Napoleon and Germany

The conclusion of the Crimean War left the emperor Napoleon the most

influential personage in Europe; and Paris, the seat of the congress,

became also the centre of the diplomatic world. Russia had been bled

almost to death by the war; Austria was discredited and isolated owing

to the dubious part she had played in it; Prussia had not recovered from

the humiliation of Olmuetz; Great Britain was soon plunged into the

critical struggle of the Indian Mutiny. The time was obviously opportune

for the realization of some of the aspirations implied in the Napoleonic

idea. The opportunity came from the side of Italy. By sending Sardinian

troops to fight in a quarrel not their own, alongside the Allies in the

Crimea, Cavour had purchased for Piedmont the right to be heard in the

councils of the powers--a right of which he had made use at the Paris

congress to denounce before all Europe the Austrian misrule in Italy.

The Italian unionists were at one with Napoleon in desiring to overset

"the treaties"; and the Franco-Italian alliance which, in 1859, drove

the Austrians out of Lombardy and established the nucleus of the Italian

kingdom was the beginning of a process which, within twelve years, was

to change the balance of Europe. It was ominous of the future that it

was largely the menace of Prussian intervention that persuaded Napoleon

to conclude the armistice of Villafranca (July 11, 1859), which,

contrary to his agreement with Victor Emmanuel, left Venice to the

Austrians. In spite of the peace of Zuerich (November 10), indeed, the

union of Italy continued during the succeeding years, and Savoy and Nice

were the reward of the French emperor's connivance (see ITALY). France

thus once more gained her "natural frontier" of the Alps; the question

was whether she would be able to regain her other natural frontier on

the Rhine. The times were not unpropitious for an enterprise which was

undoubtedly one of the main objects of Napoleon's policy. The European

concert had ceased to exist as an effective force; the treaties had been

violated with impunity; in Germany, where the tension between the two

great powers had not been eased by Prussia's dubious attitude during the

war, there was little prospect of a united opposition to French

aggression, and the conditions seemed highly favourable for reviving the

traditional policy of exploiting German disunion for the aggrandizement

of France. Prussia was arming, but her armaments were directed not

against Napoleon but against Austria, and the beginning of the reign of

William I., who had become regent in 1858 and king in 1861, pointed to

the development of a situation in which the French emperor would once

again become the arbiter of Germany. On the 29th of March 1862 Prussia

signed a commercial treaty with France on a basis that involved the

exclusion of Austria from the Zollverein, and replied to the protests of

the court of Vienna by recognizing the new kingdom of Italy. In

September of the same year King William placed the supreme direction of

Prussian policy in the hands of Otto von Bismarck, whose views on the

exclusion of Austria from Germany were known to all the world.

Decline of Napoleon's influence.

The outcome of the Polish insurrection of 1863, however, again altered

the aspect of things, and in a direction unfavourable to France (see

POLAND: _History_). Napoleon had been forced by French public opinion to

come forward as the protector of the Poles; but the spectacle of a

Bonaparte posing as the champion of "the treaties" was not impressive;

his brave words were not translated into action; and he only succeeded

in offending Russia by his protests and alienating Great Britain by his

tergiversations. The proffered intervention of Austria, France and Great

Britain was rejected in a note of Prince Gorchakov to Baron Brunnow, the

Russian ambassador in London (July 1, 1863); no action followed; and the

last effort to put forward the treaties of Vienna as the common law of

Europe ended in a fiasco. British ministers, who had been made to look

somewhat ridiculous, henceforth began to be chary of active intervention

in continental affairs; Austria and France were alike discredited and

isolated. Prussia which, under Bismarck's auspices, had aided Russia in

suppressing the Poles (convention of February 8, 1863) alone emerged

from the crisis with increased prestige. Bismarck, indeed, was too wary

to accept the tsar's suggestion of an offensive alliance and an

immediate combined attack on Austria and France; but in the coming

struggle for the hegemony of Germany he was assured at least of Russia's

neutrality.

Rivalry of Prussia and Austria. Schleswig-Holstein question.

Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Prussia supreme in Germany.

The final act in this long rivalry began with the opening up of the

Schleswig-Holstein question on the death of Frederick VII. of Denmark

and the accession of the "protocol-king" Christian IX. (November 15,

1863). The German claim to the Elbe duchies, the Danish claim to at

least Schleswig as an integral part of the northern kingdom, were but

subordinate issues of questions far more fateful, the developments of

which once more illustrated the hopeless enfeeblement of the idea of the

European concert. In the struggle for the possession of the duchies the

general sentiment of Germany was on one side, that of Europe on the

other. By the protocol of 1852 the duchies had been treated as an

integral part of Denmark, and France and Great Britain, as signatory

powers, alike protested against the action of Austria and Prussia in

asserting the German claim by force of arms. But, as in the case of

Poland, protests were not followed by action; Napoleon in the end

contented himself with proposing his favourite "Napoleonic idea" of a

plebiscite, to discover the wishes of the populations concerned;

Palmerston, who realized some of the important issues involved, allowed

his warlike attitude, under exalted influences, to evaporate in words.

Thus Great Britain earned the lasting resentment of Germans, without

succeeding in preventing the establishment of German sea-power in the

Baltic. For the Prussian war-harbour of Kiel and the Kiel Canal were in

Bismarck's mind from the outset. Throughout he intended to make the

duchies a part of Prussia and to use the whole question as a means for

the solution of that of Germany. The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 grew

inevitably out of the Dano-German War of 1864; and the treaty of Prague

(Aug. 23, 1866), which excluded Austria from Germany and established the

North German Confederation under the headship of Prussia, not only

absorbed into Prussia the North German states which had sided with

Austria, but by the annexation to her of Schleswig and Holstein laid the

foundations of German power in the North Sea, and of German rivalry with

England in the future.

Napoleon and Prussia.

More immediate were the effects of the campaign of Koeniggraetz on France.

The rapid and overwhelming victory of Prussia overthrew all the

calculations of Napoleon, who had looked to intervening as arbiter

between exhausted combatants. The sudden menace of the new German power

alarmed him, and he sought to secure the Rhine frontier for France, by

negotiations with Prussia, in the form of "compensations" at the expense

of the South German states. He succeeded only in placing a fresh weapon

in Bismarck's hands. The communication of the French overtures to the

South German courts was enough to throw them into the arms of Prussia;

and treaties of offensive and defensive alliance were signed in August

1866 between Prussia and Wuerttemberg (3rd), Baden (17th), and Bavaria

(22nd), by which the king of Prussia was to receive the supreme command

of the allied armies in time of war. In vain Napoleon tried to retrieve

his damaged prestige by securing compensation elsewhere. His proposal

that the grand-duchy of Luxemburg, which had not been included in the

new German Confederation, should fall to France by agreement with

Prussia was no more successful than his other demands for

"compensation." Luxemburg was declared a neutral state by the convention

of London in 1867 (see LUXEMBURG), and the French proposal, published by

Bismarck in _The Times_ at the outset of the war of 1870, only damaged

the French emperor's cause in the eyes of Europe.

Meanwhile public feeling in France had become seriously excited by this

sudden menace of a hostile power on her eastern frontier, and this

excitement was raised to fever heat when it became known that the vacant

throne of Spain had been offered to and accepted by a prince of the

house of Hohenzollern. Napoleon's policy had become hopelessly

discredited by the successive fiascos in Poland, Mexico and Germany, and

even the establishment of a liberal constitution in 1869 could not avail

to restore confidence in him. He knew the risk he ran in challenging a

conflict with a power whose military efficiency had been so strikingly

displayed; but by refusing to do so, in the excited state of public

feeling, he would have risked his throne. He reckoned on the traditional

jealously of the South German states for Prussia and their traditional

friendship with France; he was assured, too, of the support of Austria,

in the event of a victorious opening of the campaign. On the other hand

Bismarck was bent on war, which, in accordance with his policy of "blood

and iron," he believed to be the sole effective means of binding the

heterogeneous elements of Germany into a coherent whole. The device of

the "Ems telegrams" (see BISMARCK) was sufficient to end the hesitations

of Napoleon by giving an irresistible volume to the cry of the war party

in France; and on the 19th of July the French emperor's declaration of

war was handed in at Berlin.

The Franco-German War, 1870-1871.

The new German Empire.

The story of the struggle that followed is told elsewhere (see

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR). The hopes that Napoleon had based on the action of

the South German courts was belied; and the first crushing German

victories (Weissenburg, August 4, and Woerth, August 6) not only removed

all chance of Austrian co-operation but brought down with a crash the

imposing facade of the Second Empire. On the 2nd of September Napoleon

surrendered, with his army, at Sedan; and two days later the Empire was

overthrown and a provisional republican government set up at Paris. On

the 19th Paris itself was invested and, after a heroic defence,

capitulated on the 28th of January 1871. On the 18th of January, at the

palace of Versailles, William I., king of Prussia, was proclaimed German

emperor. On the 26th of February were signed the preliminaries of peace,

by which France agreed to cede to the German empire Alsace (except

Belfort and its territory) and German Lorraine, with Metz and Thionville

(Diedenhofen), and to pay a war indemnity of five milliards of francs

(L200,000,000) in three years, to be secured by the occupation of French

territory. The definitive treaty was signed at Frankfort-on-Main on the

10th of May 1871.

Dual system in Austria-Hungary.

Union of Italy.

The most important outcome of the events which culminated in the

Franco-German War and its result was the establishment of a powerful

German empire, which was destined to dominate the continent for years to

come, and the expansive ambitions of which remain pregnant with menace

for the future. So great an overturn, however, involved other changes in

the territorial system, which may be briefly summarized. The most

notable of these was the reconstruction of the Austrian monarchy as a

result of the war of 1866. By the treaty of Vienna (October 3, 1866)

between Austria and Italy, Austria recognized the Italian kingdom and

ceded to it the city and territory of Venice, thus surrendering the

traditional claim of the Habsburgs to domination in Italy. This was

followed in 1867 by the establishment of the Dual Monarchy in the

Habsburg dominions under the auspices of Bismarck's rival, Count

Beust,--Francis Joseph being crowned king of Hungary, and a separate

constitution being established for Hungary and the _Cis-Leithan_

dominions of the Austrian emperor (see AUSTRIA: _History_). In Italy,

meanwhile, the unification of the kingdom had continued after the

conclusion of the war of 1859 by the treaty of Zuerich. In 1860 Tuscany,

Parma and Modena were united to the monarchy of Victor Emmanuel, at the

cost of the cession of Nice and Savoy to Napoleon. In May of the same

year Garibaldi and his "Thousand" landed in Sicily, which he reduced by

the end of June; in August he crossed to the mainland, and the

capitulation of Francis II. of the Two Sicilies at Gaeta on the 13th of

February 1861 ended the Bourbon kingdom in southern Italy. On the 17th

of March Victor Emmanuel II. was proclaimed king of United Italy. This

title, as mentioned above, was recognized by Austria in 1866, when Italy

was increased by the cession of Venice. Finally, Rome, which had been

preserved to the papacy by Napoleon's troops, was on their withdrawal

occupied by the Italians on the 20th of September 1870. Thus the

temporal power of the popes came to an end; and the unification of Italy

was completed (see ITALY: History).

