taken or put to the sword. At this place the King formed a magazine: it
seemed the most convenient post because it is a peninsula and nearly
surrounded by the Mulde. Some redoubts were constructed; and ten
battalions under Sydow were left for its defence.
The army of the King thence marched to Eulenburg. The Austrian troops
that had encamped in that vicinity retired, through Mochrena to Torgau,
with so much precipitate haste that they abandoned a part of their
tents. The army encamped with the right at Thalwitz and the left at
Eulenburg. Hulsen was obliged to pass the Mulde with some battalions. He
took a position between Belzen and Gostevra, opposite the Prince de
Deuxponts, whose army was at Taucha. Under the present circumstances the
first thing necessary was to drive the troops of the circles to a
distance, as well because they were on the rear of the Prussians as to
prevent their union with the Austrians. This cost but little trouble;
Hulsen gave them the alarm, and they decamped the same night, passed the
Pleisse, and then the Elster, and retreated to Zeitz. Major Quintus,
with his free battalion, vigorously charged their rear-guard; from which
he took four hundred prisoners. After so happily terminating this
expedition, the Prussians recovered possession of Leipsic, and Hulsen
rejoined the army.
Every event hitherto (November) had turned to the advantage of the King.
The irruption of the Russians and the taking of Berlin, which might
appear to induce consequences so great, ended in a manner less
afflicting than could have been expected. Contributions and money only
were lost. The enemy was driven from the frontiers of Brandenburg.
Wittenberg and Leipsic were recovered; and the troops of the circle were
repulsed to a distance too considerable for it to be feared they should
join the Imperialists with promptitude; but all was not yet done, and
the projects that remained were the most difficult part of the whole.
The Russians kept at Landsberg on the Wartha and there might remain
peaceful spectators of what should pass in Saxony. The King, however,
was informed that other reasons engaged them not to march to too great a
distance; for their design was, should the Austrians obtain any
advantages over the army of the King, or should Marshal Daun maintain
Torgau, to reënter the electorate of Brandenburg, and, conjointly with
the Austrians, to take up their quarters on the banks of the Elbe. The
consequence of such a project would have been fatally desperate to
Prussia. By this position they would cut off the army, not only from
Silesia and Pomerania, but from Berlin itself--that nursing mother which
supplied clothing, arms, baggage, and every necessary for the men. Add
to which the troops would have no quarters to take except beyond the
Mulde, between the Pleisse, the Saale, the Elster, and the Unstrut. This
would have been a space too narrow to supply the army with subsistence
through the winter. And whence should magazines for the spring,
uniforms, and recruits be obtained?
The army thus pressed, and thrown back upon the allies, would have
starved them by starving itself.
Without any profound military knowledge every rational man would
comprehend that, had the King remained quiet during autumn, and formed
no new attempts, he would but have delivered himself, tied hand and
foot, into the power of the enemy. Let us still further add that the
provisions that had been deposited at Duben scarcely would supply the
troops for the space of a month; that the frost, which began to be felt,
would soon impede the navigation of the Elbe; consequently the boats
could no longer bring provisions from Magdeburg; and, in fine, that the
very last distress must have succeeded had not good measures been taken
to remove the enemy, and gain ground on which the army might encamp and
subsist.
After having maturely examined and weighed all these reasons, it was
determined to commit the fortune of Prussia to the issue of a battle, if
no other means by manoeuvring could be found of driving Marshal Daun
from his post at Torgau. It will be proper to observe that the fears
with which he might be inspired could only relate to two objects: the
first, that of gaining Dresden before him, in which there was but a
feeble garrison; and the second, of approaching the Elbe and disturbing
him concerning subsistence, which was brought from Dresden by the river.
It must be confessed that this last manoeuvre could not give him much
uneasiness, because he was entirely master of the right shore of the
Elbe, and might bring the provisions he wanted by land when they could
no more be transported by water.
