is. “Rhetoric, in my opinion,” says Socrates, “is a semblance of a
division of the political art,” and as such is base. This answer,
however, is not intelligible either to Gorgias or Polus; at the request
of the former, therefore, Socrates explains himself more clearly[48].
-----
Footnote 48:
§ 38-43.
-----
As there are two kinds of subject matter, he says, namely, soul and
body, so there are two arts, that which relates to the soul is
political; the other, relating to the body, he is not able to describe
by one name, but there are two divisions of it, gymnastics and medicine.
In the political art legislation corresponds to gymnastics, and the
judicial art to medicine. But flattery, perceiving that these four take
the best possible care of the soul and body respectively, has divided
itself fourfold, and feigns itself to be what it pretends, not really
caring for what is best, but seducing ignorance by means of pleasure.
Thus cookery puts on the garb of medicine, and pretends that it knows
the aliment best for the body; and again, personal decoration feigns
itself to be gymnastics. Then, he adds, what personal decoration is to
gymnastics, that is sophistry to legislation, and what cookery is to
medicine, that is rhetoric to justice; and so being proximate to each
other, sophists and rhetoricians are confounded with legislators and
judges[49].
-----
Footnote 49:
§ 44-47.
-----
Are good rhetoricians, then, asks Polus, to be esteemed as vile
flatterers in cities? Socrates replies that they appear to him to be of
no estimation at all. But have they not the greatest power in cities?
Not, if to have power is a good to him who possesses it. For what is it
to have power? is it to do what one wishes, or what appears to one to be
best? Polus admits that it is not good for a person devoid of
understanding to do what appears to him to be best. He must therefore
prove that rhetoricians possess understanding, otherwise, since to have
power is a good, they cannot do what they wish. Polus, however, is
unable to distinguish between doing what one wishes and doing what
appears to be best, and therefore agrees to change positions with
Socrates, and to answer instead of asking questions[50].
-----
Footnote 50:
§ 48-50.
-----
Socrates, then, asks, do men wish what they do for the sake of the thing
itself, or for some other end? for instance, do men take medicine
because they wish to take it, or in order to health? Again, do men incur
the perils of the sea because they wish to be in peril, or for the sake
of riches? Clearly the latter, in both and all similar cases. Now some
things, such as wisdom, health, and riches, are good, but their
contraries evil; but whatever we do, we do for the sake of that which is
good. So that if we kill or banish a person, if it is good to do so, we
wish it, and do what we wish; but if it is really evil, though it
appears to us to be good, we do not what we wish. Polus sees the force
of Socrates’ argument, and can only object to it that Socrates himself
would like to do what he pleased, and would envy another whom he saw
slaying, or spoiling, or imprisoning whom he pleased. But Socrates
resolutely denies this, and insists that if he must necessarily either
act unjustly or suffer unjustly, he should choose the latter; for that
it is better to suffer than to commit injustice[51].
-----
Footnote 51:
§ 51-57.
-----
Polus imagines that even a child could confute such a position as this;
and in order to do so mentions instances of men whom all have accounted
happy, though they were unjust, especially that of Archelaus, king of
Macedonia. But Socrates denies that any one who acts unjustly can be
happy; and further than this, he contends that a person who acts
unjustly, and does not suffer punishment, is more miserable than one who
meets with punishment for his injustice. To prove this he argues that it
is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it, and if more base it
must also be worse; Polus admits the premise, but denies the conclusion.
Socrates, therefore, endeavours to make his opponent admit this also by
the following arguments. Beautiful things are esteemed beautiful, either
on account of their usefulness, or the pleasure they occasion, or both;
and in like manner base things are deemed base on account of the pain or
evil they occasion, or both; so that when of two things one is more
beautiful than the other, it is so because it excels in pleasure or
utility, or both; and when of two things one is more base, it must be
because it exceeds in pain or evil. But Polus has already admitted that
it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it; it must therefore
be so because it exceeds in pain or evil, or both. But to commit
injustice does not exceed the suffering it, in pain; it remains,
therefore, that it must exceed it in evil: consequently it must be
worse, for whatever exceeds another thing in evil must necessarily be
worse[52].
-----
Footnote 52:
§ 58-69.
-----
Having established his point thus far he now goes on to prove that it is
the greatest of evils for one who has committed injustice not to be
punished. To suffer punishment and to be justly chastised, are one and
the same thing. But all just things are beautiful. Moreover wherever
there is an agent there must also be a patient; and the patient suffers
what the agent does; so that if the agent punishes justly the patient
also suffers justly. But it has been just admitted that all just things
are beautiful; and it was proved before that all beautiful things are
good, either because they are pleasant or useful; whence it follows that
he who is punished suffers that which is good, and is benefited in being
freed from the greatest evil, which is depravity in the soul. From all
this it is evident that rhetoric can be of no use whatever: for it is
generally employed for the purpose of excusing injustice, and screening
men from the punishment they deserve, which on the contrary they ought
rather to court than to shun[53].