Another significant outcome of the collapse of France was the

denunciation by Russia of the "Black Sea" clauses of the treaty of Paris

of 1856, an action rendered possible by the _entente_ between the

governments of Berlin and St Petersburg. In the note addressed to the

signatory powers announcing that Russia no longer felt herself bound by

the clauses of the treaty limiting her sovereign rights in the Black

Sea, Prince Gorchakov wrote: "It would be difficult to affirm that the

written law founded on the respect for treaties, as the basis of public

right and rule of the relations of states, has preserved the same moral

sanction as in former times." The action of Russia was, in fact, a

practical illustration of Bismarck's _dicta_ that "_rebus sic stantibus_

is involved in all treaties that require performance" (_Mem_. ii. 280),

and that "_ultro posse nemo obligatur_ holds good in spite of all treaty

obligations whatsoever, nor can any treaty guarantee the discharge of

obligations when the private interest of those who lie under them no

longer reinforces the text" (ib. ii. 270). Great Britain did her best to

counteract a doctrine so subversive of international confidence. For a

moment at least a diplomatic breach with Russia seemed inevitable. At

Bismarck's suggestion, however, a conference was held at London to

arrange the affair. There was, in the circumstances, no chance of

forcing Russia to recede from her position; but in order "to reconcile

facts with principles" the conference on the 17th of January 1871 agreed

on a formula announcing that "contracting powers can only rid themselves

of their treaty engagements by an understanding with their

co-signatories." Thus the principle of the European concert was saved.

But, for the time at least, it seemed that the triumph of Bismarck's

diplomacy had re-established

... the simple plan

That they should take who have the power

And they should keep who can.

Beust was not far wrong when he exclaimed, "Je ne vois plus de

l'Europe!" (W. A. P.)

By the Franco-German War of 1870-71 and the creation of the German

empire the political condition of Europe was profoundly changed. Germany

became for a time the leading power on the continent of Europe, and

German statesmanship had to devise means for preventing, until the new

edifice was thoroughly consolidated, the formation of a hostile

coalition of jealous rivals. The first thing to be done in this

direction was to secure the support of Russia and Austria to the new

order of things.

Russian policy towards Germany.

With regard to Russia there was little cause for apprehension. She had

aided Bismarck to carry out his audacious schemes in the past, and there

was no reason to suppose that she would change her policy in the

immediate future. The _rapprochement_ dated from the Polish insurrection

of 1863, when the governments of France and England, yielding to popular

excitement, made strong diplomatic representations to Russia in favour

of the Poles, whereas Bismarck not only refused to join in the

diplomatic campaign, but made a convention with the cabinet of St

Petersburg by which the Russian and German military authorities on the

frontiers should aid each other in suppressing the disturbances. From

that time the friendship ripened steadily. The relations between the two

powers were not, it is true, always without a cloud. More than once the

bold designs of Bismarck caused uneasiness and dissatisfaction in St

Petersburg, especially during the Schleswig-Holstein complications of

1864 and the Austro-Prussian conflict of 1866; but the wily statesman of

Berlin, partly by argument and partly by dexterously manipulating the

mutual trust and affection between the two sovereigns, always succeeded

in having his own way without producing a rupture, so that during the

Franco-German War of 1870-71 Russia maintained an extremely benevolent

neutrality, and prevented Austria and Italy from taking part in the

struggle. So benevolent was the neutrality that the emperor William at

the end of the campaign felt constrained to write to the tsar that he

owed to His Majesty the happy issue of the campaign and would never

forget the fact. Having thus helped to create the German empire,

Alexander II. was not likely to take an active part in destroying it,

and Bismarck could look forward confidently to a long continuance of the

cordial relations between the two courts.

Austrian relations with Germany.

The second part of the German chancellor's programme, the permanent

conciliation of Austria, was not so easily carried out. Austria had been

the great sufferer, more perhaps even than France, from Bismarck's

aggressive policy. For generations she had resisted strenuously and

successfully the efforts of the Hohenzollerns to play the leading part

in Germany, and she had always considered her own influence in Germany

as essential to the maintenance of her position as a first-class power.

By the disastrous campaign of 1866 and the consequent treaty of Prague,

Austria had been formally excluded from all direct influence in German

affairs. With these events still fresh in his recollection, the emperor

Francis Joseph could hardly be expected to support the new empire

created by his rival at Austria's expense, and it was known that on the

eve of the Franco-German War he had been negotiating with the French

government for a combined attack on Prussia. To an ordinary statesman

the task of permanently conciliating such a power might well have seemed

hopeless, but Bismarck did not shrink from it, and even before the

signature of the treaty of Prague he had prepared the way for attaining

his object. "With regard to Austria," he himself explained on one

occasion, "I had two courses open to me after her defeat, either to

destroy her entirely or to respect her integrity and prepare for our

future reconciliation when the fire of revenge had died out. I chose the

latter course, because the former would have been the greatest possible

act of folly. Supposing that Austria had disappeared, consider the

consequences." He then described very graphically those probable

consequences, and drew the conclusion: "for the sake of our own life

Austria must live. I had no hesitation, therefore, and ever since 1866

my constant effort has been to stitch up the great torn texture and to

re-establish amicable relations with our ancient associate of the

Confederation." For this purpose he tried to soothe Austrian

susceptibilities, and suggested confidentially that compensation for the

losses of territory, influence and prestige in Italy and Germany might

be found in south-eastern Europe, especially by the acquisition of

Bosnia and Herzegovina; but so long as his rival Count Beust was

minister for foreign affairs in Vienna, and Austria had the prospect of

being able to recover her lost position by the assistance of Russia and

France, these efforts had no success. It was only when Prince Gorchakov

had declined Count Beust's advances, which took the form of suggesting

the abolition of the Black Sea clauses of the treaty of Paris, and when

France had been paralysed for some years by her war with Germany, that a

_rapprochement_ between the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin became

possible. Bismarck lost no time in making advances. From the German

headquarters at Versailles he sent a despatch to Vienna suggesting the

establishing of more cordial relations between the two countries, and

Count Beust replied in an equally amicable tone. The emperor Francis

Joseph, finding himself isolated, had evidently accepted the inevitable

with his customary resignation, and abandoned his dreams of again

playing the leading part in Germany. As a further proof of the change in

his disposition and aims he replaced Count Beust by Count Andrassy, who

was a personal friend of Bismarck, and who wished, as a Hungarian, to

see Austria liberated from her German entanglement, and he consented to

pay a visit to Berlin for the purpose of drawing still closer the

relations between the two governments.

The Dreikaiserbund.

Bismarck was delighted at this turn of affairs, but he advanced with his

usual caution. He gave it to be clearly understood that improvement in

his relations with Vienna must not disturb the long-established

friendship with St Petersburg. The tsar, on hearing privately of the

intended meeting, gave a hint to Prince Reuss, the German ambassador,

that he expected an invitation, and was invited accordingly. The meeting

of the three sovereigns took place at Berlin at the end of August 1872.

The three ministers, Prince Bismarck, Prince Gorchakov and Count

Andrassy, held daily conferences, on the basis that the chief aim in

view should be the maintenance of peace in Europe, and that in all

important international affairs the three powers should consult with

each other and act in concert. As a result of three days' consultation

the Three Emperor's League was founded, without any formal treaty being

signed. In this way the danger of a powerful coalition being formed

against the young German empire was averted, for in the event of a

conflict with France, Germany could count on at least the benevolent

neutrality of Russia and Austria, and from the other powers she had

nothing to fear. What ulterior designs Bismarck may have had in forming

the league, or "Alliance" as it is often called, must be to some extent

a matter of conjecture, but we shall probably not be far wrong in

adopting the view of a competent Russian authority, who defines the

policy of the German chancellor thus: "To make Austria accept

definitively her deposition as a Germanic power, to put her in

perpetual conflict with Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and to found on

that irreconcilable rivalry the hegemony of Germany."

For more than two years there was an outward appearance of extreme

cordiality between the three powers. They acted together diplomatically,

and on all suitable occasions the three allied monarchs exchanged visits

and sent each other congratulations and good wishes. There was, however,

from the beginning very little genuine confidence between them. Before

the breaking up of the conferences at Berlin, Alexander II. and his

chancellor had conversations with the French ambassador, in which they

not only showed that they had suspicions of future aggressive designs on

the part of Germany, but also gave an assurance that so long as France

fulfilled her engagements to Germany she had nothing to fear. A few

months later, when the emperor William paid his return visit to the tsar

in St Petersburg, a defensive convention was concluded by the two

monarchs behind the back of their Austrian ally. Without knowing

anything about the existence of this convention, the Austrian ally did

not feel comfortable in his new position. In Vienna the old

anti-Prussian feeling was still strong. The so-called party of the

archdukes and the military resisted the policy of Andrassy, and sought

to establish closer relations with Russia, so that German support might

be unnecessary, but as Bismarck has himself testified, "Russia did not

yet respond. The wound caused by the conduct of Austria during the

Crimean War was not yet healed. Andrassy made himself very popular in

the court society of St Petersburg during his visit there with his

imperial master, but the traditional suspicion of Austrian policy

remained." Altogether, the new league was not a happy family. So long as

all the members of it were content to accept the _status quo_, the

latent germs of dissension remained hidden from the outside world, but

as soon as the temporary state of political quietude was replaced by a

certain amount of activity and initiative, they forced their way to the

surface. No one of the three powers regarded the _status quo_ as a

satisfactory permanent arrangement. In Berlin much anxiety was caused by

the rapid financial and military recovery of France, and voices were

heard suggesting that a new campaign and a bigger war indemnity might be

necessary before the recuperation was complete. In St Petersburg there

was a determination to take advantage of any good opportunity for

recovering the portion of Bessarabia ceded by the treaty of Paris, and

thereby removing the last tangible results of the Crimean War. In Vienna

there was a desire to obtain in the Balkan Peninsula, in accordance with

the suggestion of Bismarck, compensation for the losses in Italy and

Germany. Thus each of the members of the league was hatching secretly a

little aggressive scheme for its own benefit, and the danger for the

rest of Europe lay in the possibility of their reconciling their schemes

so far as to admit of an agreement for action in common. Fortunately for

the onlookers there were important conflicting interests, and the task

of reconciling them was extremely difficult, as the subsequent course of

events proved.

The storm-cloud of 1875.

Russia and Germany divided.

The first of the three powers to move was Germany. In February 1875 M.

de Radowitz was despatched to St Petersburg on a secret mission in order

to discover whether, in the event of hostilities between Germany and

France, Russia would undertake to maintain a neutral attitude as she had

done in 1870-1871; in that case Germany might be relied on to co-operate

with her in her great designs in the East. Prince Gorchakov did not take

the bait with the alacrity that was expected. Having overcome in some

measure his hatred of Austria, which had distorted for so many years his

political vision, he had come to understand that it was not for the

interests of his own country to have as neighbour a powerful united

Germany instead of a weak confederation of small states, and he now

perceived that it would be a grave error of policy to allow Germany to

destroy still more to her own advantage the balance of power in Europe

by permanently weakening France. No doubt he desired to recover the lost

portion of Bessarabia and to raise Russian prestige in the East, but he

did not wish to run the risk of exciting a great European war, and he

believed that what he desired might be effected without war by the

diplomatic skill which had warded off European intervention during the

Polish troubles of 1863, and had recovered for Russia her freedom of

action in the Black Sea during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. In

reply, therefore, to M. de Radowitz's inquiries and suggestions, he

declared that the Russian court fostered no ambitious designs in the

East or in the West, and desired only peace and the maintenance of the

_status quo_, with possibly an amelioration in the miserable condition

of the Christian subjects of the sultan. This rebuff did not suffice to

dispel the gathering storm. The warlike agitation in the German inspired

press continued, and the French government became thoroughly alarmed.

