FOR several days after Wilkinson’s arrival at New Orleans
he left the conspirators in doubt of his intentions. No public alarm
had yet been given; and while Colonel Cushing hurried the little army
forward, Wilkinson, November 30, called on Erick Bollman, and had with
him a confidential interview. Not until December 5 did he tell Bollman
that he meant to oppose Burr’s scheme; and even then Bollman felt some
uncertainty. December 6 the General at length confided to the Governor
his plan of defence, which was nothing less than that Claiborne should
consent to abdicate his office and invest Wilkinson with absolute power
by proclaiming martial law.
Considering that this extraordinary man knew himself to be an object of
extreme and just suspicion on Claiborne’s part, such a demand carried
effrontery to the verge of insolence; and the tone in which it was made
sounded rather like an order than like advice.
“The dangers,” said he,[228] “which impend over this city and
menace the laws and government of the United States from an
unauthorized and formidable association must be successfully
opposed at this point, or the fair fabric of our independence,
purchased by the best blood of our country, will be prostrated,
and the Goddess of Liberty will take her flight from this
globe forever. Under circumstances so imperious, extraordinary
measures must be resorted to, and the ordinary forms of our
civil institutions must for a short period yield to the strong
arm of military law.”
Claiborne mildly resisted the pressure, with much good temper refusing
to sanction either the impressment of seamen, the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, the declaration of martial law, or the illegal
arrest of suspected persons, while he insisted on meeting the emergency
with the ordinary legal means at his disposal. Wilkinson was obliged to
act in defiance of his advice.
Sunday, December 14, arrests at New Orleans began. Bollman was first
to be seized. Swartwout and Ogden had been arrested at Fort Adams.
These seizures, together with that of Bollman’s companion, Alexander,
and Wilkinson’s wild talk, spread panic through the city. The courts
tried to interpose, and applied for support to Governor Claiborne.
The Governor advised Wilkinson to yield to the civil authorities; but
Wilkinson refused, thus establishing in the city something equivalent
to martial law. He knew, or believed, that both Judge Workman and Judge
Prevost were engaged in the conspiracy with Burr, and he was obliged to
defy them, or to risk his own success. The only effect of the attempt
to enforce the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the prisoners was
to draw out what had been hitherto concealed,--Burr’s letter of July
29. Not until December 18 did Wilkinson send a written version of
that letter to the President.[229] In order to warrant the arrests of
Swartwout and Ogden, Wilkinson, December 26, swore to an affidavit
which embodied Burr’s letter.
This step brought the panic in New Orleans to a climax. Wilkinson’s
military measures were evidently directed rather against the city
than against Burr. His previous complicity in the projects of Burr
was evident. His power of life and death was undisputed. Every
important man in New Orleans was a silent accomplice of Burr, afraid
of denunciation, and at Wilkinson’s mercy. He avowed publicly that
he would act with the same energy, without regard to standing or
station, against all individuals who might be participants in Burr’s
combination; and it would have been difficult for the best people in
New Orleans to prove that they had no knowledge of the plot, or had
given it no encouragement. The creole gentlemen began to regret the
mild sway of Claiborne when they saw that their own factiousness had
brought them face to face with the chances of a drumhead court-martial.
Wilkinson’s violence might have provoked an outbreak from the mere
terror it caused, had he not taken care to show that he meant in
reality to protect and not to punish the chief men of the city. After
the first shock, his arrests were in truth reassuring. The people
could afford to look on while he seized only strangers, like Bollman
and Alexander; even in Swartwout and Ogden few citizens of New Orleans
took much personal interest. Only in case the General had arrested men
like Derbigny or Edward Livingston or Bellechasse would the people
be likely to resist; and Wilkinson showed that he meant to make no
arrests among the residents, and to close his eyes against evidence
that could compromise any citizen of the place. “Thank God!” he wrote
to Daniel Clark, December 10,[230] “your advice to Bellechasse, if your
character was not a sufficient guaranty, would vindicate you against
any foul imputation.” In another letter, written early in January, he
added,[231]--
“It is a fact that our fool [Claiborne] has written to his
contemptible fabricator [Jefferson], that you had declared if
you had children you would teach them to curse the United States
as soon as they were able to lisp.”
