REFLECTIONS ON THE SKIRMISH AT CROSS LANES.--BATTLE OF CARNIFEX
FERRY.
The occasion for the affair at Cross Lanes was brought about by a
series of blunders. The first blunder was committed by the officer who
ordered all the forces, with the exception of the Seventh Ohio, from a
position which enabled them to guard the ferries of the Gauley. If it
was deemed important to hold these ferries at all, it was certainly
advisable to retain a sufficient force to guard against surprise and
capture. But then, what would be considered a sufficient force? To
settle the question, it is necessary to take into account the size of
the army occupying the country, as well as the size of that of the
enemy. Neither army was large, and both were much scattered, scarcely
more than a brigade occupying one position. A regiment, therefore, may
perhaps be considered a sufficient force for an outpost.
The army in Western Virginia was at no time sufficiently large to
accomplish any thing, under the best generalship, beyond simply holding
the country, and preventing invasion; and it was only for the want of a
moderately sized army that the rebel general failed to drive back our
forces. But the rebel authorities had no men to spare for the purpose
of winning barren victories; so the armies of Western Virginia were
left to watch each other, with an occasional skirmish.
At the time the affair at Cross Lanes took place, our army occupied a
front of many miles, as did also the rebel army. It was quite
impossible to collect, in case of emergency, more than about six
thousand men. But, however it may be as to the first point, it is
clear, secondly, that the commanding officer at Cross Lanes committed
an error in not making a personal inspection of the grounds, adjacent
to the camp, immediately on his arrival. It is always considered highly
important that those in command should know precisely the ground their
commands are expected to defend, and not to trust to chance or a battle
to develop favorable points of defence or attack. By reason of this
want of knowledge, rumors as to the presence of the enemy in force
created uneasiness and alarm, which was entirely natural, although
without cause. While in this state of feeling, the commanding officer
sent dispatches to Generals Rosecrans and Cox, which created the
impression that their author was not to be trusted to hold these
ferries. Those generals attributed this alarm to a want of personal
courage, they being well informed as to the strength of the position at
Cross Lanes. It was not, however, a want of courage, but simply a
failure on his part to understand the real strength of the position, by
reason of not having visited it in person.
When the order to withdraw came, Colonel Tyler regretted it as much as
any one; for he had that day examined the position, and knew that he
could hold it against any force the enemy could bring to the attack.
But this knowledge was obtained too late: lying on his table was a
positive order to withdraw. Reason said hold the position; military
law, which was higher in authority, said abandon it; so the place was
evacuated. The third and irremediable error was committed in not
returning to Cross Lanes when ordered. If that had been done, the
consequences resulting from the withdrawal would have been entirely
checked. The order to return was given on Wednesday, with the
expectation that it would be acted upon as soon as Thursday morning;
but it was not until the Saturday noon following that the command
started. There was no reason for this delay. The regiment had marched
but eighteen miles in as many days, and could, without any injustice
being done it, have returned the day the order was given. Even had the
command moved as late as Friday, with dispatch, it would not have been
too late, as it seems to be well settled that Floyd did not cross over
any considerable body of troops until Saturday.
In the way of criticism on this affair, it has been said that, had a
spirited dash been made on the enemy on Saturday evening, the rebels
could have been driven across the river. I think this claim subject to
many doubts. In my opinion a reconnoissance should have been made that
night, instead of falling back to Panther Mountain. This would have
resulted in the discovery of their position and force, and thus given
the command an opportunity to take advantage of the night to withdraw.
Had this been done, the ferry might possibly have been reached.
The result of these blunders was the fighting of two engagements, with
a heavy Federal loss, while the enemy suffered less. One of these,
Carnifex Ferry, has been dignified with the name of battle, while the
other is considered but an affair.
After the repulse of the Seventh, Floyd intrenched himself on the bank
of the river, near the ferry. About two weeks later, "Rosecrans came
down with his legions," comprising about four thousand men. Approaching
the vicinity of the ferry, he threw forward General Benham's brigade,
with no design of bringing on an engagement, however; but the line
unwittingly advanced to within a short distance of the enemy's works,
when a sheet of flame shot along their entire line. The unequal contest
lasted five hours, when the Union forces withdrew, hungry and
supperless, with a loss of fourteen killed, and one hundred and four
wounded. The loss of the enemy was about twenty wounded.
