Transcriber’s Note
Italic text is enclosed in _underscores_; boldface text is enclosed in
=equals signs=; underlined text is enclosed in ~tildes~.
[Illustration: (Cover)]
COMBAT
LESSONS
NUMBER 1
_Rank and file in combat:
What they’re doing
How they do it_
★
UNCLASSIFIED
XXXXXXXXXXXX _DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER_.--The information
contained in restricted documents and the essential characteristics
of restricted material may be given to any person known to be in the
service of the United States and to persons of undoubted loyalty
and discretion who are cooperating in Government work, but will not
be communicated to the public or to the press except by authorized
military public relations agencies. (See also par. 18b, AR 380-5, 28
Sep 1942.)
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of “Combat Lessons” is to give to our officers and enlisted
men the benefit of the battle experiences of others. To be of maximum
benefit these lessons must be disseminated _without delay_. They
do not necessarily represent the carefully considered views of the
War Department; they do, however, reflect the actual experiences of
combat and, therefore, merit careful reading. For this reason also
no single issue can cover many of the phases of combat; lessons will
be drawn from the reports as they are received from the theaters of
operation and quickly disseminated so that others may apply them.
The suggestions which are made or implied are not intended to change
the tactical doctrine by which our Army has been trained but rather
to elaborate thereon. Much of the subject matter has been covered in
training literature, but the comments show that shortcomings continue
to manifest themselves on the battlefield.
The paramount combat lesson learned from every operation is the vital
importance of _leadership_. Our equipment, our supply, and, above all,
our men, are splendid. Aggressive and determined leadership is the
priceless factor which inspires a command and upon which all success in
battle depends. It is responsible for success or failure.
[Illustration: G. C. Marshall
_Chief of Staff_]
CONTENTS
SECTION ONE--INFANTRY
Page
Battle Leadership 1
Junior Officer in Battle 1
Hate Your Enemy 2
Leaders in Front 2
Keep Them Moving 3
NCO Leadership 3
Keep Your Mission in Mind 3
Team Up 6
Rally Point 6
Fear is Normal 6
Sicily--Italy--Attu 7
Night Attack 7
Surprise Saves Lives 7
Hand-to-Hand Fighting 8
Small Arms Against Armor 9
Platoon Action 9
Knocking Out Pillboxes 12
Individual Initiative 14
Action on Attu 16
The South Pacific 19
Security in the Jungle 19
In Bivouac 19
On the March 20
Jungle Notes 20
Aggressive Action, Flexible Plans 20
Feeding the Troops 20
Counterintelligence 20
Scouting and Patrolling 21
Patrolling in the Jungle 21
Don’t Forget the “Where”! 21
--or the “What”! 21
Patrol Tips 22
Size of Patrols 22
“Say It With Pictures” 22
Infantry Weapons 23
In Jungle Warfare 23
Basic Weapons 23
4.2″ Chemical Mortar 26
In Sicily 27
Advance Guard 27
Pyrotechnics 27
Miscellaneous Comment 27
At Salerno 28
The Bazooka Worked 28
Infantry-Artillery Team 29
Artillery “Close” Support 29
--and How it Worked 29
Massed Fires 30
Infantry-Tank Team 31
Opportunity Lost 31
Lesson Learned 31
Infantry-Tank Attack 32
Ranger Training 33
Buddy System 33
Realism 33
Recognition 34
Formations 34
Cooking 35
Physical Conditioning 35
Discipline 35
SECTION TWO--FIELD ARTILLERY
Artillery in the Jungle 37
Antipersonnel Fire 37
Dealing with Tree Snipers 37
Adjustment of Fire 38
Morale Effect 38
Ammunition and Fuzes 40
Disposition 40
Liaison 40
Ideas from Italy 41
Reinforcing Fire 41
Transportation 41
Fire Direction Center 41
Pack Boards for Observers 43
SECTION THREE--MISCELLANEOUS
Booby Traps 45
Timeliness of Orders 45
Maps 46
AA Fire 46
Security 47
Strafing Aircraft 47
“Gas!” 47
Counterattack Foiled 48
Room for Improvement 49
SECTION FOUR--NOTES ON THE NIPS
Japanese Pillboxes 51
Superman Myth Exploded 51
Jap Trap 52
Defensive Action 52
Vine Entanglements 52
SECTION FIVE--HINTS ON THE HEINIE
Reverse Slope Tactics 53
Don’t Gawk! 53
Traps and Mines 53
Minor Tactics 54
Typical Attack and Withdrawal 55
Rearguard Action 55
_Prepared from Combat Reports and published by direction of the Chief
of Staff by Operations Division in collaboration with other Divisions
of the War Department General Staff, Army Ground Forces, Army Air
Forces, and Army Service Forces._
SECTION I
INFANTRY
BATTLE LEADERSHIP
Again and again reports from the battlefields confirm the importance
of leadership in every grade, whether it be Corporal or Colonel. Other
combat lessons are important; the exercise of leadership in battle
is vital. Leadership has often been defined in theory. Here are some
instances of its application or its absence on the battlefield. These
are but a few examples; there are many others.
★
=Junior Officer in Battle= _Captain William T. Gordon, Infantry,
~Sicily~_: “Since November 8, I have had seventeen officers in my
company, and I am the only one who started out with it who is left
in the fight. In Tunisia, from troops pinned down in the dark, I have
heard enlisted men call out such things as ‘Where is an officer to
lead us?’--‘We don’t want to lie here--we want to attack--where is an
officer?’... In each case an officer or officers have risen to the
occasion, but this nevertheless shows beyond anything else the demand
for battle leadership.