Claiborne had brought such a charge only a few weeks before, and
Wilkinson must have heard it from Claiborne himself, who had already
written to withdraw it on learning Clark’s advice to Bellechasse.
Nevertheless Wilkinson continued,--
“_Cet bête_ [Claiborne] is at present up to the chin in
folly and vanity. He cannot be supported much longer, for Burr
or no Burr we shall have a revolt if he is not removed speedily.
The moment Bonaparte compromises with Great Britain will be
the signal for a general rising of French and Spaniards; and
if the Americans do not join, they will not oppose. Take care!
Suspicion is abroad; but you have a friend worth having.”
Clark’s business correspondents in New Orleans delivered to Wilkinson
a letter which came to them from Burr without address, but which was
intended for Bollman.[232] “For your own sake,” said the General, “take
that letter away! Destroy, and say nothing of it!” A year later, when
the frightened crew of conspirators recovered from their panic and
began to turn upon him with ferocity on account of his treason to them
and to Burr, Wilkinson wrote to Daniel Clark a last letter, mentioning
in semi-threatening language the written evidence in his possession
against Clark himself, and adding,[233]--
“Much pains were taken by Bollman to induce me to believe you
were concerned. Swartwout assured me Ogden had gone to New
Orleans with despatches for you from Burr, and that you were to
furnish provisions, etc. Many other names were mentioned to me
which I have not exposed, nor will I ever expose them unless
compelled by self-defence....”
Wilkinson never did expose them, nor did he molest in any serious
degree the society of New Orleans.
Had Wilkinson been satisfied to secure the city without magnifying
himself, he might perhaps have won its regard and gratitude; but he
could do nothing without noise and display. Before many days had passed
he put an embargo on the shipping and set the whole city at work on
defences. He spread panic-stricken stories of Burr’s force and of
negro insurrection. He exasperated the judges and the bar, alienated
Claiborne, and disgusted the creoles. Nothing but a bloody convulsion
or an assault upon the city from Burr’s armed thousands could save
Wilkinson from becoming ridiculous.
Jan. 12, 1807, the Legislature met. Probably at no time had Burr’s
project received much avowed support, even among those persons to
whom it had been confided. Men of wealth and character had no fancy
for so wild a scheme. The conduct of Daniel Clark was an example of
what Burr had to expect from every man of property and standing. The
Legislature was under the influence of conservative and somewhat timid
men, from whom no serious danger was to be expected, and whose fears
were calculated to strengthen rather than to weaken the government; yet
it was true that Burr had counted upon this meeting of the Legislature
to declare Louisiana independent, and to offer him the government.
He was to have waited at Natchez for a delegation to bring him the
offer; and he was supposed to be already at Natchez. The city had been
kept for a month in a state of continual alarm, distracted by rumors,
and expecting some outbreak from day to day, assured by Wilkinson
that Burr with seven thousand men might appear at any moment, with a
negro insurrection behind him and British ships in the river, when
suddenly John Adair rode into town, and descended at the door of
Madame Nourage’s boarding-house. Judge Prevost, Burr’s stepson, was
so indiscreet as to announce publicly that General Adair, second in
command to Burr, had arrived in town with news that Burr would follow
in three days, and that it would soon be seen whether Wilkinson’s
tyranny would prevail.[234] The same afternoon Lieutenant-Colonel
Kingsbury of the First Infantry, at the head of a hundred and twenty
men, appeared at the door of the hotel and marched Burr’s second
in command to prison. Adair afterward claimed that if he had been
allowed forty-eight hours no one could have arrested him, for he had
more friends in New Orleans than the General had; but even he must
have seen that the conspiracy was dead. For a moment his arrest, and
a few others made at the same time, caused excitement, and Wilkinson
ordered detachments of troops to patrol the city; but thenceforward
confidence began to return and soon the crisis passed away, carrying
with it forever most of the discontent and danger which had marked
the annexation of Louisiana. If New Orleans never became thoroughly
American, at least it was never again thoroughly French.
