THE SKIRMISH AT CROSS LANES.--GALLANT CONDUCT AND FINAL ESCAPE OF
THE SEVENTH REGIMENT.
The occupation of Cross Lanes was considered by the authorities of the
gravest importance. It was contiguous to three fords on the Gauley
River, which, when possessed by the Federal forces, was a perfect
protection to the left of the army occupying Gauley Bridge. Carnifex
Ferry was immediately south two and one-half miles. There was a road
leading from the vicinity of Gauley Bridge, on the south bank of the
Gauley River, which unites with the Sunday road, crossing the river at
this ferry. This road afforded the enemy a means of gaining the left of
our forces, at Gauley Bridge. The occupation of Cross Lanes, therefore,
by the enemy, would sever the communication between our forces at the
above point, and the main army under Rosecrans, occupying the country
from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, along Cheat Mountain.
Carnifex Ferry, was a point easily defended against a much superior
force. Indeed, it had so many natural defences, that it elicited
exclamations of surprise from men accustomed to the selection of places
for defence. The current of the river was rapid, while the abrupt rocks
on its banks afforded secure hiding places for a considerable body of
troops. It was quite impossible to bring artillery to bear in such a
manner on the position as to interfere materially with troops concealed
there. It seems to be the opinion of most persons familiar with the
place, that it would be quite impossible to dislodge a body of troops
properly posted on the north bank of the river at this ferry, provided
a stubborn resistance was made.
It was for the purpose of preventing the crossing of the enemy at this
point that the force of Colonel Tyler was ordered to Cross Lanes. By
keeping pickets well on the line of the river, to watch any advance of
the enemy, the regiment was entirely safe at its camp, from which it
was comparatively easy to re-enforce any portion of the line. But for
some reason, the commanding officer failed to visit the ferry in
person, until the afternoon of the day on which a peremptory order was
received to report with his command at Gauley Bridge. Hitherto he had
been entirely unable to give correct information, as to the probability
of his being able to hold the ferry. He was ordered to abandon the
position, because his dispatches were such, that they created an
uneasiness in the minds of Generals Rosecrans and Cox, as to the
propriety of trusting him to hold so important a position. Here was the
fatal mistake. A lesser error had already been made, in withdrawing all
the forces from Tyler, other than the Seventh. Had these forces
remained, the position would probably not have been abandoned, as all
would have felt secure. When the order to withdraw was received, the
commanding officer regretted it as much as any one. But the mischief
was already done; the order was imperative. On that evening, Monday,
the regiment left Cross Lanes at 11 o'clock P.M., and the next day, by
noon, was at Twenty Mile Creek, some eight miles from Gauley Bridge.
On the Wednesday morning following, Colonel Tyler reported in person to
General Cox. In the mean time, the general having become satisfied that
Colonel Tyler could be trusted to hold Cross Lanes, and being confident
that the contemplated attack of the enemy on Gauley Bridge had been
abandoned, ordered him to return as soon as the troops were rested,
expecting him to start back, at least the next morning. But Tyler did
not move. On Friday afternoon, General Cox, on learning that he had not
moved, was much excited, and said to an officer present--
"He must move; he must move at once; it is all important that Cross
Lanes be held, and Floyd be kept on the other side of the river; ride
back to camp and tell him from me, to move early in the morning, _and
with speed, to secure the position_."
The order was delivered in nearly the same language as given, but
notwithstanding its directness, he did not move till noon on Saturday,
and then made a distance of only fourteen miles, over good roads,
encamping at the foot of Panther Mountain, after having fallen back
from Peter's Creek, on learning of the presence of the enemy.
On arriving in camp, a dispatch was sent to General Cox, representing
to him that the enemy were in force in front, and asking instructions.
On Sunday morning at about 3 o'clock, a courier arrived with an order
from General Cox, substantially as follows: The force in your front
cannot be as large as you estimate it. Advance cautiously, feeling your
way; if the enemy is too strong, fall back, if not, occupy Cross Lanes
at once, as it is of the utmost importance.
About nine o'clock Sunday morning, August 25th, the regiment moved
towards Cross Lanes, casting lots as to which company should be left in
charge of the baggage. It fell upon Company F, which was temporarily
commanded by Lieutenant Kimball. The entire day was occupied in
reaching Cross Lanes. It was not until dark of that day that the
regiment went into camp.
