SAMUEL SWARTWOUT and Peter V. Ogden, the young men whom Burr
and Dayton charged with the duty of carrying despatches to Louisiana,
crossed the Alleghanies in August and floated down the Ohio River
to Louisville.[203] There they stopped to find Adair, for whom they
brought letters from Burr. After some search Swartwout delivered the
letters, and continued his journey. Adair never made known the contents
of these papers; but they probably contained the same information as
was conveyed in the despatches to Wilkinson which came in their company.
Supposing Wilkinson to be at St. Louis, the two young men bought horses
and rode across the Indiana Territory to Kaskaskias; but finding that
the General had gone down the Mississippi, they took boat and followed.
At Natchez they learned that the object of their search had gone up the
Red River. Swartwout was obliged to follow him; but Ogden went to New
Orleans with despatches from Burr to his friends in that city.
Among the mysteries that still surround the conspiracy, the deepest
covers Burr’s relations in New Orleans. That he had confederates in
the city was proved not only by Ogden’s carrying letters, but also
by Erick Bollman’s arrival by sea, as early as September 27, with a
duplicate of Burr’s letter of July 29 to Wilkinson; and above all, by
the significant disappearance of Burr’s letters carried by Ogden and
Bollman to persons in New Orleans. The persons implicated proved their
complicity by keeping Burr’s letters and his secret.
One of these correspondents was almost certainly Judge Prevost, Burr’s
stepson, whom Jefferson had appointed District Judge for the Territory
of Orleans. That Daniel Clark was another hardly admits of doubt.
Swartwout assured Wilkinson of the fact;[204] but apart from this
evidence, the same reasons which obliged Burr to confide in Wilkinson
required him to confide in Clark. The receivers of the letters, whoever
they were, hastened to make their contents known to every one whom they
could trust. Immediately after the arrival of Bollman and Dayton about
October 1, before any serious alarm had risen in Ohio, the town of New
Orleans rang with rumors of Burr’s projects. The news excited more
consternation than hope; for although the creoles had been bitter in
complaints of Claiborne’s administration and of the despotism imposed
upon them by Congress, they remembered their attempt to revolt in
1768, and were far from eager to risk their safety again. Nevertheless,
the temper of the people was bad; and no one felt deeper anxiety as to
the number of Burr’s adherents than Governor Claiborne himself.
Nearly three years had elapsed since Dec. 20, 1803, when the Spanish
governor surrendered Louisiana to the United States, and the history of
the Territory during that time presented an uninterrupted succession of
bickerings. The government at Washington was largely responsible for
its own unpopularity in the new Territory, its foreign and domestic
policy seeming calculated to create ill-feeling, and after creating
it, to keep it alive. The President began by appointing as Governor of
Louisiana a man who had no peculiar fitness for the place. Claiborne,
in contrast with men like Wilkinson, Burr, and Daniel Clark, rose to
the level of a hero. He was honest, well-meaning, straightforward, and
thoroughly patriotic; but these virtues were not enough to make him
either feared or respected by the people over whom he was to exercise
despotic powers; while Claiborne’s military colleague, Wilkinson,
possessed fewer virtues and a feebler character. The French Prefect,
Laussat, who remained for a time in New Orleans to protect French
interests, wrote his Government April 8, 1804, an interesting account
of the situation as seen by French eyes:[205]
“It was hardly possible that the government of the United States
should have made a worse beginning, and that it should have sent
two men (Messrs. Claiborne, governor, and Wilkinson, general)
less fit to attract affection. The first, with estimable private
qualities, has little capacity and much awkwardness, and is
extremely beneath his place; the second, already long known here
in a bad way, is a flighty, rattle-headed fellow, often drunk,
who has committed a hundred impertinent follies. Neither the one
nor the other understands a word of French or Spanish. They have
on all occasions, and without delicacy, shocked the habits, the
prejudices, the character of the population.”
