that we are not by any law or upon any principles, but those of mere
power; and an opinion that we ought to be or that it is necessary
that we should be. But if this should be, admitted, for argument's
sake only, what is the consequence? The consequences that may fairly
be drawn are these:--That Britain has been imprudent enough to let
colonies be planted, until they are become numerous and important,
without ever having wisdom enough to concert a plan for their
government, consistent with her own welfare: that now it is necessary
to make them submit to the authority of parliament: and because
there is no principle of law or justice, or reason, by which she can
effect it; therefore she will resort to war and conquest--to the
maxim _delenda est Carthago_. These are the consequences, according
to this writer's idea. We think the consequences are, that she has
after 150 years, discovered a defect in her government, which ought
to be supplied by some just and reasonable means; that is, by the
consent of the colonies; for metaphysicians and politicians may
dispute forever, but they will never find any other moral principle
or foundation of rule or obedience, than the consent of governors
and governed. She has found out that the great machine will not go
any longer without a new wheel. She will make this herself. We think
she is making it of such materials and workmanship as will tear the
whole machine to pieces. We are willing if she can convince us of
the necessity of such a wheel, to assist with artists and materials,
in making it, so that it may answer the end. But she says, we shall
have no share in it; and if we will not let her patch it up as she
pleases, her Massachusettensis and other advocates tell us, she will
tear it to pieces herself, by cutting our throats. To this kind of
reasoning we can only answer, that we will not stand still to be
butchered. We will defend our lives as long as providence shall
enable us.
"It is beyond doubt, that it was the sense both of the _parent
country_ and _our ancestors_, that they were to remain subject to
parliament."
This has been often asserted, and as often contradicted, and fully
confuted. The confutation may not, however, have come to every eye
which has read this newspaper.
The public acts of kings and ministers of state, in that age, when
our ancestors emigrated, which were not complained of, remonstrated
and protested against by the commons, are looked upon as sufficient
proof of the "sense" of the parent country.
The charter to the treasurer and company of Virginia, 23d March,
1609, grants ample power of government, legislative, executive and
judicial, and then contains an express covenant "to and with the
said treasurer and company, their successors, factors and assigns,
that they, and every of them, shall be free from all taxes and
impositions forever, upon any goods or merchandizes, at any time or
times hereafter, either upon importation thither, or exportation from
thence, into our realm of England, or into any other of our realms or
dominions."
I agree with this writer, that the authority of a supreme
legislature, includes the right of taxation. Is not this quotation
then an irresistible proof, that "it was not the sense of king James
or his ministers, or of the ancestors of the Virginians, that they
were to remain subject to parliament as a supreme legislature?"
After this, James issued a proclamation, recalling the patent, but
this was never regarded. Then Charles issued another proclamation,
which produced a remonstrance from Virginia, which was answered
by a letter from the lords of the privy council, 22d July, 1634,
containing the royal assurance that "all their estates, trade,
freedom, and privileges should be enjoyed by them, in as extensive a
manner, as they enjoyed them before those proclamations."
Here is another evidence of the sense of the king and his ministers.
Afterwards parliament sent a squadron of ships to Virginia; the
colony rose in open resistance until the parliamentary commissioners
granted them conditions, that they should enjoy the privileges of
Englishmen; that their assembly should transact the affairs of the
colonies; that they should have a free trade to all places and
nations, as the people of England; and fourthly, that "Virginia
shall be free from all _taxes_, customs, and impositions whatever,
and none shall be imposed on them without consent of their general
assembly; and that neither forts nor castles be erected, or garrisons
maintained, without their consent."
One would think this was evidence enough of the sense both of the
parent country and our ancestors.
After the acts of navigation were passed, Virginia sent agents
to England, and a remonstrance against those acts. Charles, in
answer, sent a declaration under the privy seal, 19th April, 1676,
affirming, "that taxes ought not to be laid upon the inhabitants and
proprietors of the colony, but by the common consent of the general
assembly; except such impositions as the parliament should lay on the
commodities imported into England from the colony." And he ordered a
charter, under the great seal, to secure this right to the Virginians.
What becomes of the "sense" of the parent country and our ancestors?
for the ancestors of the Virginians are our ancestors, when we speak
of ourselves as Americans. From Virginia let us pass to Maryland.
Charles 1st, in 1633, gave a charter to the baron of Baltimore,
containing ample powers of government, and this express covenant: "to
and with the said lord Baltimore, his heirs and assigns, that we, our
heirs and successors, shall at no time hereafter, set or make, or
cause to be set any imposition, custom, or other taxation, rate, or
contribution whatsoever, in and upon the dwellings and inhabitants
of the aforesaid province, for their lands, tenements, goods or
chattels, within the said province; or to be laden or unladen, within
the ports or harbours of the said province."