General Leflo, the French ambassador in St Petersburg, was instructed to

sound the Russian government on the subject. Prince Gorchakov willingly

assured him that Russia would do all in her power to incline the Berlin

cabinet to moderation and peace, and that the emperor would take

advantage of his forthcoming visit to Berlin to influence the emperor

William in this sense. A few days later General Leflo received similar

assurances from the emperor himself, and about the same time the British

government volunteered to work likewise in the cause of peace.

Representations were accordingly made by both governments during the

tsar's visit to Berlin, and both the emperor William and his chancellor

declared that there was no intention of attacking France. The danger of

war, which the well-informed German press believed to be "in sight," was

thus averted, but the incident sowed the seeds of future troubles, by

awakening in Bismarck a bitter personal resentment against his Russian

colleague. By certain incautious remarks to those around him, and still

more by a circular to the representatives of Russia abroad, dated Berlin

and beginning with the words _maintenant la paix est assuree_, Gorchakov

seemed to take to himself the credit of having checkmated Bismarck and

saved Europe from a great war. Bismarck resented bitterly this conduct

on the part of his old friend, and told him frankly that he would have

reason to regret it. In the Russian official world it is generally

believed that he took his revenge in the Russo-Turkish War and the

congress of Berlin. However this may be, he has himself explained that

"the first cause of coldness" was the above incident, "when Gorchakov,

aided by Decazes, wanted to play at my expense the part of a saviour of

France, to represent me as the enemy of European peace, and to procure

for himself a triumphant _quos ego_ to arrest by a word and shatter my

dark designs!" In any case the incident marks the beginning of a new

phase in the relations of the three powers; henceforth Bismarck can no

longer count on the unqualified support of Russia, and in controlling

the Russo-Austrian rivalry in south-eastern Europe, while professing to

be impartial, he will lean to the side of Count Andrassy rather than to

that of Prince Gorchakov. He is careful, however, not to carry this

tendency so far as to produce a _rapprochement_ between Russia and

France. The danger of a Franco-Russian alliance hostile to Germany is

already appearing on the political horizon, but it is only a little

cloud no bigger than a man's hand.

Austro-Russian agreement, 1876.

The next move in the aggressive game was made by Austria, with the

connivance of Russia. During the summer of 1875 an insurrection of the

Christian Slavs in Herzegovina, which received support from the

neighbouring principalities of Montenegro and Servia, was fostered by

the Austrian authorities and encouraged by the Russian consuls on the

Adriatic coast. A European concert was formed for the purpose of

settling the disturbance by means of local administrative reforms, but

the efforts of the powers failed, because the insurgents hoped to obtain

complete liberation from Turkish rule; and in the beginning of July,

with a view to promoting this solution, Servia and Montenegro declared

war against the Porte. Thereupon Russia began to show her hand more

openly. The government allowed volunteers to be recruited in Moscow and

St Petersburg, and the Russian general Chernayev, who had distinguished

himself in Central Asia, was appointed to the command of the Servian

army. When the ball had thus been set rolling, the two powers chiefly

concerned considered that the time had come for embodying the result of

their informal confidential pourparlers in a secret agreement, which is

known as the convention of Reichstadt, because it was signed at a

meeting of the two emperors in the little Bohemian town of that name. It

bore the date of the 8th of July 1876--exactly a week after Servia and

Montenegro had declared war--and it contained the following

stipulations: (1) That so long as the struggle which had just begun

remained undecided, the two sovereigns should refrain from interference,

and that in the event of the principalities being defeated, any

modification of the territorial or political _status quo ante_ to their

detriment should be prevented; (2) that in the event of the

principalities proving victorious, and territorial changes taking place,

Austria should claim compensation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia

should demand the restitution of the portion of Bessarabia which she had

lost by the Crimean War; (3) that in the event of the collapse of the

Ottoman empire, the two powers should act together to create autonomous

principalities in European Turkey, to unite Thessaly and Crete to

Greece, and to proclaim Constantinople a free town. The contracting

parties evidently expected that the two principalities would be

victorious in their struggle with the Porte, and that the compensations

mentioned would be secured without a great European war. Their

expectations were disappointed. Montenegro made a brave stand against

superior forces, but before five months had passed Servia was at the

mercy of the Turkish army, and Russia had to come to the assistance of

her protege. A Russian ultimatum stopped the advance of the Turks on

Belgrade, and an armistice, subsequently transformed into a peace, was

signed.

Bulgarian Question.

Russia and Austria had now to choose between abandoning their schemes

and adopting some other course of action, and unforeseen incidents

contributed towards making them select the latter alternative. In June

1876 an attempt at insurrection in Bulgaria had been repressed with

savage brutality by the Turks, and the details, as they became known

some weeks later, produced much indignation all over Europe. In England

the excitement, fanned by the eloquence of Gladstone, became intense,

and compelled the Disraeli cabinet to take part, very reluctantly, in a

diplomatic campaign, with the object of imposing radical reforms on

Turkey. In Russia the excitement and indignation were equally great, and

the tsar gradually formed the resolution that if the powers would not

act collectively and energetically, so as to compel the Porte to yield,

he would undertake the work single-handed. This resolution he announced

publicly in a speech delivered at Moscow on the 10th of November 1876.

The powers did not like the idea of separate Russian action, and in

order to prevent it they agreed to hold a conference in Constantinople

for the purpose of inducing the Porte to introduce the requisite

reforms. The Porte was at that moment under the influence of popular

patriotic excitement which made it indisposed to accept orders, or even

well-meant advice, from governments more or less hostile to it, and the

inconsiderate mode of procedure suggested by General Ignatiev, and

adopted by the other delegates, made it still more unconciliatory. At

the first plenary sitting of the conference the proceedings were

disturbed by the sound of artillery, and the Turkish representative

explained that the salvo was in honour of the new Ottoman constitution,

which was being promulgated by the sultan. The inference suggested was

that as Turkey had spontaneously entered on the path of liberal and

constitutional reform for all Ottoman subjects, it became superfluous

and absurd to talk of small reforms for particular provinces, such as

the conference was about to propose. The deliberations continued, but

finally the Porte refused to accept what the plenipotentiaries

considered an irreducible minimum, and the conference broke up without

obtaining any practical result. The tsar's Moscow declaration about

employing single-handed the requisite coercive measures now came to be

fulfilled.

San Stefano.

In order to make a successful aggressive move on Turkey, Russia had

first of all to secure her rear and flank by an arrangement with her two

allies. In Berlin she encountered no difficulties. Bismarck had no

objection to seeing Russia weaken herself in a struggle with Turkey,

provided she did not upset the balance of power in south-eastern Europe,

and he felt confident that he could prevent by diplomatic means any such

catastrophe. He was inclined, therefore, to encourage rather than

restrain the bellicose tendencies of St Petersburg. In Vienna the task

of coming to a definite arrangement was much more difficult, and it was

only after protracted and laborious negotiations that a convention was

concluded on the 15th of January 1877, and formally signed three months

later. It was a development of the agreement of Reichstadt, modified

according to the changes in the situation, but retaining the essential

principle that in the event of the territorial status quo being altered,

Russia should recover the lost portion of Bessarabia, and Austria should

get Bosnia and a part of Herzegovina. Having made these preliminary

arrangements, Russia began the campaign simultaneously in Europe and

Asia Minor, and after many reverses and enormous sacrifices of blood and

treasure, she succeeded in imposing on the Turks the "preliminary peace"

of San Stefano (3rd March 1878). That peace was negotiated with very

little consideration for the interests of the other powers, and as soon

as the terms of it became known in Vienna and London there was an

outburst of indignation. In negotiating the treaty General Ignatiev had

ignored the wishes of Austria, and had even, according to the contention

of Andrassy, infringed the convention signed at the beginning of the

war. However this may be, the peace of San Stefano brought to the

surface the latent conflict of interests between the two empires.

Russia's aim was to create a big Bulgaria under the influence of St

Petersburg, and to emancipate Servia and Montenegro as far as possible

from Austrian influence, whereas Austria objected to the creation of any

large Slav state in the Balkan Peninsula, and insisted on maintaining

her influence at Belgrade and Tsetigne (Cetinje). In vain Prince

Gorchakov endeavoured to conciliate Austria and to extract from Count

Andrassy a clear statement of the terms he would accept. Count Andrassy

was in no hurry to extricate Russia from her difficulties, and suggested

that the whole question should be submitted to a European congress. The

suggestion was endorsed by Great Britain, which likewise objected to the

San Stefano arrangements, and Bismarck declined to bring any pressure to

bear on the cabinet of Vienna.

Berlin Congress.

Cyprus Convention.

Deceived in her expectations of active support from her two allies,

Russia found herself in an awkward position. From a military point of

view it was absolutely necessary for her to come to an arrangement

either with Austria or with England, because the communications of her

army before Constantinople with its base could be cut by these two

powers acting in concert--the land route being dominated by Austria, and

the Black Sea route by the British fleet, which was at that time

anchored in the Sea of Marmora. As soon, therefore, as the efforts to

obtain the support of her two allies against the demands of England had

failed, negotiations were opened in London, and on the 30th of May a

secret convention was signed by Lord Salisbury and Count Schuvalov. By

that agreement the obstacles to the assembling of the congress were

removed. The congress met in Berlin on the 13th of June, and after many

prolonged sittings and much secret negotiation the treaty of Berlin was

signed on the 13th of July. By that treaty the preliminary peace of San

Stefano was considerably modified. The big Bulgaria defined by General

Ignatiev was divided into three portions, the part between the Danube

and the Balkans being transformed into a vassal principality, the part

between the Balkans and the Rhodope being made into an autonomous

province, called Eastern Rumelia, under a Christian governor named by

the sultan with the assent of the powers, and the remainder being placed

again under the direct rule of the Porte. The independence of

Montenegro, Servia and Rumania was formally recognized, and each of

these principalities received a considerable accession of territory.

Rumania, however. in return for the Dobrudja, which it professed not to

desire, was obliged to give back to Russia the portion of Bessarabia

ceded after the Crimean War. In Asia Minor Russia agreed to confine her

annexations to the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, and to restore

to Turkey the remainder of the occupied territory. As a set-off against

the large acquisitions of the Slav races, the powers recommended that

the sultan should cede to the kingdom of Greece the greater part of

Thessaly and Epirus, under the form of a rectification of frontiers. At

first the sultan refused to act on this recommendation, but in March

1881 a compromise was effected by which Greece obtained Thessaly without

Epirus. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied and administered by

Austria-Hungary, and the Austrian authorities were to have the right of

making roads and keeping garrisons in the district of Novi-Bazar, which

lies between Servia and Montenegro. In all the provinces of European

Turkey for which special arrangements were not made in the treaty, the

Porte undertook (Art. 23) to introduce organic statutes similar to that

of Crete, adapted to the local conditions. This article, like many of

the subordinate stipulations of the treaty, remained a dead letter. We

may mention specially Art. 61, in which the Sublime Porte undertook to

realize without delay the ameliorations and reforms required in the

provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their safety against

the Circassians and Kurds. Equally unreliable proved the scheme of Lord

Beaconsfield to secure good administration throughout the whole of Asia

Minor by the introduction of reforms under British control, and to

prevent the further expansion of Russia in that direction by a defensive

alliance with the Porte. A convention to that effect was duly signed at

Constantinople a few days before the meeting of the congress (4th June

1878), but the only part of it which was actually realized was the

occupation and administration of Cyprus by the British government. The

new frontiers stipulated in the treaty of San Stefano, and subsequently

rectified by the treaty of Berlin, are shown in the accompanying

sketch-map.