“A company officer must build a legend about himself. He must take
calculated risks. He must, on the other hand, do what he expects his
men to do: he must always dig in; always take cover. His men must know
that when he ducks they must duck; on the other hand, they must not
believe that when the officer ducks they must run away. The officer
must come through every barrage and bombing with a sheepish grin and a
wry remark. Masterly understatement of hardship and danger endured plus
a grin always pays dividends.
=Hate Your Enemy!= “Our men do not ordinarily hate. They _must_ hate.
They are better soldiers when they hate. They must not fraternize with
prisoners--must not give them cigarettes and food the moment they are
taken. Hate can be taught men by meticulous example. The Rangers are so
taught.”
★
=Leaders in Front= _Staff Sergeant Richard E. Deland, Infantry,
~Sicily~_: “We want our Captain out front; we don’t care much about the
position of our battalion commander.”
=Keep Them Moving!= _Operation Report, Seventh Army, ~Sicily~_: “During
an attack officers and non-commissioned officers must never allow men
to lie prone and passive under enemy fire. They must be required to
move forward if this is at all possible. If movement is absolutely
impossible, have the troops at least open fire. The act of firing
induces self-confidence in attacking troops. The familiar expression
‘Dig or Die’ has been greatly overworked. Attacking troops must not
be allowed to dig in until they have secured their final objective.
If they dig in when momentarily stopped by enemy fire, it will take
dynamite to blast them from their holes and resume the advance.”
★
=NCO Leadership= _Staff Sergeant Robert J. Kemp, Platoon Sergeant,
Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “NCO leadership is important. Leaders, NCO’s,
and officers should be taken to an OP for terrain instruction and
study before an attack. This has been possible in my outfit about
one-fourth of the time. We have what is called an ‘Orders Group,’ which
consists of that group of officers and NCO’s that must be assembled for
instruction before any tactical move.”
★
=Keep Your Mission in Mind!= _Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Thayer, Field
Artillery, Observer With Fifth Army, ~Italy~_: “Difficulty was
experienced in making patrol leaders realize the importance of bringing
back information by a specified hour, in time to be of value. Patrols
often returned, after encountering resistance, without accomplishing
their mission. Sending them back to accomplish their mission, despite
their fatigue, seemed to be the most effective solution to the training
problem involved, although the information required often arrived too
late.”
★
_Lieutenant Colonel T. F. Bogart, Infantry, Observer With Fifth Army,
~Italy~_: “Greater emphasis must be placed on inculcating in junior
officers and NCO’s the will to accomplish assigned missions despite
opposition. A few accounts of patrol actions illustrate this point:
“(1) A reconnaissance patrol consisting of a platoon was sent out at
about 1900 one evening to determine the strength if any of the Germans
in two small towns, the first about two miles away and the second about
three miles farther on. The patrol reached the outskirts of the first
town and met an Italian who told them there were no Germans in the town
and then started to lead the patrol into town. A few hundred yards
farther a German machine gun opened up, the Italian disappeared, three
of the patrol were killed, and the others dispersed. They drifted back
to our battalion during the night, and it was not until nearly daylight
that the practically valueless report of the action was received. Not
the slightest conception of the strength in the first town was obtained
and no information of the second town. It was necessary to send out
another patrol with the same mission.
“(2) A patrol was sent out with the mission of determining the
condition of a road, especially bridges, over a three-mile stretch
to the front. When this patrol had covered about a mile it ran into
a motorized German patrol. Two of the Americans were killed, and the
platoon leader claimed six Germans. The patrol leader forgot his
mission, returned to the battalion CP with the remainder of his patrol,
and had to be sent out again with a great loss in time in getting the
information desired.
“(3) On several occasions patrols were sent out on reconnaissance
missions with instructions to get certain information by a specific
time. The hour would pass and sometimes several others without a word
from the patrol. Sometimes it was due to difficulties encountered,
sometimes to mistakes in computation of time and space factors, but in
all cases there was no good reason why _some_ information did not get
back _by the specified time_.”
=COMMENT: The failure of patrols in these instances stems from a
lack of appreciation on the part of NCO’s and junior officers of
their ~missions~. In patrol actions, as in the operations of larger
units, the ~mission~ must be kept uppermost in the minds of all
ranks, and no action should be undertaken which does not contribute
directly to the accomplishment of that mission. Conversely, no
incidental or inadvertent contact with the enemy should deter or
divert patrols from the complete accomplishment of their missions,
to include compliance with ~all~ instructions given, where humanly
possible.=
★
=Team Up!= _Captain William T. Gordon, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “I have
found that men in position must fight in pairs; an order that 50 per
cent stay awake is thus easily enforced; it bolsters morale and nerves.
=Rally Point= “In every company attack order a reserve force must be
prescribed; I always do even though sometimes this force consists only
of myself and my First Sergeant. Often a soldier who a moment before
has run away is converted into a fighter by leadership. A reserve force
gives him a rallying point.”
★
=Fear is Normal= _Colonel George Taylor, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “_Fear
of being afraid_ is the greatest obstacle for the new man in battle
to overcome. There is no reason for shame in being afraid. Men who
have had excellent battle records freely admit they are scared stiff
in battle. The important thing is that every soldier must be taught
all he needs to know so well that battlefield thinking is reduced to a
minimum; automatic, disciplined reactions to battlefield problems must
be the rule.
