SPEECHES IN THE SENATE, ON THE JOINT RESOLUTION GIVING NOTICE FOR THE
TERMINATION OF THE CANADIAN RECIPROCITY TREATY, DECEMBER 21, 1864,
JANUARY 11 AND 12, 1865.
A joint resolution passed the House of Representatives,
December 13, 1864, which, after an argumentative preamble,
authorized and requested the President of the United States to
give the British Government the notice required by the fifth
article of the Reciprocity Treaty of the 5th June, 1854, for
the termination of the same; and in the Senate the same was
duly referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
December 20, 1864, Mr. Sumner reported from the Committee the
House resolution, with the following substitute as an amendment.
“JOINT RESOLUTION providing for the termination of the
Reciprocity Treaty of fifth June, eighteen hundred and
fifty-four, between the United States and Great Britain.
“Whereas it is provided in the Reciprocity Treaty concluded
at Washington the 5th of June, 1854, between the United
States, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, of the other part, that this treaty
‘shall remain in force for ten years from the date at
which it may come into operation, and further until the
expiration of twelve months after either of the high
contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its
wish to terminate the same’; and whereas it appears, by a
proclamation of the President of the United States, bearing
date 16th March, 1855, that the treaty came into operation
on that day; and whereas, further, it is no longer for the
interests of the United States to continue the same in
force: Therefore
“_Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America, in Congress assembled_,
That notice be given of the termination of the Reciprocity
Treaty, according to the provision therein contained for
the termination of the same; and the President of the
United States is hereby charged with the communication of
such notice to the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland.”
December 21st, the joint resolution was, on motion of Mr.
Sumner, taken up for consideration, when the substitute was
adopted as an amendment. The question occurring on the passage
of the joint resolution as amended, Mr. Sumner said:--
MR. PRESIDENT,--I had originally intended, when this joint resolution
came up, to review the whole subject, and to exhibit at length the
history of the Reciprocity Treaty, and existing reasons for its
termination. But, after the debate of a few days ago, and considering
the apparent unanimity in the Senate, I feel unwilling to occupy time
by any protracted remarks. They are not needed.
The people of the United States have been uneasy under the Reciprocity
Treaty for several years,--I may almost say from its date. A feeling
early showed itself that the treaty was more advantageous to Canada
than to the United States,--that, in short, it was unilateral. This
feeling has of late ripened into something like conviction. At the
same time the exigencies of the present war, requiring so large an
expenditure, make it unreasonable for us to continue a treaty by which
the revenues of the country suffer. Such considerations have brought
the public mind to its present position. The unamiable feelings
manifested toward us by the people of Canada have had little influence
on the question, unless, perhaps, they may conspire to make us look at
it in the light of reason rather than of sentiment.
The subject of the fisheries is included in this treaty. But it is not
doubted that before the termination of the treaty some arrangement can
be made in regard to it, either by reciprocal legislation or by further
negotiation.
The Committee, after careful consideration at a full meeting, was
unanimous in its report. And as the Committee represents all parts
of the country and all sentiments of the Senate, I have thought that
perhaps there might be a similar unanimity among Senators. Therefore I
forbear all further remarks, and ask for a vote.
On motion of Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, the further
consideration of the question was postponed.
January 11, 1865, it was resumed, when Mr. Hale spoke against
the notice. He was followed by Mr. Sumner.
MR. PRESIDENT,--The Reciprocity Treaty has a beautiful name. It
suggests at once exchange, equality, equity; and it is because it
was supposed to advance these ideas practically that this treaty was
originally accepted by the people of the United States. If, however, it
shall appear, that, while organizing an exchange, it forgets equality
and equity in any essential respect, then must a modification be made
in conformity with just principles.
I mean to be brief, but I hope, though brief, to make the proper
conclusion apparent. It is a question for reason, and not for passion
or sentiment, and in this spirit I enter upon the discussion.
The treaty may be seen under four different heads, as it concerns,
first, the fisheries,--secondly, the navigation of the St.
Lawrence,--thirdly, the commerce between the United States and the
British provinces,--and, fourthly, the revenue of the United States.
* * * * *
1. The fisheries have been a source of anxiety throughout our history,
even from the beginning, and for several years previous to the
Reciprocity Treaty they had been the occasion of mutual irritation,
verging at times on positive outbreak. The treaty was followed by
entire tranquillity, which has not been for a moment disturbed. This is
a plain advantage not to be denied. But, so far as I have been able to
examine official returns, I do not find any further evidence showing
the value of the treaty in this connection, while opinions, even
among those most interested in the fisheries, are divided. There are
partisans for it in Gloucester, and partisans against it in Maine.
