THEOLOGY AND EVOLUTION.
Prejudiced opinions on the subject.--"Creation" sometimes denied from
prejudice.---The unknowable.--Mr. Herbert Spencer's objections to
theism; to creation.--Meanings of term "creation."--Confusion from not
distinguishing between "primary" and "derivative" creation.--Mr.
Darwin's objections.--Bearing of Christianity on the theory of
evolution.--Supposed opposition, the result of a
misconception.--Theological authority not opposed to evolution.--St.
Augustin.--St. Thomas Aquinas.--Certain consequences of want of
flexibility of mind.--Reason and imagination.--The first cause and
demonstration.--Parallel between Christianity and natural
theology.--What evolution of species is.--Professor Agassiz.--Innate
powers must be recognized.--Bearing of evolution on religious
belief.--Professor Huxley.--Professor Owen.--Mr. Wallace.--Mr.
Darwin.--_A priori_ conception of Divine action.--Origin of
man.--Absolute creation and dogma.--Mr. Wallace's view.--A supernatural
origin for man's body not necessary.--Two orders of being in man.--Two
modes of origin.--Harmony of the physical, hyperphysical, and
supernatural.--Reconciliation of science and religion as regards
evolution.--Conclusion.
The special "Darwinian Theory" and that of an evolutionary process neither
excessively minute nor fortuitous, having now been considered, it is time
to turn to the important question, whether both or either of these
conceptions may have any bearing, and if any, what, upon Christian belief?
Some readers will consider such an inquiry to be a work of supererogation.
Seeing clearly themselves the absurdity of prevalent popular views, and the
shallowness of popular objections, they may be impatient of any discussion,
on the subject. But it is submitted that there are many minds worthy {244}
of the highest esteem and of every consideration, which have regarded the
subject hitherto almost exclusively from one point of view; that there are
some persons who are opposed to the progress (in their own minds or in that
of their children or dependents) of physical scientific truth--the natural
revelation--through a mistaken estimate of its religious bearings, while
there are others who are zealous in its promotion from a precisely similar
error. For the sake of both these then the Author may perhaps be pardoned
for entering slightly on very elementary matters relating to the question,
whether evolution or Darwinism have any, and if any, what, bearing on
theology?
There are at least two classes of men who will certainly assert that they
have a very important and highly significant bearing upon it.
One of these classes consists of persons zealous for religion indeed, but
who identify orthodoxy with their own private interpretation of Scripture
or with narrow opinions in which they have been brought up--opinions
doubtless widely spread, but at the same time destitute of any distinct and
authoritative sanction on the part of the Christian Church.
The other class is made up of men hostile to religion, and who are glad to
make use of any and every argument which they think may possibly be
available against it.
Some individuals within this latter class may not believe in the existence
of God, but may yet abstain from publicly avowing this absence of belief,
contenting themselves with denials of "creation" and "design," though these
denials are really consequences of their attitude of mind respecting the
most important and fundamental of all beliefs.
Without a distinct belief in a personal God it is impossible to have any
religion worthy of the name, and no one can at the same time accept the
Christian religion and deny the dogma of creation. [Page 245]
"I believe in God," "the Creator of Heaven and Earth," the very first
clauses of the Apostles' Creed, formally commit those who accept them to
the assertion of this belief. If, therefore, any theory of physical science
really conflicts with such an authoritative statement, its importance to
Christians is unquestionable.
As, however, "creation" forms a part of "revelation," and as "revelation"
appeals for its acceptance to "reason" which has to prepare a basis for it
by an intelligent acceptance of theism on _purely rational grounds_, it is
necessary to start with a few words as to the reasonableness of belief in
God, which indeed are less superfluous than some readers may perhaps
imagine; "a few words," because this is not the place where the argument
can be drawn out, but only one or two hints given in reply to certain
modern objections.
No better example perhaps can be taken, as a type of these objections, than
a passage in Mr. Herbert Spencer's First Principles.[246] This author
constantly speaks of the "ultimate cause of things" as "the Unknowable," a
term singularly unfortunate, and as Mr. James Martineau has pointed
out,[247] even self-contradictory: for that entity, the knowledge of {246}
the existence of which presses itself ever more and more upon the
cultivated intellect, cannot be the unknown, still less _the unknowable_,
because we certainly know it, in that we know for certain that it exists.
Nay more, to predicate incognoscibility of it, is even a certain knowledge
of the mode of its existence. Mr. H. Spencer says:[248] "The consciousness
of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena has been
growing ever clearer; and must eventually be freed from its imperfections.
The certainty that on the one hand such a Power exists, while on the other
hand its nature transcends intuition, and is beyond imagination, is the
certainty towards which intelligence has from the first been progressing."
One would think then that the familiar and accepted word "the Inscrutable"
(which is in this passage actually employed, and to which no theologian
would object) would be an indefinitely better term than "the unknowable."
The above extract has, however, such a theistic aspect that some readers
may think the opposition here offered superfluous; it may be well,
therefore, to quote two other sentences. In another place he observes,[249]
"Passing over the consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to
that of conceivability, we see that atheism, pantheism, and theism, when
rigorously analysed, severally prove to be absolutely unthinkable;" and
speaking of "every form of religion," he adds,[250] "The analysis of every
possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient but
that no hypothesis is even thinkable." The unknowable is admitted to be a
power which cannot be regarded as having sympathy with us, but as one to
which no emotion whatever can be ascribed, and we are expressly {247}
forbidden "by _duty_," to affirm personality of God as much as to deny it
of Him. How such a being can be presented as an object on which to exercise
religious emotion it is difficult indeed to understand.[251] Aspiration,
love, devotion to be poured forth upon what we can never know, upon what we
can never affirm to know, or care for, us, our thoughts or actions, or to
possess the attributes of wisdom and goodness! The worship offered in such
a religion must be, as Professor Huxley says,[252] "for the most part of
the silent sort"--silent not only as to the spoken word, but silent as to
the mental conception also. It will be difficult to distinguish the
follower of this religion from the follower of none, and the man who
declines either to assert or to deny the existence of God, is practically
in the position of an atheist. For theism enjoins the cultivation of
sentiments of love and devotion to God, and the practice of their external
expression. Atheism forbids both, while the simply non-theist abstains in
conformity with the prohibition of the atheist and thus practically sides
with him. Moreover, since man cannot imagine that of which he has no
experience in any way whatever, and since he has experience only of _human_
perfections and of the powers and properties of _inferior_ existences; if
he be required to deny human perfections and to abstain from making use of
such conceptions, he is thereby necessarily reduced to others of an
inferior order. Mr. H. Spencer says,[253] "Those who espouse this {248}
alternative position, make the erroneous assumption that the choice is
between personality and something lower than personality; whereas the
choice is rather between personality and something higher. Is it not just
possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence
and will, as these transcend mechanical motion?"
"It is true we are totally unable to conceive any such higher mode of
being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather
the reverse." "May we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to the
'ultimate cause' any attributes whatever, on the ground that such
attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not
elevations but degradations?" The way however to arrive at the object aimed
at (_i.e_. to obtain the best attainable conception of the First Cause) is
not to refrain from _the only conceptions possible to us_, but to seek the
very highest of these, and then declare their utter inadequacy; and this is
precisely the course which has been pursued by theologians. It is to be
regretted that before writing on this matter Mr. Spencer did not more
thoroughly acquaint himself with the ordinary doctrine on the subject. It
is always taught in the Church schools of divinity, that nothing, not even
_existence_, is to be predicated _univocally_ of "God" and "creatures;"
that after exhausting ingenuity to arrive at the loftiest possible
conceptions, we must declare them to be _utterly inadequate_; that, after
all, they are but accommodations to human infirmity; that they are in a
sense objectively false (because of their inadequacy), though subjectively
and very practically true. But the difference between this mode of
treatment and that adopted by Mr. Spencer is wide indeed; for the practical
result of the mode inculcated by the Church is that each one may freely
affirm and act upon the highest human conceptions he can attain of the{249}
power, wisdom, and goodness of God, His watchful care, His loving
providence for every man, at every moment and in every need; for the
Christian knows that the falseness of his conceptions lies only in their
_inadequacy_; he may therefore strengthen and refresh himself, may rejoice
and revel in conceptions of the goodness of God, drawn from the tenderest
human images of fatherly care and love, or he may chasten and abase himself
by consideration of the awful holiness and unapproachable majesty of the
Divinity derived from analogous sources, knowing that no thought of man can
ever be _true enough_, can ever attain the incomprehensible reality, which
nevertheless really _is_ all that can be conceived, _plus_ an inconceivable
infinity beyond.