The greatest difficulty in executing this plan was that two things
nearly contradictory were to be reconciled: the march of the army to the
Elbe, and the security of the magazine. Not to forget all rule, the army
of the King, in advancing, ought not to depart too far from the line of
defence by which it covered its subsistence; and the motion it was to
make upon the Elbe threw it entirely to the right and uncovered its
rear. It was still endeavored to reconcile this enterprise on the enemy
with the security of the magazine. The King proposed to incline to
Schilda, that he might prove the countenance of Daun, and attack him at
Torgau should he obstinately persist in remaining there. As it was but
one march to Schilda, should the marshal retire on this motion, there
was no fear that he should attempt Duben, and, if he remained at Torgau,
by attacking him on the morrow, it seemed apparent that he would have so
many occupations he would have no time to form projects against the
magazine.
Everything conspiring to confirm the King in his resolution, he, on
November 2d, marched the army to Schilda. During the whole route he
continued with the vanguard of the hussars, that he might observe to
which side the advanced posts of the enemy retired as they were repulsed
by the troops of the King. This did not long remain a subject of doubt.
The detachments all withdrew to Torgau, except Brentano, who was
attacked at Belgern, and taken in such a direction that he could only
escape toward Strebla. Kleist took eight hundred prisoners. The army of
the King encamped from Schilda through Probsthain to Langen-Reichenbach,
and Marshal Daun remained firm and motionless at Torgau. There no longer
was any doubt that he had received positive orders from his court to
maintain his post at any price.
The following dispositions were made for the attack on the morrow. The
right of the Imperialists was supported behind the ponds of Groswich;
their centre covered the hill of Sueptitz; the left terminated beyond
Zinna, extending toward the ponds of Torgau. Exclusive of this, Ried
observed the Prussian army from beside the forest of Torgau. Lacy, with
a reserve of twenty thousand men, covered the causeway and the ponds
that lie at the extremity of the place where the Imperialists had
supported their left. Still the ground on which the enemy stood wanted
depth, and the lines had not an interval of above three hundred paces.
This was a very favorable circumstance for the Prussians; because, by
attacking the centre in front and rear, the foe would be placed between
two fires, and could not avoid being beaten.
To produce this effect the King divided his army into two bodies. The
one destined to approach from the Elbe, after having passed the forest
of Torgau, was to attack the enemy in the rear, from the hill of
Sueptitz; while the other, following the route of Eulenburg to Torgau,
was to fix a battery on the eminence of Groswich, and at the same time
attack the village of Sueptitz. These two corps, acting in concert, must
necessarily divide the centre of the Austrians; after which it would be
easy to drive the remnant toward the Elbe, where the ground was one
continued gentle declivity, excellently advantageous to the Prussians,
and must have procured them a complete victory.
The King began his march at the dawn of day, on the 3d, and was followed
by thirty battalions and fifty squadrons of his left. The troops crossed
the forest of Torgau in three columns. The route of the first line of
infantry led through Mochrena, Wildenhayn, Groswich, and Neiden; the
route of the second through Pechhutte, Jaegerteich, and Bruckendorf, to
Elsnich. The cavalry that composed the third column passed the wood of
Wildenhayn, to march to Vogelsang. Zieten at the same time led the right
of the army, consisting of thirty battalions and seventy squadrons, and
filed off on the road that goes from Eulenburg to Torgau. The corps
headed by the King met with General Ried, posted at the skirts of the
forest of Torgau, with two regiments of hussars, as many dragoons, and
three battalions of pandoors. Some volleys of artillery were fired, and
he fell back on the right of the Imperialists.
Near Wildenhayn there is a small plain in the forest, where ten
battalions of grenadiers were seen, well posted, who affected to dispute
the passage of the Prussians. They made some discharges of artillery on
the column of the King, which were answered by the Prussians. A line of
infantry was formed to charge, but they reclined toward their army. The
hussars brought word at the same time that the regiment of St. Ignon was
in the wood, between the two columns of infantry, and that it had even
dismounted. It was incontinently attacked; and, as these dragoons found
no outlet for escape, the whole regiment was destroyed. These grenadiers
and this regiment were mutually to depart on an expedition against
Dobeln, and the commanding officer, St. Ignon, who was taken, bitterly
complained that Ried had not informed him of the approach of the
Russians. This trifling affair only cost the troops a few moments; they
pursued their road, and the heads of the columns arrived, at one
o'clock, on the farther side of the forest, in the small plain of
Neiden.
