Under this head are included the whole of that class of objections which
extend from the direct assertion of the impossibility of miracles to the
affirmation that even if their possibility is conceded, they are so
extremely improbable that it is a violation of the first principles of our
reason to believe in their actual occurrence. They are alleged to be
violations and contradictions of the laws of nature, and as such to be
incredible, as the stability of its laws is founded on a universal
experience. This unquestionably forms the most formidable difficulty in
the way of the acceptance of miracles, as actual occurrences, at the
present day, and therefore demands a careful consideration.
The question of the abstract impossibility of miracles need not occupy us
long. Such an affirmation can only be made on the assumption that our
reason is inadequate to affirm the existence of such a being as a personal
God. If this can be established, the whole argument is ended for all
practical purposes. It may be conceded that the occurrence of some
anomalous event as a bare objective fact is quite possible, even on the
principles of pantheism or atheism. But such objective fact would be no
miracle in any sense in which the word can be used in this discussion. If
the evidence was sufficiently strong to attest it as a fact, it would be
explicable on the supposition of some unknown force in nature, or even as
a purely chance occurrence. A miracle, in any sense in which it enters
into the present argument, is not only an abnormal objective fact, but one
which takes place at the bidding of a moral agent. It is the union of
these two which imparts to a miracle any power to attest a revelation. If,
therefore, there is no evidence of the existence of a God, miracles may be
pronounced impossible for all practical purposes in this controversy, and
we need not further discuss the question.
The whole argument as to whether the occurrence of a miracle is or is not
contrary to reason must proceed on the assumption of the existence of a
personal God. It is also a proposition so clear as to render all proof of
it superfluous, that if a personal God exists who has created the universe
and governs it by His Providence, miracles are possible.
First, I observe that a miracle cannot be pronounced incredible, on the
ground that it is an effect without an adequate cause. On this point I may
refer to the high authority of Mr. Mill, that the idea of a miracle
contradicts no law of causation. “In order,” says he, “that any alleged
fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be
not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect,
for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that this happened in the
absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged
miracle the objection is the very opposite of this. It is that the effect
was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence, of a counteracting
cause, viz., a direct interposition of an act of will of some being who
has power over nature; and in particular of a being whose will being
assumed to have induced all the causes, with the powers by which they
produce their effects, may well be supposed able to counteract them.”
(_Logic_, vol. ii. p. 167.)
A miracle therefore may not be the result of the action of any force which
falls within the range of our knowledge. It may be necessary for its
performance to neutralize the action of all existing forces by the calling
into energy of more powerful ones. But their operation need not even be
suspended. An adequate force, or power, or cause (it matters not by what
name we call it) is present to effectuate the result; viz. the power which
rules the universe, _i.e._ God. As Mr. Mill justly observes, the only
question which can be raised if the existence of God is assumed, is, not
the want of the presence of an adequate cause, for the supposition pre‐
supposes the presence of one, but the want of will on the part of God to
bring about the result. Thus it may be fairly argued that God will not
work a miracle, from the fact that He has not done so in the course of
previous observation.
It has been frequently affirmed that a miracle is an act which is contrary
to the laws of nature, or a violation of them, or a suspension of them, or
a violation of the order of nature; and that its occurrence is therefore
incredible, as being contrary to reason. A miracle need involve neither of
these. The laws of nature as conceived by physical science are a set of
antecedents followed by a set of invariable consequents. A miracle does
not interfere with this. Its very conception involves a new antecedent
followed by its consequent. The utmost that can be urged is that we have
never before witnessed the presence of that particular antecedent and
consequent, or that the antecedents which we have witnessed have been
followed by totally different consequents. The only mode in which such a
law could be violated would be, if a particular antecedent was present and
no other capable of modifying its action, and it failed to be attended
with its proper consequent. But this is not involved in the conception of
a miracle.
Let us now suppose that the expression “laws of nature” is extended so as
to comprise the forces of nature as well as its invariable sequences. Such
a use of the term is very common. In this point of view, it is impossible
to affirm that the laws of nature are violated by the performance of a
miracle. This could only be the case if they were made to produce the
opposite results to those which they actually produce. Thus, if a boiler
were filled with water and a fire kindled under it, and no other force was
present capable of neutralizing the action of the fire; if, instead of the
temperature of the water being raised, it gradually froze, there would be
a clear violation of the laws of nature, _i.e._ its forces would cease to
produce their usual results. But there is nothing in the idea of a miracle
that involves this. It postulates the presence of a force or forces which
are adequate to counteract the action of those already in existence, and
to produce the adequate result.
It will be objected that we have never recognized the existence of such
forces in our previous experience. Such an objection would be valid only
on the assumption that there is no force in the universe besides those
which have been already recognized by us. This, however, science will in
the present state of our knowledge hardly venture to affirm. Besides, it
is contrary to the supposition with which we started, viz. the existence
of a power able to control nature, that is, God.