In the days' advance some slight skirmishing occurred with the enemy's
cavalry videttes, but beyond these few horsemen no enemy was
encountered, the regiment encamping in apparent security near the
church, after having driven away a cavalry picket of the enemy.
Companies were sent out on picket, as follows: Company A, on the road
leading to Summerville; Company K, on the road leading to Carnifex
Ferry; Company C, on the road leading in the opposite direction, while
Company E was sent on a diagonal road leading to a ferry some distance
below Carnifex. The balance of the command remained near headquarters,
which were established in the church.
Each company on picket was divided into three reliefs, with
instructions to be vigilant.
The silence of the enemy, together with his neglect to attack, created
the impression that he had withdrawn his forces to the other side of
the river, fearing that this small force was but the advance of a
well-equipped army. But these theories were destined to fade into
sadder realities, as the shadows of night melted into morning.
Nothing occurred during the night to disturb the general repose. A
short time before day fires were kindled, and those who were up had
pieces of meat on sticks, which they were roasting. Some had obtained
green corn during the night, which they were also roasting. Before day
had fairly dawned, the command was almost entirely astir. As it became
sufficiently light to distinguish objects at a considerable distance,
several musket shots were heard in the direction of the river, followed
in quick succession by others. It soon became evident that a determined
attack was being made on Company K. About this time a column of rebels
was seen advancing from the river road, across the fields, towards
Company A's position on the Summerville road. Arriving in the vicinity
of this road, the column halted, formed in line of battle, at the same
time swinging round its right to the Summerville road, driving Company
A back to the point where the roads cross. In the mean time Companies
B, D, G, H, and I were ordered to the support of Company K; but on
arriving at the cross roads, Company K was seen falling back in some
confusion, before a superior force, therefore they remained at that
point. Meanwhile a heavy fire was opened from a dense wood opposite the
church, to resist which Company K, having been joined by Companies A
and C, which had advanced to its support on the ferry road, took
position on a hill midway between this belt of timber and the crossing
of the roads. From this point these companies delivered several
effective volleys, which soon drove the rebels from their position.
Taking advantage of this partial check of the enemy, Captain Crane
ordered a charge, which resulted in piercing the lines, and the capture
of a stand of rebel colors. The three companies now escaped, with a
loss, however, of Captain Shurtliff, Lieutenant Wilcox, and Lieutenant
Cross, taken prisoners, the latter being severely wounded in the arm.
During this time the rebel column from the direction of Summerville had
advanced so as to lap over the road opposite the Ferry road, exposing
the companies occupying the road in front of the church to an
enfilading fire, at the same time being exposed to a severe fire from
the front, from a column of infantry and cavalry coming up the Ferry
road. These companies were now ordered to rally on a hill near the
church. In executing this movement Companies D and H passed through a
corn field, exposed to a deadly fire from almost every direction. Soon
after reaching this field Captain Dyer, Company D, fell dead, pierced
in the heart by a rifle bullet. Lieutenant Weed succeeded him in
command. On reaching the hill these companies attempted to rally, but
being in an open field, combated by a much superior and partially
hidden foe, were compelled to fall back to a piece of woods skirting
the road. The balance of the command, other than those who had followed
the fortunes of Captain Crane, now joined them, and soon organized for
a systematic retreat.
Captain Crane and his followers, after putting some distance between
themselves and the enemy, crossed the Gauley road, and hastened to the
mountains, where they would be entirely free from the attacks of
cavalry, and where they would have a chance, at least, of partially
defending themselves against attack from the rebel infantry.
Arriving in the mountains, they took a direction as nearly as possible
towards Gauley Bridge, where they arrived in safety, meeting with
little of adventure on the way. Thus a small body of Federals had
fought their way out from the very grasp of the enemy, and, eluding
pursuit, traversed a mountain range, with no guide, over rocks and deep
gorges, arriving safely within the Union lines. Their arrival, however,
did little to cheer the hearts of those in camp, for they were a small
body compared with those still unheard from.
The news of the sad disaster to the Seventh had already been sent to
the friends at home; universal gloom had settled over the camp, and the
prospect looked dark for saving the organization, even, of a regiment
which was the pride of the Western Reserve.
A flag of truce was sent to Cross Lanes to ascertain, if possible, the
fate of those left behind. Chaplain Brown and Surgeon Cushing were
selected to undertake this enterprise. They, however, returned without
having accomplished their object.