A good illustration of what is here meant, and of the difference between
the theistic position and Mr. Spencer's, may be supplied by an example he
has himself proposed. Thus,[254] he imagines an intelligent watch
speculating as to its maker, and conceiving of him in terms of watch-being,
and figuring him as furnished with springs, escapements, cogged wheels,
&c., his motions facilitated by oil--in a word, like himself. It is assumed
by Mr. Spencer that this necessary watch conception would be completely
false, and the illustration is made use of to show "the presumption of
theologians"--the absurdity and unreasonableness of those men who figure
the incomprehensible cause of all phenomena as a Being in some way
comparable with man. Now, putting aside for the moment all other
considerations, and accepting the illustration, surely the example
demonstrates rather the unreasonableness of the _objector himself_! It is
true, indeed, that a man is an organism indefinitely more complex and
perfect than any watch; but if the watch could only conceive of its maker
in watch terms, or else in terms altogether inferior, the watch would
plainly be right in speaking of its maker as a, to it, inconceivably {250}
perfect kind of watch, acknowledging at the same time, that this, its
conception of him, was _utterly inadequate_, although the best its inferior
nature allowed it to form. For if, instead of so conceiving of its maker,
it refused to make use of these relative perfections as a makeshift, and so
necessarily thought of him as amorphous metal, or mere oil, or by the help
of any other inferior conception which a watch might be imagined capable of
entertaining, that watch would he wrong indeed. For man can much more
properly be compared with, and has much more affinity to, a perfect watch
in full activity than to a mere piece of metal, or drop of oil. But the
watch is even more in the right still, for its maker, man, virtually _has_
the cogged wheels, springs, escapements, oil, &c., which the watch's
conception has been supposed to attribute to him; inasmuch as all these
parts must have existed as distinct ideas in the human watchmaker's mind
before he could actually construct the clock formed by him. Nor is even
this all, for, by the hypothesis, the watch _thinks_. It must, therefore,
think of its maker as "a thinking being," and in this it is _absolutely and
completely right_.[255] Either, therefore, the hypothesis is _absurd_ or it
actually _demonstrates the very position it was chosen to refute_.
Unquestionably, then, on the mere ground taken by Mr. Herbert Spencer
himself, if we are compelled to think of the First Cause either in human
terms (but with human imperfections abstracted and human perfections
carried to the highest conceivable degree), or, on the other hand, in terms
decidedly inferior, such as those are driven to who think of Him, but
decline to accept as a help the term "personality;" there can be no
question but that the first conception is immeasurably nearer the truth
than the second. Yet the latter is the one put forward and advocated by
that author in spite of its unreasonableness, and in spite also of its{251}
conflicting with the whole moral nature of man and all his noblest
aspirations.
Again, Mr. Herbert Spencer objects to the conception of God as "first
cause," on the ground that "when our symbolic conceptions are such that no
cumulative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that
there are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made whose
fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and illusive,
and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions."[256]
Now, it is quite true that "symbolic conceptions," which are not to be
justified either (1) by presentations of sense, or (2) by intuitions, are
invalid as representations of real truth. Yet the conception of God
referred to _is_ justified by our primary intuitions, and we can assure
ourselves that it _does_ stand for an actuality by comparing it with (1)
our intuitions of free-will and causation, and (2) our intuitions of
morality and responsibility. That we _have_ these intuitions is a point on
which the Author joins issue with Mr. Spencer, and confidently affirms that
they cannot logically be denied without at the same time complete and
absolute scepticism resulting from such denial--scepticism wherein vanishes
any certainty as to the existence both of Mr. Spencer and his critic, and
by which it is equally impossible to have a thought free from doubt, or to
go so far as to affirm the existence of that very doubt or of the doubter
who doubts it.
It may not be amiss here to protest against the intolerable assumption of a
certain school, who are continually talking in lofty terms of "science,"
but who actually speak of primary religious conceptions as "unscientific,"
and habitually employ the word "science," when they should limit it by the
prefix "physical." This is the more amazing as not a few of this school
adopt the idealist philosophy, and affirm that "matter and force" are but
names for certain "modes of consciousness." It might be expected of them at
least to admit that opinions which repose on primary and fundamental {252}
intuitions, are especially and _par excellence_ scientific.
Such are some of the objections to the Christian conception of God. We may
now turn to those which are directed against God as the Creator, _i.e._ as
the absolute originator of the universe, without the employment of any
pre-existing means or material. This is again considered by Mr. Spencer as
a thoroughly illegitimate symbolic conception, as much so as the atheistic
one--the difficulty as to a _self-existent Creator_ being in his opinion
equal to that of a _self-existent universe_. To this it may be replied that
both are of course equally _unimaginable_, but that it is not a question of
facility of conception--not which is easiest to conceive, but which best
accounts for, and accords with, psychological facts; namely, with the
above-mentioned intuitions. It is contended that _we have_ these primary
intuitions, and that with these the conception of a self-existent Creator
is perfectly harmonious. On the other hand, the notion of a self-existent
universe--that there is no real distinction between the finite and the
infinite--that the universe and ourselves are one and the same things with
the infinite and the self-existent; these assertions, in _addition to_
being unimaginable, _contradict_ our primary intuitions.
Mr. Darwin's objections to "Creation" are of quite a different kind, and,
before entering upon them, it will be well to endeavour clearly to
understand what we mean by "Creation," in the various senses in which the
term may be used.
In the strictest and highest sense "Creation" is the absolute origination
of anything by God without pre-existing means or material, and is a
_supernatural_ act.[257]
In the secondary and lower sense, "Creation" is the formation of anything
by God _derivatively_; that is, that the preceding matter has been created
with the potentiality to evolve from it, under suitable conditions, {253}
all the various forms it subsequently assumes. And this power having been
conferred by God in the first instance, and those laws and powers having
been instituted by Him, through the action of which the suitable conditions
are supplied, He is said in this lower sense to create such various
subsequent forms. This is the _natural_ action of God in the physical
world, as distinguished from His direct, or, as it may be here called,
supernatural action.
In yet a third sense, the word "Creation" may be more or less improperly
applied to the construction of any complex formation or state by a
voluntary self-conscious being who makes use of the powers and laws which
God has imposed, as when a man is spoken of as the creator of a museum, or
of "his own fortune," &c. Such action of a created conscious intelligence
is purely natural, but more than physical, and may be conveniently spoken
of as hyperphysical.
We have thus (1) direct or supernatural action; (2) physical action; and
(3) hyperphysical action---the two latter both belonging to the order of
nature.[258] Neither the physical nor the hyperphysical actions, however,
exclude the idea of the Divine concurrence, and with every consistent
theist that idea is necessarily included. Dr. Asa Gray has given expression
to this.[259] He says, "Agreeing that plants and animals were produced by
Omnipotent fiat, does not exclude the idea of natural order and what we
call secondary causes. The record of the fiat--'Let the earth bring forth
grass, the herb yielding seed,' &c., 'let the earth bring forth the living
creature after his kind'--seems even to imply them," and leads to the
conclusion that the various kinds were produced through natural agencies.
{254}
Now, much confusion has arisen from not keeping clearly in view this
distinction between _absolute_ creation and _derivative_ creation. With the
first, physical science has plainly nothing whatever to do, and is impotent
to prove or to refute it. The second is also safe from any attack on the
part of physical science, for it is primarily derived from psychical not
physical phenomena. The greater part of the apparent force possessed by
objectors to creation, like Mr. Darwin, lies in their treating the
assertion of derivative creation as if it was an assertion of absolute
creation, or at least of supernatural action. Thus, he asks whether some of
his opponents believe "that at innumerable periods in the earth's history,
certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living
tissues."[260] Certain of Mr. Darwin's objections, however, are not
physical, but _metaphysical_, and really attack the dogma of secondary or
derivative creation, though to some perhaps they may appear to be directed
against absolute creation only.
Thus he uses, as an illustration, the conception of a man who builds an
edifice from fragments of rock at the base of a precipice, by selecting for
the construction of the various parts of the building the pieces which are
the most suitable owing to the shape they happen to have broken into.
Afterwards, alluding to this illustration, he says,[261] "The shape of the
fragments of stone at the base of our precipice may be called accidental,
but this is not strictly correct, for the shape of each depends on a long
sequence of events, all obeying natural laws, on the nature of the rock, on
the lines of stratification or cleavage, on the form of the mountain which
depends on its upheaval and subsequent denudation, and lastly, on the storm
and earthquake which threw down the fragments. But in regard to the use to
which the fragments may be put, their shape may strictly be said to be{255}
accidental. And here we are led to face a great difficulty, in alluding to
which I am aware that I am travelling beyond my proper province."
"An omniscient Creator must have foreseen every consequence which results
from the laws imposed by Him; but can it be reasonably maintained that the
Creator intentionally ordered, if we use the words in any ordinary sense,
that certain fragments of rock should assume certain shapes, so that the
builder might erect his edifice? If the various laws which have determined
the shape of each fragment were not predetermined for the builder's sake,
can it with any greater probability be maintained that He specially
ordained, for the sake of the breeder, each of the innumerable variations
in our domestic animals and plants--many of these variations being of no
service to man, and not beneficial, far more often injurious, to the
creatures themselves? Did He ordain that the crop and tail-feathers of the
pigeon should vary, in order that the fancier might make his grotesque
pouter and fantail breeds? Did He cause the frame and mental qualities of
the dog to vary, in order that a breed might be formed of indomitable
ferocity, with jaws fitted to pin down the bull for man's brutal sport?