If the treaty related exclusively to the fisheries, I should not be
willing to touch it,--although the circumstance that representatives
of these interests differ with regard to its value may leave it
open to debate. But the practical question remains, whether any
seeming advantage in this respect is sufficient to counterbalance the
disadvantage in other respects.
* * * * *
2. Next comes the navigation of the St. Lawrence. This plausible
concession has proved to be little more than a name. It appears that
during the first six years of the treaty only forty American vessels,
containing 12,550 tons, passed seaward through the St. Lawrence, and
during the same time only nineteen vessels, containing 5,446 tons,
returned by the same open highway.[39] These are very petty amounts,
when we consider the commerce on the Lakes, which in 1856 was estimated
at $587,197,320,[40] or when we, consider the carrying trade between
the United States and the British provinces. Take the years 1857-62,
and we find that during this period the shipping of the United States
clearing for the British provinces was 10,707,329 tons, and the foreign
shipping clearing during this same period was 7,391,399 tons, while
the shipping of the United States entering at our custom-houses from
the British provinces was 10,056,183 tons, and the foreign shipping
entering was 6,453,520 tons.[41] I mention these things by way of
contrast. In comparison with these grand movements of value, the
business we have been able to do on the St. Lawrence is trivial. It
need not be considered an element in the present discussion.
* * * * *
3. The treaty may be seen next in its bearing on the commerce between
the two countries. This has increased immensely; but it is difficult
to say how much of this increase is due to the treaty, and how much to
the natural growth of population, and the facilities of transportation
in both countries. If it could be traced exclusively or in any large
measure to the treaty, it would be an element not to be disregarded.
But it does not follow from the occurrence of this increase _after_ the
treaty that it was _on account_ of the treaty. _Post hoc, ergo propter
hoc_, is too loose a rule for our Government on the present occasion.
The census of the United States and of the British provinces shows an
increase of population which must not be disregarded in determining the
origin of this increase of commerce.
There are also the railroads, with prompt and constant means of
intercommunication, which have come into successful operation only
since the treaty. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence
they have exercised in quickening and extending commerce. I cannot
doubt that the railroad system of the two countries has been in itself
a Reciprocity Treaty more comprehensive and equal than any written on
parchment.
The extent of trade before and after the treaty is seen in a few
figures.
In the three years immediately preceding the treaty the total exports
to Canada and the other British provinces were $48,216,518, and the
total imports were $22,588,577,--being of exports to imports in the
proportion of one hundred to forty-six.
In the ten years of the treaty the total exports to Canada and the
other British provinces were $256,350,931, and the total imports were
$200,399,786. According to these amounts the exports were to the
imports in the proportion of one hundred to seventy-eight. Taking
Canada alone, we find the change in this proportion greater still. The
total exports to Canada in the three years immediately preceding the
treaty were $31,846,865, and the total imports were $16,589,624, being
in the proportion of one hundred to fifty-two,--while the total exports
to Canada alone during the ten years of the treaty were $170,371,911,
and the total imports were $161,474,349, being in the proportion of one
hundred to ninety-four.
I present these tables simply to lay before you the extent and nature
of the change in the commerce between the two countries. I forbear
embarking on the much debated inquiry as to the effect of a difference
between the amount of exports and of imports, involving, as it does,
the most delicate question of the balance of trade. In the comparison I
am making, it is not necessary to consider it. The Reciprocity Treaty
cannot be maintained or overturned on any contested principle of
political economy.
* * * * *
4. I come, in the last place, to the influence of the treaty on the
revenue of our country; and here the custom-house is our principal
witness. The means of determining this question are found in the
authentic tables published from time to time in Reports of the
Treasury, and especially in the report to Congress at this session,
which I have in my hand.
Looking at these tables, we find certain unanswerable points. I begin
with an estimate founded on the trade before the treaty. From this it
appears, that, if no treaty had been made, and the trade had increased
in the same ratio as before the treaty, Canada would have paid to the
United States in the ten years of the treaty at least $16,373,880, from
which she has been relieved. This sum is actually lost to the revenue
of the United States. In return, Canada has given up $2,650,890, being
the amount it would have collected, if no treaty had been made. This
vast disproportion is to the detriment of the national revenue.