Claiborne began his sway, assuming that the creoles were a kindly but
ignorant and degraded people, who must be taught the blessings of
American society. The creoles, who considered themselves to be more
refined and civilized than the Americans who descended upon them from
Kentucky and Tennessee, were not pleased that their language, blood,
and customs should be systematically degraded, in defiance of the
spirit in which the treaty of cession had been made. Their anger was
not without an element of danger. England and France could safely defy
public opinion and trample on prostrate races. Their empire rested on
force, but that of Jefferson rested on consent; and if the people of
New Orleans should rebel, they could not be conquered without trouble
and expense, or without violating the free principles which Jefferson
was supposed to represent.
The colonists in Louisiana had been for a century the spoiled children
of France and Spain. Petted, protected, fed, paid, flattered, and
given every liberty except the rights of self-government, they liked
Spain[206] and loved France, but they did not love the English or the
Americans; and their irritation was extreme when they saw Claiborne,
who knew nothing of their society and law, abolish their language,
establish American judges who knew only American law, while he himself
sat as a court of last resort, without even an attorney to advise him
as to the meaning of the Spanish law he administered. At the same time
that as judge he could hang his subjects, as intendant he could tax
them, and as governor he could shoot the disobedient. Even under the
Spanish despotism, appeal might be made to Havana or Madrid; but no
appeal lay from Claiborne’s judgment-seat.
Before this temporary system was superseded, the creoles already
yearned for a return to French or Spanish rule. They had but one hope
from the United States,--that, in the terms of the treaty, Louisiana
might be quickly admitted into the Union. This hope was rudely
dispelled. Not only did Congress treat their claims to self-government
with indifference, but the Territory was divided in halves, so that
it must be slower to acquire the necessary population for a State;
while as though to delay still longer this act of justice, the growth
of population was checked by prohibiting the slave-trade. Years must
pass before Louisiana could gain admission into the Union; and even
when this should happen, it must be the result of American expansion at
creole expense.
Jefferson’s Spanish policy, which kept the country always on the verge
of a war with Spain, prevented the French and Spanish population
from feeling that their submission was final. In case of war between
the United States and Spain, nothing would be easier than to drive
Claiborne away and replace Casa Calvo in the government. Claiborne
soon found himself confronted by an opposition which he could neither
control nor understand. Even the leading Americans joined it. Daniel
Clark, rich, eccentric, wild in his talk and restless in his movements,
distinguished himself by the personal hatred which he showed for
Claiborne; Evan Jones, another wealthy resident, rivalled Clark; Edward
Livingston, who had come to New Orleans angry with Jefferson for
removing him as a defaulter from office, joined the old residents in
harassing the Governor; while the former Spanish officials, Casa Calvo
and Morales, remained at New Orleans under one or another pretext,
keeping the Spanish influence alive, and maintaining communications
with Governor Folch of West Florida, who controlled the Mississippi
at Baton Rouge, and with General Herrera, who commanded the Spanish
force in Texas. So bad was the state of feeling that when Oct. 1, 1804,
the new territorial system was organized, Messrs. Boré, Bellechasse,
Cantrelle, Jones, and Daniel Clark, whom the President had named as
members of the legislative council, refused to accept the office;
while Messrs. Sauvé, Destréhan, and Derbigny were deputed by a popular
assembly to present their grievances at Washington. Two months elapsed
before Governor Claiborne could form any council at all; not until Dec.
4, 1804, was a quorum obtained.
No pretence of disguising their feelings was made by the Spanish
population. In French minds the power of Bonaparte was a stronger
reliance than the power of Spain; no Frenchman willingly admitted that
Napoleon meant to sacrifice Louisiana forever.[207]
“The President’s Message,” wrote Governor Claiborne to
Madison, Dec. 11, 1804,[208] “has been translated into the
French language, and I will take care to have it circulated
among the people. It will tend to remove an impression which
has heretofore contributed greatly to embarrass the local
administration; to wit, that the country west of the Mississippi
would certainly be re-ceded to Spain, and perhaps the whole of
Louisiana. So general has been this impression, particularly
as relates to the country west of the Mississippi, that many
citizens have been fearful of accepting any employment under the
American government, or even manifesting a respect therefor,
lest at a future time it might lessen them in the esteem of
Spanish officers.”