Unfortunately for Wilkinson’s hopes of figuring in the character of
savior to his country, Burr’s expedition met with an inglorious and
somewhat ridiculous end before it came within sight of Wilkinson or his
command. After leaving Fort Massac, the little flotilla entered the
Mississippi, and in a few days reached Chickasaw Bluffs, where a small
military post of nineteen men was stationed, commanded by a second
lieutenant of artillery, who had received no more instructions than had
been received by Captain Bissell. So far from stopping the flotilla,
Lieutenant Jackson was nearly persuaded to join it, and actually
accepted money from Burr to raise a company in his service.[235]
January 6, leaving Chickasaw Bluffs, the flotilla again descended the
river until, January 10, it reached the mouth of Bayou Pierre, about
thirty miles above Natchez. There Burr went ashore, and at the house of
a certain Judge Bruin he saw a newspaper containing the letter which he
had himself written in cipher to Wilkinson July 29, and which Wilkinson
had published December 26.
From the moment Burr saw himself denounced by Wilkinson, his only
hope was to escape. The President’s proclamation had reached the
Mississippi Territory; Cowles Meade, the acting-governor, had called
out the militia. If Burr went on he would fall into the hands of
Wilkinson, who had every motive to order him to be court-martialled
and shot; if he stayed where he was, Cowles Meade would arrest and
send him to Washington. Moving his flotilla across the river, Burr
gave way to despair. Some ideas of resistance were entertained by
Blennerhassett and the other leaders of the party; but they were
surprised to find their “emperor” glad to abdicate and submit. January
17 Burr met Acting-Governor Cowles Meade and surrendered at discretion.
His conversation at that moment was such that Meade thought him
insane.[236] January 21 he caused his cases of muskets, which had been
at first secreted in the brush, to be sunk in the river. After his
surrender he was taken to Washington, the capital of the Territory,
about seven miles from Natchez. A grand-jury was summoned, and the
attorney-general, Poindexter, attempted to obtain an indictment. The
grand-jury not only threw out the bill, but presented the seizure of
Burr and his accomplices as a grievance. The very militia who stopped
him were half inclined to join his expedition. Except for a score of
United States officials, civil and military, he might have reached New
Orleans without a check.
Fortunately neither the civil nor the military authorities of the
national government were disposed to be made a jest. The grand-jury
could grant but a respite, and Burr had still to decide between
evils. If he fell into Wilkinson’s hands he risked a fate of which he
openly expressed fear. During the delay his men on the flotilla had
become disorganized and insubordinate; his drafts on New York had been
returned protested; he knew that the military authorities at Fort Adams
were determined to do what the civil authorities had failed in doing;
and his courage failed him when he realized that he must either be
delivered to President Jefferson, whom he had defied, or to General
Wilkinson, whom he had tried to deceive.
Feb. 1, 1807, after sending to his friends on the flotilla a note to
assure them of his immediate return,[237] Burr turned his back on
them, and left them to the ruin for which he alone was responsible.
Disguised in the coarse suit of a Mississippi boatman, with a soiled
white-felt hat, he disappeared into the woods, and for nearly a month
was lost from sight. Toward the end of February he was recognized in
a cabin near the Spanish frontier, about fifty miles above Mobile;
and his presence was announced to Lieutenant Gaines, commanding at
Fort Stoddert, near by. Gaines arrested him. After about three weeks
of confinement at Fort Stoddert he was sent to Richmond in Virginia.