Here is another illustration, derived from the tables. During the ten
years of the treaty the United States have actually paid in duties to
Canada alone $16,802,962, while during this same period Canada has paid
in duties to the United States the very moderate sum of $930,447. Here
again is vast disproportion, to the detriment of the national revenue.
The same inequality is seen in another way. During the ten years of
the treaty _dutiable_ products of the United States have entered Canada
and the other provinces to the amount of $84,347,019, while during this
same period _dutiable_ products of Canada and the other provinces have
entered the United States only to the amount of $7,750,482. During
this same period _free products_ of the United States have entered
Canada and the other provinces to the amount of $118,853,972, while
_free products_ of Canada and the other provinces have entered the
United States to the amount of $178,500,184. Here, again, is vast
disproportion to the detriment of the national revenue.
Add to these various results the statement of the Secretary of the
Treasury, just laid on our tables, in the following words:--
“The treaty [during the eight fiscal years 1855-63] has
released from duty a total sum of $42,333,257 in value of
goods of Canada more than of goods the produce of the United
States.”[42]
This conclusion is in substantial harmony with that reached from an
independent examination of the tables.
These various illustrations show that the revenue of the United States
has suffered by the treaty, and that in this important particular its
advantages are not shared equally by the two countries. Here, at least,
it loses title to its name.
But its onerous character has become manifest in other forms since
the adoption of our system of internal revenue. I need not remind the
Senate of the extent to which we have gone in seeking out objects of
excise,--and there are pending propositions in the same direction,
seeking new objects; but it is notorious that such taxation is always
graduated with reference to the tariff on the same objects, when
imported from abroad. But here the Reciprocity Treaty steps forward
with imperative veto. Thus, for instance, the lumber of our country
is left free from excise, though I am assured it might well bear it,
simply because no countervailing tax can be imposed upon lumber from
the British provinces. Had a tax of five per cent been imposed upon
the lumber of our country, I am assured, by those familiar with the
subject, that we should have received at least $5,000,000,--all of
which is lost to our annual revenue. This is only a single illustration.
There are other ways in which the treaty and our excise system come
into conflict. Practical difficulties, I am assured, have already
occurred in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This conflict is seen
in the extent to which the business of the country, and even its
agriculture, is taxed now. Everything is taxed. Even the farmer works
now with taxed tools. These considerations, with the increased value of
labor among us, must give new advantages to the productive interests
of Canada as compared with ours, and tend still further to the unequal
operation of the treaty. Even admitting its original equality, you
cannot deny that the vicissitudes of war, in these latter days, have
worked changes requiring new arrangements and adaptations.
* * * * *
Mr. President, such is the result of a candid inquiry into the
operation of this treaty, as it concerns the fisheries, the navigation
of the St. Lawrence, the commerce of the two countries, and the revenue
of the United States. I have kept back nothing favorable to the treaty
that could be adequately stated in the brief space I have allowed
myself, nor have I exaggerated its unequal operation.
And now the question is, Shall this condition of things be readjusted?
The treaty itself, as if anticipating this exigency, furnishes the
opportunity, by expressly providing for its termination at the
expiration of ten years, on notice of one year from either party.
Great Britain is free to give this notice; so are the United States.
Considering the present state of the country, it would seem improvident
not to give the notice. We must husband our resources; nor can a
foreign Government justly expect us to continue a treaty which is a
drain upon our revenue. We are turning in all directions for subjects
of taxation. Our own people are contributing largely in every way.
Commerce, manufactures in every form, come to the assistance of the
country. I know no reason why the large amounts enfranchised by this
treaty should enjoy the immunity thus far conceded. An inequality which
in ordinary times might escape observation becomes too apparent in the
blaze of present responsibilities.
Something has been said about accompanying the proposed notice with
instructions to negotiate a new treaty. This is unnecessary. A new
treaty may not be advisable. It is possible that the whole matter may
be settled by Congress under general laws. At all events, there is a
full year from the 16th of March next in which to provide a substitute,
either by diplomacy or by legislation. And this remark is applicable
to the fisheries, as well as to every other interest touched by the
treaty. I cannot doubt that the two contracting parties will approach
the whole business in the determination to settle it on the permanent
foundations of justice and equity; but the first step in this direction
is the notice to terminate the existing treaty.
In the debate which ensued, Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, Mr. Collamer,
of Vermont, Mr. Morrill, of Maine, Mr. Chandler, of Michigan,
Mr. Foot, of Vermont, Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, Mr.