Nor is the assertion correct that the performance of a miracle necessarily
involves even a suspension of the laws of nature. This may be the mode of
the divine acting; but it is most important to observe that it by no means
follows that it must be so. A miracle may be performed by the introduction
of a force which has sufficient power to counteract the forces of nature
even while they are in the fullest operation. To take an illustration: It
has been frequently said that the force of gravity must have been
suspended in favour of Peter’s body when he walked on the water, and in
favour of that of our Lord when he ascended into heaven. But this is by no
means the case. The mere suspension of the law of gravitation would not in
either case have effected the results in question. The presence of other
forces was necessary. The law of gravitation might have been in the
fullest operation, and the miracle might have been performed by the action
of other forces adequate to neutralize it. The narrative itself implies
that this force was so far from being suspended, that it was in full
operation at the time when the miracle was performed, for the moment the
power which supported Peter’s body ceased to act he began to sink.
But further: even if we assume that any natural forces have been suspended
in the performance of a miracle, we are not called on to assume their
general suspension, but only in favour of the particular case in question.
This observation is rendered necessary because it has been frequently
urged against the possibility of miracles that their performance must have
thrown the whole mechanism of the universe into confusion, and involved an
extensive reconstruction of the processes of nature. This would
unquestionably be the case if the working of a miracle involved the
difficulty in question. But I have shown that it need not involve even the
suspension of any natural law whatever, and if such suspension took place
in any particular case, the force might have been acting with full energy
everywhere else.
The counteraction or modification of one force by the agency of another is
an event which we witness every day. The force of gravity is in the
fullest operation whenever we lift a weight from the ground—it is not
suspended for a single moment. The ability to modify the results of the
action of one force by the agency of another, or to combine many forces so
as to produce a definite result, constitutes the essence of all mechanical
contrivance. The self‐determining power of the human will is that which
calls all these particular modifications of existing forces into activity.
By means of it, the entire aspect of external nature has been changed from
the appearance which it would have presented, if no other agency had
existed besides the forces of nature which belong to matter. Man has been
a power manifested in the midst of them. I am quite aware that he can
create no new force, and that he can only control or modify the action of
those which exist, but is never capable of suspending them. Yet this power
has produced marvellous results on the external world, so that it presents
a wholly different aspect from that which it would have done if the forces
of nature had simply continued acting uncontrolled by the influence of
mind. Even in material nature itself, we meet with repeated instances of
such modifications of the results of one force by the action of another,
as for example when the force of gravitation is counteracted by that of
magnetism, or of capillary attraction. The action of no force is
suspended, it is only modified.
The assertion therefore is inaccurate which affirms that the performance
of a miracle involves the suspension of a single force in nature. It is
consequently so far no violation of any natural law. All that the idea of
it involves is the presence of a force which is capable in a particular
instance of counteracting the action of those forces which would produce a
contrary result if left to themselves. It is quite unnecessary for us to
determine, in reference to the subject under consideration, whether the
result may be brought about by a combination of forces which energize
within the visible sphere of things, or by bringing into action some
latent force, or one which only occasionally manifests itself, or by the
immediate action of the divine mind, which, having in itself all the
forces necessary to produce the universe, must possess those which are
necessary to effect the miracle.
It is a fact worthy of observation that in the case of the miracles
recorded in the Bible, the materials out of which the new results were
produced already existed in nature, as in the miracle of the
multiplication of the loaves and fishes. No act of creation was necessary.
All that was required was the presence of a force or forces, able to build
up these materials into the forms in question. God does this in ordinary
course by what we designate natural forces, by means of which corn is
grown and flesh produced. Can it be pretended that no other forces are
under the control of, or exist in God, which are able to produce these
results in a different manner, even while the ordinary forces of nature
continue in activity?
It has been further urged that a miracle involves a violation of the laws
of nature, because as it cannot be effected by any of the forces of nature
with which we are acquainted, the presence of an unknown force adequate to
produce one must be a violation of the laws of nature.
I reply that any apparent force which this objection may possess is due to
an ambiguous use of the word “law.” It is here used to denote the order of
the various occurrences in nature, and not its antecedents and invariable
consequents. If there are forces in nature beyond those with which we are
acquainted, how can their action be a violation of nature’s order? If God
is always present energizing in nature’s forces, how can any fresh putting
forth of his energy be a violation of nature’s laws? In a certain sense of
the words the order of nature may be said to be violated whenever one of
its forces is modified by the action of another, that is to say, an order
of events results from the modified action different from that which would
have resulted from the unmodified one. In this sense man is daily
violating the order of nature. But this has no bearing whatever on the
question at issue.
It will perhaps be urged that the resurrection of a dead man, or the cure
of a man born blind by a word is a violation of the laws of nature.
Whether this be so can only be determined when we are acquainted with the
means by which such an event may be brought about. The assertion itself is
a mere general statement that, as far as human observation has gone, dead
men have never returned to life; and that blindness has never been cured
at any person’s command.