Here were seen some dragoons of Bathiani, and four battalions, who
coming from the village of Elsnich made some discharges of artillery at
a venture and fired with their small arms. This no doubt was a motion of
surprise, occasioned perhaps by having seen some Prussian hussars. They
retired upon a height behind the defile of Neiden. In this place is a
large marsh, which begins at Groswich and goes to the Elbe, and over
which there is no other passage but two narrow causeways. Had this corps
taken advantage of its ground there certainly would have been no battle.
However determined the King might be to attack the Imperialists, such an
attack would have become impossible: he must have renounced his project,
and returned full speed to regain Eulenburg.
But it happened far otherwise; these battalions hastened to rejoin the
army, to which they were invited by a heavy cannonade which they heard
from the side of Zieten. The King supposed, as was very probable, that
the troops of Zieten already were in action with the enemy. This induced
him to pass the defile of Neiden with his hussars and infantry; for the
cavalry which ought to have proceeded was not yet come up. The King
glided into a little wood, and personally reconnoitred the position of
the enemy. He judged there was no ground on which it was proper to form,
in presence of the Austrians, but by passing this small wood, which
would in some measure conceal his troops, and whence a considerable
ravine might be gained, to protect the soldiers, while they formed, from
the enemy's artillery. This ravine was not indeed above eight hundred
paces from the Austrian army; but the remainder of the ground, which
from Sueptitz descended like a glacis to the Elbe, was such that, had
the army here been formed, one-half must have been cut off before it
could approach the enemy.
Marshal Daun scarcely could credit the report that the Prussians were
marching to the attack; nor was it till after reiterated information
that he ordered his second line to face about and that the greatest part
of the artillery of the first line was brought to the second. Whatever
precaution the King might take to cover the march of his troops, the
enemy, who had four hundred pieces of artillery in battery, could not
fail to kill many of his men. Eight hundred soldiers fell, and thirty
cannon were destroyed, with their horses, train, and gunners, before the
columns arrived at the place where they were to be put in order of
battle. The King formed his infantry in three lines, each of ten
battalions, and began the attack. Had his cavalry been present, he would
have thrown two regiments of dragoons into a bottom, that was on the
right of his infantry, to cover its flank; but the Prince of Holstein,
whose phlegm was invincible, did not come up till an hour after the
action had begun. According to the regulations that had been agreed on,
the attacks were to be made at the same time, and the result ought to
have been that either the King or Zieten should penetrate through the
centre of the enemy at Sueptitz. But General Zieten, instead of
attacking, amused himself for a considerable time with a body of
pandoors, whom he encountered in the forest of Torgau. He next
cannonaded the corps of Lacy, who as we have said was posted behind the
ponds of Torgau. In a word, the orders were not executed; the King
attacked singly, without being seconded by Zieten, and without his
cavalry being present. This still did not prevent him from pursuing his
purpose. The first line of the King left the ravine and boldly marched
to the enemy; but the prodigious fire of the Imperial artillery, and the
descent of the ground, were too disadvantageous. Most of the Prussian
generals, commanders of battalions, and soldiers, were killed or
wounded. The line fell back, and returned in some disorder. By this the
Austrian carbineers profited, pursued, and did not retreat till they had
received some discharges from the second line. This line also
approached, was disturbed, and, after a more bloody and obstinate combat
than the preceding, was in like manner repulsed. Buelow, who led it to
the attack, was taken.
At length the much-expected Prince of Holstein and his cavalry arrived.
The third line of the Prussians was already in action; the regiment of
Prince Henry, attacking the enemy, was in turn charged by the Austrian
cavalry, and supported by the hussars of Hund, Reitzenstein, and
Prittwitz, against all the efforts of the enemy to break its ranks. The
dreadful fire of the artillery of the Austrians had too hastily consumed
the ammunition. They had left their reserve of cannon on the other side
of the Elbe, and their close lines did not admit of ammunition-wagons to
pass and make proper distribution to the batteries.