In passing through the town of Chester, in South Carolina, he flung
himself from his horse and cried for a rescue; but the officer
commanding the escort seized him, threw him back like a child into the
saddle, and marched on. Like many another man in American history, Burr
felt at last the physical strength of the patient and long-suffering
government which he had so persistently insulted, outraged, and
betrayed.
Not until the end of March, 1807, did Burr reach Richmond; and in the
mean while a whole session of Congress had passed, revolution after
revolution had taken place in Europe, and a new series of political
trials had begun for President Jefferson’s troubled Administration.
The conspiracy of Burr was a mere episode, which had little direct
connection with foreign or domestic politics, and no active popular
support in any quarter. The affairs of the country at large felt hardly
a perceptible tremor in the midst of the excitement which convulsed
New Orleans; and the general public obstinately refused to care what
Burr was doing, or to believe that he was so insane as to expect a
dissolution of the Union. In spite of the President’s proclamation of
Nov. 27, 1806, no special interest was roused, and even the Congress
which met a few days later, Dec. 1, 1806, at first showed indifference
to Burr and his affairs.
If this was a matter for blame, the fault certainly lay with the
President, who had hitherto refused to whisper a suspicion either
of Burr’s loyalty or of the patriotism which Jefferson believed to
characterize Louisiana, the Mississippi Territory, and Tennessee. Even
the proclamation had treated Burr’s enterprise as one directed wholly
against Spain. The Annual Message, read December 2, showed still more
strongly a wish to ignore Burr’s true objects. Not only did it allude
to the proclamation with an air of apology, as rendered necessary by
“the criminal attempts of private individuals to decide for their
country the question of peace or war,” but it praised in defiance of
evidence the conduct of the militia of Louisiana and Mississippi in
supporting Claiborne and Wilkinson against the Spaniards:--
“I inform you with great pleasure of the promptitude with
which the inhabitants of those Territories have tendered
their services in defence of their country. It has done honor
to themselves, entitled them to the confidence of their
fellow-citizens in every part of the Union, and must strengthen
the general determination to protect them efficaciously under
all circumstances which may occur.”
On some subjects Jefferson was determined to shut his eyes. He
officially asserted that the Orleans militia had done honor to
themselves and won the confidence of their fellow-citizens at a moment
when he was receiving from Governor Claiborne almost daily warnings
that the Orleans militia could not be trusted, and would certainly not
fight against Spain.
By this course of conduct Jefferson entangled himself in a new
labyrinth of contradictions and inconsistencies. Until that moment,
his apparent interests and wishes led him to ignore or to belittle
Burr’s conspiracy; but after the moment had passed, his interests
and convictions obliged him to take the views and share the
responsibilities of General Wilkinson. Thus John Randolph found
fresh opportunities to annoy the President, while the President lost
his temper, and challenged another contest with Luther Martin and
Chief-Justice Marshall.
After shutting his ears to the reiterated warnings of Eaton, Truxton,
Morgan, Daveiss, and even to the hints of Wilkinson himself; after
neglecting to take precautions against Burr, Wilkinson, or the city
of New Orleans, and after throwing upon the Western people the
responsibility for doing what the government had been instituted to
do; after issuing a proclamation which treated Burr’s armament as
a filibustering venture like that of Miranda; and after sending to
Congress an Annual Message which excused the proclamation on the ground
that it was an act of good faith toward Spain, although Spain took no
such view of it,--Jefferson could not reasonably expect the opposition
in Congress to accept without a protest sudden legislation resting on
the theory that the Constitution and the Union were in danger.
The month of December, 1806, passed at Washington without producing a
public display of uneasiness on the President’s part; the Government
was waiting to hear from Kentucky and Ohio. Outwardly Jefferson
continued to rely on the patriotism of the people of Louisiana, but
inwardly he was troubled with fears. December 22 Robert Smith, anxious
to save himself from possible calamity, wrote to him a letter of
remonstrance.