What then was the "sense" of the parent country, and the ancestors
of Maryland? But if by "our ancestors," he confines his idea to
New England or this province, let us consider. The first planters
of Plymouth were our ancestors in the strictest sense. They had
no charter or patent for the land they took possession of, and
derived no authority from the English parliament or crown, to set
up their government. They purchased land of the Indians, and set
up a government of their own, on the simple principle of nature,
and afterwards purchased a patent for the land of the council at
Plymouth, but never purchased any charter for government of the
crown, or the king, and continued to exercise all the powers of
government, legislative, executive and judicial, upon the plain
ground of an original contract among independent individuals for
68 years, i.e. until their incorporation with Massachusetts by our
present charter. The same may be said of the colonies which emigrated
to Say-Brook, New-Haven, and other parts of Connecticut. They seem to
have had no idea of dependence on parliament, any more than on the
conclave. The secretary of Connecticut has now in his possession,
an original letter from Charles 2d. to that colony, in which he
considers them rather as friendly allies, than as subjects to his
English parliament, and even requests them to pass a law in their
assembly relative to piracy.
The sentiments of your ancestors in the Massachusetts, may be learned
from almost every ancient paper and record. It would be endless
to recite all the passages, in which it appears that they thought
themselves exempt from the authority of parliament, not only in
the point of taxation, but in all cases whatsoever. Let me mention
one. Randolph, one of the predecessors of Massachusettensis, in a
representation to Charles 2d. dated 20th September, 1676, says, "I
went to visit the governor at his house, and among other discourse, I
told him I took notice of several ships that were arrived at Boston,
some since my being there, from Spain, France, Streights, Canaries,
and other parts of Europe, contrary to your majesty's laws for
encouraging navigation and regulating the trade of the plantations."
He freely declared to me, that the law made by your majesty and your
parliament, obligeth them in nothing but what consists with the
interest of that colony, that the legislative power is and abides in
them solely to act and make laws by virtue of a charter from your
majesty's royal father. Here is a positive assertion of an exemption
from the authority of parliament, even in the case of the regulation
of trade.
Afterwards in 1677, the general court passed a law, which shews the
sense of our ancestors in a very strong light. It is in these words.
"This court being informed, by letters received this day from our
messengers, of his majesty's expectation that the acts of Trade and
Navigation be exactly and punctually observed by this his majesty's
colony, his pleasure therein not having before now, signified unto
us, either by express from his majesty, or any of his ministers
of state; It is therefore hereby ordered, and by the authority of
this court enacted, that henceforth, all masters of ships, ketches,
or other vessels, of greater or lesser burthen, arriving in, or
sailing from any of the ports in this jurisdiction, do, without
coven, or fraud, yield faithful and constant obedience unto, and
observation of all the said acts, of navigation and trade, on penalty
of suffering such forfeitures, loss and damage as in the said acts
are particularly expressed. And the governor and council, and all
officers commissionated and authorised by them, are hereby ordered
and required to see to the strict observation of the said acts." As
soon as they had passed this law, they wrote a letter to their agent,
in which they acknowledge they had not conformed to the acts of
trade; and they say, they "apprehended them to be an invasion of the
rights, liberties and properties of the subjects of his majesty in
the colony, they not being represented in parliament, and according
to the usual sayings of the learned in the law, _the laws of England
were bounded within the four seas, and did not reach America_.
However, as his majesty had signified his pleasure, that these acts
should be observed in the Massachusetts, they had made provision by
a law of the colony, that they should be strictly attended to, from
time to time, although it greatly discouraged trade, and was a great
damage to his majesty's plantation."
Thus it appears, that the ancient Massachusettensians and Virginians,
had precisely the same sense of the authority of parliament viz. that
it had none at all: and the same sense of the necessity, that by the
voluntary act of the colonies, their free cheerful consent, it should
be allowed the power of regulating trade: and this is precisely the
idea of the late congress at Philadelphia, expressed in the fourth
proposition in their Bill of Rights.
But this was the sense of the parent country too, at that time; for
king Charles II. in a letter to the Massachusetts, after this law,
had been laid before him, has these words; "We are informed that you
have lately made _some good provision_ for observing the acts of
trade and navigation, which is well pleasing unto us." Had he, or his
ministers an idea that parliament was the sovereign legislative over
the colony? If he had, would he not have censured this law, as an
insult to that legislature?
I sincerely hope, we shall see no more such round affirmations, that
it was the sense of the parent country and our ancestors, that they
were to remain subject to parliament.