But with respect to a resurrection it may be objected that it is an
observed fact amounting to a complete induction, that all men die and that
after death has taken place it is a fact no less universal that with the
exception of a few alleged instances to the contrary no resurrection has
ever taken place. It may therefore be said to be a law of nature that all
men die, and that death is followed by no resurrection. This, however, if
put into other language amounts to the following proposition. That it is a
law of nature that these results must follow, as long as the present
forces which we observe and no others are in energy. But it would cease to
be so as soon as any others capable of producing such a result were
brought into activity. The truth is that death is a phenomenon which is
caused by the joint action of a multitude of natural forces. But if these
were overborne by any force of nature, or by the Author of nature calling
any unknown force into activity, or even by the energy of his own creative
will, it would be absurd to call such an event either a violation of the
laws or of the order of nature, and therefore to affirm that it was
incredible. Death is the result of the action of the natural forces which
we observe around us. No natural force with which we are acquainted can
effect a resurrection. If it be affirmed that in this sense a resurrection
is contrary to the laws and order of nature, the expression is ambiguous
and misleading, for it is intended to be inferred that such a violation
would be contrary to reason and therefore incredible.
But the affirmation that a miracle is contrary to the order of nature
requires further consideration. What do we intend to affirm when we speak
of an order of nature or of an event being contrary to it?
In a scientific sense the order of nature can only mean the results of
forces energizing in conformity with invariable law. Every event which
occurs is the result of a combination of such forces and the product of
their joint action. These results necessarily follow an orderly
arrangement; _i.e._ the orderly result always occurs when precisely the
same antecedents and no other are present, and is invariably altered
whenever the antecedents are modified to the precise extent of the
modification. As far then as the results in nature are the effect of known
forces unmodified in their action by other forces, they follow a definite
order. Thus all the motions of the heavenly bodies present themselves to
the scientific mind as the perfection of order, because they are the
results of the action of known forces acting in conformity with invariable
law. Whenever a fact is observed which deviates from the order which these
known forces would produce, the action of another force which has hitherto
been unknown is inferred. The order of nature therefore means that the
same forces always produce the same results. There is nothing inconsistent
with this in the correct conception of a miracle. Viewed as a physical
event only, it would be due to the action of a force which has hitherto
been outside the sphere of our observation.
It is clear therefore that whenever a fresh combination of forces takes
place, their combined action will modify the result, and a very different
order of events will take place from that which would have resulted from
their unmodified action. Such modification therefore must produce a
different order of nature from that which would have otherwise resulted.
But such modifications frequently take place through the agency of man. It
therefore follows that man has the power of effecting modifications in the
order of nature, without causing any violation of nature’s laws.
But various other influences, and among them those usually designated as
chances, exert a powerful influence in changing the order of nature. It is
necessary that its forces should not only be combined, but combined at the
right time and place, or the effect which is due to their combination will
not take place; _i.e._ a different order of natural events would have
happened. An illustration will make this clear. Let us take the case of a
disintegrating rock; according as the different forces, which act on it,
meet at the suitable time and place, the progress of disintegration is
greatly lengthened or shortened. Such concurrences of events are what we
view as pure contingencies. _E.g._ water penetrates into one of its
fissures; this takes place in summer, and no appreciable result follows.
But if in winter a frost happens immediately afterwards, it will produce
an order of events widely different from that which would have happened if
either no rain had fallen or frost occurred. By their joint agency the
fissure is widened, or the rock split asunder. It follows therefore that
the concurrence of these two forces is necessary at a particular time and
place to produce the particular result. Such concurrences, though due to
natural causes, are what we call fortuitous. Yet their occurrence or non‐
occurrence occasions a different order of natural events.
Further, let us suppose that a bird with a seed in its mouth, in the
course of its flight casually drops it into a fissure in the rock, which
has been opened by the frost; and also that another concurrence of forces
has supplied the conditions suitable for its taking root and growth. This
produces a new series of events, which occasions a more rapid
disintegration, and modifies the whole of the results which follow. If the
casual act of the bird had taken place at any other time or place, the
whole series would have been different, varying with the causes which
produced the seed, and the contingencies which brought the bird to the
spot, and induced it to drop it. Let us now suppose that man with his
rational agency intervenes. He deliberately watches for the prospect of a
frosty night, pours water into the fissures, and plants seeds in fissures
where he knows that suitable material has been prepared for their growth.
Here a new order of events has been introduced, which, originating in
human agency, entirely modify the order of the results.
It is important to observe that all theories which attempt to account for
the production of living organisms by the principle of development are
compelled at almost every step of the process to postulate the concurrence
of forces of this description at the suitable time and place to render
their production possible. These must have taken place in past time in
numbers passing all comprehension. In the case of many vegetable
structures the result has been entirely modified by the contingency of
some insect choosing to enter one flower and not to enter another; and
according as this takes place a wholly different order of events follows.
Whether we choose to designate such concurrences of events at the suitable
time and place fortuitous or not, the law which regulates them is wholly
unknown, even if they are regulated by law. So far it is impossible to
affirm that these results follow a known and definite order in nature. The
concurrence of two or more such causes introduces a new series, and
occasions a break in the previously existing order of nature.
Still more completely has this happened when man with his reason and
powers of volition is introduced on the scene. It will doubtless be
objected by our materialistic philosophers, that the forces which energize
in mind act with the same uniformity as those that energize in matter, and
that volition exerts no appreciable influence on the results of our
actions. These theories, however, contradict the experience of an
overwhelming majority of mankind. Such as do so require that the strongest
proof should be given before their truth can be considered as established.
