We are told that "the provincial constitutions have no principle of

stability within themselves." This is so great a mistake, that there

is not more order, or stability in any government upon the globe,

than there ever has been in that of Connecticut. The same may be

said of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania; and indeed of the others

very nearly. "That these constitutions in turbulent times would

become wholly monarchial, or wholly republican;" they must be such

times as would have a similar effect upon the constitution at home.

But in order to avoid the danger of this, what is to be done? Not

give us an English constitution, it seems, but make sure of us at

once, by giving us constitutions wholly monarchical, annihilating

our houses of representatives first, by taking from them the support

of government, &c. and then making the councils and judges wholly

dependant on the crown.

That a representation in parliament is impracticable we all agree:

but the consequence is, that we must have a representation in our

supreme legislatures here. This was the consequence that was drawn by

kings, ministers, our ancestors, and the whole nation, more than a

century ago, when the colonies were first settled, and continued to

be the general sense until the last peace; and it must be the general

sense again soon, or Great Britain will lose her colonies.

This is apparently the meaning of that celebrated passage in Gov.

Hutchinson's letter, that rung through the continent, viz. "There

must be an abridgment of what is called English liberties." But all

the art and subtlety of Massachusettensis will never vindicate or

excuse that expression. According to this writer, it should have

been "there is an abridgment of English liberties, and it cannot

be otherwise." But every candid reader must see that the letter

writer had more than that in his _view_ and in his _wishes_. In the

same letter, a little before, he says, "what marks of resentment

the parliament will shew, whether they will be upon the province in

general, or particular persons, is extremely uncertain; but that they

will be placed somewhere is most certain, and I add, _because I think

it ought to be so_." Is it possible to read this without thinking

of the port bill, the charter bill, and the resolves for sending

persons to England by the statute of Henry VIII. to be tried! But

this is not all. "This is most certainly a crisis," says he, &c. "If

no measure shall have been taken to secure this dependence, (i.e.

the dependence which a colony ought to have upon the parent state)

it is all over with us." "The friends of government will be utterly

disheartened; and the friends of anarchy will be afraid of nothing,

be it ever so extravagant." But this is not all. "I never think of

the measures necessary for the peace and good order of the colonies

without pain." "There must be an abridgment of what are called

English liberties." What could he mean? Any thing less than depriving

us of trial by jury? Perhaps he wanted an act of parliament to try

persons here for treason by a court of admiralty. Perhaps an act that

the province should be governed by a governor and a mandamus council,

without an house of representatives. But to put it out of all doubt

that his meaning was much worse than Massachusettensis endeavors to

make it, he explains himself in a subsequent part of the letter. "I

wish," says he, "the good of the colony, _when I wish to see some

further restraint of liberty_." Here it is rendered certain, that he

is pleading for a further restraint of liberty, not explaining the

restraint, he apprehended the constitution had already laid us under.

My indignation at this letter, has sometimes been softened by

compassion. It carries on the face of it evident marks of _madness_.

It was written in such a transport of passions, _ambition_ and

_revenge_ chiefly, that his reason was manifestly overpowered. The

vessel was tost in such a hurricane, that she could not feel her

helm. Indeed, he seems to have had a confused consciousness of this

himself. Pardon me this excursion, says he, it really proceeds from

the state of mind into which our perplexed affairs often throws me."

"It is our highest interest to continue a part of the British

empire; and equally our duty to remain subject to the authority of

parliament," says Massachusettensis.

We are a part of the British dominions, that is of the king of Great

Britain, and it is our interest and duty to continue so. It is

equally our interest and duty to continue subject to the authority

of parliament, in the regulation of our trade, as long as she shall

leave us to govern our internal policy, and to give and grant our own

money, and no longer.

This letter concludes with an agreeable flight of fancy. The time

may not be so far off, however, as this writer imagines, when the

colonies may have the balance of numbers and wealth in her favour.

But when that shall happen, if we should attempt to rule her by an

American parliament, without an adequate representation in it, she

will infallibly resist us by her arms.