So far from thinking themselves subject to parliament, that during
the Interregnum, it was their desire and design to have been a free
commonwealth, an independent republic; and after the restoration, it
was with the utmost reluctance, that in the course of 16 or 17 years,
they were brought to take the oaths of allegiance: and for some time
after this, they insisted upon taking an oath of fidelity to the
country, before that of allegiance to the king.
That "it is evident from the charter itself," that they were to
remain subject to parliament, is very unaccountable, when there is
not one word in either charter concerning parliament.
That the authority of parliament has been exercised almost ever
since the settlement of the country, is a mistake; for there is no
instance, until the first Navigation Act, which was in 1660, more
than 40 years after the first settlement. This act was never executed
or regarded, until 17 years afterwards, and then it was not executed
as an act of parliament, but as a law of the colony, to which the
king agreed.
"This has been expressly acknowledged by our provincial
legislatures." There is too much truth in this. It has been twice
acknowledged by our house of Representatives, that parliament was the
supreme legislative; but this was directly repugnant to a multitude
of other votes by which it was denied. This was in conformity to the
distinction between taxation and legislation, which has since been
found to be a distinction without a difference.
When a great question is first started, there are very few, even of
the greatest minds, which suddenly and intuitively comprehend it, in
all its consequences.
It is both "our interest and our duty to continue subject to the
authority of parliament," as far as the regulation of our trade, if
it will be content with that, but no longer.
"If the colonies are not subject to the authority of parliament,
Great Britain and the colonies must be distinct states, as completely
so as England and Scotland were before the union, or as Great Britain
and Hanover are now." There is no need of being startled at this
consequence. It is very harmless. There is no absurdity at all in it.
Distinct states may be united under one king. And those states may
be further cemented and united together, by a treaty of commerce.
This is the case. We have, by our own express consent, contracted
to observe the navigation act, and by our implied consent, by long
usage and uninterrupted acquiescence, have submitted to the other
acts of trade, however grievous some of them may be. This may be
compared to a treaty of commerce, by which those distinct states are
cemented together, in perpetual league and amity. And if any further
ratifications of this pact or treaty are necessary, the colonies
would readily enter into them, provided their other liberties were
inviolate.
That the colonies owe "no allegiance" to any imperial crown, provided
such a crown involves in it an house of lords and a house of commons,
is certain. Indeed, we owe no allegiance to any crown at all. We
owe allegiance to the person of his majesty, king George the third,
whom God preserve. But allegiance is due universally, both from
Britons and Americans to the person of the king, not to his crown:
to his natural, not his politic capacity: as I will undertake to
prove hereafter, from the highest authorities, and most solemn
adjudications, which were ever made within any part of the British
dominions.
If his majesty's title to the crown is "derived from an act of
parliament, made since the settlement of these colonies," it was
not made since the date of our charter. Our charter was granted by
king William and queen Mary, three years after the revolution; and
the oaths of allegiance are established by a law of the province. So
that our allegiance to his majesty is not due by virtue of any act of
a British parliament, but by our own charter and province laws. It
ought to be remembered, that there was a revolution here, as well as
in England, and that we made an original, express contract with king
William, as well as the people of England.
If it follows from thence, that he appears king of the Massachusetts,
king of Rhode-Island, king of Connecticut, &c. this is no absurdity
at all. He will appear in this light, and does appear so, whether
parliament has authority over us or not. He is king of Ireland, I
suppose, although parliament is allowed to have authority there. As
to giving his majesty those titles, I have no objection at all: I
wish he would be graciously pleased to assume them.
The only proposition in all this writer's long string of pretended
absurdities, which he says follows from the position, that we are
distinct states, is this: That, "as the king must govern each state
by its parliament, those several parliaments would pursue the
particular interest of its own state; and however well disposed the
king might be to pursue a line of interest that was common to all,
the checks and controul that he would meet with, would render it
impossible." Every argument ought to be allowed its full weight:
and therefore candour obliges me to acknowledge, that here lies
all the difficulty that there is in this whole controversy. There
has been, from first to last, on both sides of the Atlantic, an
idea, an apprehension that it was necessary, there should be some
superintending power, to draw together all the wills, and unite all
the strength of the subjects in all the dominions, in case of war,
and in the case of trade. The necessity of this, in case of trade,
has been so apparent, that, as has often been said, we have consented
that parliament should exercise such a power. In case of war, it has
by some been thought necessary. But, in fact and experience, it has
not been found so. What though the proprietary colonies, on account
of disputes with the proprietors, did not come in so early to the
assistance of the general cause in the last war, as they ought, and
perhaps one of them not at all! The inconveniences of this were
small, in comparison of the absolute ruin to the liberties of all
which must follow the submission to parliament, in all cases, which
would be giving up all the popular limitations upon the government.