The King profited by the moment when their fire slackened, and ordered
the dragoons of Bayreuth to attack their infantry. They were led on with
so much valor and impetuosity by Buelow that, in less than three
minutes, they took prisoners the regiments of the Emperor, Neuperg,
Geisruck, and Imperial-Bayreuth. The cuirassiers of Spaen and Frederick
at the same time made an assault on that part of the enemy's infantry
which was most to the right of the Prussians, put it to the rout, and
brought back many prisoners. The Prince of Holstein was placed to cover
the left flank of the infantry, which his right wing joined, and his
left inclined toward the Elbe. The enemy soon presented himself before
the Prince, with eighty squadrons; the right toward the Elbe, the left
toward Zinna. O'Donnel commanded the Imperial cavalry. Had he resolutely
attacked the Prince, the battle must have been lost without resource,
but he was respectful of a ditch of a foot and a half wide, which those
who skirmished were forbidden to pass. The enemy believed it to be
considerable, because the Prussians made a pretence of fearing to cross
it; and the Imperialists remained, in the presence of the Prince,
inactive.
The dragoons of Bayreuth had just cleared the height of Sueptitz. The
King sent thither the regiment of Maurice, which had not engaged, and a
brave and worthy officer, Lestwitz, brought up a corps of a thousand
men, which he had formed from the different regiments that had been
repulsed in previous attacks. With these troops the Prussians seized on
the eminence of Sueptitz, and there fixed themselves, with all the
cannon they could hastily collect. Zieten at length, having arrived at
his place of destination, attacked on his side. It began to be dark, and
to prevent Prussians from combating Prussians, the infantry of Sueptitz
beat the march. They were presently joined by Zieten; and scarcely had
the Prussians begun to form with order on the ground before Lacy came
up, with his corps, to dislodge the King's forces. He came too late: he
was twice repulsed. Offended at his ill-reception, at half-past nine he
retired toward Torgau. The Prussians and Imperialists were so near each
other, among the vineyards of Sueptitz, that many officers and soldiers,
on both parts, wandering in the dark, were made prisoners after the
battle was over and all was tranquil. The King himself, as he was
repairing to the village of Neiden, as well to expedite orders relative
to the victory as to send intelligence of it through Brandenburg and
Silesia, heard the sound of a carriage near the army. The word was
demanded, and the reply was "Austrian." The escort of the King fell on
and took two field-pieces and a battalion of pandoors, that had lost
themselves in the night. A hundred paces farther he came up with a
troop of horse; that again gave the word "Austrian carbineers." The
King's escort attacked and dispersed them in the forest. Those who were
taken related that they had lost their road with Ried in the wood, and
that they had imagined the Imperialists remained masters of the field.
The whole forest that had been crossed by the Prussians before the
battle, and beside which the King was then riding, was full of large
fires. What these might mean no one could divine, and some hussars were
sent to gain information. They returned, and related that soldiers sat
round the fires, some in blue uniforms and others in white. As
intelligence more exact was necessary, officers were then sent, who
learned a very singular fact, of which I doubt whether any example in
history may be found: The soldiers were of both armies, and had sought
refuge in the woods, where they had passed an act of neutrality, to wait
till fortune had decided in favor of the Prussians or Imperialists; and
they had mutually agreed to follow the victorious party.
This battle cost the Prussians thirteen thousand men, three thousand of
whom were killed, and three thousand fell into the enemy's hands, during
the first attacks, while the Austrians were victorious; Buelow and Finck
were among these. The breast of the King was grazed by a ball, and the
margrave, Charles, received a contusion: several generals were wounded.
The battle was obstinately disputed by both armies; its fury cost the
Imperialists twenty thousand men, eight thousand of whom were taken,
with four generals. They lost twenty-seven pair of colors and fifty
cannon. Marshal Daun was wounded at the commencement of the battle.