But, if we give up the principle in one case---if we do not admit that the
variations of the primeval dog were intentionally guided, in order that the
greyhound, for instance, that perfect image of symmetry and vigour, might
be formed,--no shadow of reason can be assigned for the belief that the
variations, alike in nature, and the result of the same general laws, which
have been the groundwork through Natural Selection of the formation of the
most perfectly adapted animals in the world, man included, were
intentionally and specially guided. However much we may wish it, we can
hardly follow Professor Asa Gray in his belief that 'variation has been led
along certain beneficial lines,' like a stream 'along definite and useful
lines of irrigation.'"
"If we assume that each particular variation was from the beginning of{256}
all time pre-ordained, the plasticity of the organization, which leads to
many injurious deviations of structure, as well as that redundant power of
reproduction which inevitably leads to a struggle for existence, and, as a
consequence, to the Natural Selection and survival of the fittest, must
appear to us superfluous laws of nature. On the other hand, an omnipotent
and omniscient Creator ordains everything and foresees everything. Thus we
are brought face to face with a difficulty as insoluble as is that of
freewill and predestination."
Before proceeding to reply to this remarkable passage, it may be well to
remind some readers that belief in the existence of God, in His primary
creation of the universe, and in His derivative creation of all kinds of
being, inorganic and organic, do not repose upon physical phenomena, but,
as has been said, on primary intuitions. To deny or ridicule any of these
beliefs on physical grounds is to commit the fallacy of _ignoratio
elenchi_. It is to commit an absurdity analogous to that of saying a blind
child could not recognize his father because he could not _see_ him,
forgetting that he could _hear_ and _feel_ him. Yet there are some who
appear to find it unreasonable and absurd that men should regard phenomena
in a light not furnished by or deducible from the very phenomena
themselves, although the men so regarding them avow that the light in which
they do view them comes from quite another source. It is as if a man, A,
coming into B's room and finding there a butterfly, should insist that B
had no right to believe that the butterfly had not flown in at the open
window, inasmuch as there was nothing about the room or insect to lead to
any other belief; while B can well sustain his right so to believe, he
having met C, who told him he brought in the chrysalis and, having seen the
insect emerge, took away the skin.
By a similarly narrow and incomplete view the assertion that human
conceptions, such as "the vertebrate idea," &c., are ideas in the mind of
God, is sometimes ridiculed; as if the assertors either on the one {257}
hand pretended to some prodigious acuteness of mind--a far-reaching genius
not possessed by most naturalists--or, on the other hand, as if they
detected in the very phenomena furnishing such special conception evidences
of Divine imaginings. But let the idea of God, according to the highest
conceptions of Christianity, be once accepted, and then it becomes simply a
truism to say that the mind of the Deity contains all that is _good_ and
_positive_ in the mind of man, _plus_, of course, an absolutely
inconceivable infinity beyond. That thus such human conceptions may, nay
must, be asserted to be at the same time ideas in the Divine mind also, as
every real and separate individual that has been, is, or shall be, is
present to the same mind. Nay, more, that such human conceptions are but
faint and obscure adumbrations of corresponding ideas which exist in the
mind of God in perfection and fulness.[262]
The theist, having arrived at his theistic convictions from quite other
sources than a consideration of zoological or botanical phenomena, {258}
returns to the consideration of such phenomena and views them in a theistic
light without of course asserting or implying that such light has been
derived _from them_, or that there is an obligation of reason so to view
them on the part of others who refuse to enter upon or to accept those
other sources whence have been derived the theistic convictions of the
theist.
But Mr. Darwin is not guilty of arguing against metaphysical ideas on
physical grounds only, for he employs very distinctly metaphysical ones;
namely, his conceptions of the nature and attributes of the First Cause.
But what conceptions does he offer us? Nothing but that low
anthropomorphism which, unfortunately, he so often seems to treat as the
necessary result of Theism. It is again the dummy, helpless and deformed,
set up merely for the purpose of being knocked down.
It must once more be insisted on, that though man is indeed compelled to
conceive of God in human terms, and to speak of Him by epithets objectively
false, from their hopeless inadequacy, yet nevertheless the Christian
thinker declares that inadequacy in the strongest manner, and vehemently
rejects from his idea of God all terms distinctly implying infirmity or
limitation.
Now, Mr. Darwin speaks as if all who believe in the Almighty were compelled
to accept as really applicable to the Deity conceptions which affirm limits
and imperfections. Thus he says: "Can it be reasonably maintained that the
Creator intentionally ordered" "that certain fragments of rock should
assume certain shapes, so that the builder might erect his edifice?"
Why, surely every theist must maintain that in the first foundation of the
universe--the primary and absolute creation--God saw and knew every purpose
which every atom and particle of matter should ever subserve in all suns
and systems, and throughout all coming æons of time. It is almost
incredible, but nevertheless it seems necessary to think that the
difficulty thus proposed rests on a sort of notion that amidst the
boundless profusion of nature there is too much for God to superintend;
that the number of objects is too great for an infinite and {259}
_omnipresent_ being to attend singly to each and all in their due
proportions and needs! In the same way Mr. Darwin asks whether God can have
ordered the race variations referred to in the passage last quoted, for the
considerations therein mentioned. To this it may be at once replied that
even man often has _several_ distinct intentions and motives for a _single_
action, and the theist has no difficulty in supposing that, out of an
infinite number of motives, the motive mentioned in each case may have been
an exceedingly subordinate one. The theist, though properly attributing to
God what, for want of a better term, he calls "purpose" and "design," yet
affirms that the limitations of human purposes and motives are by no means
applicable to the Divine "purposes." Out of many, say a thousand million,
reasons for the institution of the laws of the physical universe, some few
are to a certain extent conceivable by us; and amongst these the benefits,
material and moral, accruing from them to men, and to each individual man
in every circumstance of his life, play a certain, perhaps a very
subordinate, part.[263] As Baden Powell observes, "How can we {260}
undertake to affirm, amid all the possibilities of things of which we
confessedly know so little, that a thousand ends and purposes may not be
answered, because we can trace none, or even imagine none, which seem to
our short-sighted faculties to be answered in these particular
arrangements?"[264]
The objection to the bull-dog's ferocity in connexion with "man's brutal
sport" opens up the familiar but vast question of the existence of evil, a
problem the discussion of which would be out of place here. Considering,
however, the very great stress which is laid in the present day on the
subject of animal suffering by so many amiable and excellent people, one or
two remarks on that matter may not be superfluous. To those who accept the
belief in God, the soul and moral responsibility; and recognize the full
results of that acceptance--to such, physical suffering and moral evil are
simply incommensurable. To them the placing of non-moral beings in the same
scale with moral agents will be utterly unendurable. But even considering
physical pain only, all must admit that this depends greatly on the mental
condition of the sufferer. Only during consciousness does it exist, and
only in the most highly-organized men does it reach its acme. The Author
has been assured that lower races of men appear less keenly sensitive to
physical pain than do more cultivated and refined human beings. Thus only
in man can there really be any intense degree of suffering, because only in
him is there that intellectual recollection of past moments and that
anticipation of future ones, which constitute in great part the bitterness
of suffering.[265] The momentary pang, the present pain, which beasts
endure, though real enough, is yet, doubtless, not to be compared as {261}
to its intensity with the suffering which is produced in man through his
high prerogative of self-consciousness.[266]
As to the "beneficial lines" (of Dr. Asa Gray, before referred to), some of
the facts noticed in the preceding chapters seem to point very decidedly in
that direction, but all must admit that the actual existing outcome is far
more "beneficial" than the reverse. The natural universe has resulted in
the development of an unmistakable harmony and beauty, and in a decided
preponderance of good and of happiness over their opposites.
Even if "laws of nature" did appear, on the theistic hypothesis, to be
"superfluous" (which it is by no means intended here to admit), it would be
nothing less than puerile to prefer rejecting the hypothesis to conceiving
that the appearance of superfluity was probably due to human ignorance; and
this especially might be expected from naturalists to whom the
interdependence of nature and the harmony and utility of obscure phenomena
are becoming continually more clear, as, _e.g._, the structure of orchids
to their illustrious expositor.
Having now cleared the ground somewhat, we may turn to the question what
bearing Christian dogma has upon evolution, and whether Christians, as
such, need take up any definite attitude concerning it.
As has been said, it is plain that physical science and "evolution" _can_
have nothing whatever to do with absolute or primary creation. The Rev.
