119. “It appears so to me,” said Cebes, “in every respect.”

But some one of those present, on hearing this, I do not clearly

remember who he was, said, “By the gods, was not the very contrary of

what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our discussion, that

the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater,

and in a word, that the very production of contraries is from

contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that this can never

be the case.”

Upon this Socrates, having leant his head forward and listened, said,

“You have reminded me in a manly way; you do not, however, perceive the

difference between what is now and what was then asserted. For then it

was said, that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary; but now,

that a contrary can never become contrary to itself, neither that which

is in us, nor that which is in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke of

things that have contraries, calling them by the appellation of those

things; but now we are speaking of those very things, from the presence

of which things so called receive their appellation, and of these very

things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production from

each other.” 120. And, at the same time looking at Cebes, “Has any thing

that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?”

“Indeed,” said Cebes, “I am not at all so disposed; however, I by no

means say that there are not many things that disturb me.”

“Then,” he continued, “we have quite agreed to this, that a contrary can

never be contrary to itself.”

“Most certainly,” he replied.

“But further,” he said, “consider whether you will agree with me in this

also. Do you call heat and cold any thing?”

“I do.”

“The same as snow and fire?”

“By Jupiter, I do not.”

“But heat is something different from fire, and cold something different

from snow?”

“Yes.”

“But this, I think, is apparent to you, that snow, while it is snow, can

never, when it has admitted heat, as we said before, continue to be what

it was, snow and hot, but, on the approach of heat, it must either

withdraw or perish?”

“Certainly.”

“And again, that fire, when cold approaches it, must either depart or

perish; but that it will never endure, when it has admitted coldness, to

continue what it was, fire and cold?”

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