“In battle the worst element is mental and nervous exhaustion. There
is no real rest under fire. The ability to withstand fire is more
important than all the knowledge in the world.”
SICILY--ITALY--ATTU
NIGHT ATTACK
=Surprise Saves Lives= _Major John R. Patterson, Infantry, ~Sicily~_:
“The mission of our battalion after landing south of GELA in Sicily was
to capture the airport at BISCARI. The battalion used the _silent night
attack_. The three rifle companies were in line with the heavy-weapons
company in reserve. To reach its line of departure, the battalion
crossed two precipitous ridges using two control lines, then climbed
the cliff at the airport to the line of departure. All this was done
silently under cover of darkness.
[Illustration]
“The attack was started with a hand grenade. We didn’t fire until the
Germans counterattacked. We went in with bayonets and hand grenades
and caught some of the Germans undressed and dressing. The MK IV tanks
fired their guns but wouldn’t close on us. The enemy knew their men
were all about, so fired their machine guns and rifles mainly into the
air.
“The first counterattack came in two hours, and there was one about
each hour thereafter until 1600. They had all emplacements wired and
fixed with trip-wire booby traps. We removed the traps and used the
emplacements during counterattacks.
“We found a line of airplane bombs wired to blow up the area; we
de-activated them. A German plane landed just as we were ready to leave
the line of departure. Later, one of our men grenaded it.
“The battalion took no transportation. I had with me the S-3, one
runner, and one 511 radio.[A] The wire came up thirty minutes later,
but was not necessary.
[A] A twenty-pound, battery-operated, short-range
transmitter-receiver.
“I estimate the enemy had a reinforced battalion. His tanks and
self-propelled’s came up later. Some of the enemy were air personnel,
and there were about eleven AA guns set up for antipersonnel use.
“Our attack lasted thirty minutes. We had no casualties during the
attack; two were killed during the counterattacks.”
★
=Hand-to-Hand Fighting= _Captain Jarrold, Infantry_: “At BISCARI
AIRPORT I used my trench knife twice. One of my men got three with his
bayonet. He shot one, then another tried to grab his bayonet. He got
this one with the bayonet. That got him started, so he got three in all
before it was over.
=Small Arms Against Armor= “We found that caliber .30 AP pierces enemy
armored half-tracks at close ranges.”
★
=Platoon Action= _Lieutenant Hollerich, Infantry_: “Company A, moving
forward in darkness to participate in the BISCARI AIRPORT fight, ran
right into the enemy position. Before the fight started, my platoon
crossed the road just above a culvert and reached the south edge of
the airport, but I was ordered to take it back to a position just east
of the culvert. I wish I could have stayed where I was because it was
a perfect place from which to envelop the resistance in front of my
company.
“When the enemy machine guns opened up we threw grenades. The machine
guns pulled back out of grenade fire. Then NCO’s and Browning Automatic
Riflemen went up over the embankment, through and beyond the initial
enemy positions. Eventually we had a base of fire of about twenty men
including the BAR’s.
“During the enemy counterattacks we did pretty well with other fire,
too. Lead was flying fast and furiously at twenty to thirty yards. We
fire at flashes. In this kind of firing _you learn to fire and roll to
one side or they’ll soon get you_.”
“One of the corporals sneaked up on a dug-in vehicle and got it with an
’03 rifle grenade at 25 yards.
[Illustration]
“The ‘bazooka’ man of my platoon heard ‘Tanks to the right,’ went
around a bend in the road, and fired at about 35 yards. He got the
first of a pair of vehicles. A German officer tried to capture him with
a pistol, but he gave the officer an uppercut and then killed him with
his helmet. I don’t know how the other vehicle was knocked out, but one
of the BAR men got its driver.
=COMMENT: In these accounts of a successful night attack by a small
unit the application of the following principles is worthy of note:=
=_a._ Close control during the approach by the use of control lines
adjusted to difficult terrain features.=
=_b._ Designation of a Line of Departure as close to the objective
as possible and after all major terrain obstacles had been passed.
This is essential to assure proper organization of the unit
immediately prior to the assault.=
=_c._ Attainment of the vital element of surprise (Germans caught
undressed and dressing, airplanes landing on the field).=
=_d._ Use of the bayonet and hand grenades with no weapon firing
permitted. It may often be advisable to prohibit the loading of
rifles.=
=_e._ Use of frontal attack only. Any attempt at envelopment tends
to cause disorder and confusion. Note that one platoon which had
advanced ahead of the general line was pulled back to conform.=
=_f._ A definite and limited objective--capture of an airfield, in
this case--in which the entire front could be covered by manpower
rather than fire-power.=
=These are the major elements of a successful night attack brought
out in the foregoing account. Others not mentioned but which were
undoubtedly contributing factors in this operation are:=
=Careful planning in minute detail.=
=Precise, specific orders.=
=Careful arrangements for maintenance of direction.=
=Thorough daylight reconnaissance by as many of the leaders as
possible.=
=Use of compact columns in the approach formation until the Line of
Departure is reached.=
KNOCKING OUT PILLBOXES
_Colonel Rogers, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “The neutralization and reduction
of concrete pillboxes played an important part in the Sicilian
campaign. In the initial landing phases alone, this regiment cleaned
out over thirty of these pillboxes. They were located all over the
place as we went inland.