Under the remonstrances of Sauvé, Destréhan, and Derbigny, and at the
intercession of John Randolph, Congress was induced to yield a single
point. The Act of March 2, 1805, gave Louisiana ordinary Territorial
rights, an elected legislature, and a delegate to Congress. After its
passage, Claiborne wrote to Madison that the people were disappointed;
and in fact the concessions were so trivial as to irritate rather
than soothe. Claiborne, whom the people obstinately disliked, was
re-appointed governor under the Act, and nothing in reality was changed.
Burr visited New Orleans in June and July, 1805. The new Legislature
assembled, Nov. 4, 1805, when Claiborne found himself surrounded by a
council partly elected by the Legislature, and a Legislature wholly
elected by the people. He was soon at odds with both. The leader of
opposition was Daniel Clark; and for a moment in May, 1806, the quarrel
went so far that the two legislative bodies were on the point of
voluntary disbandment, and a majority of the council actually resigned.
The Legislature chose Daniel Clark as their delegate to Congress.
Claiborne thought that the choice was made merely out of personal
spite; but no sooner did he hear of Burr’s disunion scheme than he
wrote to Madison,[209]--
“If this be the object of the conspirators, the delegate to
Congress from this Territory, Daniel Clark, is one of the
leaders. He has often said that the Union could not last, and
that had he children he would impress early on their minds the
expediency of a separation between the Atlantic and Western
States.”
In the same month of May Lieutenant Murray of the artillery, an
intimate friend of Daniel Clark, came with a Lieutenant Taylor from
Fort Adams to New Orleans, and heard the ordinary conversation of
society.
“Lieutenant Taylor and myself,” he afterward testified,[210]
“were invited to dine with a gentleman there whose name was on
the list before mentioned [of persons engaged in an expedition
against Mexico]; it was Judge Workman. We three dined together.
After the cloth was removed, Mr. Lewis Kerr came in.... After a
number of inquiries about Baton Rouge and the Red River country,
they proceeded to lay open their plan of seizing upon the money
in the banks at New Orleans, impressing the shipping, taking
Baton Rouge, and joining Miranda by way of Mexico.... When I
told Mr. Clark that I was calculated on as the officer to attack
Baton Rouge, he advised me by all means to do it. He urged as an
inducement that he was coming on to Congress, and would do all
he could in my favor; that he would represent to the Government
that it would require a large force to retake it; and he further
observed that, at any rate, if the Government should be disposed
to trouble me, before they could send off a sufficient force I
should be in a situation to take care of myself.”
This attempt to seduce officers of the United States army into Burr’s
conspiracy was flagrant; for although Burr’s name was not mentioned,
no one could fail to see that the seizure of government money in the
banks at New Orleans was an act of treason, and that the attack on West
Florida implied a permanent military establishment on the Gulf.
June 7, 1806, the first Louisiana legislature adjourned, and Governor
Claiborne felt relief as deep as was felt by Jefferson at escaping the
stings of John Randolph; but although for a time Claiborne flattered
himself that his difficulties were lessening, he soon became aware
that some mystery surrounded him which he could not penetrate. General
Herrera began to press upon the Red River from Nacogdoches in Texas
with a force considerably stronger than any which Claiborne could
oppose to him. The militia showed indifference. August 28 the Governor
wrote to the Secretary of War that the French population would not
support the government in case of hostilities.[211] September 9
he wrote to Cowles Meade, then acting-governor of the Mississippi
Territory, a letter of uneasiness at the behavior of Wilkinson’s
troops: “My present impression is that _all is not right_. I know
not whom to censure, but it seems to me that there is wrong somewhere.”