Russian resentment against Bismarck.

The secret schemes of Russia and Austria, in so far as they were defined

in the agreement of Reichstadt and the subsequent Austro-Russian treaty

of Vienna, had thus been realized. Russia had recovered the lost portion

of Bessarabia, and Austria had practically annexed Bosnia and

Herzegovina, though the nominal suzerainty of the sultan over the two

provinces was maintained. But Russia was far from satisfied with the

results, which seemed to her not at all commensurate with the sacrifices

imposed on her by the war, and her dissatisfaction led to a new grouping

of the powers. Before the opening of the Berlin congress Bismarck had

announced publicly that he would refrain from taking sides with any of

the contending parties, and would confine himself to playing the part of

an honest broker. The announcement was received by the Russians with

astonishment and indignation. What they expected was not an impartial

arbiter, but a cordial and useful friend in need. In 1871 the emperor

William, as we have seen, had spontaneously declared to the tsar that

Germany owed to His Majesty the happy issue of the war, and that she

would never forget it, and we may add that on that occasion he signed

himself "Your ever grateful Friend." Now, in 1878, when the moment had

come for paying at least an instalment of this debt, and when Russia was

being compelled to make concessions which she described as incompatible

with her dignity, Bismarck had nothing better to offer than honest

brokerage. The indignation in all classes was intense, and the views

commonly held regarding Bismarck's "duplicity" and "treachery" were

supposed to receive ample confirmation during the sittings of the

congress and the following six months. On the 4th of February 1879

Prince Gorchakov wrote to the ambassador in Vienna: "Needless to say,

that in our eyes the Three Emperors' Alliance is practically torn in

pieces by the conduct of our two allies. At present it remains for us

merely to terminate the liquidation of the past, and to seek henceforth

support in ourselves alone." The same view of the situation was taken in

Berlin and Vienna, though the result was attributed, of course, to

different causes, and the danger of serious complications became so

great that Bismarck concluded with Andrassy in the following October

(1879) a formal defensive alliance, which was avowedly directed against

Russia, and which subsequently developed into the Triple Alliance,

directed against Russia and France.

[Illustration: Map to illustrate the Treaty of Berlin (1878).]

The causes of the rupture are variously described by the different

parties interested. According to Bismarck the Russian government began a

venomous campaign against Germany in the press, and collected, with

apparently hostile intentions, enormous masses of troops near the German

and Austrian frontiers, whilst the tsar adopted in his correspondence

with the emperor William an arrogant and menacing tone which could not

be tolerated. On the other hand, the Russians declare that the so-called

Press-Campaign was merely the spontaneous public expression of the

prevailing disappointment among all classes in Russia, that the military

preparations had a purely defensive character, and that the tsar's

remarks, which roused Bismarck's ire, did not transgress the limits of

friendly expostulation such as sovereigns in close friendly relations

might naturally employ. Subsequent revelations tend rather to confirm

the Russian view. After an exhausting war and without a single powerful

ally, Russia was not likely to provoke wantonly a great war with Germany

and Austria. The press attacks were not more violent than those which

frequently appear in newspapers which draw their inspiration from the

German foreign office, and the accusations about the arrogant attitude

and menacing tone of Alexander II. are not at all in harmony with his

known character, and are refuted by the documents since published by Dr

Busch. The truth seems to be that the self-willed chancellor was

actuated by nervous irritation and personal feeling more than by

considerations of statecraft. His imperial master was not convinced by

his arguments, and showed great reluctance to permit the conclusion of a

separate treaty with Austria. Finally, with much searching of heart, he

yielded to the importunity of his minister; but in thus committing an

unfriendly act towards his old ally, he so softened the blow that the

personal good relations between the two sovereigns suffered merely a

momentary interruption. Bismarck himself soon recognized that the

permanent estrangement of Russia would be a grave mistake of policy, and

the very next year (1880), negotiations for a treaty of defensive

alliance between the two cabinets were begun. Nor did the accession to

the throne of Russia of Alexander III., who had long enjoyed the

reputation of being systematically hostile to Germans, produce a

rupture, as was expected. Six months after his father's death, the young

tsar met the old kaiser at Danzig (September 1881), and some progress

was made towards a complete renewal of the traditional friendship.

Immediately afterwards a further step was taken towards re-establishing

the old state of things with regard also to Austria. On his return to St

Petersburg, Alexander III. remembered that he had received some time

previously a telegram of congratulation from the emperor Francis Joseph,

and he now replied to it very cordially, referring to the meeting at

Danzig, and describing the emperor William as "that venerable friend

with whom we are united in the common bonds of a profound affection."

The words foreshadowed a revival of the Three Emperors' League, which

actually took place three years later.

Growth of the Triple Alliance.

The removal of all immediate danger of a Franco-Russian alliance did not

prevent Bismarck from strengthening in other ways the diplomatic

position of Germany, and the result of his efforts soon became apparent

in the alliance of Italy with the two central powers. Ever since the

Franco-German War of 1870-71, and more especially since the congress of

Berlin in 1878, the Italian government had shown itself restless and

undecided in its foreign policy. As it was to France that Italy owed her

emancipation from Austrian rule, it seemed natural that the two

countries should remain allies, but anything like cordial co-operation

was prevented by conflicting interests and hostile feeling. The French

did not consider the acquisition of Savoy and Nice a sufficient

compensation for the assistance they had given to the cause of Italian

unity, and they did not know, or did not care to remember, that their

own government was greatly to blame for the passive attitude of Italy in

the hour of their great national misfortunes. On the other hand, a

considerable amount of bitterness against France had been gradually

accumulating in the hearts of the Italians. As far back as the end of

the war of 1859, popular opinion had been freely expressed against

Napoleon III., because he had failed to keep his promise of liberating

Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic." The feeling was revived and

intensified when it became known that he was opposing the annexation of

central and southern Italy, and that he obtained Savoy and Nice as the

price of partly withdrawing his opposition. Subsequently, in the war of

1866, he was supposed to have insulted Italy by making her conclude

peace with Austria, on the basis of the cession of Venetia, before she

could wipe out the humiliation of her defeats at Custozza and Lissa.

Then came the French protection of the pope's temporal power as a

constant source of irritation, producing occasional explosions of

violent hostility, as when the new Chassepot rifles were announced to

have "worked wonders" among the Garibaldians at Mentana. When the Second

Empire was replaced by the Republic, the relations did not improve.

French statesmen of the Thiers school had always condemned the imperial

policy of permitting and even encouraging the creation of large,

powerful states on the French frontiers, and Thiers himself publicly

attributed to this policy the misfortunes of his country. With regard to

Italy, he said openly that he regretted what had been done, though he

had no intention of undoing it. The first part of this statement was

carefully noted in Italy, and the latter part was accepted with

scepticism. In any case his hand might perhaps be forced, for in the

first republican chamber the monarchical and clerical element was very

strong, and it persistently attempted to get something done in favour of

the temporal power. Even when the party of the Left undertook the

direction of affairs in 1876, the government did not become

anti-clerical in its foreign policy, and Italian statesmen resigned

themselves to a position of political isolation. The position had its

advantages. Events in the Balkan Peninsula foreshadowed a great European

war, and it seemed that in the event of Europe's being divided into two

hostile camps, Italy might have the honour and the advantage of

regulating the balance of power. By maintaining good relations with all

her neighbours and carefully avoiding all inconvenient entanglements,

she might come forward at the critical moment and dictate her own terms

to either of the contending parties, or offer her services to the

highest bidder. This Machiavellian policy did not give the expected

results. Being friends with everybody in a general way may be the best

course for an old, conservative country which desires merely the

maintenance of the _status quo_, but it does not secure the energetic

diplomatic support required by a young enterprising state which wishes

to increase its territory and influence. At the congress of Berlin, when

several of the powers got territorial acquisitions, Italy got nothing.

The Italians, who were in the habit of assuming, almost as a matter of

principle, that from all European complications they had a right to

obtain some tangible advantage, were naturally disappointed, and they

attributed their misfortune to their political isolation. The policy of

the free hand consequently fell into disrepute, and the desire for a

close, efficient alliance revived. But with what power or powers should

an alliance be made? The remnants of the old party of action, who still

carried the _Italia Irredenta_ banner, had an answer ready. They

recommended that alliances should be concluded with a view to wresting

from Austria the Trentino and Trieste, with Dalmatia, perhaps, into the

bargain. On the other hand, the Conservatives and the Moderates

considered that the question of the Trentino and Trieste was much less

important than that of political influence in the Mediterranean. A

strong Austria was required, it was said, to bar the way of Russia to

the Adriatic, and France must not be allowed to pursue unchecked her

policy of transforming the Mediterranean into a French lake.

Considerations of this kind led naturally to the conclusion that Italy

should draw closer to the powers of central Europe. So the question

appeared from the standpoint of "la haute politique." From the less

elevated standpoint of immediate political interests, it presented

conflicting considerations. A _rapprochement_ with the central powers

might prevent the conclusion of a commercial treaty with France, and

thereby increase the financial and economic difficulties with which the

young kingdom was struggling, whereas a _rapprochement_ with France

would certainly excite the hostility of Bismarck, who was retiring from

the _Kulturkampf_ and journeying towards Canossa, and who might possibly

conciliate the pope by helping him to recover his temporal sovereignty

at the expense of Italy. Altogether the problem was a very complicated

one. The conflicting currents so nearly balanced each other, that the

question as to which way the ship would drift might be decided by a

little squall of popular sentiment. A very big squall was brewing.

France and Tunis.

During the congress of Berlin the French government was very indignant

when it discovered that Lord Beaconsfield had recently made a secret

convention with the sultan for the British occupation of Cyprus, and in

order to calm its resentment Lord Salisbury gave M. Waddington to

understand that, so far as England was concerned, France would be

allowed a free hand in the Regency of Tunis, which she had long coveted.

Though the conversations on the subject and a subsequent exchange of

notes were kept strictly secret, the Italian government soon got wind of

the affair, and it was at first much alarmed. It considered, in common

with Italians generally, that Tunis, on the ground of historic right and

of national interests, should be reserved for Italy, and that an

extension of French territory in that direction would destroy, to the

detriment of Italy, the balance of power in the Mediterranean. These

apprehensions were calmed for a time by assurances given to the Italian

ambassador in Paris. M. Gambetta assured General Cialdini that he had no

intention of making Italy an irreconcilable enemy of France, and M.

Waddington declared, on his word of honour, that so long as he remained

minister of foreign affairs nothing of the sort would be done by France

without a previous understanding with the cabinet of Rome. M. Waddington

honourably kept his word, but his successor did not consider himself

bound by the assurance; and when it was found that the Italians were

trying systematically to establish their influence in the Regency at the

expense of France, the French authorities, on the ground that a Tunisian

tribe called the Kroumirs had committed depredations in Algeria, sent an

armed force into the Regency, and imposed on the bey the Bardo treaty,

which transformed Tunis into a French protectorate.

Triple Alliance signed 1882.