-----
Footnote 53:
§ 70-80
-----
Polus having been thus completely silenced, Callicles takes up the
argument and begins by asking whether Socrates is really in earnest.
Finding that he is so, he blames Polus for having granted that it is
more base to commit injustice than to suffer it; for that there is a
difference between nature and law, which Socrates perceiving, confounded
that which is more base by nature with that which is so by law, and so
made that which is more base by law appear to be more so by nature:
whereas by nature it is more base to suffer injustice than to commit it.
For the weak and the many make laws with a view to their own advantage,
but nature herself avows that it is just that the better should have
more than the worse, and the more powerful than the weaker. Callicles
then proceeds to inveigh against philosophy and philosophers, and when
he has done, Socrates, after having indulged in a vein of pleasant irony
at his expense, returns to the subject, and asks what he means by the
superior, the better, and the stronger, whether they are the same or
different. Callicles says they are the same. Socrates objects, that if
that is the case the many being stronger are also the better, and so,
inasmuch as they make the laws, law and nature are not contrary to each
other. Callicles therefore is compelled to change his ground, and next
says that by the better and superior he means the more wise: and at last
he says that they are those who are skilled and courageous in
administering the affairs of a city. He adds that it is just that the
governors should have more than the governed. Socrates, hereupon, asks
whether they ought not to govern themselves also and be temperate, which
elicits from Callicles the shameless avowal that a man should have as
large desires as he can, and indulge them without restraint[54].
-----
Footnote 54:
§ 81-103.
-----
Socrates having in vain endeavoured to persuade Callicles to change his
opinion by two similitudes of a perforated cask, and a full and an empty
one, to which he compares the soul, proceeds to combat his assertion
that a happy life consists in having and indulging as large desires as
possible. If happiness consists in being hungry and eating, thirsty and
drinking, it must follow that to be scabby and itch and scratch one’s
self is to live happily. Callicles is forced to admit that this is to
live pleasantly, and then if pleasantly, happily; and at length is
driven to assert that the pleasant and the good are the same. In order
to confute this opinion, Socrates leads him to maintain that science and
courage differ from each other and from the good; and then by a series
of most subtle questions, too minute to be abbreviated, forces him to
this absurd conclusion, that if the pleasant and the good are the same,
a bad man, inasmuch as he oftentimes receives more pleasure than a good
man, must be accounted better than a good one[55].
-----
Footnote 55:
§ 104-117.
-----
Callicles to evade this absurdity is compelled to admit that some
pleasures are better than others. From this concession Socrates shews
that the end of all human actions is the good and not the pleasant; for
that so far is it from being the case that we do any thing merely for
the sake of pleasure, that we pursue pleasure itself for the sake of the
good[56].
-----
Footnote 56:
§ 118-119.
-----
Having established this point, Socrates brings back the discussion to
the original subject, and proposes to enquire whether it is better to
live in such a manner as Callicles advises, namely to devote one’s self
to public business and to study rhetoric, or in such a manner as
philosophy persuades. He recurs therefore to his own former arguments,
in which he stated that as there are certain skills, not arts, employed
for the gratification of the body, so there are other corresponding ones
made use of to please the soul, such as flute-playing, harp-playing,
dithyrambic and even tragic poetry; now take from these last melody,
rhythm and measure, and what else remains but words, that is to say a
kind of flattery addressed to the multitude? And is not popular rhetoric
similar? Callicles answers that there is a difference to be observed in
this respect, for that some do, as Socrates has observed, speak only in
order to please, but that others look to the interest of the citizens.
“That is enough,” says Socrates. At all events one part of rhetoric is
flattery, and when has an instance of that which is honourable, which
strives to speak what is best, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to
the hearers, ever been seen? Callicles instances Themistocles, Cimon,
Miltiades and Pericles, but Socrates will by no means admit that any of
these really endeavoured to make the people better. But before this,
Callicles, being hard pressed in argument, breaks off the discussion,
and Socrates, at the request of Gorgias, carries it on by himself, and
shews at length and with great force and perspicuity the advantages of a
virtuous and well regulated life; and in conclusion he describes the
future judgment when each man will give account of himself in another
world, and be rewarded or punished according as he has lived a good or a
bad life.