The militia could not be stimulated to action against Herrera, and the
feeling of hostility between Americans and creoles was so bitter that
Claiborne intervened for fear of violence.[212]
October 6, 1806, the Governor returned to New Orleans after a tour of
inspection. Erick Bollman had been then ten days in the city, and
young Ogden had arrived about October 1, bringing Burr’s despatches.
According to Bellechasse and Derbigny the creole society was already
much excited; but this excitement showed itself to Claiborne in a
display of assumed stolidity.
“There is in this city,” wrote Claiborne to the Secretary of
War October 8,[213] “a degree of apathy at the present time
which mortifies and astonishes me; and some of the native
Americans act and discourse as if perfect security everywhere
prevailed.... I fear the ancient Louisianians of New Orleans
are not disposed to support with firmness the American cause.
I do not believe they would fight against us; but my present
impression is that they are not inclined to rally under the
American standard.”
Claiborne’s spirits fluctuated from day to day as he felt the changes
in a situation which he could not fathom. October 17 he was elated
because the militia of New Orleans unexpectedly, and contrary to the
tenor of all its previous conduct, made a voluntary tender of services.
November 7 he was again discouraged; and November 15, and even as late
as November 25, he fell back into despondency. During all that time the
enemies whom he feared were Spaniards in Texas and West Florida; the
thought of conspiracy among the apathetic creoles had not yet entered
his mind.
Yet around him the city was trembling with excitement; and of all
persons in the city Daniel Clark was the one whose conduct showed most
signs of guilty knowledge. A few months later, he collected affidavits
from four or five of the most important gentlemen in New Orleans to
show what his conduct had been. At the moment when Bollman and Ogden
arrived, Clark was preparing for his journey to Washington, where he
meant to take his seat in Congress as the Territorial delegate. The
news brought by Bollman and Ogden that Burr was on his way to New
Orleans placed him in a dilemma. Like Senator Smith and Andrew Jackson,
his chief anxiety regarded his own safety; and he adopted an expedient
which showed his usual intelligence. An affidavit of Bellechasse,[214]
on whose character he mainly depended, narrated that--
“in the month of October, a very few days before Mr. Clark
left this city to go to Congress, he called together a number
of his friends, and informed them of the views and intentions
imputed to Colonel Burr, which were then almost the sole topic
of conversation, and which, from the reports daily arriving
from Kentucky, had caused a serious alarm; and he advised
them all to exert their influence with the inhabitants of the
country to support the Government of the United States and to
rally round the Governor, although he thought him incapable of
rendering much service as a military man,--assuring them that
such conduct only would save the country if any hostile projects
were entertained against it, and that this would be the best
method of convincing the Government of the United States of the
attachment of the inhabitants of Louisiana, and of the falsity
of all the reports circulated to their prejudice. And Mr. Clark
strongly recommended to such members of the Legislature as were
then present not to attend any call or meeting of either House
in case Colonel Burr should gain possession of the city, stating
that such a measure would deservedly expose every individual
concerned to punishment, and would occasion the ruin of the
country.”
According to Bellechasse, the society of New Orleans between Oct. 1 and
Oct. 15, 1806, was in serious alarm. Burr’s intentions formed “almost
the sole topic of conversation;” daily reports were arriving from
Kentucky, although in Kentucky, down to October 1, no alarm existed,
and Burr’s intentions were not even developed. Each of the four
affidavits which Clark obtained, one of them signed by Peter Derbigny,
affirmed that about the middle of October, 1806, Burr’s projects were
the general theme of conversation in the city; but nothing was more
certain than that this knowledge of Burr’s projects must have come
not from Kentucky, but from Burr’s own letters and from the messages
brought by Ogden and Bollman.