The establishment of a French protectorate over a country which the

Italians had marked out for themselves as necessary for the defence and

colonial expansion of the kingdom had the effect which Gambetta had

foreseen--it made Italy, for a time at least, the irreconcilable enemy

of France. Whilst the French were giving free expression to their

patriotic exultation, and even Gambetta himself, in defiance of what he

had said to Cialdini, was congratulating Jules Ferry on having restored

France to her place among the nations, the Italians were trying to

smother their indignation and to discover some means of retrieving what

they had lost. The only remedy seemed to be to secure foreign alliances,

and there was now no hesitation as to where they should be sought.

Simple people in Italy imagined that if an alliance had been concluded

sooner with Germany and Austria, these powers would have prevented

France from trampling on the sacred interests of Italy. This idea was

entirely erroneous, because Austria had little or no interest in the

Tunisian Question, and Bismarck was not at all sorry to see France

embark on an enterprise which distracted her attention from

Alsace-Lorraine and removed all danger of a Franco-Italian alliance. The

illusion, however, had a powerful influence on Italian public opinion.

The government was now urged to conclude without further delay an

alliance with the central powers, and the recommendation was not

unwelcome to the king, because most of the Italian Gallophils had

anti-dynastic and republican tendencies, and he was naturally disposed

to draw nearer to governments which proclaimed themselves the defenders

of monarchical institutions and the opponents of revolutionary

agitation. After protracted negotiations, in which Italy tried in vain

to secure protection for her own separate interests in the

Mediterranean, defensive treaties of alliance were concluded with the

cabinets of Vienna and Berlin in May 1882. Though the Italian statesmen

did not secure by these treaties all they wanted, they felt that the

kingdom was protected against any aggressive designs which might be

entertained by France or the Vatican, and when the treaties were renewed

in 1887 they succeeded in getting somewhat more favourable conditions.

Dreikaiserbund revived 1884.

By the creation of this Triple Alliance, which still subsists, the

diplomatic position of Germany was greatly strengthened, but Bismarck

was still haunted by the apprehension of a Franco-Russian alliance, and

he made repeated attempts to renew the old cordial relations with the

court of St Petersburg. He was bold enough to hope that, notwithstanding

the Austro-German treaty of October 1879, avowedly directed against

Russia, and the new Triple Alliance, by which the Austro-German Alliance

was strengthened, he might resuscitate the Three Emperors' League in

such a form as to ensure, even more effectually than he had done on the

former occasion, the preponderance of Germany in the arrangement. With

this object he threw out a hint to the Russian ambassador, M. Sabourof,

in the summer of 1883, that the evil results of the congress of Berlin

might be counteracted by a formal agreement between the three emperors.

The suggestion was transmitted privately by M. Sabourof to the tsar, and

was favourably received. Alexander III. was disquieted by the

continuance of the Nihilist agitation, and was not averse from drawing

closer to the conservative powers; and as he desired tranquillity for

some time in the Balkan Peninsula, he was glad to have security that his

rival would do nothing in that part of the world without a previous

understanding. M. de Giers, who had now succeeded Prince Gorchakov in

the direction of foreign affairs, was accordingly despatched to

Friedrichsruh to discuss the subject with Bismarck. The practical result

of the meeting was that negotiations between the two governments were

begun, and on the 21st of March 1884 a formal document was signed in

Berlin. About six months later, in the month of September, the three

emperors met at Skiernevice and ratified the agreement. Thus, without

any modification of the Triple Alliance, which was directed against

Russia, the old Three Emperors' League, which included Russia, was

revived. Germany and Austria, being members of both, were doubly

protected, for in the event of being attacked they could count on at

least the benevolent neutrality of both Russia and Italy. France was

thereby completely isolated.

In drawing up the secret treaty of Skiernevice, which may be regarded as

the _chef-d'oeuvre_ of Bismarckian diplomacy, the German chancellor's

chief aims evidently were to paralyse Russia by yoking her to Germany

and Austria, to isolate France, and to realize his old scheme of holding

the balance between Russia and Austria in the Balkan Peninsula. With a

view to attaining the first two objects it was stipulated that if any

one of the three powers were forced to make war on a fourth power, the

two other contracting parties should observe a benevolent neutrality

towards their ally. If we may believe a well-informed Russian authority,

Bismarck wished it to be understood that in the event of _two_ of the

powers being at war with a fourth, the stipulation about benevolent

neutrality should still hold good, but Alexander III. objected, on the

ground that he could not remain a passive spectator of a duel in which

France would be confronted by two antagonists. In his third object

Bismarck was successful, for it was expressly laid down that in all

cases of a disagreement between two of the parties in the affairs of the

Balkan Peninsula, the third power should decide between them. This

meant, of course, that in all discussions between Russia and Austria,

the two great rivals in the Eastern Question, Bismarck should always

have a casting vote. In return for all this, Russia obtained two small

concessions: firstly, that Germany and Austria should seek to restrain

the sultan from permitting the passage of the Dardanelles to an English

fleet, as he had done in 1878, when the Russian army was before

Constantinople; and, secondly, that they should not oppose the union of

Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, if it was accomplished by the force of

things and within the limits traced by the congress of Berlin.

Bulgarian crisis.

This new form of the Three Emperors' League had all the organic defects

of its predecessor, and was destined to be still more short-lived. The

claims of Russia and Austria might be reconcilable in theory, but in

practice they were sure to conflict; and however much Bismarck might try

to play the part of an honest broker, he was certain to be suspected of

opposing Russia and favouring Austria. It was therefore only during a

period of political stagnation in south-eastern Europe that the

arrangement could work smoothly. The political stagnation did not last

long. Prince Alexander of Bulgaria had for some time been fretting under

the high-handed interference of the Russian agents in the principality,

and had begun to oppose systematically what the Russians considered

their legitimate influence. Relations between Sofia and St Petersburg

had consequently become strained, when a crisis was suddenly brought

about by the revolution of Philippopolis in September 1885. The

conspirators arrested and expelled the governor-general, who had been

appointed by the sultan with the assent of the powers, and at the same

time proclaimed the union of the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia

with the principality of Bulgaria, in defiance of the stipulations of

the treaty of Berlin. The revolution had been effected with the

connivance and approval of the regularly accredited Russian agents in

Philippopolis, but it had not received the sanction of the Russian

government, and was resented as a new act of insubordination on the part

of Prince Alexander. When he arrived in Philippopolis and accepted the

declaration of union, the cabinet of St Petersburg protested against any

such infraction of the Berlin treaty, and the Porte prepared to send an

army into the province. It was restrained from taking this step by the

ambassadors in Constantinople, so that an armed conflict between Turks

and Bulgarians was prevented; but no sooner had the Bulgarians been

relieved from this danger on their eastern frontier, than they were

attacked from the west by the Servians, who were determined to get ample

compensation for any advantage which the Bulgarians might obtain. The

Bulgarian army defeated the Servians at Slivnitza (November 19-20,

1885), and was marching on Belgrade when its advance was stopped and an

armistice arranged by the energetic intervention of the Austrian

government. Following the example of the Servians, the Greeks were

preparing to exact territorial compensation likewise; but as their

mobilization was a slow process, the powers had time to restrain them

from entering on active hostilities, first by an ultimatum (April 26,

1886), and afterwards by a blockade of their ports (May 1886). By that

time, thanks to the intervention of the powers, a peace between Bulgaria

and Servia had been signed at Bucharest (March 3); and with regard to

Eastern Rumelia a compromise had been effected by which the formal union

with the principality was rejected, and the prince was appointed

governor-general of the province for a term of five years. This was in

reality union in disguise.

The diplomatic solution of the problem averted the danger of a European

war, but it left a great deal of dissatisfaction, which soon produced

new troubles. Not only had Prince Alexander escaped punishment for his

insubordination to Russia, but he and the anti-Russian party among the

Bulgarians had obtained a decided success. This could not well be

tolerated. Before six months had passed (August 21, 1886) Prince

Alexander was kidnapped by conspirators in his palace at Sofia and

conveyed secretly to Russian Bessarabia. As soon as the incident was

reported to the tsar, the prince was released, and he at once returned

to Sofia, where a counter-revolution had been effected in his favour;

but he considered his position untenable, and formally abdicated. A

fortnight after his departure General Kaulbars arrived from St

Petersburg with instructions from the tsar to restore order in

accordance with Russian interests. In St Petersburg it was supposed that

the Bulgarian people were still devoted to Russia, and that they were

ready to rise against and expel the politicians of the Nationalist party

led by Stambolof. General Kaulbars accordingly made a tour in the

country and delivered speeches to the assembled multitudes, but

Stambolof's political organization counteracted all his efforts, and on

the 20th of November he left Bulgaria and took the Russian consuls with

him. Stambolof maintained his position, suppressed energetically several

insurrectionary movements, and succeeded in getting Prince Ferdinand of

Coburg elected prince (July 7, 1887), in spite of the opposition of

Russia, who put forward as candidate a Russian subject, Prince Nicholas

of Mingrelia. Prince Ferdinand was not officially recognized by the

sultan and the powers, but he continued to reign under the direction of

Stambolof, and the Russian government, passively accepting the

accomplished facts, awaited patiently a more convenient moment for

action.

Russian hostility to Germany.

These events in the Balkan Peninsula necessarily affected the mutual

relations of the powers composing the Three Emperors' League. Austria

could not remain a passive and disinterested spectator of the action of

Russia in Bulgaria. Her agents had given a certain amount of support to

Prince Alexander in his efforts to emancipate himself from Russian

domination; and when the prince was kidnapped and induced to abdicate,

Count Kalnoky had not concealed his intention of opposing further

aggression. Bismarck resisted the pressure brought to bear on him from

several quarters in favour of the anti-Russian party in Bulgaria, but he

was suspected by the Russians of siding with Austria and secretly

encouraging the opposition to Russian influence. This revived the hatred

against him which had been created by his pro-Austrian leanings after

the Russo-Turkish War. The feeling was assiduously fomented by the

Russian press, especially by M. Katkoff, the editor of the _Moscow

Gazette_, who exercised great influence on public opinion and had

personal relations with Alexander III. On the 31st of July 1886, three

weeks before the kidnapping of Prince Alexander, he had begun a regular

journalistic campaign against Germany, and advocated strongly a new

orientation of Russian policy. M. de Giers, minister of foreign affairs,

was openly attacked as a partisan of the German alliance, and his

"pilgrimages to Friedrichsruh and Berlin" were compared to the

humiliating journeys of the old Russian grand-princes to the Golden

Horde in the time of the Tatar domination. The moment had come, it was

said, for Russia to emancipate herself from German diplomatic thraldom,

and for this purpose a _rapprochement_ with France was suggested. The

idea was well received by the public, and it seemed to be not

unpalatable to the tsar, for the _Moscow Gazette_ was allowed to

continue its attacks on M. de Giers's policy of maintaining the German

alliance. In Berlin such significant facts could not fail to produce

uneasiness, because one of the chief aims of Bismarck's policy had

always been to prevent a Russo-French _entente cordiale_. The German

press were instructed to refute the arguments of their Russian

colleagues, and to prove that if Russia had really lost her influence in

the Balkan Peninsula, the fact was due to the blunders of her own

diplomacy. The controversy did not produce at once a serious

estrangement between the two cabinets, but it marked the beginning of a

period of vacillation on the part of Alexander III. When the treaty of

Skiernevice was about to expire in 1887, he positively refused to renew

the Three Emperors' League, but he consented to make, without the

cognizance of Austria, a secret treaty of alliance with Germany for

three years. Not satisfied with this guarantee against the danger of a

Franco-Russian alliance, Bismarck caused attacks to be made in the press

on Russian credit, which was rapidly gaining a footing on the Paris

bourse, and he imprudently showed his hand by prohibiting the Reichsbank

from accepting Russian securities as guarantees. From that moment the

tsar's attitude changed. All his dormant suspicions of German policy

revived. When he passed through Berlin in November 1887, Bismarck had a

long audience, in which he defended himself with his customary ability,

but Alexander remained unmoved in his conviction that the German

government had systematically opposed Russian interests, and had

paralysed Russian action in the Balkan Peninsula for the benefit of

Austria; and he failed to understand the ingenious theory put forward by

the German chancellor, that two powers might have a severe economic

struggle without affecting their political relations. Bismarck had to

recognize that, for the moment at least, the Three Emperors' League,

which had served his purposes so well, could not be resuscitated, but he

had still a certain security against the hostility of Russia in the

secret treaty. Soon, however, this link was also to be broken. When the

treaty expired in 1890 it was not renewed. By that time Bismarck had

been dismissed, and he subsequently reproached his successor, Count

Caprivi, with not having renewed it, but in reality Count Caprivi was

not to blame. Alexander III. was determined not to renew the alliance,

and was already gravitating slowly towards an understanding with France.