The troops awoke in the morning to find the rebel works abandoned. Thus
ended the battle of Carnifex Ferry, no less a blunder than Cross Lanes.
General Benham was censured for having attacked their main works, when
he was ordered to make a reconnoissance only. But when it is understood
that the commanding general sent up reinforcements, the blame, if there
was any, attached itself to him.
The loss to the Seventh, at Cross Lanes, was one killed, twenty
wounded, and ninety-six taken prisoners. Several of these were
recaptured at Carnifex Ferry, when Rosecrans attacked Floyd. Among the
number was Lieutenant Cross, Company C. The loss to the enemy has never
been known. There is no doubt, however, that it was considerable. They
attacked in large numbers, confident of an easy victory, therefore very
little caution attended their movements. But instead of a flag of
truce, accompanied by an offer to surrender, they were met by a shower
of bullets, which must have told fearfully on their heavy columns. The
fact that they were thrown into such confusion as to permit our men to
escape, shows that they were too severely punished to follow up their
victory.
The force of Floyd has been variously estimated: some having placed it
as high as six thousand; while, in his official report of the
engagement at Carnifex Ferry, Floyd himself places it at only two
thousand. His force was probably four thousand, of all arms, with ten
pieces of artillery. This entire force must have been in the vicinity
at the time of the affair at Cross Lanes.
The following is an unofficial list of the loss in the regiment:
_Killed._--Captain John N. Dyer.
_Wounded._--Corporal Frank Dutton, N. J. Holly, Thomas Shepley, Thomas
J. Scoville, Sergeant H. G. Orton, Joseph W. Collins, B. Yeakins, Lewis
J. Jones, Thomas S. Curran, William Meriman, B. F. Gill, William S.
Reed, David M. Daily, Robert J. Furguson, James R. Greer, E. J.
Kreiger, Sergeant James Grebe, John W. Doll, William W. Ritiche, Fred.
W. Steinbauer.
The following is a list of those taken prisoners:
Sergeant W. W. Parmeter, Sergeant E. R. Stiles, Sergeant G. C. C.
Ketchum, Sergeant F. F. Wilcoxson, Sergeant Edward Bohn, Sergeant A.
Kolman, Sergeant E. W. Morey, Corporal C. F. Mack, Corporal J. G.
Turner, Corporal T. A. Mohler, Corporal S. M. Cole, Corporal E. C.
Palmer, Corporal Charles Bersett, Privates Albert Osborn, Charles
Weber, Alex. Parker, R. Bears, L. Warren, A. M. Halbert, H. Keiser, S.
B. Kingsbury, E. Kennedy, A. Hubbell, C. C. Quinn, C. Burrows, E.
Evans, W. H. Scott, C. H. Howard, Charles Carrol, T. B. Myers, George
Sweet, John Massa, J. F. Curtis, W. E. Bartlett, W. Cherry, John Bark,
John Hann, L. M. Blakesly, Z. Fox, J. Butler, F. S. Stillwell, G. W.
Downing, G. C. Newton, William Biggs, Mathew Merkle, J. Sheloy, H.
Huntoon, G. W. Williams, George C. Robinson, H. Wessenbock, J. C.
Rafferty, J. Snyder, W. W. Wheeler, C. Haskell, J. W. Finch, James
Johnson, H. Johnson, L. C. Logue, A. Scoville, P. Wildson, F. Boole,
John Miller, P. Jenkins, John Smith, J. Wolf, Theodore Burt, A.
Schwartz, G. A. Akerman, Charles Sahl, G. W. Thompson, F. Williams, M.
H. Whaley, Z. Larkins, T. Hebbig, Z. A. Fuig, F. A. Noble, J. Hettlick,
J. McCabe, L. Beles, E. R. Smith, F. A. Rubicon, John Smith, E. Smith,
H. Smith, D. N. K. Hubbard, H. Wood, Charles Ottinger, R. S. Beel, N.
D. Claghorn, H. Thompson, N. Freidenburg, M. Levullen, S. Gill, fifer.