Baden Powell well expresses this, saying: "Science demonstrates incessant
past changes, and dimly points to yet earlier links in a more vast series
of development of material existence; but the idea of a _beginning_, or of
_creation_, in the sense of the original operation of the Divine volition
to constitute nature and matter, is beyond the province of physical {262}
philosophy."[267]
With secondary or derivative creation, physical science is also incapable
of conflict; for the objections drawn by some writers seemingly from
physical science, are, as has been already argued, rather metaphysical than
physical.
Derivative creation is not a supernatural act, but is simply the Divine
action by and through natural laws. To recognize such action in such laws
is a religious mode of regarding phenomena, which a consistent theist must
necessarily accept, and which an atheistic believer must similarly reject.
But this conception, if deemed superfluous by any naturalist, can never be
shown to be _false_ by any investigations concerning natural laws, the
constant action of which it presupposes.
The conflict has arisen through a misunderstanding. Some have supposed that
by "creation" was necessarily meant either primary, that is, absolute
creation, or, at least, some supernatural action; they have therefore
opposed the dogma of "creation" in the imagined interest of physical
science.
Others have supposed that by "evolution" was necessarily meant a denial of
Divine action, a negation of the providence of God. They have therefore
combated the theory of "evolution" in the imagined interest of religion.
It appears plain then that Christian thinkers are perfectly free to accept
the general evolution theory. But are there any theological authorities to
justify this view of the matter?
Now, considering how extremely recent are these biological speculations, it
might hardly be expected _a priori_ that writers of earlier ages should
have given expression to doctrines harmonizing in any degree with such very
modern views,[268] nevertheless such most certainly is the case, and {263}
it would be easy to give numerous examples. It will be better, however,
only to cite one or two authorities of weight. Now, perhaps no writer {264}
of the earlier Christian ages could be quoted whose authority is more
generally recognized than that of St. Augustin. The same may be said of the
mediæval period, for St. Thomas Aquinas; and, since the movement of Luther,
Suarez may be taken as a writer widely venerated as an authority and one
whose orthodoxy has never been questioned.
It must be borne in mind that for a considerable time after even the last
of these writers no one had disputed the generally received view as to the
small age of the world or at least of the kinds of animals and plants
inhabiting it. It becomes therefore much more striking if views formed
under such a condition of opinion are found to harmonize with modern ideas
regarding "Creation" and organic life.
Now St. Augustin insists in a very remarkable manner on the merely
derivative sense in which God's creation of organic forms is to be
understood; that is, that God created them by conferring on the material
world the power to evolve them under suitable conditions. He says in his
book on Genesis:[269] "Terrestria animalia, tanquam ex ultimo elemento
mundi ultima; nihilominus _potentialiter_, quorum numeros tempus postea
visibiliter explicaret."
Again he says:--
"Sicut autem in ipso grano invisibiliter erant omnia simul, quæ per tempora
in arborem surgerent; ita ipse mundus cogitandus est, cum Deus _simul omnia
creavit_, habuisse simul omnia quæ in illo et cum illo facta sunt quando
factus est dies; non solum coelum cum sole et lunâ et sideribus ... ; sed
etiam illa quæ aqua et terra produxit potentialiter atque causaliter,
priusquam per temporum moras ita exorirentur, quomodo nobis jam nota sunt
in eis operibus, quæ Deus usque nunc operatur."[270]
"Omnium quippe rerum quæ corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, {265}
occulta quædam semina in istis corporeis mundi hujus elementis
latent."[271]
And again: "Ista quippe originaliter ac primordialiter in quadam textura
elementorum cuncta jam creata sunt; sed acceptis opportunitatibus
prodeunt."[272]
St. Thomas Aquinas, as was said in the first chapter, quotes with approval
the saying of St. Augustin that in the first institution of nature we do
not look for _Miracles_, but for the _laws of Nature_: "In prima
institutione naturæ non quæritur miraculum, sed quid natura rerum habeat,
ut Augustinus dicit."[273]
Again, he quotes with approval St. Augustin's assertion that the kinds were
created only derivatively, "_potentialiter tantum_."[274]
Also he says, "In prima autem rerum institutione fuit principium activum
verbum Dei, quod de materia elementari produxit animalia, vel in actu vel
_virtute_, secundum Aug. lib. 5 de Gen. ad lit. c. 5."[275]
Speaking of "kinds" (in scholastic phraseology "substantial forms") latent
in matter, he says: "Quas quidam posuerunt non incipere per actionem naturæ
sed prius in materia exstitisse, ponentes latitationem formarum. Et hoc
accidit eis ex ignorantia materiæ, quia nesciebant distinguere inter
potentiam et actum. Quia enim formæ præexistunt eas simpliciter
præexistere."[276]
Also Cornelius à Lapide[277] contends that at least certain animals were
not absolutely, but only derivatively created, saying of them, "Non fuerunt
creata formaliter, sed potentialiter."
As to Suarez, it will be enough to refer to Disp. xv., 2, n. 9, p. 508, t.
i. Edition _Vives_, Paris; also Nos. 13--15, and many other references{266}
to the same effect could easily be given, but these may suffice.
It is then evident that ancient and most venerable theological authorities
distinctly assert _derivative_ creation, and thus harmonize with all that
modern science can possibly require.
It may indeed truly be said with Roger Bacon, "The saints never condemned
many an opinion which the moderns think ought to be condemned."[278]
The various extracts given show clearly how far "evolution" is from any
necessary opposition to the most orthodox theology. The same may be said of
spontaneous generation. The most recent form of it, lately advocated by Dr.
H. Charlton Bastian,[279] teaches that matter exists in two different
forms, the crystalline (or statical) and the colloidal (or dynamical)
conditions. It also teaches that colloidal matter, when exposed to certain
conditions, presents the phenomena of life, and that it can be formed from
crystalline matter, and thus that the _prima materia_ of which these are
diverse forms contains potentially all the multitudinous kinds of animal
and vegetable existence. This theory moreover harmonizes well with the
views here advocated, for just as crystalline matter builds itself, under
suitable conditions, along _certain definite lines_, so analogously
colloidal matter has _its definite lines and directions_ of development. It
is not collected in haphazard, accidental aggregations, but evolves
according to its proper laws and special properties.
The perfect orthodoxy of these views is unquestionable. Nothing is plainer
from the venerable writers quoted, as well as from a mass of other {267}
authorities, than that "the supernatural" is not to be looked for or
expected in the sphere of mere nature. For this statement there is a
general _consensus_ of theological authority.
The teaching which the Author has received is, that God is indeed
inscrutable and incomprehensible to us from the infinity of His attributes,
so that our minds can, as it were, only take in, in a most fragmentary and
indistinct manner (as through a glass darkly), dim conceptions of
infinitesimal portions of His inconceivable perfection. In this way the
partial glimpses obtained by us in different modes differ from each other;
not that God is anything but the most perfect unity, but that apparently
conflicting views arise from our inability to apprehend Him, except in this
imperfect manner, _i.e._ by successive slight approximations along
different lines of approach. Sir William Hamilton has said,[280] "Nature
conceals God, and man reveals Him." It is not, according to the teaching
spoken of, exactly thus; but rather that physical nature reveals to us one
side, one aspect of the Deity, while the moral and religious worlds bring
us in contact with another, and at first, to our apprehension, a very
different one. The difference and discrepancy, however, which is at first
felt, is soon seen to proceed not from the reason but from a want of
flexibility in the imagination. This want is far from surprising. Not only
may a man naturally be expected to be an adept in his own art, but at the
same time to show an incapacity for a very different mode of activity.[281]
We rarely find an artist who takes much interest in jurisprudence, or {268}
a prizefighter who is an acute metaphysician. Nay, more than this, a
positive distaste may grow up, which, in the intellectual order, may amount
to a spontaneous and unreasoning disbelief in that which appears to be in
opposition to the more familiar concept, and this at all times. It is often
and truly said, "that past ages were pre-eminently credulous as compared
with our own, yet the difference is not so much in the amount of the
credulity, as in the direction which it takes."[282]
Dr. Newman observes: "Any one study, of whatever kind, exclusively pursued,
deadens in the mind the interest, nay the perception of any other. Thus
Cicero says, that Plato and Demosthenes, Aristotle and Isocrates, might
have respectively excelled in each other's province, but that each was
absorbed in his own. Specimens of this peculiarity occur every day. You can
hardly persuade some men to talk about anything but their own pursuit; they
refer the whole world to their own centre, and measure all matters by their
own rule, like the fisherman in the drama, whose eulogy on his deceased
lord was 'he was so fond of fish.'"[283]
The same author further says:[284] "When anything, which comes before us,
is very unlike what we commonly experience, we consider it on that account
untrue; not because it really shocks our reason as improbable, but because
it startles our imagination as strange. Now, revelation presents to us a
perfectly different aspect of the universe from that presented by the
sciences. The two informations are like the distinct subjects represented
by the lines of the same drawing, which, accordingly as they are read {269}
on their concave or convex side, exhibit to us now a group of trees with
branches and leaves, and now human faces." ... "While then reason and
revelation are consistent in fact, they often are inconsistent in
appearance; and this seeming discordance acts most keenly on the
imagination, and may suddenly expose a man to the temptation, and even
hurry him on to the commission of definite acts of unbelief, in which
reason itself really does not come into exercise at all."[285]
Thus we find in fact just that distinctness between the ideas derived from
physical science on the one hand and from religion on the other, which we
might _a priori_ expect if there exists that distinctness between the
natural and the miraculous which theological authorities lay down.