“In the course of our various communications,” said Smith,[238]
“in relation to the movements of Colonel Burr in the Western
country, I have from time to time expressed the opinions which,
as they were not at all countenanced by any of the other
gentlemen, I did not deem it expedient to press upon your
attention.... If, as was proposed on the 24th of October, the
sloops-of-war and the gunboats stationed at Washington, New
York, Norfolk, and Charleston had been sent to New Orleans under
the command of Commodore Preble, with Captain Decatur second in
command, we would at this time have nothing to apprehend from
the military expedition of Colonel Burr. Such a naval force
joined to the ketches and gunboats now on the Mississippi,
would beyond a doubt have been sufficient to suppress such an
enterprise. But this step, momentous as it was, the Executive
could not take consistently with the limitations of existing
statutes and with the spirit manifested by the House of
Representatives at their last session. The approaching crisis
will, I fear, be a melancholy proof of the want of forecast in
so circumscribing the Executive within such narrow limits.”
Robert Smith, conscious of being the person whom Congress most
distrusted, grasped at the idea of freeing himself from restraint,
and did not stop to ask whether Burr’s impunity were due to want of
forecast in Congress or in the Executive. He was alarmed; and the
President’s reply to his letter showed that Jefferson was equally
uncomfortable.[239]
“What I had myself in contemplation,” the President answered,
“was to wait till we get news from Louisville of December 15,
the day of Burr’s proposed general rendezvous. The post comes
from thence in twelve days. The mail next expected will be of
that date. If we then find that his force has had no effectual
opposition at either Marietta or Cincinnati, and will not be
stopped at Louisville, then, without depending on the opposition
at Fort Adams (though I have more dependence on that than
any other), I should propose to lay the whole matter before
Congress, ask an immediate appropriation for a naval equipment,
and at the same time order twenty thousand militia, or
volunteers, from the Western States to proceed down the river to
retake New Orleans, presuming our naval equipment would be there
before them. In the mean time I would recommend to you to be
getting ready and giving orders of preparation to the officers
and vessels which we can get speedily ready.”
Not a trace of confidence in the people of Louisiana was to be detected
in this plan of operations. The duty of the government not only to
act, but to act with extreme quickness and vigor, before Burr should
come within a long distance of New Orleans, was avowed. The idea of
calling out twenty thousand men to retake New Orleans showed a degree
of alarm contrasting strongly with the equanimity that preceded
it, and with the inertness which had allowed such an emergency to
arise. The difference of tone between this letter and the President’s
public language was extreme. Nevertheless, the Western mail arrived,
bringing news that the State of Ohio had seized the greater part of
Burr’s boats, that six or eight had escaped, and that Burr had gone
to Nashville; and in this partly satisfactory report the President
saw reason for further silence. Next came, Jan. 2, 1807, Wilkinson’s
letter of November 12 from Natchez, with its pledge to perish in New
Orleans, and with messages, not trusted to writing, but orally imparted
to the messenger, about Burr’s cipher letters and their contents.
Still the President made no sign. For want of some clew his followers
were greatly perplexed; and men like John Randolph, who hated the
President, and Samuel Smith, who did not love him, began to suspect
that at last the Administration was fairly at a standstill. Randolph,
with his usual instability, swayed between extremes of scepticism.
At one moment he believed that the situation was most serious; at
another, that the conspiracy was only a Spanish intrigue. January 2 he
wrote to Monroe, in London, a letter full of the conviction that Spain
was behind Burr:[240] “I am informed also, through a very direct and
respectable channel, that there is a considerable party about Lexington
and Frankfort highly propitious to his views, and with strong Spanish
prepossessions. Some names which have been mentioned as of the number
would astonish you.” Jefferson’s conduct irritated him more than that
of Burr or Yrujo:--
“The state of things here is indeed unexampled. Although the
newspapers teem with rumors dangerous to the peace and safety
of the Union, and notwithstanding Government give full faith
and credit to the existence of a formidable conspiracy, and
have given information and instructions to the several State
authorities how to act (under which Ohio has done herself much
honor), yet not one syllable has been communicated to Congress
on the subject. There are some other curious circumstances which
I must reserve for oral communication, not caring to trust them
by letter. One fact, however, ought not to be omitted. The army
(as it is called) is in the most contemptible state, unprovided
with everything, and men and officers unacquainted with their
duties.”
