FIELD ARTILLERY
ARTILLERY IN THE JUNGLE
=Antipersonnel Fire= _Report of Operations, ~Arundel Island~_: “It
was apparent that the Japs were concentrating their forces on STIMA
PENINSULA.... The area was divided by coordinates and assigned to
various artillery and mortar elements. Heavy fires were placed on them
throughout the night.
During the advance down the peninsula the next day numerous enemy
dead were noted, verifying the effectiveness of the previous night’s
concentrations.”
★
=Dealing with Tree Snipers= _Report of Operations, 43d Division, ~New
Georgia~_: “We effectively cured the Jap of his liking for sniping from
trees by the command, ‘Fire Mission. All Battalions. Fuze Quick. Three
Volleys.’ The quick fuze resulted in bursts in the tree tops. After
a week of this treatment the Jap sniper moved from the trees to the
ground.
[Illustration]
=Adjustment of Fire= “All close support adjustments were made by
‘sound and fragment’ method until the latter part of the campaign,
when ground observation was obtained. Forward observers were always in
the most forward position possible--in some cases in advance of the
lines. Adjustments were time-consuming, starting at a range surely over
friendly troops and working gradually closer to our front lines. Some
smoke was used but _not very successfully in the jungle. Tree tops were
not used for observation because of the limited view and the fact that
our troops were suspicious of all activity in trees._ Prisoners of war
inquired about our ‘automatic artillery.’
=Morale Effect= “The incessant firing of our artillery during the
six-week period produced contrasting effects on the nerves of our own
troops and on those of the enemy. Our infantry often stated that having
those rounds continually landing in front of them was one of their
best morale builders, especially at night. In the Jap, on the other
hand, it produced severe cases of war neurosis. He couldn’t sleep at
night because he never knew when or where the next round was going to
land. He couldn’t sleep in the daytime because when our infantry wasn’t
attacking him our artillery was giving him hell.
“The following statements made by prisoners are interesting:
“‘Between BIBILO HILL and the airport we had many guns of all sizes
before this campaign, but now many of them are gone--knocked out
by artillery. It has completely demoralized many units, reduced
many units in strength, and has made many men go crazy. We were
awakened at night by the slightest noise, because of the bad state
of nerves. At night three men stayed in one foxhole; two smoked
while one slept. During the day we also tried to get some sleep by
alternating, but the continual artillery fire kept us on edge and
we got no rest.’
“‘Even in the two-story dugouts many men were killed just by
concussion. A direct hit would kill all the men inside.’
“‘The artillery is the one thing that is universally feared by all
our ground troops. It continues over such long periods of time and
the rounds come so fast.’
“‘Except for the artillery we could continue our defense.’”
★
=Ammunition and Fuzes= _First Marine Division, Guadalcanal_: “The
super-quick fuze is more effective than the delay fuze against troops
in wide areas, particularly in the cocoanut groves of the tropics.
A report from prisoners indicated that in one unit of approximately
100 men, all but six were casualties as a result of one artillery
concentration. The 37mm canister proved to be a devastating type of
ammunition.
=Disposition= “In jungle warfare the artillery of the defensive set-up
should not be placed too close to the infantry line. The added range
thus obtained is of no value unless observation of the terrain permits
its use, which will very seldom be the case. Artillery too close to the
infantry is not only needlessly exposed, but is actually less effective
because of the limits imposed by minimum-range considerations, and,
in the case of 105mm howitzers, because of the impossibility of using
high-angle fire at ranges less than 2,000 yards.
=Liaison= “The liaison officers with infantry regiment should be
officers with as much experience as possible, preferably of the rank
of captain or above. When possible, either the artillery battalion
commander or his executive officer should be sent to the infantry
regimental CP at first sign of enemy activity.”
IDEAS FROM ITALY
=Reinforcing Fire= _Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Funk, Field Artillery,
Battalion Commander_: “If I can spare the radios I am going to send one
to the artillery battalion that reinforces me the next time we are in
direct support. Then when one of our observers calls in a fire mission
we can simply tell the radio at the other battalion to take the mission
direct from the observer. This will eliminate a relay through our Fire
Direction Center and speed things up considerably.
=Transportation= “We keep only seven 2½-ton trucks with each howitzer
battery. The three spares stay in the Service Battery ready to replace
damaged ones in any howitzer battery. This also allows the maintenance
section to have vehicles available for 6,000-mile checks. When one is
finished they send it out to replace another that is due for check.
=Fire Direction Center= “We are using two ¾-ton trucks for the CP
section of Headquarters Battery. Each has a tent and a fire direction
group. When we move the CP we send out one truck with the S-3. He takes
over the operation of the Fire Direction Center when he gets set up,
and the rear CP can then close down and move.”
[Illustration:
PHOTOGRAPH BY U. S. ARMY SIGNAL CORPS
_Uses of the Pack Board_]
=Pack Boards for Observers= “We use pack boards[C] for forward
observers and liaison parties. They are a wonderful help in hilly or
mountainous country when these parties have to leave their vehicles and
hoof it. Two for each party adds up to six per howitzer battery and six
in Battalion Headquarters Battery.”
[C] Rectangular frames with canvas centers to which supplies or
gear may be lashed and carried as a pack. See illustration.
[Illustration:
PHOTOGRAPH BY U. S. ARMY SIGNAL CORPS
_Patrol of the 25th Division, New Georgia Campaign_]