“They were cleverly constructed and elaborately camouflaged. Many were
covered with brush, grass, straw, or other natural stuff. Others had
cane houses built over them to represent peasant outbuildings or huts.
All those we encountered in and about villages and towns were covered
over with some kind of house to conceal them. Most of these were cane
or wood shacks, though some were actually covered with plaster or
stucco to represent real houses. Many had dummy houses built right over
the pillbox, and windows arranged to give full freedom of fire from the
embrasures of the pillbox inside the shell of the building. In the open
country a number were also built with hay ricks and straw stacks over
them, all very natural and innocent looking.
“Reduction of these often proved very simple, and in many cases the
enemy simply dug his own grave in his efforts at camouflage. When
we learned not to be surprised by them and recognized them for what
they were, we developed a very simple method of dealing with the ones
concealed by straw, hay, cane, and other inflammable material. We
dosed them freely with white phosphorus, especially from the attached
chemical mortars, and this did the work to perfection. We set the
camouflage on fire, blinded the gunners inside, and choked them with
the phosphorus and the smoke from the burning hay, straw, and other
material. The fire and heat, too, made the interiors untenable, and the
occupants would become terrified and come out and surrender in a bunch.
“In one place near LICATA there were several of these straw- and
hay-covered pillboxes, also some concealed with cane huts, arranged at
key positions in country covered with wheat fields and terraced grain
plantings. We simply set a first-class prairie fire with our white
phosphorus, and burned out a position over 2,500 yards long. We waited
until the wind was right and let them have it. Every pillbox was burned
out. The more difficult pillboxes that wouldn’t burn we attacked with
massed fire from mortars of all types, AT guns, and heavy machine guns.
In the case of very tough ones that were reinforced, we used ‘bazooka’
rockets and at times sent men up close under heavy covering fire and
knocked them out with bangalore torpedoes.”
=COMMENT: The use of fire is, of course, dependent on favorable
weather conditions. Careful coordination is also necessary to
insure that the resulting smoke does not interfere with the
operations and observation of adjacent units.=
INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE
The following cases of individual initiative and heroism during the
SALERNO landing were reported by the --th Infantry:
“_Sergeant Manuel Gonzales_, upon landing, discovered the position of
a German ‘88’ in the sand dunes near the beach. This gun was firing
on the assault boats as they landed. The Sergeant crept around the
position under machine-gun fire which set his pack on fire, and despite
the hand grenades being thrown at him. He then calmly tossed several
hand grenades into the gun emplacement, killing the crew and blowing up
their ammunition.
“Near PAESTUM _Sergeant John Y. McGill_ jumped on an enemy tank and
dropped a hand grenade into the open turret, killing all the crew.
“_Private Clayton I. Tallman_, on HILL 424, observed that the enemy
was attempting an envelopment of the left flank of his company. Taking
up a better position, he killed an enemy machine-gun crew with three
carefully aimed shots. In a few minutes he repeated the same action
when another enemy machine-gun crew appeared. He alone protected the
left flank of the company until the rest of the platoon arrived.
“_Private Burrell B. Reitch_ discovered that he and a group of five men
had been cut off from his company. He immediately organized them in a
defensive position on a small knoll. They repulsed three rushes by
the enemy, who were attempting to establish machine-gun positions on
the flank. Private Reitch was completely in command of the situation,
giving fire orders and shouting encouragement.
“_Staff Sergeant Quillian H. McMitchen_ was shot in the chest and
shoulder before his assault boat reached the shore. When the boat
beached, the landing ramp stuck and would not drop. The Sergeant,
despite his wounds, kicked the ramp loose and then led his section
ashore, continuing to direct their operations until he received a fatal
shot from enemy gun fire.
“Our men steadily moved ahead in the face of the intense fire and
cleared the beach as soon as possible. _Lieutenant Carey_, soon after
reaching the shore, was fired upon by three Germans armed with machine
pistols. He returned the fire, but his carbine jammed after killing one
of his adversaries. He then grasped his weapon as a club and advancing
in the face of their fire clubbed the second. He then physically
tackled, subdued, and disarmed the third German, taking him prisoner.”
=COMMENT: The ability of the individual soldier to grasp the
implications of the situation and take the necessary action
should be fully exploited. The results of combat are the fruits
of the combined efforts of individuals. ~Every soldier should be
indoctrinated with the idea that his individual action may be the
decisive factor in the final result.~=
ACTION ON ATTU
_Operations report, Regimental Combat Team_: “To fight the Japs in this
country our troops must stick to the high ground and not only outflank
but ‘out-altitude’ the enemy.
“Continuous movement is necessary to keep the spark in an attack. If
a machine gun covers one point, then a group not at that point must
continue to advance. When fire is shifted, the original group must
move. If even a platoon is entirely halted by the fire of enemy guns,
then the commitment of additional troops results, whereas by proper
coordination some portion of the platoon can be kept moving and the
force committed kept to a minimum.
“The tendency of lower commanders to commit reserves too early must be
curbed.
“Security cannot be overemphasized. Any movement or group on the
battlefield, even in rear areas, is subject to enemy action. In
this connection, consideration must be given to the protection of
medical installations. At present these are left unprotected, without
even individual arms for their personnel. In the event of any enemy
penetration through our front-line positions it is practically certain
that these installations will be hit.