In what state Randolph expected the army to be, after six years of
such legislation as his, could not be guessed. Officers and soldiers,
distributed by companies, in forts hundreds of miles distant from
each other, could hardly become acquainted with any other duties than
those of a frontier garrison. General Smith did not, like Randolph,
complain of others for the consequences of his own acts. He too wrote
at that moment a confidential letter, describing the situation, to his
brother-in-law, Wilson Cary Nicholas:[241]--
“I fear that Burr will go down the river and give us trouble.
The proclamation, it seems, in the Western country is very
little attended to. They, no doubt, seeing no exertion making,
consider that it has originated from false information. The
President has not yet given any kind of information to Congress,
and gentlemen (Giles among the number) will not believe that
there is any kind of danger.... Burr’s letter to Wilkinson
is explicit. (This is secret.) He had passed the Alleghany
_never, never_ to return; his object, New Orleans,--open
and avowed. And yet not one step taken, except the proclamation!
Duane calls on Congress to act. How can Congress act? Would you
force from the Executive the information they are unwilling
to give? This would be imprudent. I have (with consent of the
President) introduced a Resolution proposing an addition to our
military establishment. Will it pass? That I can’t tell.... It
is curious that the nation should depend on the unauthorized
exertions of a man whose honor and fidelity were doubted by all
except a very, very few, not five in the United States, for its
preservation and character. Had he not disclosed the conspiracy,
the President would have folded his arms and let the storm
collect its whole strength. Even now, not an energetic measure
has been taken except by him [Wilkinson] and Tiffin.”
Another week passed. Then at last, January 16, John Randolph rose in
the House and moved a Resolution asking the President what he knew
about Burr’s affairs, and what he had done or meant to do in the
matter. “The United States are not only threatened with external war,”
Randolph said, “but with conspiracies and treasons, the more alarming
from their not being defined; and yet we sit and adjourn, adjourn
and sit, take things as schoolboys, do as we are bid, and ask no
questions!” His Resolution annoyed the democrats; but his sneers were
more convincing than his arguments, and after some contradictory and
unorganized resistance, a majority supported him. The Resolution was
adopted and sent to the President.
Two days afterward, January 18, Wilkinson’s despatches from New Orleans
to December 18, embracing his first written version of Burr’s cipher
despatch reached Washington. The country learned that Wilkinson had
arrested Bollman and other accomplices of Burr, and in defiance of
their legal rights had shipped them to Washington for trial. Jefferson
was obliged to decide whether he should sustain or repudiate Wilkinson;
and in the light of Burr’s revelations and Wilkinson’s _quasi_
confession, he could not deny that a serious conspiracy existed, or
affirm that the General had gone beyond the line of duty, even though
he had violated the laws. Dearborn’s instructions, indeed, had to some
extent authorized the arrests. At that moment if the President had
repudiated Wilkinson, he would have only diverted public indignation
from Burr, and would have condemned the Executive itself, which after
so many warnings had left such power in the hands of a man universally
distrusted.
Thus at last Jefferson was obliged to raise his voice against Burr’s
crimes. Thenceforward a sense of having been made almost a party to the
conspiracy gave a sting of personal bitterness to the zeal with which
he strove to defend Wilkinson and to punish Burr. Anxiety to excuse
himself was evident in the Message which he sent to Congress January
22, in response to Randolph’s Resolution of January 16.
“Some time in the latter part of September,” he said, “I
received intimations that designs were in agitation in the
Western country, unlawful and unfriendly to the peace of the
Union, and that the prime mover in these was Aaron Burr.”
He had received such intimations many times, and long before the month
of September.