Franco-Russian entente.

No treaty or formal defensive engagement of any kind existed between

Russia and France, but it was already tolerably certain that in the

event of a great war the two nations would be found fighting on the same

side, and the military authorities in both countries felt that if no

arrangements were made beforehand for concerted action,--such

arrangements having been long ago completed by the powers composing the

Triple Alliance--they would begin the campaign at a great disadvantage.

This was perfectly understood by both governments; and after some

hesitation on both sides. Generals Vannovski and Obruchev, on the one

side, and Generals Saussier, Miribel and Boisdeffre on the other, were

permitted to discuss plans of co-operation. At the same time a large

quantity of Lebel rifles were manufactured in France for the Russian

army, and the secret of making smokeless powder was communicated to the

Russian military authorities. The French government wished to go further

and conclude a defensive alliance, but the tsar was reluctant to bind

himself with a government which had so little stability, and which might

be induced to provoke a war with Germany by the prospect of Russian

support. Even the military convention was not formally ratified until

1894. The enthusiastic partisans of the alliance flattered themselves

that the tsar's reluctance had been overcome, when he received very

graciously Admiral Gervais and his officers during the visit of the

French fleet to Cronstadt in the summer of 1891, but their joy was

premature. The formal _rapprochement_ between the two governments was

much slower than the unofficial _rapprochement_ between the two nations.

More than two years passed before the Cronstadt visit was returned by

the Russian fleet, under Admiral Avelan. The enthusiastic ovations

which the admiral and his subordinates received in Toulon and Paris

(October 1893) showed how eager and anxious the French people were for

an alliance with Russia, but the Russian government was in no hurry to

gratify their wishes. Of the official action all we know with certainty

is, that immediately after the Cronstadt visit in 1891 a diplomatic

protocol about a defensive alliance was signed; that during the special

mission of General Boisdeffre to St Petersburg in 1892 negotiations took

place about a military convention; that in 1894 the military convention

was ratified; that in the summer of 1895 M. Ribot, when prime minister,

first spoke publicly of an alliance; and that during the visit of the

president of the French Republic to St Petersburg, in August 1897,

France and Russia were referred to as allies in the complimentary

speeches of the tsar and of M. Felix Faure. Though we are still in the

dark as to the precise terms of the arrangement, there is no doubt that

close friendly relations were established between the two powers, and

that in all important international affairs they sought to act in accord

with each other. It is equally certain that for some years Russia was

the predominant partner, and that, in accordance with the pacific

tendencies of the tsar, she systematically exercised a restraining

influence on France.

The Triple entente and the Triple Alliance.

The great expectations excited among the French people by the _entente

cordiale_ were consequently not realized, and there appeared gradually

premonitory symptoms of a reaction in public opinion, but the alliance

between the two governments was maintained, and though the Triple

Alliance was weakened by the internal troubles of Austria-Hungary and by

a tendency on the part of Italy to gravitate towards France, the

grouping of the great powers was not radically changed till the

Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. By that war the balance of power in Europe

was seriously disturbed. Russia inadvertently provoked a struggle with

Japan which made such a drain on her energies and material resources

that her political influence in Europe necessarily suffered a partial

eclipse. Thus the Triple Alliance outweighed its rival, and there was a

danger of the German emperor's taking advantage of the situation to

secure for himself a diplomatic predominance in Europe. France at once

perceived that there was a grave danger for herself, and naturally

looked about for some diplomatic support to replace that of Russia,

which had lost much of its value. From her uncomfortable isolation there

were only two possible exits--a _rapprochement_ with Germany or a

_rapprochement_ with England. Both of these demanded sacrifices. The

former required a formal abandonment of all ideas of recovering Alsace

and Lorraine; the latter a formal recognition of British predominance in

Egypt. Under the influence of M. Delcasse the French government chose

what seemed the lesser of two evils, and concluded with the English

foreign office in April 1904 a general agreement, of which the most

important stipulation was that France should leave England a free hand

in Egypt, and that England in return should allow France, within certain

limits, a free hand in Morocco. On that basis was effected a

_rapprochement_ between the two governments which soon developed into an

_entente cordiale_ between the two nations. The efforts of the German

emperor to undermine the _entente_ by insisting on the convocation of a

conference to consider the Morocco question caused M. Delcasse to

resign, and produced considerable anxiety throughout Europe, but the

desired result was not attained. On the contrary, the conference in

question, which met at Algeciras in January 1906, ended in strengthening

the _entente_ and in accentuating the partial isolation of Germany.

The grouping of the great continental states into two opposite but not

necessarily hostile camps helped to preserve the balance of power and

the peace of Europe. The result was that the causes of conflict which

arose from time to time up to the end of the 19th century were

localized. Some of the principal questions involved may be more

particularly mentioned.

Armenia.

The Armenian Question was brought prominently before Europe by the

Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. In the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin

the Sublime Porte undertook "to carry out without delay the

ameliorations and reforms required by local needs in the provinces

inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the

Circassians and the Kurds." This stipulation remained a dead letter, and

the relations between the Armenians and the Mussulmans became worse than

before, because the protection of the powers encouraged in the oppressed

nationality far-reaching political aspirations, and the sultan regarded

the political aspirations and the intervention of the powers as

dangerous for the integrity and independence of his empire. For some

fifteen years the Armenians continued to hope for the efficacious

intervention of their protectors, but when their patience became

exhausted and the question seemed in danger of being forgotten, they

determined to bring it again to the front. Some of them confined

themselves to agitating abroad, especially in England, in favour of the

cause, whilst others made preparations for exciting an insurrectionary

movement in Constantinople and Asia Minor. These latter knew very well

that an insurrection could be suppressed by the Turkish government

without much difficulty, but they hoped that the savage measures of

repression which the Turks were sure to employ might lead to the active

intervention of Europe and ensure their liberation from Turkish rule, as

the famous "atrocities" of 1876 had led to the political emancipation of

Bulgaria. In due course--1895-1896--the expected atrocities took place,

in the form of wholesale massacres in Constantinople and various towns

of Asia Minor. The sultan was subjected to diplomatic pressure and

threatened with more efficient means of coercion. In the diplomatic

campaign England took the lead, and was warmly supported by Italy, but

Germany, Austria and France showed themselves lukewarm, not to say

indifferent, and Russia, departing from her traditional policy of

protecting the Christians of Turkey, vetoed the employment of force for

extracting concessions from the sultan. In these circumstances the Porte

naturally confined itself to making a few reforms on paper, which were

never carried out. Thus the last state of the Armenians was worse than

the first, but the so-called European concert was maintained, and the

danger of a great European war was averted.

Crete.

The next attempt to raise the Eastern Question was made by the Greeks.

In 1896 a semi-secret society called the Ethnike Hetairia began a

Panhellenic agitation, and took advantage of one of the periodical

insurrections in Crete to further its projects. In February 1897 the

Cretan revolutionary committee proclaimed the annexation of the island

to the Hellenic kingdom, and a contingent of Greek regular troops landed

near Canea under the command of Colonel Vassos to take possession of the

island in the name of King George. The powers, objecting to this

arbitrary proceeding, immediately occupied Canea with a mixed force from

the ships of war which were there at the time, and summoned the Greek

government to withdraw its troops. The summons was disregarded, and the

whole of the Greek army was mobilized on the frontier of Thessaly and

Epirus. In consequence of a raid into Turkish territory the Porte

declared war on the 17th of April, and the short campaign ended in the

defeat of the Greeks. The powers intervened to put an end to the

hostilities, and after prolonged negotiations a peace was concluded by

which Greece had to consent to a strategical rectification of frontier

and to pay a war indemnity of L4,000,000. Thus a second time the

European concert acted effectually in the interests of peace, but it did

not stand the strain of the subsequent efforts to solve the Cretan

Question. Finding the Turks less conciliatory after their military

success, and being anxious to remain in cordial relations with the

Porte, Germany withdrew from further co-operation with the powers, and

Austria followed her example. They did not, however, offer any active

opposition, and the question received a temporary solution by the

appointment of Prince George, second son of the king of Greece, as high

commissioner and governor-general of the island. (See CRETE.)

Africa.

The conflicting desires of several of the powers to obtain colonial

possessions in various parts of the world, and to forestall their

competitors in the act of taking possession, were bound to introduce

complications in which England, as the greatest of colonial powers,

would generally be involved; and as the unappropriated portions of the

earth's surface at the beginning of the period under discussion were to

be found chiefly in Africa, it was in the Dark Continent that the

conflicts of interests mostly took place. England's chief competitors

were France and Germany. Her traditional policy, except in the south of

the continent, where the conditions of soil and climate were favourable

to European colonists, had been purely commercial. She had refrained

from annexation of territory, as involving too much expenditure and

responsibility, and confined her protection to the trading stations on

the coast. When France came into the field this policy had to be

abandoned. The policy of France was also commercial in a certain sense,

but the methods she adopted were very different. She endeavoured to

bring under her authority, by annexation or the establishment of

protectorates, the largest possible extent of territory, in order to

increase her trade by a system of differential tariffs; she encroached

on the hinterland of British settlements, and endeavoured to direct

artificially the native inland trade towards her own ports. A glance at

the map of the African West Coast will suffice to show the success with

which this policy was carried out. When the British government awoke to

the danger, all that could be done was to prevent further encroachments

by likewise annexing territory. The result is shown in the article

AFRICA: Sec. 5. In her dealings with France about the partition of Africa,

England was generally conciliatory, but she was always inflexible in

guarding carefully the two entrances to the Mediterranean. There was,

therefore, a permanent danger of conflict in Egypt and Morocco. When

England in 1882 considered it necessary to suppress the Arabi

insurrection, she invited France to co-operate, but the French

government declined, and left the work to be done by England alone.

England had no intention of occupying the country permanently, but she

had to take precautions against the danger of French occupation after

her withdrawal, and these precautions were embodied in an Anglo-Turkish

convention signed at Constantinople in May 1887. France prevented the

ratification of the convention by the sultan, with the result that the

British occupation has been indefinitely prolonged. She still clung

persistently, however, to the hope of obtaining a predominant position

in the valley of the Nile, and she tried to effect her purpose by

gaining a firm foothold on the upper course of the river. The effort

which she made in 1898 to attain this end, by simultaneously despatching

the Marchand mission from her Congo possessions and inciting the emperor

Menelek of Abyssinia to send a force from the east to join hands with

Major Marchand at Fashoda, was defeated by the overthrow of the Khalifa

and the British occupation of Khartum. For a few days the two nations

seemed on the brink of war, but the French government, receiving no

encouragement from St Petersburg, consented to withdraw the Marchand

mission, and a convention was signed defining the respective spheres of

influence of the two countries.