“Aggressive patrolling, particularly to maintain active contact, is
of vital importance and can mean the difference between defeat and
victory. However, mere numbers of patrols will not solve the problem.
Special training in patrolling and organizing patrols must be
initiated. Commanders must plan to have reasonably fresh men available
for night contact. It is vital to organize patrol activity carefully
to insure that all lines are familiar with the routes of returning
patrols so that the danger of mistaken identity in the darkness will be
minimized.”
★
_Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General, ~Alaskan
Department~_: “It was apparent that the enemy was particularly
vulnerable to attack by units of our infantry which pushed forward
vigorously while the enemy was held down by artillery fire. Those
units which had learned to advance closely behind their own artillery
supporting fire had the greatest success.
“The Japs do not like our coordinated artillery fire nor do they like
our attacks with the bayonet. When under fire from small arms they stay
down in their holes and are easily approached. When attacking small
groups of foxholes, our troops were able to keep the Japs down by fire
from rifles and the Browning Automatic Rifle while some of our men
approached and dropped hand grenades into their holes. This was our
favorite mop-up method.
“When about to be run out of a position, the Japs seemed to feel it
necessary to counterattack. These attacks were not well coordinated and
were welcomed by our troops, who were able then to shoot down the enemy
in great numbers. These Jap counterattacks were of a suicidal character
and were pressed home regardless of losses until practically all of
the counterattacking troops were exterminated.
“The enemy may believe that, in such terrain, he can hold up the
advance of an entire battalion with three men and a light machine gun.
In fact, however, he is critically vulnerable to intelligent action by
officers and men who understand the necessity for immediate maneuver
against small parties of the enemy seeking to hold them up. The fact
was that small maneuvering patrols easily disposed of machine-gun
positions on reverse slopes behind mountain spurs, whereas any tendency
to lie down and call for artillery support would have resulted only in
tremendous wastage of artillery fire in attempting to seek out targets
which, in fact, were inaccessible to artillery fire.
“The ATTU action likewise indicated that standard Japanese infiltration
tactics can be offset by a system of ‘anti-termite’ patrols organized
behind our lines, protecting our artillery, command posts, and supply
lines. Wherever troops know that these friendly patrols are behind
them, fire in their rear will mean to them simply that our patrols are
exterminating the infiltrating Japs. This feeling was well expressed by
General Nathan Bedford Forrest [Confederate cavalry commander, Civil
War], when one of his staff officers approached him in great excitement
and said, ‘General, the enemy is in our rear.’ Forrest calmly replied:
‘If they’re in our’n, we must be in their’n.’”
THE SOUTH PACIFIC
SECURITY IN THE JUNGLE
=In Bivouac= _Report of Commanding General, 43d Division, ~New Georgia~
Campaign_: “Security in bivouac was a big problem in this New Georgia
operation. The Japs conducted harassing raids against our bivouac
areas with some success for a period of about a week. Our initial plan
had been adopted on the advice of other units experienced in jungle
warfare. It called for complete immobility at night, with grenades
and bayonets as the only defense weapons. Gun crews were directed to
fire only in the event of a major attack. However, we found that small
parties of Japs were able to filter into the battle areas and cause
some casualties without being seriously opposed.
“This situation was effectively corrected by using a close perimeter
defense. Men occupying these perimeter lines were ordered to fire at
known targets. Machine guns were so laid that final protective lines
covered the perimeter. The nature of the terrain and the type of night
tactics employed by the Japanese made the establishment of outposts for
security purposes inadvisable as visibility was limited to a few feet
from any given outpost. Two men occupied each foxhole, one remaining
awake and alert to all activity in his vicinity. Within the perimeter,
machetes were used from the foxholes against any enemy raiders who were
able to penetrate. This system effectively discouraged night raids.
=On the March= “March security adhered to established doctrine except
that distances between the elements of the column were greatly reduced.
Extremely limited visibility and the difficulty of moving through
the jungle off the trails nearly always prevented close-in security
detachments.”
★
JUNGLE NOTES
=Aggressive Action, Flexible Plans= _Report of 43d Division, ~New
Georgia~_: “Aggressive action is necessary. Never relax the pressure.
Maneuver of small units at the risk of temporary loss of communications
is important. Plans and orders must be so flexible as to permit prompt
maneuver change.
=Feeding the Troops= “The serving of any hot meals in jungle fighting
is often impracticable. A hot drink or hot soup serves the same purpose
and is much more within the realm of possibility.
“An issue of two canteens per man relieves the water problem a lot in
jungle operations.”
★
=Counterintelligence= _First Marine Division, ~Guadalcanal~_: “Due to
the amount of vital information we had taken from captured Japanese
message centers we decided at once that we wouldn’t make the same
mistake. Command post installations were usually in the foxhole of the
unit commander. Papers of possible value to the enemy were destroyed or
sent to the rear.”
SCOUTING AND PATROLLING
=Patrolling in the Jungle= An officer with considerable experience in
jungle patrolling gives this advice:
“Patrols are most likely to give away their presence in an area by
their footprints.
“Shine from the smallest metal surface, such as a belt buckle, or a
watch, must be avoided. A luminous watch constitutes a real danger.
“A white skin is most conspicuous, and _the practice of some patrol
members marching stripped to the waist is inviting trouble_.
“Dark clothing is essential.
