The "February Revolution," 1848.
The attempt to secure the succession to the Spanish throne for his
descendants by pressing on the marriage of the duke of Montpensier with
the infanta Luisa, before that of the young queen Isabella had been
proved to be fruitful in children, was on the part of Louis Philippe
more than a breach of faith with Great Britain (how deeply it was
resented may be learnt from Queen Victoria's letters); it was a breach
of faith with the revolution that had made him king. Since 1840, indeed,
the whole tendency of the king's policy had been to revert to the
traditional standpoint of the Bourbons; internally, "resistance" to the
growing claims of the democracy; externally, dynastic ambition. But in
endeavouring to win the goodwill of the reactionary powers he only
succeeded in losing that of the classes of his own people on which his
authority was based. In 1847 he joined with the three autocratic powers
in supporting the clerical and reactionary _Sonderbund_ in Switzerland,
in defiance of the protests of Great Britain and the attitude of the
majority of Frenchmen. When, in February 1848, the revolution broke out
in Paris, the _bourgeois_ monarchy, utterly discredited, fell without a
struggle (see FRANCE and LOUIS PHILIPPE).
Revolution of 1848 outside France.
The revolution in Paris was not the cause of the political upheaval
which in the year 1848 convulsed Europe from Ireland to the banks of the
Danube; it had indeed been preceded by the triumph of Liberalism in
Switzerland, by successful revolutions in Naples and Palermo, and by the
grant of a constitution in Piedmont; but flaming up as it were in the
revolutionary centre of Europe, it acted as the beacon signal for the
simultaneous outbreak of movements which, though long prepared, might
but for this have been detached and spasmodic. It was this simultaneity
which gave to the revolutions of 1848 their European character and their
formidable force. They were the outcome of various, dissimilar and
sometimes contradictory impulses--political, social, racial. In France
the issue resolved itself into a struggle between the new working-class
ideal of Socialism and the _bourgeois_ ideal of the great Revolution; in
England the Chartist movement presented, in a less degree, the same
character; in Germany, in the Austrian empire, in Italy, on the other
hand, the dominant motives were constitutional and nationalist, and of
these two the latter became in the end the determining factor. The
events of the different revolutions are described elsewhere (see FRANCE;
AUSTRIA; GERMANY; HUNGARY; ITALY). From the point of view of Europe such
unity as they possessed was due to their being, so far as Central Europe
was concerned, directed against the system of "stability" associated
with the name Metternich. In hatred of this system German, Czech,
Magyar, and Italian were united; Kossuth's great speech of the 3rd of
March echoed far beyond the frontiers of Hungary; the fall of Metternich
(March 13) was a victory, not only for the populace of Vienna, but for
all the peoples and races which had worn the Austrian fetters. It was
the signal for revolutions in Hungary (the passing of the "March Laws"),
in Bohemia, in Prussia (March 15), in Milan; on the 23rd of March,
Charles Albert of Sardinia, placing himself at the head of the Italian
national movement, declared war against Austria. Against a movement so
widespread and apparently inspired by a common purpose the governments
were powerless. The collapse of the Austrian administration, of which
the inherent rottenness was now revealed, involved that of those
reactionary powers which had leaned upon it. One by one they accepted
what seemed to be the inevitable; even Pope Pius IX. sent troops to
fight under the banner of St Peter for the Italian cause; while in
Berlin Frederick William IV., wrapped in the gold and black colours of
imperial Germany, posed as the leader of "the glorious German
revolution." When, on the 18th of May, the parliament of United Germany
was opened at Frankfort, it seemed as though pan-German dreams were on
the threshold of realization; while in Italy, early in the same month,
Lombardy, Modena, Parma and Piacenza declared by plebiscites for
incorporation in the north Italian kingdom, Venice following suit on the
4th of June. A profound modification of the European states system
seemed inevitable.
Causes of the failure of the revolutionary movements.
That, in the event, the revolutions of 1848 left the territorial
settlement of Vienna intact, was due in the main to the marvellous
resisting power of the Habsburg monarchy, the strength of which lay in
the traditional loyalty of the army and the traditional policy of
balancing race against race within the empire. The triumph of democracy
in Germany was made possible only by the temporary collapse of the
Habsburg power, a collapse due to the universality and apparent
unanimity of the onslaught upon it. But it was soon clear that the
unanimity was more apparent than real. The victory of the democratic
forces had been too easy, too seemingly overwhelming; the establishment
of the constitutional principle in the main centres of autocracy seemed
to make common action against the powers of reaction of secondary
importance, and free play was allowed to the racial and national
antagonisms that had been present from the first. The battle of German,
as well as of Italian, liberty was being fought out on the plains of
Lombardy; yet the German democrats, whether in Vienna or Frankfort,
hailed the victories of the veteran Radetzky as triumphs of Germanism.
In Bohemia the revolution was wrecked on the rivalry of German and
Czech; and when the Hungarians drew the sword against Austria, the
imperial government was reinforced by the hatred of the southern Slavs
for their Magyar task-masters.