These inconveniences fell chiefly upon New England. She was
necessitated to greater exertions: but she had rather suffer these
again and again, than others infinitely greater. However this subject
has been so long in contemplation, that it is fully understood now,
in all the colonies; so that there is no danger in case of another
war, of any colony's failing of its duty.
But admitting the proposition in its full force, that it is
absolutely necessary there should be a supreme power, co-extensive
with all the dominions, will it follow that parliament, as now
constituted, has a right to assume this supreme jurisdiction? By no
means.
A union of the colonies might be projected, and an American
legislature; for, if America has 3,000,000 people, and the whole
dominions 12,000,000, she ought to send a quarter part of all the
members to the house of commons, and instead of holding parliaments
always at Westminster, the haughty members for Great Britain must
humble themselves, one session in four, to cross the atlantic, and
hold the parliament in America.
There is no avoiding all inconveniences in human affairs. The
greatest possible or conceivable would arise from ceding to
parliament power over us, without a representation in it. The next
greatest would accrue from any plan that can be devised for a
representation there. The least of all would arise from going on
as we begun, and fared well for 150 years, by letting parliament
regulate trade, and our own assemblies all other matters.
As to "the prerogatives not being defined, or limited," it is as much
so in the colonies as in Great Britain, and as well understood, and
as cheerfully submitted to in the former as the latter.
But "where is the British constitution, that we all agree we are
entitled to?" I answer, if we enjoy, and are entitled to more liberty
than the British constitution allows, where is the harm? Or, if we
enjoy the British constitution in greater purity and perfection than
they do in England, as is really the case, whose fault is this? Not
ours.
We may find all the blessings "of this constitution in our provincial
assemblies." Our houses of Representatives have, and ought to
exercise, every power of the House of Commons. The first charter to
this colony is nothing to the present argument: but it did grant a
power of taxing the people, implicitly, though not in express terms.
It granted all the rights and liberties of Englishmen, which include
the power of taxing the people.
"Our council boards," in the royal governments, "are destitute of
the noble independence and splendid appendages of peerages." Most
certainty: they are the meanest creatures and tools in the political
creation; dependent every moment for their existence on the tainted
breath of a prime minister. But they have the authority of the house
of lords, in our little models of the English constitution; and it is
this which makes them so great a grievance. The crown has really two
branches of our legislature in its power. Let an act of parliament
pass at home, putting it in the power of the king, to remove any peer
from the house of lords at his pleasure, and what will become of the
British constitution? It will be overturned from the foundation. Yet
we are perpetually insulted, by being told, that making our council
by mandamus, brings us nearer to the British constitution. In this
province, by charter, the council certainly hold their seats for
the year, after being chosen and approved, independent of both the
other branches. For their creation, they are equally obliged to both
the other branches; so that there is little or no bias in favour of
either, if any, it is in favour of the prerogative. In short, it is
not easy without an hereditary nobility, to constitute a council
more independent, more nearly resembling the house of lords, than
the council of this province has ever been by charter. But perhaps
it will be said that we are to enjoy the British constitution in
our supreme legislature, the parliament, not in our provincial
legislatures.
To this I answer, if parliament is to be our supreme legislature,
we shall be under a complete oligarchy or aristocracy, not the
British constitution, which this writer himself defines a mixture
of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.--For king, lords and
commons will constitute one great oligarchy, as they will stand
related to America, as much as the decemvirs did in Rome; with this
difference for the worse, that our rulers are to be three thousand
miles off. The definition of an oligarchy, is a government by a
number of grandees, over whom the people have no controul. The
states of Holland were once chosen by the people frequently; then
chosen for life. Now they are not chosen by the people at all. When
a member dies, his place is filled up, not by the people he is to
represent, but by the states. Is not this depriving the Hollanders
of a free constitution, and subjecting them to an aristocracy, or
oligarchy? Will not the government of America be like it? Will not
representatives be chosen for them by others, whom they never saw
nor heard of? If our provincial constitutions are in any respect
imperfect and want alteration, they have capacity enough to discern
it, and power enough to effect it, without the interposition of
parliament. There never was an American constitution attempted by
parliament, before the Quebec bill and Massachusetts bill. These
are such _samples_ of what they may, and probably will be, that few
Americans are in love with them. However, America will never allow
that parliament has any authority to alter their constitution at all.
She is wholly penetrated with a sense of the necessity of resisting
it, at all hazards. And she would resist it, if the constitution of
the Massachusetts had been altered as much for _the better_, as it
is for the worse. The question we insist on most is not whether the
alteration is for the better or not, but whether parliament has any
right to make any alteration at all. And it is the universal sense of
America, that it has none.