Assuming, for argument's sake, the truth of Christianity, it evidently has
not been the intention of its Author to make the evidence for it so plain
that its rejection would be the mark of intellectual incapacity. Conviction
is not forced upon men in the way that the knowledge that the government of
England is constitutional, or that Paris is the capital of France, is
forced upon all who choose to inquire into those subjects. The Christian
system is one which puts on the strain, as it were, _every_ faculty of
man's nature, and the intellect is not (any more than we should _a priori_
expect it to be) exempted from taking part in the probationary trial. A
moral element enters into the acceptance of that system.
And so with natural religion--with those ideas of the supernatural, viz.
God, Creation, and Morality, which are anterior to revelation and repose
upon reason. Here again it evidently has not been the intention of the
Creator to make the evidence of His existence so plain that its
non-recognition would be the mark of intellectual incapacity. {270}
Conviction, as to theism, is not forced upon men as is the conviction of
the existence of the sun at noon-day.[286] A moral element enters also
here, and the analogy there is in this respect between Christianity and
theism speaks eloquently of their primary derivation from one common
author.
Thus we might expect that it would be a vain task to seek anywhere in
nature for evidence of Divine action, such that no one could sanely deny
it. God will not allow Himself to be caught at the bottom of any man's
crucible, or yield Himself to the experiments of gross-minded and
irreverent inquirers. The natural, like the supernatural, revelation
appeals to _the whole_ of man's mental nature and not to the _reason
alone_.[287]
None, therefore, need feel disappointed that evidence of the direct action
of the first cause in merely natural phenomena ever eludes our grasp; for
assuredly those same phenomena will ever remain fundamentally inexplicable
by physical science alone.
There being then nothing in either authority or reason which makes
"evolution" repugnant to Christianity, is there anything in the Christian
doctrine of "Creation" which is repugnant to the theory of "evolution"?
Enough has been said as to the distinction between absolute and derivative
"creation." It remains to consider the successive "evolution" (Darwinian
and other) of "specific forms," in a theological light.
As to what "evolution" is, we cannot of course hope to explain it
completely, but it may be enough to define it as the manifestation to the
intellect, by means of sensible impressions, of some ideal entity (power,
principle, nature, or activity) which before that manifestation was in{271}
a latent, unrealized, and merely "potential" state--a state that is capable
of becoming realized, actual, or manifest, the requisite conditions being
supplied.
"Specific forms," kinds or species, are (as was said in the introductory
chapter) "peculiar congeries of characters or attributes, innate powers and
qualities, and a certain nature realized in individuals."
Thus, then, the "evolution of specific forms" means the actual
manifestation of special powers, or natures, which before were latent, in
such a successive manner that there is in some way a genetic relation
between posterior manifestations and those which preceded them.
On the special Darwinian hypothesis the manifestation of these forms is
determined simply by the survival of the fittest of many indefinite
variations.
On the hypothesis here advocated the manifestation is controlled and helped
by such survival, but depends on some unknown internal law or laws which
determine variation at special times and in special directions.
Professor Agassiz objects to the evolution theory, on the ground that
"species, genera, families, &c., exist as thoughts, individuals as
facts,"[288] and he offers the dilemma, "If species do not exist at all, as
the supporters of the transmutation theory maintain, how can they vary? and
if individuals alone exist, how can the differences which may be observed
among them prove the variability of species?"
But the supporter of "evolution" need only maintain that the several
"kinds" become manifested gradually by slight differences among the various
individual embodiments of one specific idea. He might reply to the dilemma
by saying, species do not exist _as species_ in the sense in which they are
said to vary (variation applying only to the concrete embodiments of {272}
the specific idea), and the evolution of species is demonstrated not by
individuals _as individuals_, but as embodiments of different specific
ideas.
Some persons seem to object to the term "creation" being applied to
evolution, because evolution is an "exceedingly slow and gradual process."
Now even if it were demonstrated that such is really the case, it may be
asked, what is "slow and gradual"? The terms are simply relative, and the
evolution of a specific form in ten thousand years would be instantaneous
to a being whose days were as hundreds of millions of years.
There are others again who are inclined absolutely to deny the existence of
species altogether, on the ground that their evolution is so gradual that
if we could see all the stages it would be impossible to say _when_ the
manifestation of the old specific form ceased and that of the new one
began. But surely it is no approach to a reason against the existence of a
thing that we cannot determine the exact moment of its first manifestation.
When watching "dissolving views," who can tell, whilst closely observing
the gradual changes, exactly at what moment a new picture, say St. Mark's,
Venice, can be said to have commenced its manifestation, or have begun to
dominate a preceding representation of "Dotheboys' Hall"? That, however, is
no reason for denying the complete difference between the two pictures and
the ideas they respectively embody.
The notion of a special nature, a peculiar innate power and activity--what
the scholastics called a "substantial form"--will be distasteful to many.
The objection to the notion seems, however, to be a futile one, for it is
absolutely impossible to altogether avoid such a conception and such an
assumption. If we refuse it to the individuals which embody the species, we
must admit it as regards their component parts--nay, even if we accept the
hypothesis of pangenesis, we are nevertheless compelled to attribute to
each gemmule that peculiar power of reproducing its own nature (its own
"substantial form"), with its special activity, and that remarkable {273}
power of annexing itself to certain other well-defined gemmules whose
nature it is also to plant themselves in a certain definite vicinity. So
that in each individual, instead of one such peculiar power and activity
dominating and controlling all the parts, you have an infinity of separate
powers and activities limited to the several minute component gemmules.
It is possible that in some minds, the notion may lurk that such powers are
simpler and easier to understand, because the bodies they affect are so
minute! This absurdity hardly bears stating. We can easily conceive a being
so small, that a gemmule would be to it as large as St. Paul's would be to
us.
Admitting then the existence of species, and of their successive evolution,
is there anything in these ideas hostile to Christian belief?
Writers such as Vogt and Buchner will of course contend that there is; but
naturalists, generally, assume that God acts in and by the various laws of
nature. And this is equivalent to admitting the doctrine of "derivative
creation." With very few exceptions, none deny such Divine concurrence.
Even "design" and "purpose" are recognized as quite compatible with
evolution, and even with the special "nebular" and Darwinian forms of it.
Professor Huxley well says,[289] "It is necessary to remark that there is a
wider teleology, which is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but is
actually based upon the fundamental proposition of evolution." ... "The
teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not necessarily
mutually exclusive; on the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the
speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular
arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are the
consequences; and the more completely thereby is he at the mercy of the
teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial {274}
molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the
universe."[290]
Professor Owen says, that natural evolution, through secondary causes, "by
means of slow physical and organic operations through long ages, is not the
less clearly recognizable as the act of all adaptive mind, because we have
abandoned the old error of supposing it to be the result[291] of a primary,
direct, and sudden act of creational construction." ... "The succession of
species by continuously operating law, is not necessarily a 'blind
operation.' Such law, however discerned in the properties and successions
of natural objects, intimates, nevertheless, a preconceived progress.
Organisms may be evolved in orderly succession, stage after stage, towards
a foreseen goal, and the broad features of the course may still show the
unmistakable impress of Divine volition."
Mr. Wallace[292] declares that the opponents of evolution present a less
elevated view of the Almighty. He says: "Why should we suppose the machine
too complicated to have been designed by the Creator so complete that it
would necessarily work out harmonious results? The theory of 'continual
interference' is a limitation of the Creator's power. It assumes that He
could not work by pure law in the organic, as He has done in the inorganic
world." Thus, then, there is not only no necessary antagonism between the
general theory of "evolution" and a Divine action, but the compatibility
between the two is recognized by naturalists who cannot be suspected of any
strong theological bias.
{275}
The very same may be said as to the special Darwinian form of the theory of
evolution.
It is true Mr. Darwin writes sometimes as if he thought that his theory
militated against even _derivative creation_.[293] This, however, there is
no doubt, was not really meant; and indeed, in the passage before quoted
and criticised, the possibility of the Divine ordination of each variation
is spoken of as a tenable view. He says ("Origin of Species," p. 569), "I
see no good reason why the views given in this volume should shock the
religious feelings of anyone;" and he speaks of life "having been
originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one," which is
_more_ than the dogma of creation actually requires. We find then that no
_in_compatibility is asserted (by any scientific writers worthy of mention)
between "evolution" and the co-operation of the Divine will; while the same
"evolution" has been shown to be thoroughly acceptable to the most orthodox
theologians who repudiate the intrusion of the supernatural into the domain
of nature. A more complete harmony could scarcely be desired.