NOVANGLUS.

ADDRESSED

_To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay_,

March 13, 1775.

MY FRIENDS,

It has been often observed by me, and it cannot be too often

repeated, that _colonization_ is _casus omissus_ at common law. There

is no such title known in that law. By common law, I mean that system

of customs, written and unwritten, which was known and in force in

England, in the time of king Richard 1st. This continued to be the

case, down to the reign of Elizabeth, and king James 1st. In all that

time, the laws of England were confined to the realm, and within the

four seas. There was no provision made in this law for governing

colonies beyond the Atlantic, or beyond the four seas, by authority

of parliament, no nor for the king to grant charters to subjects

to settle in foreign countries. It was the king's prerogative to

prohibit the emigration of any of his subjects, by issuing his writ

_ne exeat regno_. And therefore it was in the king's power to permit

his subjects to leave the kingdom. 1 Hawk. P.C. c. 22. § 4. "It is a

high crime to disobey the king's lawful commands, or prohibitions,

as not returning from beyond sea, upon the king's letters to that

purpose; for which the offender's lands shall be seized until he

return; and when he does return, he shall be fined, &c. or going

beyond sea, against the king's will, expressly signified, either

by the writ _ne exeat regno_, or under the great or privy seal, or

signet, or by proclamation." When a subject left the kingdom, by the

king's permission, and if the nation did not remonstrate against

it, by the nation's permission too, at least connivance, he carried

with him, as a man, all the rights of nature. His allegiance bound

him to the king, and entitled him to protection. But how? not in

France; the king of England was not bound to protect him in France,

nor in America; not in the dominions of Lewis, nor of Passachus, or

Massachusetts. He had a right to protection, and the liberties of

England upon his return there, not otherwise. How then do we, New

Englandmen, derive our laws? I say, not from parliament, not from

common law, but from the law of nature, and the compact made with the

king in our charters. Our ancestors were entitled to the common law

of England, when they emigrated, that is, to just so much of it as

they pleased to adopt, and no more. They were not bound or obliged to

submit to it, unless they chose it. By a positive principle of the

common law, they were bound, let them be in what part of the world

they would, to do nothing against the allegiance of the king. But

no kind of provision was ever made by common law, for punishing or

trying any man, even for treason, committed out of the realm. He must

be tried in some county of the realm, by that law, the county where

the overt-act was done, or he could not be tried at all. Nor was

any provision ever made, until the reign of Henry VIII. for trying

treasons committed abroad, and the acts of that reign were made on

purpose to catch cardinal Pole.

So that our ancestors, when they emigrated, having obtained

permission of the king to come here, and being never commanded to

return into the realm, had a clear right to have erected in this

wilderness a British constitution, or a perfect democracy, or any

other form of government they saw fit. They indeed, while they lived,

could not have taken arms against the king of England, without

violating their allegiance, but their children would not have been

born within the king's allegiance, would not have been natural

subjects, and consequently not entitled to protection, or bound to

the king.

Massachusettensis, Jan. 16, seems possessed of these ideas, and

attempts in the most aukward manner, to get rid of them. He is

conscious that America must be a part of the realm, before it can

be bound by the authority of parliament; and therefore is obliged

to suggest, that we are annexed to the realm, and to endeavour to

confuse himself and his readers, by confounding the realm, with the

empire and dominions.

But will any man soberly contend, that America was ever annexed to

the realm? to what realm? When New England was settled, there was a

realm of England, a realm of Scotland, and a realm of Ireland. To

which of these three realms was New England annexed? To the realm

of England, it will be said. But by what law? no territory could be

annexed to the realm of England, but by an act of parliament. Acts

of parliament have been passed to annex Wales, &c. &c. to the realm.

But none ever passed to annex America. But if New-England was annexed

to the realm of England, how came she annexed to the realm of, or

kingdom of Great Britain? The two realms of England and Scotland

were, by the act of union, incorporated into one kingdom by the name

of Great Britain: but there is not one word about America in that act.

