Yet, it is said, there is an aesthetic. There are several aesthetics,
even. But we shall suppose there is but one, and that--always in
principle--it has good reasons for opposing success, whatever it may
be. Acceptance of an aesthetic obliges us to admit that there is an
absolute beauty, and that works are deemed beautiful according to the
degree of their resemblance to this vague and complaisant ideal. It is
this aesthetic--admitting its existence for the moment--that is now to
be laid open and submitted to the scalpel.
The sensibility which yields to success, or which produces it, is very
interesting; but perhaps it will be permitted not to despise entirely,
and at very first sight, the sensibility which opposes success and
denies that the successful work is, as such, the beautiful work. These
two sensibilities, though equally spontaneous, are not equally pure.
The second is very mixed. The aesthetic which sums it up--an aesthetic
as fragile as morality--is a mixture of beliefs, of traditions, of
arguments, of habits, of conceptions. Respect enters into it--also fear
and an obscure appetite for novelty. "On new thoughts let us make old
verses." The new-old--that is what all aesthetics extol, for a caste
must be flattered in keeping with its nerves and its erudition. The
artist's judgment, in artistic matters, is an amalgam of sensations
and superstitions. The simple-minded crowd has merely sensations.
Its judgment is not aesthetic. It is not even a judgment. It is the
naïve avowal of a pleasure. It follows necessarily from this that the
aesthetic caste alone is qualified to judge the beauty of works, and to
accord them this quality. The crowd creates success, the caste creates
beauty. It is all the same, if you like, since there is a hierarchy
neither in acts nor in sensations, and all is but movement. It is the
same, but it is different. There, then, is one point established. In
art, the opinion of the intelligence is opposed to the opinion of
sensibility. Sensibility is concerned only with pleasure. If, to this
pleasure, an intellectual element be added, we have aesthetics. The
crowd can say: that pleases me, hence it is beautiful. It cannot say:
that pleases me, yet it is not beautiful, or: that displeases me,
yet it is beautiful. The crowd, as such, never lies; while aesthetic
judgment is one of the most complicated forms of falsehood.[3]
It is very evident that absolute beauty exists no more than truth,
justice, love. The beauty of the poets, the truth of the philosophers,
the justice of the sociologists, the love of the theologians, are
all so many abstractions which enter the realm of our senses--and
very clumsily--only when blocked out by the sculptor's chisel. Like
ideas conceived in the future or in the past, they express a certain
harmony between our present sensations and the general state of our
intelligence. This is especially felt in the case of truth, which is
indeed a sensation uncontradicted by our intelligence; but any other
intelligence may contradict it, or it may find itself contradicted by
sensations of a different order or intensity.
The idea of beauty has an emotional origin, connected with the idea
of generation. The female who is to be the mother must conform to the
racial type. That is, she must be beautiful.[4] Woman is less exacting,
perhaps because man transmits very little of himself to his offspring.
The first standard of beauty was, then, woman and, in general, the
human body. Beauty, in the case of an animal, an object, is possession
of something human in the form, in the character. A landscape can be
described in terms almost all of which would apply to the beauty of a
woman, and marble has her whiteness, sapphires are her eyes, coral is
her lips. We have here a whole vocabulary of poetic commonplaces. To be
sure, some of them should be corrected, and it should be noted that it
is ebony which is black as black hair, and the swan which has a woman's
neck. Beauty is so sexual that the only generally accepted works of art
are those which show, quite simply, the human body in its nakedness.
By his persistence in remaining purely sexual, the Greek sculptor has
placed himself above all discussion for eternity. It is beautiful,
because it is a beautiful human body, such as every man or every woman
would like to unite with for the perpetuation of the race.
But another fact, more obscure, though not less certain, permits us
to bring the idea of beauty back by another route to the very idea of
sexuality. This is, that all human emotions, whatever their order,
nature or intensity, awaken a more or less marked response in the
genital nervous system. Sexual pathology has thrown light upon this.
Perfumes, as well as the smell or sight of blood, noise and heat,
intellectual or muscular effort, repose and fatigue, drunkenness
and abstinence--the most contradictory sensations all favour the
sexual impulse. Others, like fear, cold, vexation, also react upon
a neighbouring and intricate centre in the genital system. Read the
first chapter of _En Ménage_, in which M. Huysmans describes the effect
produced upon a gentle, nervous being by the discovery of a lover in
his wife's arms. Among the emotions which reverberate most surely on
every somewhat sensitive organism, aesthetic emotions must be placed
in the first rank. And thus they return to their origin. That which
inclines to love seems beautiful. That which seems beautiful inclines
to love. There is between the two an undeniable relation. A man loves
a woman because she is beautiful, and he deems her beautiful because
he loves her. It is the same with everything that permits associations
of sexual ideas, and with every emotion which reacts upon the genital
system.
But it is not at all necessary for a work of art to present a sensual
picture in order to awaken ideas of love. It is enough for it to be
beautiful, captivating. It stirs passion. Where shall we seek the
seat of this passion? The brain is merely a centre of transmission.