“Any noise, such as talking, coughing, spitting, etc., has to be
treated as the greatest of all dangers.
“A man on patrol must learn to move silently, making every possible use
of natural cover.”
★
=Don’t Forget the “Where”!= _Colonel Liversedge, U. S. Marine Corps,
~New Georgia~_: In many cases patrol leaders were able to report what
they saw, but not _where it was seen_. In general, _such information
was valueless_ as locations could not be plotted on a map or aerial
photo. This should be emphasized in training programs and is worth a
special directive.”
★
=----or the “What”!= _Seventh Army Report, ~Sicily~_: “Men must
be taught _to recognize what they see_ when they are scanning the
landscape. Unless properly trained they will not recognize enemy gun
emplacements, strong points, and machine-gun nests.”
★
=Patrol Tips= _Staff Sergeant Richard E. Deland, Infantry, ~Sicily~_:
“I was not taught to observe properly nor how to use the message blank.
“Position and camouflage are more important than I learned in the
States. In training bear down on cover and concealment; bear down on
the avoidance of the blundering approach, on patrols, on fire and
maneuver--which are equally important.
“Battles move slowly; patrols can’t dash about.
“My battalion, instead of using ‘Scouts Out,’ used a full squad in
wedge formation to do the job.”
★
=Size of Patrols= _Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Walker, Tank Destroyer
Battalion Commander, ~Tunisia~_: “Many men were lost in Tunisia by
using squad patrols. The Germans used stronger patrols and just gobbled
them up. A patrol should be either a sneak patrol, small enough to
escape detection, or a combat patrol, large enough to fight its way out
of difficulty. Never allow one man to go out alone.
=Say It With Pictures!= “The value of hasty sketches illustrating
reconnaissance reports was proved many times during this campaign, but
it is difficult to get such sketches out of untrained personnel. All
reconnaisance personnel should receive sketching training.”
INFANTRY WEAPONS
IN JUNGLE WARFARE
The following comments on the use and effectiveness of infantry weapons
in jungle warfare appear in the report of the 43d Division on the MUNDA
Campaign--NEW GEORGIA:
=Basic Weapons= “The ~M1 rifle~ is doubtless the best all-around weapon
possessed by our troops. Its serviceability under existing campaign
conditions is excellent. Ammunition supply was adequate, since the
rifle was normally fired only at observed targets. The Japs possessed a
number of our M1 rifles, apparently considering them a superior weapon
to their own.
“The ~fragmentation grenade~ was used frequently against suspected
areas of heavy jungle growth and on some occasions for the destruction
of booby traps around perimeter defenses. Its effect when used as a
booby trap is questionable because of the long fuze time. _The Japs
used our grenades extensively in their night harassing raids against
our bivouacs._ Rifle grenades were used on some occasions with success
against enemy pillboxes.
“In spite of its handicap of sounding like a Jap .25-caliber light
machine gun, the ~Thompson sub-machine gun~ proved very satisfactory
for specialized personnel such as linemen, artillery forward observers,
vehicle drivers, and reconnaissance personnel. Its limited range made
it especially useful in combat in rear areas.
“The ~Browning auto rifle~ gave excellent service. This weapon has
high jungle mobility and provides excellent fire power for the
short-range targets frequently encountered. It has been used many times
to reinforce the final protective lines at night, to establish trail
blocks, to cover patrol advances, and to destroy snipers.
“The ~light machine gun~ proved very effective in the night security of
bivouacs. At other times, it was used to cover the advance of attacking
echelons by placing heavy fire in the direction of suspected pillboxes.
Since fields of fire and visibility were so limited the effectiveness
of such support was questionable.
“We did not use the ~heavy machine gun~ to any extent in the attack
in the jungle. This was mainly due to its weight and to its heavy
ammunition supply requirements. It was used primarily for the defense
of beachheads and water passageways, also to some extent in the defense
of regimental and battalion command posts.
“The ~60mm mortar~ was not effective against enemy pillboxes, although
it unquestionably contributed by its demoralizing effect on the enemy.
After we reached the outer taxiways of the airfield, we had excellent
visibility from ideally situated OP’s, and the disorganized enemy
presented many profitable targets for this weapon. _The exceptional
accuracy of the weapon made it very valuable in close support, and its
use during the assault on the revetments and shell craters at_ MUNDA
FIELD _and_ KOKENGOLO HILL _is credited with saving many lives_.
“The ~81mm mortar~ proved to be one of the most important single
weapons contributing to the success of this offensive. Because of
the difficulty of supply only two mortars were taken forward with
each heavy-weapons company, the balance of the personnel being used
as ammunition carriers. Troops frequently remarked that if given the
choice of rations or 81mm mortar ammunition, they would gladly take the
latter.
[Illustration]
“While the ~37mm AT gun~ is admittedly a weapon of opportunity in
jungle warfare, there were two occasions on which it served us
handsomely. The Nips had a field piece located where it could interdict
our beachhead at LAIANA. Scouts located the gun, but our mortar fire
couldn’t silence it. We disassembled a 37mm gun and carried it forward
under cover of the dense foliage. The gun was then assembled under
cover and moved rapidly to a point in the open from where it could
command the target. _Three accurately aimed rounds destroyed the gun
and killed its crew._
“On another occasion we picked up an enemy occupied pillbox about 600
yards from one of our OP’s. The 37mm gun was manhandled to a position
on the forward slope in only partial concealment. It placed accurate
and intense fire on the pillbox and completely destroyed it.