Besides, if America was annexed to the realm, or a part of the

kingdom, every act of parliament that is made, would extend to

it, named or not named. But every body knows that every act of

parliament, and every other record, constantly distinguishes between

this kingdom, and his majesty's other dominions. Will it be said

that Ireland is annexed to the realm, or a part of the kingdom of

Great Britain? Ireland is a distinct kingdom, or realm, by itself,

notwithstanding British parliament claims a right of binding it in

all cases, and exercises it in some. And even so the Massachusetts

is a realm, New York is a realm, Pennsylvania another realm, to all

intents and purposes, as much as Ireland is, or England or Scotland

ever were. The king of Great Britain is the sovereign of all these

realms.

This writer says, "that in denying that the Colonies are annexed to

the realm, and subject to the authority of parliament, individuals

and bodies of men subvert the fundamentals of government, deprive us

of British liberties, and build up absolute monarchy in the colonies."

This is the first time that I ever heard or read that the colonies

are annexed to the realm. It is utterly denied that they are, and

that it is possible they should be, without an act of parliament, and

acts of the colonies. Such an act of parliament cannot be produced,

nor any such law of any one colony. Therefore as this writer builds

the whole authority of parliament upon this fact, viz: That the

colonies are annexed to the realm, and as it is certain they never

were so annexed, the consequence is, that his whole superstructure

falls.

When he says, that they subvert the fundamentals of government,

he begs the question. We say that the contrary doctrines subvert

the fundamentals of government. When he says that they deprive us

of British liberties, he begs the question again. We say that the

contrary doctrine deprives us of English liberties; as to British

liberties, we scarcely know what they are, as the liberties of

England and Scotland are not precisely the same to this day. English

liberties are but certain rights of nature, reserved to the citizen,

by the English constitution, which rights cleaved to our ancestors,

when they crossed the Atlantic, and would have inhered in them, if

instead of coming to New-England they had gone to Outaheite, or

Patagonia, even although they had taken no patent or charter from

the king at all. These rights did not adhere to them the less, for

their purchasing patents and charters, in which the king expressly

stipulates with them, that they and their posterity should forever

enjoy all those rights and liberties.

The human mind is not naturally the clearest atmosphere; but the

clouds and vapours which have been raised in it, by the artifices

of temporal and spiritual tyrants, have made it impossible to see

objects in it distinctly. Scarcely any thing is involved in more

systematical obscurity, than the rights of our ancestors, when they

arrived in America. How, in common sense, came the dominions of king

Philip, king Massachusetts, and twenty other sovereigns, independent

princes here, to be within the allegiance of the kings of England,

James and Charles? America was no more within the allegiance of those

princes, by the common law of England, or by the law of nature, than

France and Spain were. Discovery, if that was incontestible, could

give no title to the English king, by common law, or by the law of

nature, to the lands, tenements, and hereditaments of the native

Indians here. Our ancestors were sensible of this, and therefore

honestly purchased their lands of the natives. They might have bought

them to hold allodially, if they would.