“It was not till the latter part of October that the objects of
the conspiracy began to be perceived.”
Absolute truth would have required the President to say rather that it
was not till the latter part of October that inquiry on his part began
to be made.
“In Kentucky a premature attempt to bring Burr to justice,
without a sufficient evidence for his conviction, had produced a
popular impression in his favor and a general disbelief of his
guilt. This gave him an unfortunate opportunity of hastening his
equipments.”
Complaint of District-Attorney Daveiss was natural; but the reproof
was inexact in every particular. The attempt to indict Burr, if any
attempt were to be made, was not premature. The impression in his
favor did not give Burr an opportunity to hasten his equipments, since
Graham appeared at Marietta the same day with the news of Burr’s first
discharge at Frankfort. Finally, if Daveiss’s attempt failed, the fault
was chiefly with the Government at Washington, which had taken no
measures to direct or to support it, and which was represented on the
bench by a judge himself implicated in the charge.
“On the whole,” said the Message, “the fugitives from the Ohio,
with their associates from Cumberland, or any other place in
that quarter, cannot threaten serious danger to the city of New
Orleans.”
Yet a conspiracy against the Union existed; the President communicated
Burr’s cipher letters; he proclaimed Burr’s expectation of seizing upon
New Orleans, as well as the panic prevailing there; and he approved
Wilkinson’s arrest of Bollman and Swartwout. Finally, the Message spoke
of the people in New Orleans in a tone of confidence quite different
from that of Wilkinson’s despatches, communicated with the Message
itself.[242]
The Senate interpreted the Message in the sense it was doubtless
meant to bear,--as a request from the President for support. Bollman
and Swartwout, who would arrive in Washington within a few days or
hours, had been illegally arrested, and they, as well as the other
conspirators, could not without special legislation be held longer
in custody. Giles at once introduced a Bill suspending for three
months the writ of habeas corpus with respect to such persons; and the
necessity of this measure seemed so obvious to the Senate that the
Rules were suspended by unanimous consent, and the Bill was passed
on the same day through all its stages. Bayard alone voted against
it.[243]
Monday, January 26, the Bill was brought before the House, and Eppes of
Virginia, the President’s son-in-law, immediately moved its rejection.
The debate that followed was curious, not only on account of the
constitutional points discussed, but also on account of the division
of sentiment among the President’s friends, who quoted the Message to
prove that there was no danger to public safety such as called for
a suspension of habeas corpus, and appealed to the same Message to
prove the existence of a more wanton and malignant insurrection than
any that had ever before been raised against the Government. John
Randolph intimated that the President was again attempting to evade
responsibility.
“It appears to my mind,” said he, “like an oblique attempt to
cover a certain departure from an established law of the land,
and a certain violation of the Constitution of the United
States, which we are told have been committed in this country.
Sir, recollect that Congress met on the first of December; that
the President had information of the incipient stage of this
conspiracy about the last of September; that the proclamation
issued before Congress met; and yet that no suggestion, either
from the Executive or from either branch of the Legislature,
has transpired touching the propriety of suspending the writ
of habeas corpus until this violation has taken place. I will
never agree in this side way to cover up such a violation by
a proceeding highly dangerous to the liberty of the country,
or to agree that this invaluable privilege shall be suspended
because it has been already violated,--and suspended, too, after
the cause, if any there was for it, has ceased to exist.... With
whatever epithets gentlemen may dignify this conspiracy, ... I
think it nothing more nor less than an intrigue!”
The Bill was accordingly rejected by the great majority of one hundred
and thirteen to nineteen. On the same day the attorney-general applied
to Judge Cranch of the District Court for a warrant against Bollman and
Swartwout on the charge of treason, filing Wilkinson’s affidavit and a
statement given under oath by William Eaton in support of the charge.