One dark, rainy night, as if nature was in sympathy with the feelings
of those in camp, the band commenced playing a patriotic air in front
of the colonel's quarters, accompanied with cheers. I knew that this
indicated good news. Hastening to the spot I learned that a dispatch
had just arrived from Charleston with the comforting news that four
hundred of the regiment had arrived in safety on the Elk River, twelve
miles from the above place. But let us accompany these four hundred
heroes in their march from the battlefield.
Organizing the troops, Major Casement, being first in rank, Colonels
Tyler and Creighton having already escaped, assumed command. Losing no
time the detachment immediately took up the line of march. Avoiding all
highways, and keeping well in the timber, they moved on for some time,
when, considering themselves out of immediate danger, they ventured out
to the road, to find themselves only three miles from the place of
starting. It was now concluded that it was not advisable to attempt
reaching Gauley Bridge, as the enemy would be likely to interpose a
considerable body of troops between them and that point. It was
considered to be more practicable to make in the direction of Elk
River, and by this means reach Charleston. This course being adopted,
the command crossed the road and took to the mountains. Very soon after
a party of rebel cavalry came dashing down as if in pursuit, barely
missing the object of their search.
The command, aided by a compass, took their course over the mountains
in a direction which they supposed would ultimately lead them to the
banks of the Elk River.
During the afternoon Captain W. R. Sterling procured a guide, who
conducted them by narrow pathways, in which they were compelled to
march single file, towards a house which was situated at some distance
on the mountain. Night setting in, before reaching the spot, without
even a star visible to light them on the way, the column halted, and
passed the word back for a candle. The line extended for nearly half a
mile, and it was not until the last company, H, had been reached, that
one was procured. On its arriving at the front, it was discovered that
the head of the column had arrived on the brink of a deep chasm, into
which it would be sure death to plunge. One step more, and the unlucky
leader of the line would have been precipitated into the dreadful
crater. But these daring adventurers were spared the misfortune of such
an accident.
Two hours of valuable time having been lost, the line now pressed
forward, each man holding on to the man preceding him. About midnight
the house was reached, and the weary band laid themselves down; not,
however, to sleep, for the only provisions they had had during the day
was roasted corn, for in the morning they were attacked while preparing
breakfast, which they were compelled to abandon. The woman of the house
was kept cooking the good old-fashioned corn-dodger, and by morning the
command was tolerably well fed, and ready for the toilsome as well as
hazardous march of the succeeding day.
As the day again dawned, the line moved on. Procuring another guide
during the day, they arrived, in early evening, on the banks of the Elk
River, without any adventure worth relating. Before halting they forded
the river, which was, at the time, waist deep. Company B was sent out
on picket, under command of Lieutenant Molyneaux. The instructions were
to establish a chain of pickets, at short intervals, along the road
leading up the river. In case of an attack, the outer picket to fire
and fall back on the next, when another volley was to be delivered, and
so continue until the camp should be finally reached. The position
selected for the camp was at the base of a range of abrupt hills, which
were not accessible to cavalry, while many difficulties would present
themselves in the way of a force of infantry advancing to an attack
from that direction. The river ran at the very foot of these hills, too
deep to cross in the face of an enemy, and sufficiently wide to present
a decided obstacle in the way of an attacking party on the opposite
shore. The command felt, therefore, comparatively safe in this retreat.
As it afterwards proved, they were not mistaken; for it was ascertained
that, at the time the pickets were being stationed, seven hundred rebel
cavalry were a short distance up the river; indeed, they were so near
that a party of rebel officers heard the lieutenant give the
instructions to the outer picket. One of these officers, when
afterwards taken prisoner, being questioned by Molyneaux as to their
reason for not attacking, remarked that it would have been quite
impossible for them to reach the camp in case his instructions to the
picket should be carried out; and he and his brother-officers agreed in
the opinion, that the orders would be carried out; for no body of
troops, after having made so stubborn a resistance as at Cross Lanes,
would afterwards lose all by a want of vigilance or a disobedience of
orders. True it is that they did not attack, but suffered the camp to
remain quiet, and the command to move off at leisure in the morning.
A dispatch being sent to Charleston, on the following day a
provision-train met them twelve miles from the latter place. In due
time the command arrived at Charleston, weary and foot-sore from their
long and toilsome march.