Such proof certainly yet remains to be given. Its advocates, however, tell
us that it will be forthcoming at some future time. In the meanwhile the
fact is sufficient for our purpose that man is capable of acting on nature
and of producing most important changes in the results of the action of
its forces. This being so, it is certain that an order of events takes
place through the interference of man, quite different from that which
would have taken place apart from his interference. But these
interferences take place in conformity with no known law, and their
results occasion a break in the previously existing series of events, by
the introduction of a new one. Man, therefore, is capable of interfering
with and effecting changes in the order of nature. It will be objected
that all the agencies by which such results are brought about are forces
energizing in nature in conformity with invariable law, and consequently
that the order of nature is preserved intact. It is unquestionably true
that the actual forces at work are forces in nature. But there is another
principle at work which interferes with the regular course of their
action, and brings out a series of results quite different to that which
would have been produced if they had not been interfered with. This is
man’s reason and intelligent volition. It is impossible to reduce the
action of this to any known law of invariable sequence. It follows
therefore that man is a power either in or out of nature, which is capable
of interfering with the order of the results of its material forces, or,
in the language of those with whom I am reasoning, of violating the order
of nature.
But it will be further objected that man in his action on nature can only
use or combine such natural forces as come within his knowledge; and this
proves nothing about the possibility of the action of a power outside
nature which is able to employ its known and unknown forces for the
purpose of producing such results as miracles. I answer that this
objection can have no validity unless it is first assumed that man is a
portion of nature in the sense in which we are now speaking of it. But the
proof of this has certainly yet to be given. By the word “nature,” as it
is used by this philosophy, is meant the sum total of known material
forces, acting on matter in conformity with invariable laws; that is to
say, of forces which are devoid of intelligence and volition. It is
impossible in this sense of the word to include man in it, until his
entire intellectual and moral being can be shown to be the result of
material forces. Nor even if this could be done, would it avail for the
present argument; for however it may have originated, man’s power to
modify the action of material forces is an existing fact, and produces
results quite different in kind from the action of the unintelligent
forces of nature.
The fact that the mind acts through a material organism, and is incapable
of calling into existence any new force, does not alter the position above
taken. I am quite ready to take either of the following alternatives. Man
is either in nature, or he is outside of it. If he is in it, then a power
exists within it which is capable of compelling its unintelligent forces
to effectuate the determinations of rational volition. If he is outside
nature, then a power exists outside it which is capable of effectuating
these results. It follows, therefore, that in either case a power exists
which is capable of modifying the order of nature. Now it would be absurd
to deny that whatever man can effect, God is able also to effect; and that
He is so much the more able, in proportion as His knowledge is more
perfect. Whether, therefore, God works in nature, or outside it, a power
exists which is capable of varying the order of nature without
interrupting the action of any of its forces, or violating its laws. He
also must have other forces at His command beyond those which are known to
man, and can combine them and thereby modify their action in conformity
with His pleasure. He must also be the primary force everywhere underlying
nature, which imparts to every other force its energy and power. It
follows that He can work a miracle without even suspending any of the
existing forces of nature, and that the allegation that miracles are
contrary to reason, because they are contrary to nature, and a violation
of its laws and order, is disproved.
I will now proceed to adduce examples of these contradictions to our
reason which are said to be involved in the occurrence of a miracle, for
the purpose of illustrating the confusion arising from the various senses
in which the words “nature” and “natural law,” and other similar
expressions have been employed. Although the instances will be taken from
the opponents of Revelation, I by no means wish to imply that they alone
have been guilty of this ambiguous use of language. Its defenders are
equally obnoxious to the charge.
After quoting a brief passage from Dr. Newman, the author of “Supernatural
Religion” urges the following objections: “Miracles are here described as
‘beside, beyond, and above’ nature, but a moment’s consideration will show
that in so far as these terms have any meaning at all, they are simply
evasions, and not solutions of a difficulty. If the course of nature be
interrupted in any way, whether the interruption be said to proceed from
some cause which is said to be beyond, or beside, or above nature, it is
certain that the interruption is not caused by nature itself; and every
disturbance of the order of nature, call it by whatsoever name we may, is
contrary to nature, whose chief characteristic is invariability of law. It
is clearly unnatural for the ordinary course of nature to be disturbed,
and indeed were this not the case, the disturbance would be no miracle at
all.”
It is by no means my purpose to defend Dr. Newman’s use of the
expressions, “natural,” “beside nature,” “beyond nature,” or “above
nature.” But while the author criticises Dr. Newman, it is clear that in
this passage he has fallen into a number of very singular confusions of
thought.
First: The words “nature” and “natural,” are used as though they had one
clear, simple, and invariable meaning, whereas in this passage they are
used so as to include phenomena which widely differ from one another. We
are not told what is included under the term “nature,” whether it is
restricted to matter, its forces, and its laws, or whether it also
includes mind and all its phenomena. When we speak of interruptions in the
order of nature, we usually intend it to be assumed that volition is the
cause of these interruptions. This being so, the author has included in
nature phenomena which differ so widely from one another as those of mind
and matter. He then speaks of the chief characteristic of nature being
invariability of law. The laws and forces which regulate matter are
distinguished by this invariability. But the action of mind is very
different. All men habitually speak of some portions of it as capricious.