Clark, having thus secured himself from the charge of abetting Burr,
sailed for the Atlantic coast, and in due time made his appearance at
Washington; but neither he nor Bellechasse nor Derbigny nor Bouligny,
although officers of the government, giving each other excellent
advice, communicated to Governor Claiborne what they knew about Burr’s
plans. From October 1 to November 25, the projects of Burr were
“the exclusive subject of every conversation” in the city, yet the
single official who ought to have been first informed, and who bore
all responsibility, had not a suspicion that any conspiracy existed.
Claiborne’s isolation was complete. This isolation was natural, since
all the gentlemen of New Orleans quarrelled with the Governor; but the
same silence was preserved where their social relations were friendly.
Neither Clark nor any of the persons who talked so much with each
other about Burr’s projects communicated with General Wilkinson, who
was in full sympathy with their hatred of Claiborne. Wilkinson stood
in relations of close confidence with Clark; intimate letters passed
between them as late as October 2.[215] Clark knew that Wilkinson
was Burr’s most intimate friend; yet he neither warned Claiborne nor
Wilkinson nor President Jefferson, although as early as October 15 he
warned a number of other gentlemen who needed no warning, and although
October 17 the militia of New Orleans, evidently in consequence of his
advice, tendered their services to the Governor.
For two months, between September 27 and November 25, Burr’s emissaries
were busy in New Orleans, without suspicion or hindrance from the
United States authorities; while every prominent Frenchman in the
Territory knew the contents of Burr’s letter to Wilkinson as soon as
Wilkinson could have known them. That Burr had few active adherents
might be true; but nothing showed that Bollman regarded the result
of his mission as unfavorable. Toward the end of October Bollman
sent letters by a certain Lieutenant Spence, who reached Lexington
in due course, and November 2 delivered his despatches to Burr;[216]
but whatever their contents may have been, they were not so decisive
against Burr’s hopes as to stop his movement. The people of New Orleans
were careful not to commit themselves, but they guarded Burr’s secret
with jealousy. They warned no United States official of the danger in
which the city stood; they wrote no letters to the President; they sent
no message to Burr forbidding his approach.
This was the situation in New Orleans Nov. 25, 1806, the day when
District-Attorney Daveiss at Frankfort made his second attempt to
procure an indictment against Burr, and when President Jefferson at
Washington was startled into energy by receiving a letter, almost
equivalent to a confession, from General Wilkinson. From the Ohio River
to the Gulf of Mexico the conspiracy had numerous friends; and in New
Orleans it had the most alarming of all qualities,--silence.
Meanwhile young Samuel Swartwout, after parting from his friend Ogden,
had slowly ascended the Red River, pursuing General Wilkinson, as
Evangeline pursued Gabriel, even as far as “the little inn of the
Spanish town of Adayes.” The military point for Wilkinson to decide was
whether he should make an effort to drive the Spaniards back to their
town of Adayes, or whether he should allow them to fix themselves on
the Red River. The movements of the Spanish General Herrera, who had
brought a considerable mounted force to Nacogdoches, were supposed at
the moment by many persons to have been made in concert with Burr;
but in reality they were doubtless intended only to derange the plan,
recommended by Armstrong and Monroe to Jefferson, by which Texas
should be seized for the United States, while West Florida for the
moment should be left aside. The Spanish government saw the danger,
and sent a little army of some fifteen hundred men to the Red River,
where they posted a strong garrison at Bayou Pierre, and pressed close
upon Natchitoches. The Americans, instead of taking the offensive
and advancing with five thousand men, as Wilkinson wished, to the
Rio Grande, were thrown upon the defensive, and trembled for New
Orleans, protected only by a French militia which neither Claiborne nor
Wilkinson could trust.
Under orders from Washington, General Wilkinson reached Natchitoches
September 22, and found the Spaniards in force between his own post
and the Sabine. For a few days Wilkinson talked loudly, after his
peculiar manner. War seemed imminent. September 28 he wrote from
Natchitoches a letter to Senator Smith of Ohio, the contractor for his
supplies:[217]--
“I have made the last effort at conciliation in a solemn appeal
to Governor Cordero at Nacogdoches, who is chief in command on
this frontier. Colonel Cushing bore my letter, and is now with
the Don. I expect his return in four days; and then,--I believe,
my friend, I shall be obliged to fight and flog them.”