Victory of the conservative forces.
Thus, from the chaos of warring races, the old order began slowly to
reappear. So early as the 15th of June 1848 Prince Windischgraetz had
restored order in Prague and received the thanks of the Frankfort
parliament; on the 25th of July Radetzky's victory at Custozza set free
the imperialist army in Italy; on the 4th of September Jellachich, ban
of Croatia, invaded Hungary in the name of the united empire; on the 1st
of November Windischgraetz entered democratic Vienna. The alliance of the
army and the Slav races had won the victory over German democracy. The
combating of Hungarian nationalism proved a longer and a harder task;
but the Austrian victory of Kapolna (February 26-27, 1849) encouraged
Schwarzenberg to dissolve the rump of the _Reichsrath_ at Kremsier and
proclaim a new constitution for the whole empire, including Hungary. The
Magyar victories that followed issued in the proclamation, on the 14th
of April, of the independence of Hungary. But though the Austrian arms
had not been strong enough to crush the Hungarian revolt, they had
proved at least the vitality of the conservative principle. The emperor
Nicholas I. of Russia had watched in disgusted silence the weak spirit
of concession with which the revolutions had been everywhere met; so
long as the sovereigns seemed to forget their divine mission he had held
rigorously aloof, and had only broken silence to congratulate
Windischgraetz on his capture of Vienna and Schwarzenberg on his
reassertion of vigorous principles. Now, however, that Divine Right was
in arms against the forces of disorder, he was prepared to listen to the
prayer of the emperor Francis Joseph for assistance against the
Hungarian rebels. The engagements of 1833 were remembered; and in the
brotherly spirit of the Holy Alliance, Hungary was subdued by Russian
armies and handed over, without _quid pro quo_, to her legitimate king.
Prussia and Austria. Convention of Olmuetz, 1850.
Goergei's capitulation of Vilagos (August 14, 1849) cleared the ground
for the complete restoration of the system destroyed by the March
revolutions of the year before. The refusal of Frederick William IV. of
Prussia to accept the imperial crown (April 21,1849) had already
advertised the failure of the constitutional and unionist movement in
Germany; and Prussia, her military prestige restored, stood once more
face to face with Austria in rivalry for the hegemony of Germany. In the
diplomatic contest that followed Prussia was worsted, her claims to an
independent supremacy in the north were defeated, and the convention of
Olmuetz (November 29, 1850) restored the _status quo_ of the
Confederation as established in 1815.
Napoleon III. and Europe.
Rise of socialism.
"The Napoleonic Idea."
Within three years of the great upheaval of 1848 the forces of
revolution seemed everywhere to have been subdued, the states system of
Europe to have been re-established on the basis of the treaties of
Vienna. In reality, however, this restoration was only on the surface;
the cracks in the structure of the European system had--to use
Bismarck's phrase applied to another occasion--only been "papered over";
and soon ominous rents revealed the fact that the forces that had
threatened it with sudden ruin were still at work. One fateful breach in
the treaties had, indeed, been accepted as beyond repair; when the dust
of the revolutionary turmoil was at length laid a Bonaparte was once
more firmly seated on the throne of France. The emperor Nicholas,
watching from the calm of Russia, had realized all that the recognition
of this fact would involve; he had proposed to set in motion the
somewhat rusty machinery of the Grand Alliance, but the other autocratic
powers were in no case to support a legitimist crusade, and when
Napoleon in 1852 assumed the title of emperor, all Europe recognized his
right to do so, even Nicholas being fain to content himself with
refusing to treat the _parvenu_ monarch as his "brother," and to admit
his style of "third" Napoleon, which seemed to imply a dynastic claim.
Napoleon, indeed, was accepted by the powers, as he was welcomed by the
French people, as the "saviour of society" from the newly revealed
perils of the social revolution. For new and ominous forces had made
their appearance since the revolution of 1830 had established the middle
classes in power. The industrial development had proceeded in the west
of Europe with astonishing rapidity, with its resulting concentration of
vast populations in factories and factory cities; and this
"proletariat," excluded from any voice in the government, and exposed in
accordance with the prevailing economic theories of doctrinaire
Liberalism to the horrors of unrestricted competition, had begun to
organize itself in a movement, of which the catchword was "the right to
work" and the banner the red flag of the socialist commune. The reign of
Charles X. had been the _reductio ad absurdum_ of the principle of
legitimacy; that of Louis Philippe had discredited for ever government
based solely on the _bourgeoisie_; the socialistic experiments of 1848
in Paris had collapsed amid the anarchy and bloodshed of the June days.