The warrant was issued; Bollman and Swartwout at once applied to the
Supreme Court, then in session, for a writ of habeas corpus. February
13 Chief-Justice Marshall granted the writ; February 16 their counsel
moved for their discharge; and February 21 the chief-justice decided
that sufficient evidence of levying war against the United States had
not been produced to justify the commitment of Swartwout, and still
less that of Bollman, and therefore that they must be discharged. Adair
and Ogden, who had been sent to Baltimore, were liberated by Judge
Nicholson.
The friends of the Administration, exasperated at this failure of
justice, again talked of impeaching the judges.[244] Giles threatened
to move an amendment of the Constitution taking all criminal
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court. Meanwhile Randolph and the
Federalists assailed Wilkinson, and by implication the President. They
brought forward a Resolution declaring the expediency of making further
provision by law for securing the privilege of habeas corpus; and in
the warm debate raised by this manœuvre John Randolph made himself
conspicuous by slurs upon Wilkinson, whom he did not scruple to charge
with double treason,--to the Constitution and to Burr. By a close vote
of sixty to fifty-eight this Resolution was indefinitely postponed; but
the debate showed the settled drift of Randolph’s tactics. He meant to
attack the President by attacking Wilkinson; and the President could
no longer evade responsibility for Wilkinson’s acts. To be thwarted by
Chief-Justice Marshall and baited by John Randolph; to be made at once
the scapegoat of Burr’s crimes and of Wilkinson’s extravagances,--was
a fate peculiarly hard to bear, but was one which Jefferson could not
escape.
Thenceforward the situation changed. What seemed to be the indictment
and trial of Burr became, in a political point of view, the trial of
Wilkinson, with John Randolph acting as accuser and President Jefferson
as counsel for the defence, while Chief-Justice Marshall presided
in judgment. No more unpleasant attitude could be readily imagined
for a man of Jefferson’s high position and pure character than to
plead before his two most formidable and unforgiving enemies as the
patron and protector of a client so far beneath respect. Driven by
forces which allowed no choice of paths, he stood by the man who had
saved him; but in order to understand precisely what he effected in
sustaining Wilkinson, Americans must look in the archives of the King
of Spain for knowledge of facts disbelieved by the President of the
United States.
“According to appearances,” wrote Yrujo Jan. 28, 1807,[245]
“Spain has saved the United States from the separation of
the Union which menaced them. This would have taken place if
Wilkinson had entered cordially into the views of Burr,--which
was to be expected, because Wilkinson detests this government,
and the separation of the Western States has been his favorite
plan. The evil has come from the foolish and pertinacious
perseverance with which Burr has persisted in carrying out a
wild project against Mexico. Wilkinson is entirely devoted
to us. He enjoys a considerable pension from the King. With
his natural capacity and his local and military knowledge, he
anticipated with moral certainty the failure of an expedition
of this nature. Doubtless he foresaw from the first that the
improbability of success in case of making the attempt would
leave him like the dog in the fable with the piece of meat in
his mouth; that is, that he would lose the honorable employment
he holds and the generous pension he enjoys from the King. These
considerations, secret in their nature, he could not explain
to Burr; and when the latter persisted in an idea so fatal to
Wilkinson’s interests, nothing remained but to take the course
adopted. By this means he assures his pension; and will allege
his conduct on this occasion as an extraordinary service, either
for getting it increased, or for some generous compensation. On
the other hand this proceeding secures his distinguished rank in
the military service of the United States, and covers him with
a popularity which may perhaps result in pecuniary advantages,
and in any case will flatter his vanity. In such an alternative
he has acted as was to be expected; that is, he has sacrificed
Burr in order to obtain, on the ruins of Burr’s reputation, the
advantages I have pointed out.”
Whether Yrujo was right in his theory of Wilkinson’s motives
might be doubted, but on one point he could not be mistaken. The
general-in-chief of the United States Army was in the employment of
Don Carlos IV.; he enjoyed a pension of two thousand dollars a year in
consideration of secret services, and for twenty years the services had
been rendered and the pension had been paid.[246]