“The value of the 37mm gun was also proved by two episodes when the
enemy attempted to make night landings. First, one enemy barge was
fired on as it neared a landing on BOMBOE PENINSULA. Both HE and AP
ammunition were used, and the barge was heard to limp away, sputtering
badly. On another night a group of Japs approached the north coast of
SAGEKARASAS ISLAND in an assault boat. Antitank gunners held their
fire until the boat was nearly ashore, then fired several rounds of
canister. The boat was seen to sink and several bodies floated ashore
the next day.
=4.2″ Chemical Mortar= “The 4.2-inch chemical mortar company was
placed under the control of the Division Artillery and the fires of
the chemical mortars coordinated with artillery fires. These mortars,
employing a 25-pound high-explosive shell, were used successfully
with the artillery in firing preparations prior to an attack and in
firing prearranged fires such as area barrages to block enemy routes
and to disrupt barge traffic near WESTERN SAGEKARASAS ISLAND. One
prisoner stated that the mortar barrages were more feared by them than
artillery. The only criticism of the weapon is that the shell has no
delayed fuze; consequently, a great many tree bursts result from its
use.”
★
IN SICILY
=Advance Guard= _Captain Reed, Infantry_: “We have had considerable
success in using a platoon of heavy machine guns with each advance or
assault company. You need this increase of fire power right up there in
front. With the advance guard we put a platoon of machine guns right
up in the forward support. We also put a section of 37mm AT guns right
behind the advance party. The remaining section of AT guns is placed
behind the support of the advance guard. We place the 57mm’s and the
cannon company in the center of the main body.”
★
=Pyrotechnics= _Staff Sergeant Robert J. Kemp, Infantry_: “We want
lots of pyrotechnics for use in all kinds of situations to include
bedeviling the enemy. Sometimes Jerry puts on a pyrotechnic show that
just scares hell out of us; it would work on him too.”
★
=Miscellaneous Comment= _Various Small Infantry Unit Commanders_:
“~81mm mortar~: A perfect weapon. I like to use the alternate
traversing method.
“~60mm mortar~: We kept them right up in front and used them often.
“~Bazooka~: We have had no trouble with our bazookas. Have gotten
several tanks with them.
“~37mm AT gun~: Very mobile. It’s artillery; good against
anything--vehicles, pillboxes, personnel, houses. Gets in faster than
the mortar. If I had to throw away any heavy weapons, the ‘37’ would be
the last to go.
“~75mm self-propelled cannon~: Excellent for coordinated
attack--perfect. Too vulnerable to get very close initially.”
★
AT SALERNO
=The “Bazooka” Worked= _Operations report, --th Infantry_: “Several
tank attacks occurred which the Infantry fought off with their
‘bazookas.’ It became more and more apparent that this was really an
effective weapon. During this one day it destroyed seven enemy tanks.”
=COMMENT: Numerous reports indicate the effectiveness of the
“Bazooka” when used by trained personnel. It has been used
successfully against pillboxes, machine-gun nests, and personnel.=
INFANTRY-ARTILLERY TEAM
=Artillery “Close” Support= _Lieutenant Colonel McCormick, Field
Artillery, ~New Georgia~_: “Our infantry, finding themselves with a
mobile enemy on three sides and a swamp on the fourth, called for
defensive fires. A horseshoe of concentration fires was laid down
around them. Infantry commanders stated their willingness to accept
responsibility for any casualties resulting from these fires, which
were adjusted so close to the defensive positions that fragments were
received within the perimeter. The fires were continued throughout
the night with no casualties to friendly troops. _This fire was
credited with probably saving the force from disaster._ For some time
‘Concentration 110’ became a by-word with all infantrymen.”
★
=----and How It Worked= _Report of Operations, Munda Campaign, ~New
Georgia~_: “The best cure for the whistle-blowing, howling night attack
was a closely adjusted system of night fires placed around our troops.
The all-night firing of single batteries and sometimes a single gun
discouraged these attacks. What few were attempted after this system
was inaugurated were quickly stopped by short bursts of fire at maximum
rate in the vicinity of the unit being attacked and along the front of
adjacent units.”
[Illustration]
=Massed Fires= _Lieutenant Colonel James, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “Our
division artillery was never out of support for more than five minutes
throughout the whole campaign. We’ve got a wonderful set of battalions
in our division artillery, and we have worked so closely together that
they are as much a part of our outfit as our own battalions. They
keep right up on our heels all the time, and that is just what we
have got to have. I don’t know what we could have done without them.
They leapfrogged their batteries continually and went into some of
the damndest positions I have ever seen, and delivered the goods. We
just can’t praise them too much. They were always right there when you
needed them.
“In one place where we just couldn’t get forward because the Heinies
were on superior ground and had us pinned down with rifle, machine-gun,
and mortar fire, the division artillery massed nine batteries on them
and plastered them with 1,500 rounds in less than thirty minutes. We
then walked through that position without a scratch, and the German
dead were all over the place.”