But if we may never hope to find, in physical nature, evidence of
supernatural action, what sort of action might we expect to find there,
looking at it from a theistic point of view? Surely an action the results
of which harmonize with man's reason,[294] which is orderly, which {276}
disaccords with the action of blind chance and with the "fortuitous
concourse of atoms" of Democritus; but at the same time an action which, as
to its modes, ever, in parts, and in ultimate analysis, eludes our grasp,
and the modes of which are different from those by which we should have
attempted to accomplish such ends.
Now, this is just what we _do_ find. The harmony, the beauty, and the order
of the physical universe are the themes of continual panegyrics on the part
of naturalists, and Mr. Darwin, as the Duke of Argyll remarks,[295]
"exhausts every form of words and of illustration by which intention or
mental purpose can be described"[296] when speaking of the wonderfully
complex adjustments to secure the fertilization of orchids. Also, we find
co-existing with this harmony a mode of proceeding so different from that
of man as (the direct supernatural action eluding us) to form a
stumbling-block to many in the way of their recognition of Divine action at
all: although nothing can be more inconsistent than to speak of the first
cause as utterly inscrutable and incomprehensible, and at the same time to
expect to find traces of a mode of action exactly similar to our own. It is
surely enough if the results harmonize on the whole and preponderatingly
with the rational, moral, and æsthetic instincts of man.
Mr. J. J. Murphy[297] has brought strongly forward the evidence of
"intelligence" throughout organic nature. He believes "that there is
something in organic progress which mere Natural Selection among
spontaneous variations will not account for," and that "this something is
that organizing intelligence which guides the action of the inorganic
forces, and forms structures which neither Natural Selection nor any other
unintelligent agency could form."
{277}
This intelligence, however, Mr. Murphy considers may be unconscious, a
conception which it is exceedingly difficult to understand, and which to
many minds appears to be little less than a contradiction in terms; the
very first condition of an intelligence being that, if it knows anything,
it should at least know its own existence.
Surely the evidence from physical facts agrees well with the overruling,
concurrent action of God in the order of nature; which is no miraculous
action, but the operation of laws which owe their foundation, institution,
and maintenance to an omniscient Creator of whose intelligence our own is a
feeble adumbration, inasmuch as it is created in the "image and likeness"
of its Maker.
This leads to the final consideration, a difficulty by no means to be
passed over in silence, namely the ORIGIN OF MAN. To the general theory of
Evolution, and to the special Darwinian form of it, no exception, it has
been shown, need be taken on the ground of orthodoxy. But in saying this,
it has not been meant to include the soul of man.
It is a generally received doctrine that the soul of every individual man
is absolutely created in the strict and primary sense of the word, that it
is produced by a direct or supernatural[298] act, and, of course, that by
such an act the soul of the first man was similarly created. It is
therefore important to inquire whether "evolution" conflicts with this
doctrine.
Now the two beliefs are in fact perfectly compatible, and that either on
the hypothesis--1. That man's body was created in a manner different in
kind from that by which the bodies of other animals were created; or 2.
That it was created in a similar manner to theirs.
One of the authors of the Darwinian theory, indeed, contends that even{278}
as regards man's body, an action took place different from that by which
brute forms were evolved. Mr. Wallace[299] considers that "Natural
Selection" alone could not have produced so large a brain in the savage, in
possessing which he is furnished with an organ beyond his needs. Also that
it could not have produced that peculiar distribution of hair, especially
the nakedness of the back, which is common to all races of men, nor the
peculiar construction of the feet and hands. He says,[300] after speaking
of the prehensile foot, common without a single exception to all the apes
and lemurs, "It is difficult to see why the prehensile power should have
been taken away" by the mere operation of Natural Selection. "It must
certainly have been useful in climbing, and the case of the baboons shows
that it is quite compatible with terrestrial locomotion. It may not be
compatible with perfectly easy erect locomotion; but, then, how can we
conceive that early man, _as an animal_, gained anything by purely erect
locomotion? Again, the hand of man contains latent capacities and powers
which are unused by savages, and must have been even less used by
palæolithic man and his still ruder predecessors. It has all the appearance
of an organ prepared for the use of civilized man, and one which was
required to render civilization possible." Again speaking of the "wonderful
power, range, flexibility, and sweetness of the musical sounds producible
by the human larynx," he adds, "The habits of savages give no indication of
how this faculty could have been developed by Natural Selection; because it
is never required or used by them. The singing of savages is a more or less
monotonous howling, and the females seldom sing at all. Savages certainly
never choose their wives for fine voices, but for rude health, and strength
and physical beauty. Sexual selection could not therefore have developed
this wonderful power, which only comes into play among civilized people. It
seems as if the organ had been prepared in anticipation of the future {279}
progress of man, since it contains latent capacities which are useless to
him in his earlier condition. The delicate correlations of structure that
give it such marvellous powers, could not therefore have been acquired by
means of Natural Selection."
[Illustration: FIBRES OF CORTI.]
To this may be added the no less wonderful faculty in the ear of
appreciating delicate musical tones, and the harmony of chords.
It matters not what part of the organ subserves this function, but it has
been supposed that it is ministered to by the fibres _of Corti_.[301] Now
it can hardly be contended that the preservation of any race of men in the
struggle for life could have depended on such an extreme delicacy and
refinement of the internal ear,[302]--a perfection only fully exercised in
the enjoyment and appreciation of the most exquisite musical performances.
Here, surely, we have an instance of an organ preformed, ready beforehand
for such action as could never by itself have been the cause of its
development,--the action having only been subsequent, not anterior. The
Author is not aware what may be the minute structure of the internal ear in
the highest apes, but if (as from analogy is probable) it is much as in
man, then _a fortiori_ we have an instance of _anticipatory_ development of
a most marked and unmistakable kind. And this is not all. There is no {280}
reason to suppose that any animal besides man appreciates musical
_harmony_. It is certain that no other one _produces_ it.
Mr. Wallace also urges objections drawn from the origin of some of man's
mental faculties, such as "the capacity to form ideal conceptions of space
and time, of eternity and infinity--the capacity for intense artistic
feelings of pleasure, in form, colour and composition--and for those
abstract notions of form and number which render geometry and arithmetic
possible," also from the origin of the moral sense.[303]
The validity of these objections is fully conceded by the Author of this
book, but he would push it much further, and contend (as has been now
repeatedly said), that another law, or other laws, than "Natural Selection"
have determined the evolution of _all_ organic forms, and of inorganic
forms also. And it must be contended that Mr. Wallace, in order to be quite
self-consistent, should arrive at the very same conclusion, inasmuch as he
is inclined to trace all phenomena to the action of superhuman WILL. He
says:[304] "If therefore we have traced one force, however minute, to an
origin in our own WILL, while we have no knowledge of any other primary
cause of force, it does not seem an improbable conclusion that all force
may be will-force; and thus, that the whole universe is not merely
dependent on, but actually _is_, the WILL of higher intelligences, or of
one Supreme Intelligence."
If there is really evidence, as Mr. Wallace believes, of the action of an
overruling intelligence in the evolution of the "human form divine;" if we
may go so far as this, then surely an analogous action may well be traced
in the production of the horse, the camel, or the dog, so largely
identified with human wants and requirements. And if from other than
physical considerations we may believe that such action, though
undemonstrable, has been and is; then (reflecting on sensible {281}
phenomena the theistic light derived from psychical facts) we may, in the
language of Mr. Wallace, "see indications of that power in facts which, by
themselves, would not serve to prove its existence."[305]
Mr. Murphy, as has been said before, finds it necessary to accept the
wide-spread action of "intelligence" as the agent by which _all_ organic
forms have been called forth from the inorganic. But all science tends to
unity, and this tendency makes it reasonable to extend to all physical
existences a mode of formation which we may have evidence for in any _one_
of them. It therefore makes it reasonable to extend, if possible, the very
same agency which we find operating in the field of biology, also to the
inorganic world. If on the grounds brought forward the action of
intelligence may be affirmed in the production of man's bodily structure,
it becomes probable _a priori_ that it may also be predicated of the
formative action by which has been produced the animals which minister to
him, and all organic life whatsoever. Nay more, it is then congruous to
expect analogous action in the development of crystalline and colloidal
structures, and in that of all chemical compositions, in geological
evolutions, and the formation not only of this earth, but of the solar
system and whole sidereal universe.