But there were two ideas, which confused them, and have continued

to confuse their posterity, one derived from the feudal, the other

from the canon law. By the former of these systems, the prince,

the general, was supposed to be sovereign lord of all the lands,

conquered by the soldiers in his army; and upon this principle, the

king of England was considered in law as sovereign lord of all the

land within the realm. If he had sent an army here to conquer king

Massachusetts, and it had succeeded, he would have been sovereign

lord of the land here upon these principles; but there was no rule of

the common law, that made the discovery of a country by a subject,

a title to that country in the prince. But conquest would not have

annexed the country to the realm, nor have given any authority to

the parliament. But there was another mist cast before the eyes of

the English nation from another source. The pope claimed a sovereign

propriety in, as well as authority over the whole earth. As head of

the christian church, and vicar of God, he claimed this authority

over all Christendom; and, in the same character, he claimed a right

to all the countries and possessions of heathens and infidels; a

right divine to exterminate and destroy them at his discretion, in

order to propagate the catholic faith. When king Henry VIII. and

his parliament, threw off the authority of the pope, stripped his

holiness of his supremacy, and invested it in himself by an act of

parliament, he and his courtiers seemed to think that all the rights

of the holy see were transferred to him; and it was a union of these

two, the most impertinent and fantastical ideas that ever got into an

human pericranium, viz: that as feudal sovereign and supreme head of

the church together, a king of England had a right to all the land

their subjects could find, not possessed by any christian state,

or prince, though possessed by heathen or infidel nations, which

seems to have deluded the nation about the time of the settlement

of the colonies. But none of these ideas gave or inferred any right

in parliament, over the new countries conquered or discovered; and

therefore denying that the colonies are a part of the realm, and

that as such they are subject to parliament, by no means deprives

us of English liberties. Nor does it "build up absolute monarchy in

the colonies." For admitting these notions of the common and feudal

law to have been in full force, and that the king was absolute in

America, when it was settled; yet he had a right to enter into a

contract with his subjects, and stipulate that they should enjoy all

the rights and liberties of Englishmen forever, in consideration of

their undertaking to clear the wilderness, propagate christianity,

pay a fifth part of ore, &c. Such a contract as this has been

made with all the colonies; royal governments, as well as charter

ones. For the commissions to the governors contain the plan of the

government, and the contract between the king and subject, in the

former, as much as the charters in the latter.

Indeed this was the reasoning, and upon these feudal and

_catholic_ principles in the time of some of the predecessors of

Massachusettensis. This was the meaning of Dudley, when he asked, "Do

you think that English liberties will follow you to the ends of the

earth?" His meaning was, that English liberties were confined to the

realm, and out of that the king was absolute. But this was not true;

for an English king had no right to be absolute over Englishmen, out

of the realm, any more than in it, and they were released from their

allegiance, as soon as he deprived them of their liberties.

But "our charters suppose regal authority in the grantor." True

they suppose it, whether there was any or not. "If that authority

be derived from the British (he should have said English) crown,

it presupposes this territory to have been a part of the British

(he should have said English) dominion, and as such subject to the

imperial sovereign." How can this writer shew this authority to be

derived from the English crown, including in the idea of it lords

and commons? Is there the least color for such an authority but in

the popish and feudal ideas before mentioned? And do these popish

and feudal ideas include parliament? Was parliament, were lords and

commons parts of the head of the church, or was parliament, that

is, lords and commons, part of the sovereign feudatory? Never. But

why was this authority derived from the English, any more than the

Scottish or Irish crown? It is true the land was to be held in

soccage, like the manor of East Greenwich; but this was compact, and

it might have been as well to hold, as they held in Glasgow or Dublin.

But, says this writer, "if that authority was vested in the person

of the king in a different capacity, the British constitution and

laws are out of the question, and the king must be absolute as to us,

as his prerogatives have never been limited." Not the prerogatives

limited in our charters, when in every one of them all the rights

of Englishmen are secured to us! Are not the rights of Englishmen

sufficiently known, and are not the prerogatives of the king among

those rights?

As to those colonies which are destitute of charters, the commissions

to their governors have ever been considered as equivalent

securities, both for property, jurisdiction, and privileges, with

charters; and as to the power of the crown being absolute in those

colonies, it is absolute no where. There is no fundamental or other

law, that makes a king of England absolute any where, except in

conquered countries; and an attempt to assume such a power, by the

fundamental laws, forfeits the prince's right even to the limited

crown.

As to "the charter governments reverting to absolute monarchy, as

their charters may happen to be forfeited, by the grantees not

fulfilling the conditions of them;" I answer, if they could be

forfeited, and were actually forfeited, the only consequence would

be, that the king would have no power over them at all. He would

not be bound to protect the people, nor, that I can see, would the

people here, who were born here, be, by any principle of common law,

bound even to allegiance to the king. The connection would be broken

between the crown and the natives of the country.