At this opportune moment Louis Napoleon Bonaparte proclaimed to the
French people the "Napoleonic Idea" as conceived by himself. The great
Napoleon had been the incarnation of the Revolution, had "sprung armed
from the Revolution, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter"; he had
ruled because to him the people, by whom the Revolution had been made,
had delegated the duty of representing, protecting and guiding it. Of
this idea Louis Napoleon conceived himself to be the heir; and when by a
double plebiscite the French nation had established him in supreme
power, first as president for life (1851), then as emperor (1852), he
was able to claim that he represented the people in a far more immediate
sense than could be asserted of the chance majority of any
representative assembly.
Economic revolution in Europe.
It was clear that, sooner or later, Napoleon III. would prove a
disturbing force in Europe. His title to rule was that he represented
France; it followed therefore that he must be hostile to "the treaties,"
by which the traditional aspirations of France, e.g. for her "natural
boundaries" of Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees, were restrained. He reigned as
"emperor of the French"; it followed that he represented that principle
of nationality which the treaties ignored. He could not afford--as
Metternich had said of Ferdinand of Naples--"to treat his throne as an
arm-chair"; and any activity he might display would be almost certainly
at the expense of the established order. At the outset, indeed, it was
his policy to pose as its custodian. To conciliate the French clericals
he supported the pope against the Italian Liberals; but otherwise he
proclaimed aloud his devotion to the arts of peace. A period of rapid
material expansion succeeded the unrest of the revolutionary years;
engineers and men of science were quickly producing a change in all the
material conditions of life, greater than could have been effected by
any political revolution; especially the face of Europe was gradually
being covered with a network of railways, which it was hoped would draw
the European nations not only materially but morally closer together.
The first universal exhibition, opened under the auspices of the prince
consort at London in 1851, was intended to advertise and consecrate the
dawn of a new era of international peace and goodwill. The Crystal
Palace at Sydenham, once hailed as the "bright Koh-i-nur of the West,"
remains the dismal monument of a hope so soon to be belied by the hard
logic of events. For no period since 1815 has been so occupied with wars
and the rumours of war as the twenty years that followed the opening of
this great temple of peace.
The Crimean War.
Congress of Paris, 1856.
One question, that of the ultimate destination of the duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein, which threatened the tranquillity of the West,
was temporarily settled by the conference of London in 1852 (see
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION). But about the same time anxious watchers
noticed on the political horizon in the East a cloud, no bigger than a
man's hand, that threatened a serious storm. At first this was no more
than a quarrel between Greek and Latin monks about the custody of
certain holy places and things in Palestine. It soon, however, became
clear that behind these insignificant combatants loomed the figures of
the emperors of Russia and France. The motives that induced Napoleon to
take up the cause of the rights of the Latin church in this matter were
partly political, partly personal. He resented the tsar's attitude
towards himself; he wished to gain the firm support of the clergy for
his throne; he desired to win prestige for himself and his dynasty by
reasserting the traditional influence of France in the Ottoman empire.
The events that led up to the Crimean War, and those of the war itself,
are told elsewhere (see CRIMEAN WAR). Great Britain had been drawn into
the war by her traditional policy of preserving the Ottoman empire as a
barrier against the advance of Russia to the Mediterranean and the
consequent danger to the British empire in India. It is now generally
conceded that, so far as these objects were concerned, the war was a
tragic mistake. The hopes that were built on the capacity of Turkey to
reform itself were disappointed; the restrictions imposed upon Russia
were repudiated at the first opportunity, during the Franco-German War
in 1870; and the results of the Russo-Turkish War of 1876 have shown
that a far more effective barrier against Russia than the weakened
Ottoman empire has been furnished by the young and vigorous national
states of the Balkan Peninsula. None the less, the treaty of Paris
(1856), by which the war was closed, marks an important epoch in the
diplomatic history of Europe; and it is impossible to say that the blood
spilled in the Crimea was wholly wasted. At the time the main success of
the allied powers seemed to be in the thrusting back of Russia from the
Danube by the cession of Bessarabia, the extinction of Russian sea-power
in the Black Sea, the formal repudiation of the tsar's claim to a
special right of interference in Turkey. But the true significance of
the work of the congress of Paris lies in the impetus given by it to the
development of an effective international law. The concert of Europe was
consecrated anew by the solemn admission of the Ottoman empire to an
equality of _status_ with the European powers and the declaration of the
collective obligations of Europe towards it. The congress, moreover,
acted in some sort as the legislative body of Europe; it established the
principle of the free navigation of the Danube and of the right of all
nations to carry their commerce into the Black Sea; by a declaration,
signed by all the powers present, it abolished the practice of granting
letters of marque to privateers in war time. The question was even
discussed of establishing some sanction by which the rules of
international law agreed upon should be enforced upon recalcitrant
states; and, though nothing was settled, a _voeu_ to this effect was
entered upon the protocol. The congress of Paris thus set a precedent
more hopeful than those of the congresses held earlier in the century,
because the issues were not confused by the supposed necessity for
upholding "legitimacy" at all costs; it was a stage in the progress from
the ideals of the Grand Alliance to those of the Hague Conference.
Preponderance of France.
Napoleon and Italy. War of 1859.