If such really be the direction in which physical science, philosophically
considered, points; if intelligence may thus be seen to preside over the
evolution of each system of worlds and the unfolding of every blade of
grass--this grand result harmonizes indeed with the teachings of faith that
God acts and concurs, in the natural order, with those laws of the material
universe which were not only instituted by His will, but are sustained by
His concurrence; and we are thus enabled to discern in the natural order,
however darkly, the Divine Author of nature--Him in whom "we live, and
move, and have our being."
But if this view is accepted, then it is no longer absolutely {282}
necessary to suppose that any action different in kind took place in the
production of man's body, from that which took place in the production of
the bodies of other animals, and of the whole material universe.
Of course, if it _can_ be demonstrated that that difference which Mr.
Wallace asserts really exists, it is plain that we then have to do with
facts not only harmonizing with religion, but, as it were, preaching and
proclaiming it.
It is not, however, necessary for Christianity that any such view should
prevail. Man, according to the old scholastic definition, is "a rational
animal" (_animal rationale_), and his animality is distinct in nature from
his rationality, though inseparably joined, during life, in one common
personality. This animal body must have had a different source from that of
the spiritual soul which informs it, from the distinctness of the two
orders to which those two existences severally belong.
Scripture seems plainly to indicate this when it says that "God made man
from the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of
life." This is a plain and direct statement that man's _body_ was _not_
created in the primary and absolute sense of the word, but was evolved from
pre-existing material (symbolized by the term "dust of the earth"), and was
therefore only _derivatively created_, i.e. by the operation of secondary
laws. His _soul_, on the other hand, was created in quite a different way,
not by any pre-existing means, external to God himself, but by the direct
action of the Almighty, symbolized by the term "breathing:" the very form
adopted by Christ, when conferring the _supernatural_ powers and graces of
the Christian dispensation, and a form still daily used in the rites and
ceremonies of the Church.
That the first man should have had this double origin agrees with what we
now experience. For supposing each human soul to be directly and
immediately created, yet each human body is evolved by the ordinary
operation of natural physical laws. [Page 283]
Professor Flower in his Introductory Lecture[306] (p. 20) to his course of
Hunterian Lectures for 1870 well observes: "Whatever man's place may be,
either _in_ or _out_ of nature, whatever hopes, or fears or feelings about
himself or his race he may have, we all of us admit that these are quite
uninfluenced by our knowledge of the fact that each individual man comes
into the world by the ordinary processes of generation, according to the
same laws which apply to the development of all organic beings whatever,
that every part of him which can come under the scrutiny of the anatomist
or naturalist, has been evolved according to these regular laws from a
simple minute ovum, indistinguishable to our senses from that of any of the
inferior animals. If this be so--if man is what he is, notwithstanding the
corporeal mode of origin of the individual man, so he will assuredly be
neither less nor more than man, whatever may be shown regarding the
corporeal origin of the whole race, whether this was from the dust of the
earth, or by the modification of some pre-existing animal form."
Man is indeed compound, in him two distinct orders of being impinge and
mingle; and with this an origin from two concurrent modes of action is
congruous, and might be expected _a priori_. At the same time as the "soul"
is "the form of the body," the former might be expected to modify the
latter into a structure of harmony and beauty standing alone in the organic
world of nature. Also that, with the full perfection and beauty of that
soul, attained by the concurrent action of "Nature" and "Grace," a
character would be formed like nothing else which is visible in this world,
and having a mode of action different, inasmuch as complementary to all
inferior modes of action.
Something of this is evident even to those who approach the subject from
the point of view of physical science only. Thus Mr. Wallace observes,[307]
that on his view man is to be placed "apart, as not only the head and {284}
culminating point of the grand series of organic nature, but as in some
degree _a new and distinct order of being_.[308] From those infinitely
remote ages when the first rudiments of organic life appeared upon the
earth, every plant and every animal has been subject to one great law of
physical change. As the earth has gone through its grand cycles of
geological, climatal, and organic progress, every form of life has been
subject to its irresistible action, and has been continually but
imperceptibly moulded into such new shapes as would preserve their harmony
with the ever-changing universe. No living thing could escape this law of
its being; none (except, perhaps, the simplest and most rudimentary
organisms) could remain unchanged and live amid the universal change around
it."
"At length, however, there came into existence a being in whom that subtle
force we term _mind_, became of greater importance than his mere bodily
structure. Though with a naked and unprotected body, _this_ gave him
clothing against the varying inclemencies of the seasons. Though unable to
compete with the deer in swiftness, or with the wild bull in strength,
_this_ gave him weapons with which to capture or overcome both. Though less
capable than most other animals of living on the herbs and the fruits that
unaided nature supplies, this wonderful faculty taught him to govern and
direct nature to his own benefit, and make her produce food for him when
and where he pleased. From the moment when the first skin was used as a
covering; when the first rude spear was formed to assist in the chase; when
fire was first used to cook his food; when the first seed was sown or shoot
planted, a grand revolution was effected in nature, a revolution which in
all the previous ages of the earth's history had had no parallel, for a
being had arisen who was no longer necessarily subject to change with the
changing universe, a being who was in some degree superior to nature,
inasmuch as he knew how to control and regulate her action, and could {285}
keep himself in harmony with her, not by a change in body, but by an
advance in mind."
"On this view of his special attributes, we may admit 'that he is indeed a
being apart.' Man has not only escaped 'Natural Selection' himself, but he
is actually able to take away some of that power from nature which before
his appearance she universally exercised. We can anticipate the time when
the earth will produce only cultivated plants and domestic animals; when
man's selection shall have supplanted 'Natural Selection;' and when the
ocean will be the only domain in which that power can be exerted."
Baden Powell[309] observes on this subject: "The relation of the animal man
to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual man, resembles that of a crystal
slumbering in its native quarry to the same crystal mounted in the
polarizing apparatus of the philosopher. The difference is not in physical
nature, but in investing that nature with a new and higher application. Its
continuity with the material world remains the same, but a new relation is
developed in it, and it claims kindred with ethereal matter and with
celestial light."
This well expresses the distinction between the merely physical and the
hyperphysical natures of man, and the subsumption of the former into the
latter which dominates it.
The same author in speaking of man's moral and spiritual nature says,[310]
"The assertion in its very nature and essence refers wholly to a DIFFERENT
ORDER OF THINGS, apart from and transcending any material ideas
whatsoever." Again[311] he adds, "In proportion as man's _moral_
superiority is held to consist in attributes _not_ of a _material_ or
corporeal kind or origin, it can signify little how his _physical_ nature
may have originated."
Now physical science, as such, has nothing to do with the soul of man which
is hyperphysical. That such an entity exists, that the correlated {286}
physical forces go through their Protean transformations, have their
persistent ebb and flow outside of the world of WILL and SELF-CONSCIOUS
MORAL BEING, are propositions the proofs of which have no place in this
work. This at least may however be confidently affirmed, that no reach of
physical science in any coming century will ever approach to a
demonstration that countless modes of being, as different from each other
as are the force of gravitation and conscious maternal love, may not
co-exist. Two such modes are made known to us by our natural faculties
only: the physical, which includes the first of these examples; the
hyperphysical, which embraces the other. For those who accept revelation, a
third and a distinct mode of being and of action is also made known,
namely, the direct and immediate or, in the sense here given to the term,
the supernatural. An analogous relationship runs through and connects all
these modes of being and of action. The higher mode in each case employs
and makes use of the lower, the action of which it occasionally suspends or
alters, as gravity is suspended by electro-magnetic action, or the living
energy of an organic being restrains the inter-actions of the chemical
affinities belonging to its various constituents.
Thus conscious will controls and directs the exercise of the vital
functions according to desire, and moral consciousness tends to control
desire in obedience to higher dictates.[312] The action of living {287}
organisms depends upon and subsumes the laws of inorganic matter. Similarly
the actions of animal life depend upon and subsume the laws of organic
matter. In the same way the actions of a self-conscious moral agent, such
as man, depend upon and subsume the laws of animal life. When a part or the
whole series of these natural actions is altered or suspended by the
intervention of action of a still higher order, we have then a "miracle."
In this way we find a perfect harmony in the double nature of man, his
rationality making use of and subsuming his animality; his soul arising
from direct and immediate creation, and his body being formed at first (as
now in each separate individual) by derivative or secondary creation,
through natural laws. By such secondary creation, _i.e._ by natural laws,
for the most part as yet unknown but controlled by "Natural Selection," all
the various kinds of animals and plants have been manifested on this
planet. That Divine action has concurred and concurs in these laws we know
by deductions from our primary intuitions; and physical science, if unable
to demonstrate such action, is at least as impotent to disprove it.
Disjoined from these deductions, the phenomena of the universe present an
aspect devoid of all that appeals to the loftiest aspirations of man, that
which stimulates his efforts after goodness, and presents consolations for
unavoidable shortcomings. Conjoined with these same deductions, all the
harmony of physical nature and the constancy of its laws are preserved
unimpaired, while the reason, the conscience, and the æsthetic instincts
are alike gratified. We have thus a true reconciliation of science and
religion, in which each gains and neither loses, one being complementary to
the other.