Governor Cordero, whose object was probably no more than to restrict
American possession within the narrowest possible limits, withdrew his
troops from Bayou Pierre, September 27, to the west bank of the Sabine,
and left open to Wilkinson the road to the eastern bank. The Spanish
forces recrossed the Sabine before September 30, but a week later,
October 8, General Wilkinson had not begun his ostentatious march, of
some fifty miles, to retake possession of the east bank of the river.
On the evening of October 8, General Wilkinson was sitting with Colonel
Cushing, of the Second Infantry, alone in the Colonel’s quarters at
Natchitoches, discussing the military problem before them, when a young
man was introduced who said that his name was Swartwout, and that he
brought a letter of introduction from General Dayton. After some little
ordinary talk, Colonel Cushing having for a moment been called out of
the room, Swartwout slipped into General Wilkinson’s hands a packet
which he said contained a letter from Colonel Burr. Wilkinson received
the letter, and soon afterward retired to his chamber, where he passed
the rest of the evening in the labor of deciphering Burr’s long
despatch of July 29.[218]
If the falsehoods contained in the letters of Burr and Dayton found
any credit in Wilkinson’s mind, they should have decided him to follow
his old bent toward revolution. Everything beckoned him on. His
secret relations, nearly twenty years old, with the Spanish officials
guaranteed to him the connivance of the Spanish force. The French
militia of Louisiana, deaf to Governor Claiborne’s entreaties, would
have seen with pleasure Claiborne deposed. About five hundred United
States troops were under Wilkinson’s command on the Red River, of
whom few were native Americans, or cared for the Government except to
obtain their pay. In New Orleans a breath would blow away the national
authority; and what power would restore it? If it were true, as Burr
wrote, that a British fleet stood ready to prevent a blockade of the
Mississippi, the success of the Western empire seemed assured.
Severance of the ties that bound him to Dayton and Burr was not a
simple matter for Wilkinson. That they were old friends was something;
and that all three had fought side by side under the walls of Quebec in
the winter of 1776, with the father of young Peter Ogden for a friend,
and with Benedict Arnold for their commander, was still more; but the
most serious difficulty was that Wilkinson stood in the power of these
men, who knew his thoughts and could produce his letters, and who, in
case of his deserting them, would certainly do their utmost to destroy
what character he possessed.
Whatever may have been his reflections, Wilkinson took at once measures
to protect his own interests. Like Senator Smith, Andrew Jackson, and
Daniel Clark, his first step was to provide against the danger of being
charged with misprision of treason. The morning after Swartwout’s
arrival, Wilkinson took Colonel Cushing aside, and after telling him
the contents of Burr’s letter, announced that he meant to notify the
President of the plot, and that after making some temporary arrangement
with the Spaniards, he should move his whole force to New Orleans. In
one sense this avowal was an act of patriotism; in another light it
might have been regarded as an attempt to sound Colonel Cushing, whose
assistance was necessary to the success of the plot.
In any case the deliberation of his conduct proved no eagerness to act.
A week passed. Although time pressed, and Burr was to move down the
Ohio River November 15, Wilkinson did not yet warn the President or the
authorities in Mississippi and Tennessee, or the commanding officers
at Fort Adams or Chickasaw Bluffs. About October 15 a troop of militia
reached Natchitoches; and Wilkinson confided his plans to Colonel
Burling, who accompanied it. One might almost have suspected that he
was systematically sounding his officers. Not until October 21 did he
send the promised letter to President Jefferson, and in that letter he
did not so much as mention Burr’s name.[219] He spoke of the expedition
as destined for Vera Cruz. “It is unknown under what authority this
enterprise has been projected, from whence the means of its support are
derived, or what may be the intentions of its leaders in relation to
the Territory of Orleans.” The communication was so timed as to reach
Washington after Burr should have passed down the Ohio; and it was so
worded as to protect Wilkinson in case of Burr’s failure, but in no
event to injure Burr.