Whether they are so or not, nothing is more certain than that many of our
mental phenomena have not been reduced to the action of known laws.
When, therefore, such expressions as “beside, beyond, and above nature,”
and “natural,” are used, I ask what nature is intended? Is it matter, its
forces and laws; or mind, including the principle of volition; or both? If
man is included in nature, then there is a power in nature which is
capable of controlling other portions of nature, and even of acting on
itself. If man is excluded from nature, then there must exist a power
outside nature, which is “beyond and above nature,” and is capable of
acting on it. But if by nature is meant the sum total of all the forces
which exist, whether material or immaterial, then it is clear that a power
must exist in nature which is capable of controlling the forces of
material nature, and of compelling them to effectuate its purposes.
Whichever point of view we take of it, the objection falls to the ground.
But, says the author, “If the course of nature be interrupted in any way,
whether the interruption proceed from a cause beyond, beside, or above
nature, such interruption cannot be caused by nature; and every
disturbance in the order of nature is contrary to nature.” This passage
seems to imply that an interruption in the order of nature cannot proceed
from nature itself. But this is certainly incorrect. Natural forces, that
is to say, material ones, modify one another; and by their combined
action, they produce a series of events quite different from what would be
the result of their separate action. Such a new series of events is to all
intents and purposes an interruption of the previous order of nature and
the introduction of a new one. Such results are produced by fortuitous
combinations taking place, in the manner which I have already illustrated,
at the right time and place. The fortuitous combination of forces in
nature is capable of producing a new order “contrary to” the previous
order of nature.
This, as I have shown, is still more evidently the case if we include the
phenomena of mind in nature.
But it is affirmed, “if the interruption be due to a cause either beyond,
beside, or above nature, the interruption cannot be caused by nature.”
This is of course a self‐evident truth. But then it is inferred that such
interruption is a disturbance of the order of nature; and that every
disturbance of its order is contrary to nature. The inference which the
reader is left to draw, and which is directly stated in other parts of the
work, is, that what is contrary to nature is contrary to reason; that a
miracle is thus contrary to nature, and therefore contrary to reason.
I observe that, although the interruption here referred to cannot be
caused by nature (for it is contrary to the conditions of the case that it
should be), yet it by no means follows that it is a breach of the order of
nature in any other sense than that which I have already discussed. Such
disturbances occur every day. It is, therefore, misleading to designate
them as contrary to nature, as they neither necessarily suspend any
natural force nor violate any natural law. I have already proved that
there is nothing in such disturbances, or, if we persist in so designating
them violations of the order of nature, that is contrary to reason. Such a
use of the terms “course and order of nature” is full of ambiguities and
certain to betray us into fallacious reasonings.
But, adds the writer, “it is clearly unnatural that the ordinary course of
nature should be disturbed.” Here the ambiguity of the expressions used,
and the consequent fallacy of the reasonings, are brought to a
culmination.
What, I ask, is intended by the ordinary course of nature? Is it the
invariable action of its forces, or the invariable sequences of their
results, or the orderly arrangement of its parts; or does it include mind
and all its phenomena, of the precise nature of the forces, laws and order
of which we are ignorant, and its action on the physical universe? What,
again, is the precise meaning which can be attached to the word
“unnatural” in such a context, where it is evident that its meaning must
vary according as we include in nature one, several, or all of these
phenomena? If by the word “unnatural” the meaning intended to be conveyed
is unusual or impossible, it is then clearly not unnatural that the course
of nature should be interrupted in the manner I have previously pointed
out. Nor if man is included in nature, is it unnatural that the results
produced by its physical forces should be greatly modified by his action?
The remark of the author in connection with this subject is perfectly
true, that a grain could never of itself, nor according to the law of
natural development, issue in a loaf of bread; but it is wholly aside from
the issue which he raises. It is unquestionable that forces purely
physical could not effect this result; but does it follow from this that
the production of a loaf of bread is an event contrary to nature? The
result can only be produced by the combination and controlling of a number
of material forces by human reason. The grain of wheat must be planted by
man at the proper season. It must be cared for by him. Various physical
forces must contribute to the growth and development of the plant. The
ears produced must be reaped in harvest‐time. This process must be
repeated until the grains are sufficient in number to produce our intended
loaf. Then they must be threshed, ground, prepared for the oven, baked. In
one word, the miller and the baker must be invoked to control, combine,
modify and give a new direction to the forces of nature under the
direction of intelligence. All this involves something more than the
action of material forces. The forces of nature carry on the work to a
certain point. Then man takes it up and interrupts their order, although
he does so by compelling other forces to effectuate the purposes of his
will. The ordinary course of material nature is disturbed in the
production of a loaf of bread. A new order of events is introduced. Man is
either within or without nature. In either case a power exists which is
capable of producing innovations in its order.
But how stands the case of the feeding of five thousand persons on seven
loaves and two fishes? The seven loaves and two fishes had been previously
produced, by the action of material forces out of materials already
existing in the ground, in water, and in the air. Of such materials there
was abundance at hand to produce the requisite amount of food for the
feeding of the multitude. The only question was how to build them up into
the forms of bread and fish. There was no occasion to create one single
particle of matter. As to the nature of the forces employed to work the
miracle the narrative says nothing. Nor does it imply that one of the
ordinary forces of nature was suspended on the occasion. All that it
asserts is the presence of a force adequate to build up the materials
already existing into the forms of bread and fish, that force being God.