INFANTRY-TANK TEAM
=Opportunity Lost= _Captain Putnam, Infantry, ~Sicily~_: “The infantry
should be given practical training in cooperation with tanks. I don’t
mean the armored infantry--they’re part of the armored division and
work with them all the time. I mean ordinary infantry like us. I know
our regiment didn’t have any training with tanks in preparation for
combat. At BRANIERI we just didn’t know how to work with the attached
tank unit. When our tanks came up to support us after we had broken
up the German attack, we did not follow up the tanks properly as they
went forward. _Had we done so we could have cleaned out almost a
battalion of Germans._ We had not been trained to work with tanks, and
we remained in position after they went forward. _If we had known how
to go forward with them we could have done a much better job and could
have gotten all of the Germans’ vehicles and matériel._ After this
experience, we strongly recommend that all infantry be given practical
training in cooperation with tanks in action. Get the infantrymen used
to tanks and how to fight together with them.”
=Lesson Learned= _First Marine Division, ~Guadalcanal~_: “The initial
assault by our five tanks across the field east of our 3d Battalion
lines at the ‘Battle of Bloody Ridge’ on GUADALCANAL was entirely
successful. They caused much havoc among the enemy and returned
unharmed. Within an hour, they attacked again over the same terrain.
Meanwhile, the Japs had had time to move 37mm AT guns into position
along the edge of the woods at the eastern side of the field. These
guns knocked out three of our tanks during the second assault. It thus
proved extremely unwise to launch a second attack over the same route
and terrain. This is especially true if there is sufficient elapsed
time for the enemy to move AT guns into position.”
★
=Infantry-Tank Attack= _Lieutenant Colonel Perkins, Tank Battalion
Commander, ~Italy~_: “Shortly after landing at SALERNO we attacked a
hill south of the town of OLIVETO. The attack was up a winding road.
The medium tanks moved down into the bottoms at the foot of the hill
into a covered position and covered the light tanks as they went up.
As the light tanks went up the hill both the lights and mediums fired
on the enemy infantry. When they spotted enemy soldiers going into
buildings the mediums took care of the buildings, leaving the light
tanks to take care of the infantry and the machine guns. Both the
lights and mediums stayed until the infantry took over.
“The ‘rush-to-battle’ idea is wrong. Here we _creep_ up. Each tank
should overwatch another tank; each section should overwatch another
section; each platoon another platoon.”
RANGER TRAINING
=Buddy System= _Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby, Commanding Officer
of Rangers, ~Italy~_: “In our work we use the ‘Buddy’ system--the men
always work in pairs. They live in pairs, eat in pairs, do guard in
pairs--even do KP in pairs. Confidence in each other is developed. They
can pick their own buddy from within their platoon.
=Realism= “In our training we never do anything without battle noises
and effects. We always use live ammunition. We use mines, barbed wire,
and protective bands of machine-gun fire extensively. If the problem is
to capture a machine-gun nest, there is always a machine-gun nest there
with a machine gun firing in a fixed direction. The men very quickly
get accustomed to having live ammunition flying around them.
“Captured Italian and German machine guns and machine pistols are used
by the ‘enemy’ in our problems. Our men quickly learn to distinguish
between the fire of our own weapons and that of enemy weapons. Also the
‘enemy’ makes constant use of flares.
“We always carry our normal load of ammunition with weapons loaded. If
a man knows his weapon is loaded he will be more careful in handling
it. Accidental discharge of a weapon automatically means a fine and
immediate reduction to the grade of private. In our work, we must take
drastic measures to guard against accidental discharge of weapons. We
learned our lesson in Tunisia, _where the accidental discharge of a
rifle queered a raid and caused a 24-hour delay in operations_. [See
comment on this subject following “Night Attack.”]
=Recognition= “We use colored flashlights with the light dimmed down
for recognition purposes in night work. Different colors are used, and
we usually have a certain light signal for recognition; for instance,
‘A’----which would be a dot, dash. It gives a man great comfort and
confidence when working at night, especially in towns, to receive a
recognition signal when he needs one.
=Formations= “We use a column formation for approach and assault
movement at night. From experience, I believe it is the best formation
to use at night. We do not attempt to use prominent terrain features
to keep direction. We use pacing, compass bearing, and stars. Usually
in advancing to attack at night we halt to check position every 1,000
yards. We start moving again by radio signal over the SCR 536[B] or by
runner.
[B] A 5½-pound “Handy-talkie” transmitter-receiver.
“It is necessary to arrange for collecting your men together again
after the raid is over. To do this I have men stationed along a line
through which men will pass at intervals in their withdrawal. The
sentinels on this line stop and collect the men into groups as they
withdraw.
=Cooking= I prefer to have men cook their own meals with their mess
kits. We did not have kitchens in Sicily, and we have been here a month
without them. Even though the kitchens are available I always have men
individually cook at least one meal a day.
=Physical Conditioning= “One of our best means of physical conditioning
is speed marching, finally reaching a point where we march ten miles at
a rate of six miles an hour. To keep in condition we use calisthenics
and a daily five-mile speed march.
=Discipline= “Disciplinary drills are all important. We have a retreat
formation daily, conditions permitting. At this formation men are
inspected and some manual of arms performed, followed by retreat. Every
Sunday morning there is a review, followed by inspection in ranks, and
then inspection of camp or quarters. We have at least four periods a
week of close-order drill and manual of arms, and one period every week
is devoted to military courtesy.
“Infractions of discipline, military courtesy, and uniform regulations
are dealt with quickly and severely. The officers must bear down on
these things. The Army in general has not stressed strict discipline
enough. Without it you are lost.”
[Illustration:
PHOTOGRAPH BY U. S. SIGNAL CORPS
_“Long Tom” in Action_]