It is not a terminus. It is a happy and praiseworthy error to have
made man's brain his absolute centre, but it is an error. The sole
natural end of man is reproduction. If his activity had another goal,
he would no longer be an animal, and we fall back into Christianity, to
be confronted again by the soul, demerit and all the jargon employed
by spiritualistic quacks. Emotion becomes conscious at the very
moment of its passing, but it merely passes, leaving its image, and
descends to the loins. This manner of speaking is perhaps figurative,
and, moreover, I am not speaking of intense and strongly localized
excitations. What is meant is merely that aesthetic emotion puts man in
a state favourable to the reception of erotic emotion. This state is
communicated to some by music, to others by painting, the drama. I have
known a man--of a certain age, it is true--who could cheat a sexual
desire by glancing at engravings. The reverse example would, doubtless,
be less paradoxical. Aesthetic emotion is that from which man lets
himself be most easily diverted by love, so easy, almost fatal, is the
passage from one to the other. This intimate union between art and love
is, moreover, the sole explanation of art. Without it--without this
genital repercussion--it would never have been born; and, without it,
it would not be perpetuated. Nothing is useless in deep-seated human
habits. Everything which has lasted is, for that reason, necessary. Art
is the accomplice of love. Take love away, and there is no longer art.
Take art away, and love becomes merely a physiological need.
But it is less here art itself that is concerned than its emotional
power, and there must therefore be grouped under the name of art
everything in the nature of spectacle or sport--every diversion enjoyed
in public, or with regard to which one communicates to himself his
impressions. Fireworks can thrill quite as much as a tragedy. The
sole hierarchy is that of intensity; but there is no doubt that the
success of a work of art greatly increases its emotional power upon
men in general. Hence, for the crowd, the quite natural belief that
every successful work is beautiful, and that failure and scorn are
always merited. In short, what the caste calls beauty, the people call
success; but they have learned from the aristocrats this word truly
devoid of meaning for them, and employ it to enhance the quality of
their pleasures. That is not entirely illegitimate, success and beauty
having a common origin in the emotions, their sole difference being the
difference of the nervous systems in which they have evolved.
But very few men are capable of an original aesthetic emotion. Most of
those who believe they experience it are like the people themselves,
merely obeying the suggestion of a master, the bidding of their
memories, the influence of their environment, the fashion. There is a
passing beauty as precarious as popular success. A work of art extolled
by the caste to-day will be despised by the caste to-morrow, and less
trace of it will perhaps remain than of the work rejected by the caste
and acclaimed by the people. For success is a fact whose importance
increases with the dust it raises, with the number of the faithful come
to accompany the cortège. The emotions of the caste and the emotions
of the people are destined to the same end. Nature, which makes no
leaps, makes no choice either. It is a question of making children.
The sense of smell (or an analogous sense) is so highly developed in
the emperor-moth, that a female egg of that rare butterfly attracts
a throng of males to the spot where not one was seen before. This
acuteness would be absurd if it merely served the emperor-moth to
select a more delicate repast in the flowery flock or, in one way or
another, to increase its pleasure and its spiritual advancement, the
culture of its intelligence. It is an aid to the emperor-moth in making
love. It is its aesthetic sense.
However, there are human natures, less diffuse or more refractory, in
which the emotions do not react upon the centre of major sensibility,
either because this centre is atrophied, or because the emotional
current has encountered in its course an obstacle, a dyke, an
impervious barrier. Let us, without examining too closely the aptness
of the analogy, avail ourselves of the commonest and most striking
comparisons. An electric current is thrown into a wire for the purpose
of creating motion. The wire falls supported by a bit of wood and,
instead of motion, heat is generated. The train which was to have
been propelled burns. So the emotion, on its way towards the genital
sense which it is meant to awaken, encounters a centre of resistance.
It is broken, twists back upon itself, but becomes installed; and all
the emotions of the same order, which pass by the same centre, will
share the same fate. A wheel was to be turned, and we have fireworks.
The species was to be preserved, and we have born the idea of beauty.
Aesthetic emotion, even in its purest, most disinterested form, is,
then, merely a deviation of the genital emotion. Aphrodite, who urged
us to her cult, no longer troubles us. The woman has vanished. Noble
forms are left, agreeable lines; but a horse also is beautiful, and
a lion, and an ox. Fortunate short-circuit which has permitted us to
reflect, to compare, to judge! The current hurled us on towards the
sister of the goddess. Now it turns us from her, for she is less fair!
It might be supposed that it is in the region of the intelligence
the emotional current has become diffused, thus forming that mixture
of emotion and intelligence which gives us the aesthetic sense.
Intelligence is an accident. Genius is a catastrophe. We must carefully
avoid even dreaming of a social state where health, equilibrium,
equity, moderation, order would reign uniformly, where catastrophes
would be impossible, and accidents very rare. Human intelligence is
certainly the consequence of what we naïvely call evil. If the threads
did not become cut and knotted, if emotion always attained its goal,
men would be stronger and handsomer, and their houses would be as
perfect as ant-hills. Only, the world would not exist.