122. “How should I not?” he replied.

“Observe then,” said he, “what I wish to prove. It is this, that it

appears, not only that these contraries do not admit each other, but

that even such things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always

possess contraries, do not appear to admit that idea which is contrary

to the idea that exists in themselves, but, when it approaches, perish

or depart. Shall we not allow that the number three would first perish,

and suffer any thing whatever, rather than endure, while it is still

three, to become even?”

“Most certainly,” said Cebes.

“And yet,” said he, “the number two is not contrary to three.”

“Surely not.”

“Not only, then, do ideas that are contrary never allow the approach of

each other, but some other things also do not allow the approach of

contraries.”

“You say very truly,” he replied.

“Do you wish, then,” he said, “that, if we are able, we should define

what these things are?”

“Certainly.”

“Would they not then, Cebes,” he said, “be such things as whatever they

occupy, compel that thing not only to retain its own idea, but also that

of something which is always a contrary?”

“How do you mean?”

123. “As we just now said. For you know surely, that whatever things the

idea of three occupies must of necessity not only be three, but also

odd?”

“Certainly.”

“To such a thing, then, we assert, that the idea contrary to that form

which constitutes this can never come.”

“It cannot.”

“But did the odd make it so?”

“Yes.”

“And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?”

“Yes.”

“The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three?”

“No surely.”

“Three, then, has no part in the even?”

“None whatever.”

“The number three is uneven?”

“Yes.”

“What therefore I said should be defined, namely, what things they are

which, though not contrary to some particular thing, yet do not admit of

the contrary itself, as in the present instance, the number three though

not contrary to the even, does not any the more admit it, for it always

brings the contrary with it, just as the number two does to the odd,

fire to cold, and many other particulars, consider then, whether you

would thus define, not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary,

but also that that which brings with it a contrary to that to which it

approaches, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with

it. 124. But call it to mind again, for it will not be useless to hear

it often repeated. Five will not admit the idea of the even, nor ten,

its double, that of the odd. This double then, though it is itself

contrary to something else[38], yet will not admit the idea of the odd;

nor will half as much again, nor other things of the kind, such as the

half and the third part admit the idea of the whole, if you follow me

and agree with me that it is so.”

“I entirely agree with you,” he said, “and follow you.”

“Tell me again, then,” he said, “from the beginning; and do not answer

me in the terms in which I put the question, but in different ones,

imitating my example. For I say this because, besides that safe mode of

answering, which I mentioned at first[39], from what has now been said,

I see another no less safe one. For if you should ask me what that is,

which if it be in the body will cause it to be hot, I should not give

you that safe but unlearned answer, that it is heat, but one more

elegant, from what we have just now said, that it is fire: nor, if you

should ask me what that is, which if it be in the body, will cause it to

be diseased, should I say that it is disease, but fever; nor, if you

should ask what that is, which if it be in number, will cause it to be

odd, should I say that it is unevenness, but unity, and so with other

things. But consider whether you sufficiently understand what I mean.”

The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) · 第 43 / 147 题