In the manufacture of the loaves and in the catching of the fish, man had
interfered with nature’s order by the blending of her powers. God
interfered with nature’s order at a higher stage by building up the
particular forms of bread and fish out of materials already in existence,
by means of forces differing from those which come under our cognisance.
The act of man is evidence of the presence of a being who is able to
control the forces of external nature for his own purposes. The miracle
would be evidence of the presence of a Being who is able to exert a
mightier influence over them in order to effect his own.
Equal ambiguity prevails in the use of the term “law.” What do we mean by
law when we apply the term to nature? In physical philosophy, the Duke of
Argyll tells us it is used in a great variety of senses. Its proper
meaning is to denote an invariable sequence of phenomena. It is frequently
made to include the conception of the forces at work which produce the
phenomena. This ambiguous use of the word has been a source of endless
confusion. The following quotation will furnish us with an example:—
“If in animated beings we have the solitary instance of an efficient cause
acting among the forces of nature and possessing the power of initiation,
this efficient cause produces no disturbance of physical law. Its
existence is as much a recognised part of the infinite variety of form
within the order of nature, as the existence of a crystal or a plant; and
although the character of the force exercised by it may not be clearly
understood, its effects are regulated by the same laws as govern all the
other forces of nature. If the laws of matter are suspended by the laws of
life, each time an animated being moves any part of its body, one physical
law is suspended in precisely the same manner and to an equivalent degree,
each time another physical law is called into action. The law of
gravitation, for instance, is suspended by the law of magnetism each time
a magnet suspends a weight in the air. In each case a law is successfully
resisted precisely to the extent of the force employed.... No exercise of
will can overcome the law of gravitation or any other law to a greater
extent than the actual force exerted, any more than a magnetic current can
do so beyond the action of the battery. Will has no power against
exhaustion. Even Moses in the sublimest moments of faith could not hold up
his arms to heaven after his physical force was consumed.” P. 44, vol. i.
First: it is alleged “that an efficient cause” (man for example) “acting
among the forces of nature, and possessing the power of initiation,
produces no disturbance of physical law.” What is here meant by
disturbance of physical law? It is plain that physical forces would work
out a wholly different result apart from the action of man upon them.
Though he suspends no physical force, the action of man has produced an
order of events in nature different from that which would have taken place
without it, but by balancing one against the other he modifies their
action. What is more, he possesses a power of self‐determination. Other
forces are unintelligent. Man is an intelligent force capable of
introducing an order of nature quite different from that which the
material forces of nature would have produced without his intervention.
Next: we are told that the existence of man “is as much a recognised part
of the infinite variety of form within the order of nature as the
existence of a plant or a crystal.” I again ask, what nature? Is the order
spoken of that of blind unintelligent forces, or does it include
intelligence and free agency? Unless man is a blind unintelligent force,
although he be supposed to exist within nature, he belongs to an order
wholly different from that of a plant or a crystal. To assert the contrary
is to assume the whole question. The results produced by intelligent
volition differ completely in character from those effected by the
unintelligent forces of nature. The one follows an order of necessity: the
other of freedom. The affirmation that the results of the latter belong to
the same order as those of the former is directly contrary to facts.
Again: “the laws of matter are suspended by the laws of life.” If laws are
the invariable sequences of phenomena how is it possible that one law can
suspend another law? It is not even true that one force can suspend
another force. All that it can do is to neutralize its action. Physical
philosophy is constantly attributing to laws what can only be true of
forces, and even frequently ascribes to them what is only true of
intelligent forces. It must never be overlooked in this controversy that
the laws of nature can effectuate nothing. Forces, not laws, produce
results. The following sentence will be a correct expression of a truth,
if we substitute “force” for “law:” “The law of gravitation is overcome by
the law of magnetism each time a magnet suspends a weight in the air.”
Immediately after, we are told that the arm falls in obedience to law. It
falls by the force of gravitation. When theologians use metaphors of this
description they are charged with anthropomorphism. Such a charge is
equally valid against the language in which physical philosophy expresses
itself.
Again: The author affirms “that the solitary instance of an efficient
cause, if it be distinguished from the other forces of nature by the
possession of an initiatory impulse, is from the moment when that power is
exerted subject to physical laws like all other forces; and there is no
instance producible, or even logically conceivable, of any power whose
effects are opposed to the ultimate ruling of the laws of nature. The
occurrence of anything opposed to these laws is incredible.” p. 48.
What is meant, I ask, by “the intimate ruling of the laws of nature”? Even
if we substitute forces for laws, the meaning is sufficiently obscure.