Some apology is due to the reader for certain observations and arguments
which have been here advanced, and which have little in the shape of
novelty to recommend them. But after all, novelty can hardly be predicated
of the views here criticised and opposed. Some of these seem almost a {288}
return to the "fortuitous concourse of atoms" of Democritus, and even the
very theory of "Natural Selection" itself--a "survival of the fittest"--was
in part thought out not hundreds but _thousands_ of years ago. Opponents of
Aristotle maintained that by the accidental occurrence of combinations,
organisms have been preserved and perpetuated such as final causes, did
they exist, would have brought about, disadvantageous combinations or
variations being speedily exterminated. "For when the very same
combinations happened to be produced which the law of final causes would
have called into being, those combinations which proved to be advantageous
to the organism were preserved; while those which were not advantageous
perished, and still perished like the minotaurs and sphinxes of
Empedocles."[313]
In conclusion, the Author ventures to hope that this treatise may not be
deemed useless, but have contributed, however slightly, towards clearing
the way for peace and conciliation and for a more ready perception, of the
harmony which exists between those deductions from our primary intuitions
before alluded to, and the teachings of physical science, as far, that is,
as concerns the evolution of organic forms--_the genesis of species_.
The aim has been to support the doctrine that these species have been
evolved by ordinary _natural laws_ (for the most part unknown) controlled
by the _subordinate_ action of "Natural Selection," and at the same time to
remind some that there is and can be absolutely nothing in physical science
which forbids them to regard those natural laws as acting with the Divine
concurrence and in obedience to a creative fiat originally imposed on the
primeval Cosmos, "in the beginning," by its Creator, its Upholder, and its
Lord.
{289}
* * * * *
INDEX.
A.
Aard-Vark, 174.
Absolute creation, 252.
Acanthometræ, 186.
Acrodont teeth, 148.
Acts formally moral, 195.
Acts materially moral, 195.
Adductor muscles, 79.
Agassiz, Professor, 271.
Aged, care of, 192.
Aggregational theory, 163.
Algoa Bay, cat of, 98.
Allantois, 82.
Amazons, butterflies of, 85.
Amazons, cholera in the, 192.
American butterflies, 29.
American maize, 100.
American monkeys, 226.
Amiurus, 147.
Amphibia, 109.
Analogical relations, 157.
Ancon sheep, 100, 103, 227.
Andrew Murray, Mr., 83.
Angora cats, 175.
Animal's sufferings, 260.
Ankle bones, 158.
Annelids undergoing fission, 169, 211.
Annulosa, eye of, 76.
Anoplotherium, 109.
Anteater, 83.
Antechinus, 82.
Antenna, of orchid, 56.
Anthropomorphism, 258.
Ape's sexual characters, 49.
Apostles' Creed, 245.
Appendages of lobster, 161.
Appendages of Normandy pigs, 99.
Appendages of turkey, 100.
Appendix, vermiform, 83.
Appreciation of Mr. Darwin, 10.
Apteryx, 7, 70.
Aqueous humour, 76.
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 17, 263, 265.
Archegosaurus, 135.
Archeopteryx, 73.
Arcturus, 193.
Argyll, Duke of, 14, 276.
Aristotle, 288.
Armadillo, extinct kind, 110.
Arthritis, rheumatic, 183.
Artiodactyle foot, 109.
Asa Gray, Dr., 253, 255, 261.
Asceticism, 193.
Ascidians, placental structure, 81.
Assumptions of Mr. Darwin, 16.
Astronomical objections, 136.
Auditory organ, 74.
Augustin, St., 17, 263, 264.
Aurelius, Marcus, 206.
Avian limb, 106.
Avicularia, 80.
Axolotl, 165.
Aye-Aye, 107.
Aylesbury ducks, 234.
B.
Backbone, 135, 162.
Bacon, Roger, 266.
Baleen, 40.
Bamboo insect, 33.
Bandicoot, 67.
Bartlett, Mr. A. D., 126, 234.
Bartlett, Mr. E., 192.
Basil, St., 17.
Bastian, Dr. H. Charlton, 115, 219, 237, 266.
Bat, wing of, 64.
Bates, Mr., 29, 85, 87.
[Page 290]
Bats, 108.
Beaks, 83.
Beasts, sufferings of, 260.
Beauty of shell-fish, 54.
Bee orchid, 55.
Bird, wings of, 64.
Birds compared with reptiles, 70.
Bird's-head processes, 80.
Birds of Paradise, 90.
Birth of individual and species, 2.
Bivalves, 79.
Black sheep, 122.
Black-shouldered peacock, 100.
Bladebone, 70.
Blood-vessels, 182.
Blyth, Mr., 100, 181.
Bones of skull, 153.
Bonnet, M., 217.
Borwick, Mr., 198.
"Boots" of pigeons, 181.
Breathing, modified power of, 99.
Breeding of lions, 234.
Brill, 37.
Broccoli, variety of, 100.
Bryozoa, 81.
Buchner, Dr., 273.
Budd, Dr. W., 183.
Buffon, 217.
Bull-dog's instinct, 260.
Burt, Prof. Wilder, 180, 184.
Butterflies, 29.
Butterflies, Amazonian, 85.
Butterflies, American, 29.
Butterflies of Indian region, 83.
Butterflies, tails of, 85.
Butterfly, Leaf, 31.
C.
Cacotus, 149.
Cæcum, 83.
Calamaries, 77.
Cambrian deposits, 137.
Cape ant-eater, 174.
Care of aged, 192.
Carinate birds, 70.
Carnivora, 68.
Carnivorous dentition, 110.
Carp fishes, 146.
Carpal bones, 106, 178.
Carpenter, Dr., 115.
Carpus, 177, 178.
Cases of conscience, 201.
Cassowary, 70.
Catasetum, 56.
Causes of spread of Darwinism, 10.
Cebus, 226.
Celebes, butterflies of, 85.
Centetes, 148.
Centipede, 66, 159.
Cephalopoda, 74.
Ceroxylus laceratus, 36.
Cetacea, 42, 83, 105, 108, 174.
Chances against few individuals, 57.
Characinidæ, 146.
Cheirogaleus, 158.
Chetahs, 234.
Chickens, mortality of hybrids, 124.
Chioglossa, 165.
Chiromys, 107.
Cholera, 192.
Choroid, 76.
Chronic rheumatism, 183.
Circumcision, 212.
Clarias, 146.
Climate, effects of, 98.
Climbing plants, 107.
Clock-thinking illustration, 249.
Cobra, 50.
Cockle, 79.
Cod, 39.
Colloidal matter, 266.
Conceptions, symbolic, 251.
Connecticut footsteps, 131.
Connecting links, supposed, 107.
Conscience, cases of, 201.
Conscientious Papuan, 197.
Cope, Professor, 71, 130.
Coracoid, of birds and reptiles, 70.
Cornea, 77.
Cornelius à Lapide, 265.
Correlation, laws of, 173.
Corti, fibres of, 53, 279.
Coryanthes, 56.
Costa, M., 88.
Cranial segments, 172.
Creation, 245, 252.
Creator, 15, 252.
Creed, Apostles', 245.
Crocodile, 43.
Croll, Mr., 137.
Crustacea, 79, 160.
Cryptacanthus, 146.
Crystalline matter, 266.
Crystals of snow, 186.
Cuttle-fishes, 74, 75.
Cuvier, 109.
Cyprinoids, 146.
Cytheridea, 79.
[Page 291]
D.
Dana, Professor, 149.
Darwin, Mr. Charles, 2, 10, 12, 14-21, 23, 27, 34, 35, 43, 45, 47, 48,
55-57, 59, 65, 88, 94, 98-100, 107, 118-126, 129, 138, 142, 145, 149,
150, 181, 188-190, 196, 208, 209, 214-216, 218, 223, 233, 234, 252,
254, 258, 259, 275, 276.
Datura tatula, 101.
Delhi, days at, 98.
Delpino, Signor, 212, 213, 215.
Democritus, 217, 275, 288.
Density of air for breathing, 99.
Dentition, carnivorous, 110.
Derivation, 238.
Derivative creation, 252, 282.
Design, 259.
Devotion, 193.
Dibranchiata, 74.
Difficulties of problem of specific origin, 1.
Digits, supernumerary, 122, 181.
Digits, turtle's, 106.
Dimorphodon, 71.
Dinornis, 70.
Dinosauria, 71.
Diseased pelvis, 182.
Dissemination of seeds, 65.
Doris, 170.
Dotheboys' Hall, 272.
Dragon, the flying, 64, 158.
Dragon-fly, 77.
Droughts, 25.
Duck-billed platypus, 175.
Dugong, 41, 175.
Duke of Argyll, 14, 276.
Dyspepsia, 201.