It has been a great dispute whether charters granted within the

realm, can be forfeited at all. It was a question debated with

infinite learning, in the case of the charter of London: it was

adjudged forfeited, in an arbitrary reign: but afterwards, after

the revolution, it was declared in parliament, not forfeited, and

by an act of parliament made incapable of forfeiture. The charter

of Massachusetts was declared forfeited too. So were other American

charters. The Massachusetts alone, were tame enough to give it up.

But no American charter will ever be decreed forfeited again, or if

any should, the decree will be regarded no more, than a vote of the

lower house of the robinhood society. The court of chancery has no

authority without the realm; by common law, surely it has none in

America. What! the privileges of millions of Americans depend on the

discretion of a lord chancellor? God forbid! The passivity of this

colony in receiving the present charter, in lieu of the first, is,

in the opinion of some, the deepest stain upon its character. There

is less to be said in excuse for it, than the witchcraft, or hanging

the Quakers. A vast party in the province were against it at the

time, and thought themselves betrayed by their agent. It has been a

warning to their posterity, and one principal motive with the people,

never to trust any agent with power to concede away their privileges

again. It may as well be pretended that the people of Great Britain

can forfeit their privileges, as the people of this province. If the

contract of state is broken, the people and king of England must

recur to nature. It is the same in this province. We shall never more

submit to decrees in chancery, or acts of parliament, annihilating

charters, or abridging English liberties.

Whether Massachusettensis was born as a politician, in the year

1764, I knew [Errata: know] not: but he often writes as if he know

[Errata: knew] nothing of that period. In his attempt to trace the

denial of the supreme authority of the parliament, he commits such

mistakes, as a man of age, at that time, ought to blush at. He says,

that "when the stamp act was made, the authority of parliament to

impose external taxes, or, in other words, to lay duties upon goods

and merchandize was admitted," and that when the tea act was made, "a

new distinction was set up, that parliament had a right to lay duties

upon merchandize, for the purpose of regulating trade, but not for

the purpose of raising a revenue." This is a total misapprehension

of the declared opinions of people at those times. The authority

of parliament to lay taxes for a revenue has been always generally

denied. And their right to lay duties to regulate trade, has been

denied by many, who have ever contended that trade should be

regulated only by prohibitions.

The act of parliament of the 4th George 3d, passed in the year

1764, was the first act of the British parliament that ever was

passed, in which the design of raising a revenue was expressed. Let

Massachusettensis name any statute before that, in which the word

revenue is used, or the thought of raising a revenue is expressed.

This act is entitled, "an act for granting certain duties in the

British colonies, and plantations in America," &c. The word revenue,

in the preamble of this act, instantly ran through the colonies, and

rang an alarm, almost as much as if the design of forging chains

for the colonists had been expressed in words. I have now before me

a pamphlet, written and printed in the year 1764, entitled, "The

sentiments of a British American," upon this act. How the idea of a

revenue, though from an acknowledged external tax, was relished in

that time, may be read in the frontispiece of that pamphlet.

_Ergo quid refert mea

Cui serviam? clitellas dum portem meas._ PHAEDRUS.

The first objection to this act, which was made in that pamphlet,

by its worthy author, OXENBRIDGE THACHER, Esq. who died a

martyr to that amity [Errata: anxiety] for his country, which the

conduct of the junto gave him, is this, "The first objection is,

that a tax is thereby laid on several commodities, to be raised

and levied in the plantations, and to be remitted home to England.

This is esteemed a grievance, inasmuch as the same are laid, without

the consent of the representatives of the colonists. It is esteemed

an essential British right, that no person shall be subject to any

tax; but what in person, or by his representative, he hath a voice

in laying." Here is a tax unquestionably external, in the sense in

which that word is used, in the distinction that is made by some

between external and internal taxes, and unquestionably laid in part

for the regulation of trade; yet called a grievance, and a violation

of an essential British right, in the year 1764, by one who was then

at the head of the popular branch of our constitution, and as well

acquainted with the sense of his constituents, as any man living. And

it is indisputable, that in those words he wrote the almost universal

sense of this colony.

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