Probably the expression is intended to mean the combined result effected
by the energy of all the forces in nature. If these include all mental as
well as all material forces, then the assertion is a simple truism, that
nothing can be contrary to itself. But if they exclude mental force, then
the results which they produce are clearly opposed to the ultimate ruling
of the forces of unintelligent nature. Numerous instances are not only
logically conceivable, but actually producible. The occurrence, therefore,
of anything opposed to the ultimate rulings of these unintelligent
physical forces is not incredible. It is perfectly true that man can only
produce results through the agency of these physical forces; but he can
modify their results, and so use them as to make them the means of
effectuating his purposes. It is quite true that nothing can occur opposed
to the forces of nature; that is to say, that, while the force of
gravitation is in energy, and no other force is present capable of
overcoming its power, the ascension of a human body into heaven is
impossible. But who has ever affirmed that it was possible? Those who
affirm that an ascension has taken place, also assert that another force
was in active energy, which was capable of counteracting the force of
gravitation. This assertion, therefore, is totally irrelevant to the point
at issue.
The consideration of the next question before us may very properly be
introduced, by quoting the following passage of the same author:
“Our highest attainable conception of infinite power and wisdom is based
on the universality and invariability of law, and inexorably excludes as
unworthy and anthropomorphistic any idea of its fitful suspension.”
This at once raises the very important question, whether there is anything
in the performance of a miracle inconsistent with the divine character and
perfections. It has been often alleged by those who deny the possibility
of miracles, that God energizes in the universe in conformity with
invariable laws, which express the uniform mode of the divine working.
From these, as the result of his wisdom, He will never deviate. To alter
or vary from this mode of acting implies that the machinery of the
universe, through which He acts, is imperfect. The supposition that He has
worked a miracle therefore involves the assumption that He has ceased from
one mode of action and adopted another; or, in other words, that the
forces of the universe fail to effectuate his purposes; or that the whole
machine has got out of order and requires rectification. Any action of
this kind in the case of a Being possessed of all power, is a reflection
both on his wisdom and his immutability. Still further: it is affirmed by
some that the love of order is an attribute so inherent in Deity, that it
is inconceivable that any alteration in the existing order of the universe
should take place under his government.
One objection raised in the above quotation I may dismiss summarily, viz.
the idea that God interposes with any fitful interventions in the
universe. The idea of fitful intervention is quite foreign to the
conception of a miracle, which is described in the New Testament as one of
the means by which he realizes his deliberate purposes. I shall elsewhere
disprove the allegation that Revelation is an intervention of the Creator
to rectify a miscarriage in his creative work.
It will also be desirable in this place to answer the charge of
anthropomorphism so frequently urged against the defenders of
Christianity. When they speak of God as a person, they are charged with
manufacturing a gigantic man. When they ascribe to Him a moral character,
or describe Him as acting in nature, they are then accused of making a God
out of a number of conceptions which are purely human. This fault, if it
be one, must be shared alike by philosophers, men of science, and
theologians. The plain fact is, that man has no conceptions but human
ones. To abandon these is to cease to think altogether. When philosophers
and men of science speak of nature, they are obliged to apply to it
conceptions which are strictly true only of man. We are obliged to do
precisely the same with respect to God. So far all thought, the most
elevated and the most ordinary, is anthropomorphic. The term can be fairly
used as a reproach only when certain material conceptions or degraded
passions are directly affirmed to exist in the divine mind.
The author, in the following passage, places the objection before us in a
still more striking light: “Being therefore limited to reason for our
feeble conceptions of the divine Being of which we are capable, and reason
being totally opposed to an order of nature so imperfect as to require or
permit repeated interference, and rejecting the supposition of arbitrary
suspension of law, such a conception of the Deity as is proposed by
theologians must be pronounced irrational, and derogatory to the wisdom
and perfection which we recognize in the invariable order of nature. It is
impossible for us to conceive the supreme Being acting otherwise than we
actually see in nature; and if we recognize in the universe the operation
of his infinite wisdom and power, it is in the immutable order and
regularity of all phenomena, and the eternal prevalence of law that we see
their highest manifestation.”
It is asserted by this writer and a great number of others, that the most
perfect conception of the universe is that of a machine, which when once
set into action shall go on eternally grinding out its results without the
smallest occasion for the intervention of its Maker. According to this
view, all the He has to do for the future after the machine is once set
into operation, is to retire from the scene of His creative work, and to
contemplate the results of its wonderful operations. Any intervention on
His part would imply a defect in the construction of the machine. It
follows therefore that the most perfect conception of God (if there be
one) is that of a perfect mechanist and chemist, who has originally formed
matter with its properties and forces acting in conformity with invariable
law, and that this has been done by Him with such perfection, that they
have gone on ever since evolving whatever has existed, without the need of
His intervention or supervision; or to put it in other words, after the
original act of creation, His presence in the universe may be dispensed
with as unnecessary. The universe is therefore a self‐acting machine which
goes on in an eternal series of self‐evolutions.
Such a conception may be the most worthy one that we can form of a perfect
mechanist or chemist, though it may be doubtful how far the idea of having
his services dispensed with for the future would be wholly satisfactory to
him. It is far from clear, however, that it is the most perfect conception
we can form of God. The creations of the mechanist and of the chemist are
destitute alike of feeling, reason and volition, a moral nature,
conscience, and spiritual affections. They may therefore when completed be
left to themselves; and the more perfect the irrational machine may be,
the more perfectly it will grind out its results. But many of the
constructions of God possess attributes, which exhibit other qualities in
their maker than those of a perfect mechanist or chemist. It follows,
therefore, that this is not the most perfect nor the most worthy
conception which we can form of God.