When the enemy saw the first line of the Prussians give ground, with
hopes too frivolous, they despatched couriers to Vienna and Warsaw to
announce their victory; but the same night they abandoned the field of
battle, and crossed the Elbe at Torgau. On the morning of the following
day (the 4th), Torgau capitulated to General Hulsen. The Prince of
Wurtemberg was sent over the Elbe to pursue the foe, who fled in
disorder: he augmented the number of prisoners already made. The
Imperialists would have been totally defeated had not General Beck, who
was not in the engagement, covered their retreat by posting his corps
between Arzberg and Triestewitz, behind the Landgraben. It was wholly
in the power of Daun to have avoided a battle. Had he placed Lacy behind
the defile of Neiden, instead of the ponds of Torgau, which six
battalions would have been sufficient to defend, his camp would have
been impregnable, so great may the consequences be of the least
inadvertency in the difficult trade of war.
When the Russians were informed of the fate of the day of Torgau, they
retired to Thorn, where they crossed the Vistula. The army of the King,
on the 5th, advanced to Strebla, and on the 6th to Meissen. The
Imperialists had left Lacy on that side of the Elbe, that he might cover
the bottom of Plauen before their arrival. He attempted to dispute the
defile of Zehren with the vanguard; but, when he saw the cavalry in
motion to turn him by Lommatsch, he fled to Meissen, where he crossed
the Tripsche; but, in spite of the celerity of his march, his rear-guard
was attacked, and lost four hundred men. The pursuit was continued that
an attempt might be made, favored by the fears and disorder of the foe,
to pass the bottom of Plauen with him and seize on this important post.
But no diligence could accomplish this; the troops were two hours too
late; for, on arriving at Ukersdorf, another corps of the enemy was
discovered, that had already taken post at the Windberg, the right of
which extended to the Trompeter Schloesgen. This was the corps of
Haddick, who, with the Prince de Deuxponts, quitting Leipsic, had
marched to Zeitz, and afterward to Rosswein. No sooner were they
informed of the Imperial defeat at Torgau than they diligently advanced
to cover Dresden before the Prussians could come up.
FOOTNOTES:
[42] The Hanoverian nobility, who hoped thereby to protect their
property, were implicated in this affair. They were shortly afterward
well and deservedly punished, being laid under contribution by the
French.
CONQUEST OF CANADA
VICTORY OF WOLFE AT QUEBEC
A.D. 1759
A.G. BRADLEY
With the opening of the Seven Years' War the two races, French and
English, once more began to contend for the prize of empire in the
New World. For a while the advantage in the struggle was on the side
of France, though the preponderance of population was vastly on the
side of the English colonies. Louis XV, however, had one general in
Canada worthy of the gallant race from which he had sprung, and who
strenuously endeavored to uphold the fortunes of his country. This
was the Marquis de Montcalm, a cultured and far-seeing French
nobleman, whose ability and enthusiasm in the profession of arms had
procured for him the chief military command in Canada, and who was
now seeking to expel the English from the colonial possessions of
France on the Continent.
But, unfortunately for his country, Montcalm was ill-supported by
Old France, and his difficulties were increased by the
maladministration of affairs in the colony. Despite these drawbacks,
he was for some years the means of protracting the gallant struggle
in America and of bringing many disasters on the English arms.
Concentrating his forces in the neighborhood of Lake Champlain, he
attacked Fort William Henry, on Lake George, and with a body of
Indian auxiliaries from the Ottawa forced the English to capitulate.
The victory was marred by horrible Indian atrocities on the English
prisoners of war, which Montcalm was unable to prevent. During the
year 1757 Montcalm acted solely on the defensive, while the English,
having incompetent generals, accomplished little and failed in an
attempt to wrest Louisburg from the French. The following year,
however, William Pitt, "the Great English Commoner," was called to
the councils of his nation, and infused new vigor into the war which
had now been formally declared between the two countries. Pitt,
aiming at the extinction of French power in America, fitted out a
fleet of one hundred fifty sail, under Admiral Boscawen, with a land
force of some fourteen thousand men, under General Amherst and
Brigadier-General James Wolfe, and despatched both to Canada.