After sending this despatch to Washington by a special messenger,
Wilkinson wrote October 23 a letter of mysterious warning to
Lieutenant-Colonel Freeman, who commanded at New Orleans.[220] He wrote
also a letter to Burr, which he afterward recovered at Natchez and
destroyed.[221] He sent his force forward to the Sabine, and passed ten
days in making an arrangement with the Spanish officers for maintaining
the relative positions of the outposts. Not until November 5 did he
return to Natchitoches. Then, at last, his movements became as rapid
as they had hitherto been dilatory.
November 7 he wrote to Colonel Cushing from Natchitoches:[222] “On
the 15th of this month Burr’s declaration is to be made in Tennessee
and Kentucky. Hurry, hurry after me; and if necessary, let us be
buried together in the ruins of the place we shall defend!” He had
at last chosen his part; and having decided to act as the savior of
the country, he began to exaggerate the danger. “If I mistake not, we
shall have an insurrection of blacks as well as whites to combat.”[223]
“I shall be with you by the 20th instant,” he wrote to Freeman the
same day;[224] “in the mean time be you as silent as the grave!” He
left Natchitoches November 7, and reached Natchez on the 11th, whence
he wrote “from the seat of Major Minor” a letter of alarm to the
President, confiding to the messenger an oral account of Burr’s letter,
for Jefferson’s benefit:[225]--
“This is indeed a deep, dark, and widespread conspiracy,
embracing the young and the old, the Democrat and the
Federalist, the native and the foreigner, the patriot of ’76 and
the exotic of yesterday, the opulent and the needy, the ‘ins’
and the ‘outs;’ and I fear it will receive strong support in
New Orleans from a quarter little suspected.... I gasconade not
when I tell you that in such a cause I shall glory to give my
life in the service of my country; for I verily believe such an
event to be probable, because, should seven thousand men descend
from the Ohio,--and this is the calculation,--they will bring
with them the sympathies and good wishes of that country, and
none but friends can be afterward prevailed on to follow them.
With my handful of veterans, however gallant, it is improbable I
shall be able to withstand such a disparity of numbers.”
If this was not gasconade, it sounded much like intoxication; but on
the same day the writer indulged in another cry of panic. He should
have written to Governor Claiborne a month before; but having made up
his mind to speak, he was determined to terrify:[226]--
“You are surrounded by dangers of which you dream not, and the
destruction of the American government is seriously menaced. The
storm will probably burst in New Orleans, where I shall meet it,
and triumph or perish!”
If the courage of Claiborne did not, on the arrival of this letter,
wholly desert him, his heart was stout; but he had yet another shock to
meet, for on the same day that Wilkinson at Natchez was summoning this
shadowy terror before his eyes, Andrew Jackson at Nashville was writing
to him in language even more bewildering than that of Wilkinson:[227]--
“I fear treachery has become the order of the day. This induces
me to write you. Put your town in a state of defence; organize
your militia, and defend your city as well against internal
enemies as external. My knowledge does not extend so far as to
authorize me to go into details, but I fear you will meet with
an attack from quarters you do not at present expect. Be upon
the alert! Keep a watchful eye on our General [Wilkinson], and
beware of an attack as well from your own country as Spain!
I fear there is something rotten in the state of Denmark....
Beware of the month of December!... This I will write for your
own eye and for your own safety. Profit by it, and the ides of
March remember!”
A storm of denunciations began to hail upon Claiborne’s head; but
buffeted as he was, he could only bear in silence whatever fate might
be in store, for General Wilkinson, who was little more trustworthy or
trusted than Burr himself, arrived in New Orleans November 25, and took
the reins of power.