But it will be objected that even if we concede that the Creator is ever
present energizing in the works of nature, and even if the forces of
nature are viewed as the expressions of His energy, His action in
conformity with unchanging order is the worthiest conception of Him, and
to assert that He ever has varied from this mode of action is to degrade
Him. Such being the case, to affirm that miracles have been wrought by
Him, is to introduce a degraded view of the character of God, one alike
inconsistent with His wisdom, immutability and power.
I reply: that the objection overlooks the existence of purpose in the
divine mind, and that it may not be confined to the realization of a
mechanical result. The purpose or idea of creation in God includes the
production of both the material and the moral worlds. If this be so, one
harmonious purpose, including the divine manifestations, both in the
material and moral universe, may be carried out by a succession of
progressive manifestations, each forming a portion of one great divine
plan. A miracle, therefore, as a part of such a moral intervention, would
be no interruption of the orderly action of the divine mind, but a portion
of it.
But further: if God exists, He must have other attributes besides those of
a mechanist or a chemist. He has created not only the material universe,
but a moral one. God, therefore, must be a moral being, and a person, for
moral attributes can only be conceived of as belonging to a being who is
possessed of personality. It follows, therefore, that manifestations of
Himself, under aspects suitable to moral beings, are as much to be
expected as manifestations of His power or of His wisdom addressed to an
intellectual nature. The supposition, therefore, that all His
manifestations can only be made through the laws of material nature, and
in an unchanging series, and that it is not a portion of His purpose to
manifest Himself as a moral being, is only valid on the denial that He is
one. It involves the absurdity of denying to God that freedom from the
trammels of necessary law which as matter of fact He has bestowed on man.
If therefore God be a moral being and not an impersonal force, it is
perfectly consistent with the highest conceptions of Him, that He should
manifest Himself in the moral as well as in the material universe. This is
the more necessary, because philosophy is never wearied with telling us,
that we can know little or nothing of His moral attributes from material
nature. As a part of such manifestation a miracle is addressed to our
highest reason.
It is absurd to argue on the assumption that there is a God, and then to
found our reasonings on principles which are inconsistent with it. If
there is a God, He must be the creator of the universe. It must,
therefore, have been consistent with His perfection and immutability to
create. It follows, therefore, even on the assumption of the truth of the
Darwinian theory of creation, that a new order must have been introduced,
when God first breathed life into the lowest forms of matter. But if He
introduced a new order then, that is to say, when He first deviated from
the previous order of His existence, and performed His first creative act,
how can it possibly be contrary to reason to affirm that He has repeated
it. A miracle would be such a repetition, or, in other words, the
introduction of a new series of events.
I fully admit that reason is opposed to the supposition of such an order
of nature as to require repeated interferences with it, assuming that what
is intended is a frequent meddling with it to set it right, not constant
presence and superintendence. Still more is it opposed to the idea of
arbitrary interruption of law. The entire validity of these reasonings
which we have been considering proceeds on the assumption that the
argument requires this. I care not what some Christian apologists may have
said on this subject. The New Testament affirms in the most unequivocal
language that revelation is the steady carrying out of a pre‐determined
purpose in God to make a manifestation of Himself not only to man, but to
other rational beings besides man. The objection therefore falls to the
ground.
The assertion that it is impossible to conceive of the supreme Being
acting otherwise than we see him act in nature, may be met by a direct
denial. On the contrary the presence of evil, moral and physical, forms
the greatest difficulty connected with the belief in theism. The elder
Mill was so capable of conceiving that if a supreme Being existed, the
order of the universe would have been so wholly different from its present
order, that it led him to affirm that the proof of His existence was
altogether wanting.(3) But intelligent Christians fully recognize in the
immutable order and regularity of the universe and the eternal prevalence
of law, the operation of His infinite wisdom and power. Unless there was
such a general regularity and order in the universe, the evidential force
of miracles would be deprived of all value.
It follows therefore, whichever views we may take of the mode in which a
miracle may be performed, that there is nothing in the idea of it which is
contrary to our reason. Whenever it is affirmed to be so, the assertion
originates in an ambiguity in the use of terms, or in partial views of
nature, or of the mode of the divine working, or from confounding under a
common name phenomena so different in character as those of mind and
matter, or by making assumptions respecting the divine operations which
contradict the laws of the universe, or respecting the divine character,
which reason refuses to endorse. How far the known or unknown forces of
nature may be employed in the performance of a miracle is an abstract
question that we have no means of determining. The agency of some of the
known forces of nature is unequivocally asserted in the Old Testament to
have been the media employed in the performance of some of its miracles.
No such affirmation is made in the New Testament. Still there is not one
word to imply that any of the forces of material nature were for a single
moment suspended in their action. The only assertion made is the presence
and active energy of a force capable of producing them. That force is the
Creator of the universe bearing witness to the divine mission of Jesus
Christ. “The Father himself, which hath sent me, hath borne witness of
me.” “The works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works
that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me.” (John v. 36,
37.)