Farwell, of Maine, Mr. Conness, of California, Mr. Wilson,
of Massachusetts, Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Riddle, of
Delaware, and Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, spoke in favor of
the notice; Mr. Ramsey, of Minnesota, Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin,
Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, and Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana,
spoke against it.
January 12th, Mr. Sumner spoke again.
MR. PRESIDENT,--The proposition to terminate the Reciprocity Treaty has
been mystified in various ways. There has been mystification because it
came from the Committee on Foreign Relations, as if that committee, to
which are referred all treaties and questions with foreign powers, was
not the proper committee to consider it, according to the usages and
traditions of the Senate. Pray, what other committee could so justly
deal with it?
There has also been illusiveness in argument, by accumulation
of statistics and figures without end. We have been treated to
calculations, showing the increase of commerce since the treaty,
and also the relative increase of exports and imports. To these
calculations I am no stranger; but, after careful study, I am satisfied
that it is impossible to find in them any _terra firma_ on which to
stand. They are little better than quicksand, or a deceptive mirage.
In the remarks which I submitted to the Senate yesterday I declined to
dwell on these calculations, for I saw, that, while involving large
amounts, they were uncertain, inconclusive, and inapplicable. With
one theory of political economy they seemed to point one way, and with
another to point another way. If, for instance, you accept the early
theory that commerce is disadvantageous where imports exceed exports,
they tell against the treaty; but if you accept the opposite theory of
later writers, they tell the other way. All this assumes that they are
applicable. But nobody is able to show that the general increase of
commerce since the treaty has been caused by the treaty. Other agencies
have had their influence; and it is difficult to say what is due to
them, and what to the treaty.
In this uncertainty, I prefer to rest the proposition on the simple
ground that the national revenue is impaired by this treaty. Authentic
figures place this beyond controversy.
I forbear now all details, and content myself with stating the
indubitable conclusion. The national revenue is impaired in two ways:
first, at the custom-house on our frontier, which, under the operation
of the treaty, yields little or nothing, when it might yield much;
and, secondly, it is impaired through the check and embarrassment the
treaty causes in our internal taxation. There is failure of duties
and of excise. It is not enough to say that there is a countervailing
advantage in the increase of our commerce. The conclusion is none the
less exact, that the national revenue is impaired. And the question is
distinctly presented, whether, at this critical moment, in a period of
war, when the whole country in its wealth and labor is contributing
to the support of Government, any good reason can be assigned why
the commerce of Canada should be exempt from contribution. Commerce
elsewhere, manufactures, business, income, tea, coffee, books, all
pay tribute. The tax-gatherer is everywhere except on the Canadian
frontier. At home there is not an interest, hardly a sentiment, free
from taxation. Surely there is nothing in the recent conduct of
Canadians to make us treat them better than we treat ourselves.
There is another consideration which is decisive, even if others fail.
In view of existing Public Opinion, and considering the criticisms
of the treaty, it is important that our relations with Canada should
be carefully revised in the light of experience. The treaty, in
authorizing its termination at the end of ten years, has anticipated
this very exigency. But such revision cannot be made advantageously
without the proposed notice. In the case of a lease, with a right to
terminate it at the end of ten years on a year’s notice, the landlord,
if the character of the lease had been called in question, would not
hesitate to give the notice, if for no other reason, that he might
revise the terms anew on a footing of equality. For like reason we must
give the notice to Great Britain. We must untie ourselves now, even if
we would tie ourselves again for the future. The notice will leave us
“master of the situation” to this extent at least, that we shall be
free to act according to the requirements of the public good. Without
this notice there will be no foothold for diplomacy or legislation; but
the notice will be a foothold from which we may accomplish whatever
is proper and just. The treaty may be reconsidered and then adopted
anew, or it may be entirely changed, and we shall have a year for this
purpose,--so that, when the Old expires, the New may begin.
The joint resolution directing the notice was adopted in the
Senate,--Yeas 33, Nays 8,--and was at once adopted by the House
of Representatives, and approved by the President January 18,
1865. It was then communicated by Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, our
minister at London, who, under date of March 17th, addressed a
note to Earl Russell, “giving formal notice of the termination
of the Reciprocity Treaty, and inclosing at the same time a
certified copy of the resolution expressing the sense of both
Houses of Congress on that subject.” Mr. Adams adds, in his
letter to Mr. Seward: “This note was delivered by the messenger
of this Legation at the Foreign Office at 2 P. M., notice of
which was entered by him on the envelope, and also reported
to me on his return. Not long afterwards I received from his
Lordship his own acknowledgment of the reception of it.”[43]