In Morocco the rivalry between the two powers was less acute but not

less persistent and troublesome. France aspired to incorporate the

sultanate with her north African possessions, whilst England had

commercial interests to defend and was firmly resolved to prevent France

from getting unfettered possession of the southern coast of the Straits

of Gibraltar. As in Egypt, so in Morocco the dangers of conflict were

averted, in 1904, by a general agreement, which enabled France to carry

out in Morocco, as far as England was concerned, her policy of pacific

penetration, but debarred her from erecting fortifications in the

vicinity of the straits. Germany thereafter strongly opposed French

claims in Morocco, but after a period of great tension, and the holding

of an ineffectual conference at Algeciras in 1906, an understanding was

come to in 1909 (see MOROCCO: _History_).

With Germany likewise, from 1880 onwards, England had some diplomatic

difficulties regarding the partition of Africa, but they never reached a

very acute phase, and were ultimately settled by mutual concessions. By

the arrangement of 1890, in which several of the outstanding questions

were solved, Heligoland was ceded to Germany in return for concessions

in East Africa. A conflict of interests in the southern Pacific was

amicably arranged by the Anglo-German convention of April 1886, in which

a line of demarcation was drawn between the respective spheres of

influence in the islands to the north and east of the Australian

continent, and by the convention of 1899, in virtue of which Germany

gained possession of Samoa and renounced in favour of England all

pretensions to the Tonga Archipelago.

Asia.

In Asia the tendencies of the European powers to territorial expansion,

and their desire to secure new markets for their trade and industry,

have affected from time to time their mutual relations. More than once

England and Russia have had disputes about the limits of their

respective spheres of influence in central Asia, but the causes of

friction have steadily diminished as the work of frontier delimitation

has advanced. The important agreement of 1872-1873 was supplemented by

the protocol of the 22nd of July 1887 and the Pamir delimitation of

1895, so that the Russo-Afghan frontier, which is the dividing line

between the Russian and British spheres of influence, has now been

carried right up to the frontier of the Chinese empire. The delimitation

of the English and French spheres of influence in Asia has also

progressed. In 1885 France endeavoured to get a footing on the Upper

Irrawaddy, the hinterland of British Burma, and England replied in the

following year by annexing the dominions of King Thebaw, including the

Shan States as far east as the Mekong. Thereupon France pushed her

Indo-Chinese frontier westwards, and in 1893 made an attack on the

kingdom of Siam, which very nearly brought about a conflict with

England. After prolonged negotiations an arrangement was reached and

embodied in a formal treaty (January 1896), which clearly foreshadows a

future partition between the two powers, but guarantees the independence

of the central portion of the kingdom, the Valley of the Menam, as a

buffer-state. Farther north, in eastern China, the aggressive tendencies

and mutual rivalries of the European powers have produced a problem of a

much more complicated kind. Firstly Germany, then Russia, next England,

and finally France took portions of Chinese territory, under the thin

disguise of long leases. They thereby excited in the Chinese population

and government an intense anti-foreign feeling, which produced the Boxer

movement and culminated in the attack on the foreign legations at Pekin

in the summer of 1900. (See CHINA: _History_.)

In 1899-1901 the relations of the European powers were disturbed by the

Boer War in South Africa. In nearly every country of Europe popular

feeling was much excited against England, and in certain influential

quarters the idea was entertained of utilizing this feeling for the

formation of a coalition against the British empire; but in view of the

decided attitude assumed by the British government, and the loyal

enthusiasm displayed by the colonies, no foreign government ventured to

take the initiative of intervention, and it came gradually to be

recognized that no European state had any tangible interest in

prolonging the independence and maladministration of the Boer republics.

One permanent factor in the history of Europe after the war of 1870-71

was the constant increase of armaments by all the great powers, and the

proportionate increase of taxation. The fact made such an impression on

the young emperor of Russia, Nicholas II., that he invited the powers to

consider whether the further increase of the burdens thereby imposed on

the nations might not be arrested by mutual agreement; and a conference

for this purpose was convened at the Hague (May 18-July 29, 1899), but

the desirable object in view was not attained. (See ARBITRATION,

INTERNATIONAL.) (D. M. W.)

Progress of the Peace movement.

Though neither the first Hague Conference nor the second, which met in

1907, did much to fulfil the expectations of those who hoped for the

establishment of a system which should guarantee the world against the

disasters of war, they undoubtedly tended to create a strong public

opinion in favour of peaceful methods in the solution of international

problems which has not been without its effect. Any attempt to organize

the concert of the powers must always fail, as it failed in the early

part of the 19th century, so long as the spirit of national and racial

rivalry is stronger than the consciousness of common interests; and the

early years of the 20th century showed no diminution, but rather an

accentuation of this rivalry. The court of arbitration established at

the Hague early in 1901 may deal effectively with questions as to which

both parties desire a _modus vivendi_, and the pacific efforts of King

Edward VII., which did so much to prevent misunderstandings likely to

lead to war, resulted from 1903 onwards in a series of arbitration

treaties between Great Britain and other powers which guaranteed the

Hague court an effective activity in such matters. But more perilous

issues, involving deep-seated antagonisms, have continued to be dealt

with by the methods of the old diplomacy backed by the armed force of

the powers. How far the final solution of such problems has been helped

or hindered by the general reluctance to draw the sword must for some

time to come remain an open question. Certainly, during the early years

of the 20th century, many causes of difference which a hundred years

earlier would assuredly have led to war, were settled, or at least

shelved, by diplomacy. Of these the questions of Crete, of Armenia, and

of contested claims in Africa have already been mentioned. Other

questions of general interest which might have led to war, but which

found a peaceful solution, were those of the separation of Norway and

Sweden, and the rivalry of the powers in the northern seas. In October

1905 Sweden formally recognized the separate existence of Norway (see

NORWAY: _History_ and SWEDEN: _History_). On the 23rd of April 1908 were

signed the "Declarations"; the one, signed by the four Baltic littoral

powers, recognized "in principle" the maintenance of the territorial

_status quo_ in that sea; the other--to which Great Britain, France,

Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Holland were the parties--sanctioned a

similar principle in regard to the North Sea. These were followed, in

June of the same year, by two agreements intended to apply the same

principles to the southern European waters, signed by France and Spain

and Great Britain and Spain respectively. Another agreement, that signed

between Russia and Great Britain in 1907 for the delimitation of their

spheres of influence in Persia and the northern borders of the Indian

empire, though having no direct relation to European affairs, exercised

considerable influence upon them by helping to restore the international

prestige of Russia, damaged by the disasters of the war with Japan and

the internal disturbances that followed. The new cordial understanding

between the British and Russian governments was cemented by the meeting

of King Edward VII. and the emperor Nicholas II. at Reval in June 1908.

Revival of the Eastern Question.

More perilous to European peace, however, than any of these issues was

the perennial unrest in Macedonia, which threatened sooner or later to

open up the whole Eastern Question once more in its acutest form. The

situation was due to the internecine struggle of the rival Balkan

races--Greek, Bulgarian, Servian--to secure the right to the reversion

of territories not yet derelict. But behind these lesser issues loomed

the great secular rivalries of the powers, and beyond these again the

vast unknown forces of the Mahommedan world, ominously stirring. The

very vastness of the perils involved in any attempt at a definitive

settlement compelled the powers to accept a compromise which, it was

hoped, would restore tolerable conditions in the wretched country. But

the "Muerzsteg programme," concerted between the Austrian and Russian

emperors in 1903, and imposed upon the Porte by the diplomatic pressure

of the great powers, did not produce the effects hoped for. The hideous

tale of massacres of helpless villagers by organized Greek bands, and of

equally hideous, if less wholesale, reprisals by Bulgarian bands, grew

rather than diminished, and reached its climax in the early months of

1908. The usefulness of the new _gendarmerie_, under European officers,

which was to have co-operated with the Ottoman authorities in the

restoration of order, was from the outset crippled by the passive

obstruction of the Turkish government. The sultan, indeed, could hardly

be blamed for watching with a certain cynical indifference the mutual

slaughter of those "Christians" whose avowed ideal was the overthrow of

Mahommedan rule, nor could he be expected to desire the smooth working

of a system against which he had protested as a violation of his

sovereign rights. In 1908 the powers were still united in bringing

pressure to bear on the Porte to make the reforms effective; but the

proposal of Great Britain to follow the precedent of the Lebanon and

commit the administration of Macedonia to a Mussulman governor appointed

by the sultan, but removable only by consent of the powers, met with

little favour either at Constantinople or among the powers whose

ulterior aims might have been hampered by such an arrangement.

Young Turkish revolution, 1908.

European results.

European crisis provoked by Austria.

Such was the condition of affairs when in October 1908 the revolution in

Turkey altered the whole situation. The easy and apparently complete

victory of the Young Turks, and the re-establishment without a struggle

of the constitution which had been in abeyance since 1876, took the

whole world by surprise, and not least those who believed themselves to

be most intimately acquainted with the conditions prevailing in the

Ottoman empire. The question of the Near East seemed in fair way of

settlement by the action of conflicting races themselves, who in the

enthusiasm of new-found freedom appeared ready to forget their ancient

internecine feuds and to fraternize on the common ground of

constitutional liberty (see TURKEY: _History_). By the European powers

the proclamation of the constitution was received, at least outwardly,

with unanimous approval, general admiration being expressed for the

singular moderation and self-restraint shown by the Turkish leaders and

people. Whatever views, however, may have been openly expressed, or

secretly held, as to the revolution so far as it affected the Ottoman

empire itself, there could be no doubt that its effects on the general

situation in Europe would be profound. These effects were not slow in

revealing themselves. On the 5th of October Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria

proclaimed himself king (_tsar_) of the Bulgarians; and two days later

the emperor Francis Joseph issued a rescript announcing the annexation

of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Habsburg monarchy (see BULGARIA:

_History_ and BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: _History_). Whatever cogent

reasons there may have been for altering the status of these countries

in view of the changed conditions in Turkey, there could be no doubt

that the method employed was a violation of the public law of Europe. By

the declaration of London of 1871, to which Austria-Hungary herself had

been a principal party, it had been laid down that "contracting powers

could only rid themselves of their treaty engagements by an

understanding with their co-signatories." This solemn reaffirmation of a

principle on which the whole imposing structure of international law

had, during the 19th century, been laboriously built up was now

cynically violated. The other powers, confronted with the _fait

accompli_, protested; but the astute statesman who had staked his

reputation as foreign minister of the Dual Monarchy on the success of

this _coup_ had well gauged the character and force of the opposition he

would have to meet. Baron von Aehrenthal, himself more Slav than German,

in spite of his name, had served a long apprenticeship in diplomacy at

Belgrade and St Petersburg; he knew how fully he could rely upon the

weakness of Russia, and that if Russian Pan-Slav sentiment could be

cowed, he need fear nothing from the resentment of the Servians. He was

strong, too, in the moral and--in case of need--the material support of

Germany. With Germany behind her, Austria-Hungary had little to fear

from the opposition of the powers of the triple _entente_, Great

Britain, France and Russia. This diagnosis of the situation was

justified by the event. For months, indeed, Europe seemed on the verge

of a general war. During the autumn the nationalist excitement in Servia

and Montenegro rose to fever-heat, and Austria responded by mobilizing

her forces on the frontiers and arming the Catholic Bosnians as a

precaution against a rising of their Orthodox countrymen. Only the

winter seemed to stand between Europe and a war bound to become general,

and men looked forward with apprehension to the melting of the snows. It

is too early as yet to write the history of the diplomatic activities by

which this disaster was avoided. Their general outline, however, is

clear enough. The protests of Turkey at a violation of treaty rights,

doubly resented as likely to damage the prestige of the new

constitutional regime, were sympathetically received by the powers of

the triple _entente_. An international conference was at once suggested

as the only proper authority for carrying out any modifications of the

treaty of Berlin necessitated by the new conditions in Turkey; the right

of Austria-Hungary to act on her own initiative was strenuously denied;

Bulgarian independence and Prince Ferdinand's title of king were

meantime refused recognition. In the assertion of these principles Great

Britain, Russia and France were united. Germany, on the other hand,

maintained an attitude of reserve, though diplomatically "correct"; she

accepted the principle of a conference, but made her consent to its

convocation conditional on that of her ally Austria-Hungary. But the

latter refused to agree to any conference in which the questions at

issue should be reopened; the most that she would accept was a

conference summoned merely to register the _fait accompli_ and to

arrange "compensations" not territorial but financial.

The German-Austrian victory.

For a while it seemed as though Baron Aehrenthal's ambition had

o'erleaped itself. The reluctance of the Russian government, conscious

of its military and political weakness, to take extreme measures seemed

likely to be overborne by the Pan-Slav enthusiasm of the Russian people,

and the Austrian statesman's policy to have placed him in an _impasse_

from which it would be difficult to extricate himself, save at an

expense greater than that on which he had calculated. At this point

Germany, conscious throughout of holding the key to the situation,

intervened with effect. Towards the end of March 1909 the German

ambassador at St Petersburg, armed with an autograph letter from the

emperor William II., had an interview with the tsar. What were the

arguments he used is not known; but the most powerful are supposed to

have been the German forces which had been mobilized on the Polish

frontier. In any case, the result was immediate and startling. Russia,

without previous discussion with her allies, dissociated herself from

the views she had hitherto held in common with them, and accepted the

German-Austrian standpoint. All question of a conference was now at an

end; and all that the powers most friendly to Turkey could do was to

persuade her to make the best of a bad bargain. The Ottoman government,

preoccupied with the internal questions which were to issue in the

abortive attempt at counter-revolution in April, was in no condition to

resist friendly or unfriendly pressure. The principle of a money payment

in compensation for the shadowy rights of the sultan over the lost

provinces was accepted,[79] and Bulgarian independence under King

Ferdinand was recognized on the very eve of the new victory of the Young

Turks which led to the deposition of Abd-ul-Hamid II. and the

proclamation of Sultan Mahommed V. (see TURKEY: _History_).

Its moral.

The change made by these events in the territorial system of Europe was

of little moment. A subject principality, long practically independent,

became a sovereign state; the _Almanach de Gotha_ was enriched with a

new royal title; the sentiment of the Bulgarian people was gratified by

the restoration of their historic tsardom. Two provinces long annexed to

the Habsburg monarchy _de facto_ became so _de jure_, and the vision of

a Serb empire with a free outlet to the sea, never very practicable, was

finally dissolved. Of vastly greater importance were the moral and

international issues involved. The whole conception of an effective

concert of Europe, or of the World, based on the supposed sacred

obligation of treaties and the validity of international law, was

revealed, suddenly and brutally, as the baseless fabric of a dream. The

most momentous outcome of the international debates caused by Austria's

high-handed action was the complete triumph of Bismarck's principle that

treaties cease to be valid "when the private interest of those who lie

under them no longer reinforces the text." Henceforth, it was felt, no

reaffirmation of a principle of international comity and law, so

successfully violated, could serve to disguise the brutal truth that in

questions between nations, in the long-run, might is right--that there

is no middle term between the naked submission preached by Tolstoy and

his disciples and Napoleon's _dictum_ that "Providence is with the big

battalions." In Great Britain, especially, public opinion was quick to

grasp this truth. It was realized that it was the immense armed power of

Germany that had made her the arbiter in a question vitally affecting

the interests of all Europe. Germany alone emerged from the crisis with

prestige enormously enhanced; for without her intervention Austria could

not have resisted the pressure of the powers. The cry for disarmament,

encouraged by the action of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's government,

suddenly died down in England; and the agitation in favour of an

increased ship-building programme, that followed the revelation by the

first lord of the admiralty (April 1909) of Germany's accelerated

activity in naval construction, showed that public opinion had been

thoroughly awakened to the necessity of maintaining for Great Britain

her maritime supremacy, on which not only her position in Europe but the

existence of her over-sea empire depended.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.--(1) _Bibliographies_.--Lists of the principal

works on the history of the various European countries, and of their

main sources, are given in the bibliographies attached to the separate

articles (see also those appended to the articles PAPACY; CHURCH

HISTORY; DIPLOMACY; CRUSADES; FEUDALISM, &c.). For the sources of the

medieval history of Europe see Ulysse Chevalier's monumental

_Repertoire des sources historiques du moyen age; Bio-Bibliography_

(Paris, 1877, &c.), which with certain limitations (notably as regards

the Slav, Hungarian and Scandinavian countries) gives references to

published documents for all names of people, however obscure,

occurring in medieval history. In 1894 M. Chevalier began the

publication of a second series of his _Repertoire_, under the somewhat

misleading title of _Topo-Bibliographie_, intended as a compendious

guide to the places, institutions, &c., of the middle ages; though

very useful, this is by no means so complete as the

_Bio-Bibliographie_. August Potthast's _Bibliotheca historica medii

aevi_ (2nd ed., Berlin, 1895-1896) gives a complete catalogue of all

the annals, chronicles and other historical works which appeared in

Europe between the years 375 and 1500 and have since been printed,

with short notes on their value and significance, and references to

critical works upon them. See also the article RECORD. For authorities

on the history of Europe from the end of the 15th to the 19th

centuries inclusive the excellent bibliographies appended to the

volumes of the _Cambridge Modern History_ are invaluable.

(2) _Works_.--Of general works the most important are the _Histoire

generale du IV^me siecle a nos jours_, published under the direction

of E. Lavisse and A. Rambaud (Paris, 1894, &c.), in 12 vols., covering

the period from the 4th to the end of the 19th century: Leopold von

Ranke's _Weltgeschichte_ (Leipzig, 1881, &c.), in 9 vols., covering

(i.) the oldest group of nations and the Greeks; (ii.) the Roman

Republic; (iii.) the ancient Roman Empire; (iv.) the East Roman empire

and the origin of the Romano-German kingdoms; (v.) the Arab

world-power and the empire of Charlemagne; (vi.) dissolution of the

Carolingian and foundation of the German empire; (vii.) zenith and

decay of the German empire; the hierarchy under Gregory VII.; (viii.)

crusades and papal world-power (12th and 13th centuries); (ix.) period

of transition to the modern world (14th and 15th centuries). To this

may be added Ranke's works on special periods: e.g. _Die Fuersten und

Voelker von Sued-Europa im 16ten und 17ten Jahrhundert_ (2nd ed.,

Leipzig, 1837-1839); _Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen

Voelker_, 1494-1514 (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1874, Eng. trans. 1887). In

English the most important general work is the _Cambridge Modern

History_ (1903, &c.), produced by the collaboration of English and

foreign scholars, and covering the ground from the end of the 15th to

the 19th century inclusive. The _Historians' History of the World_,

edited by Dr H. Smith Williams (1908), is a compilation from the works

of eminent historians of all ages, and the value of its various parts

is therefore that of the historians responsible for them. Its chief

merit is that it makes accessible to English readers many foreign or

obscure sources which would otherwise have remained closed to the

general reader. It also contains essays by notable modern scholars on

the principal epochs and tendencies of the world's history, the texts

of a certain number of treaties, &c., not included as yet in other

collections, and comprehensive bibliographies. On a less ambitious

scale are the volumes of the "Periods of European History" series

(London, 1893, &c.): Per. I. _The Dark Ages, 476-918_, by C.W.C. Oman

(1893); Per. II. _The Empire and the Papacy, 918-1273_, by T.F. Tout

(1898); Per. III. _The Close of the Middle Ages, 1273-1494_, by R.

Lodge (1901); _Europe in the 16th Century, 1494-1598_, by A.H. Johnson

(1897); _The Ascendancy of France_, by H.O. Wakeman (1894); _The

Balance of Power_, by A. Hassal (1896); _Revolutionary Europe_, by H.

Morse Stephens (1893); _Modern Europe_, by W. Alison Phillips (1901,

5th ed., 1908). See also T.H. Dyer, _History of Modern Europe from

the fall of Constantinople_, revised and continued to the end of the

19th century by A. Hassal (6 vols., London, 1901). Besides the above

may be mentioned, for European history since the outbreak of the

French Revolution, A. Sorel, _l'Europe et la Revolution Francaise_ (7

vols., Paris, 1885, &c.), a work of first-class importance; A. Stern,

_Geschichte Europas seit den Wiener Vertraegen von 1815_ (Stuttgart and

Berlin, 1894, &c.), based on the study of much new material, still in

progress (1908); C. Seignobos, _Histoire politique de l'Europe

contemporaine_ (Paris, 1897), a valuable text-book with copious

bibliography (Eng. trans., London, 1901); C.M. Andrews, _Historical

development of Europe_, 2 vols. (New York, 1896-1898).

(3) _Published Documents_.--For the vast mass of published sources

reference must be made to the bibliographies mentioned above. It must

be borne in mind, however, that these represent but a fraction of the

unpublished material, and that the great development of original

research is constantly revealing fresh sources, throwing new light on

old problems, and not seldom upsetting conclusions long established as

final. For these latest developments of scholarship the numerous

historical and archaeological reviews published in various countries

should be consulted: e.g. _The English Historical Review_ (London);

_The Scottish Hist. Rev._ (Glasgow); _The American Hist. Rev._ (London

and New York); the _Revue historique_ (Paris); the _Historische

Zeitschrift_ (Munich). The most notable collections of treaties are J.

Dumont's _Corps diplomatique_, covering the period from A.D. 800 to

1731 (Amsterdam and the Hague, 1726-1731); F.G. de Martens and his

continuators, _Recueil des traites_, &c. (1791, &c.), covering with

its supplements the period from 1494 to 1874; F. (T.T.) de Martens,

_Recueil des traites conclus par la Russie_, &c. (14 vols., St

Petersburg, 1874, &c.); A. and J. de Clercq, _Recueil des traites de

la France_ (Paris, 1864; new ed., 1880, &c.); L. Neumann, _Recueil des

traites conclus par l'Autriche_ (from 1763), (6 vols., Leipzig, 1855);

new series, by. L. Neumann and A. de Plason (16 vols., Vienna,

1877-1903); _Oesterreichische Staatsvertraege_ (vol. i. _England_,

1526-1748), published by the Commission for the modern history of

Austria (Innsbruck, 1907), with valuable introductory notes; _British

and Foreign State Papers_ (from the termination of the war in 1814),

compiled at the Foreign Office by the Librarian and Keeper of the

Papers (London, 1819, &c.); Sir E. Hertslet, _The Map of Europe by

Treaty_ (from 1814), (4 vols., London, 1875-1891). See the article

TREATIES. (W. A. P.)