UNKNOWABLE GOD.
The proof on _à priori_ grounds that an event is either possible or
probable, cannot establish that it has actually occurred. This must rest
on its own particular evidence. To prove that a revelation is both
possible and probable, and that it ought to be evidenced by miracles, may
form an essential portion of our general argument, because the degree of
probability of the occurrence of a particular fact affects the amount of
positive evidence necessary to establish its truth. But the proof that a
revelation has actually been given, or a miracle wrought, can only be
effected through the same media as those through which other facts are
established. To prove that a revelation is probable will not be of the
smallest avail to prove that one has been actually given, without adequate
proof of the fact itself.
Still the examination of the antecedent question is in this case
particularly important, because modern unbelief boldly affirms that a
revelation and its attestation of miracles are both impossible and
incredible. If this can be demonstrated, the discussion of the evidence
that can be adduced for them as facts is a useless expenditure of our
reasoning powers; for no evidence can prove the occurrence of that which
is impossible. It may be assumed, however, that those who make this
affirmation are not quite satisfied as to the cogency of their reasonings;
because, after having demonstrated, as they allege, that miracles are
impossible, they proceed to attack the evidence of those narrated in the
Gospels, and pronounce it worthless. As, therefore, the opponents of
Christianity boldly affirm that both a supernatural revelation and
miracles are impossible, it is necessary that the defender of Christianity
should examine the validity of the assertion.
Our opponents constantly charge us with reasoning in a circle, or assuming
the fact which ought to be proved. To avoid even the appearance of this, I
lay down the following positions:—
If direct atheism is a just conclusion from the phenomena of the Universe,
it follows that a divine revelation is impossible. Nor are miracles in any
proper sense of the word less so, because they are not merely facts
occurring in external nature, but facts in the production of which we
recognize intelligence and will. With the principles of atheism the
occurrence of an extraordinary event is quite compatible, because as it
cannot rise to any higher knowledge than that of phenomena, the knowledge
of the invariability of past phenomena is incapable of giving the fact
that all future phenomena will resemble the past. Still the occurrence of
a fact, however extraordinary, would not constitute a miracle, and would
prove only the existence of an unknown force in the universe, or the
predominance of chance.
The same remark is equally applicable to that form of modern atheism which
does not affirm that no God exists, but contents itself with the denial
that there is any evidence that there is one.
Nor is the case altogether different with regard to pantheism. According
to this system, God is only another name for nature, which works out every
form of fleeting existence for itself in an unceasing round of unconscious
self‐evolution. The essence of its affirmation is, that God has no
conscious personal existence, but that He is only another name for the
blind unconscious forces of the universe. Such a being (if it is possible
to conceive of it as a being at all, or as a unity) is everlastingly
making a revelation of itself by a ceaseless evolution of phenomena, the
result of the blind action of its inherent forces. But to whom? Obviously
only to beings capable of reason and consciousness, whom it (I dare not
say, He) has evolved out of its own bosom, and will again resolve into
unconsciousness. Prior to their evolution this mighty τὸ πᾶν must have
been everlastingly making manifestations of itself, without a single being
in existence capable of recognizing them. Whatever be the result of such
theories in a logical point of view, it is evident that if pantheism be a
rational account of the order of the universe, a revelation and miracles,
in any sense in which such terms can bear meaning, are impossible.
No less applicable is the same remark to that form of pantheism held by
Mr. Herbert Spencer, which, while it affirms the existence of a cause of
all things, as alike required by the demands of philosophy, science, and
religion, yet affirms that He is unknown and unknowable, and that every
thing which is knowable, although a manifestation of that great unknown
cause, yet conveys no idea of Him that the intellect can apprehend. In one
word, the unknown cause of all things is inconceivable, and incapable of
becoming the subject of rational thought. The intellect cannot help
assuming the existence of this cause of all things; but all that it can
affirm of him is, that He is unknown and unknowable; and that everything
within the bounds of our knowledge, though it may represent some mode of
his existence, cannot be he, or like him. With respect to this theory,
while it cleverly evades some of the harsher difficulties of pantheism and
atheism, it is not too much to say that it is a civil way of bowing God
out of the universe, of which He is alleged to be the cause. He can
neither be a person, nor have wisdom, nor be benevolent, nor be capable of
conscious self‐manifestation; because all these conceptions are limited
and finite. All that we can know of Him is, that such a cause exists
beyond present phenomena; and that we are condemned respecting Him, to a
profound and perpetual ignorance. It is possible to designate such a being
by the name of God, but it would be to use the term in a sense peculiar to
those who thus employ it. Such a God is a bare abstract conception of the
intellect, void of all moral value. It is sufficient for my present
purpose to observe that it is impossible for the unknown and the
unknowable to make a revelation of himself. Consequently St. Paul’s
affirmation with respect to the unknown God at Athens, “Whom therefore ye
ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you” (Acts xvii. 23), is untrue. To
such a God a revelation of Himself, and miracles to confirm it, are alike
impossible.
It is evident, therefore, that if either of these principles can be
demonstrated to be a true account of the nature of things, all further
discussion as to the truth of a revelation or of miracles is useless. Let
us take the most favourable hypothesis, that of Mr. Spencer. It concedes
that the necessities of reason compel us to assume the existence of an
unknown cause of all things, which may be called God. But He is
unknowable; He is inscrutable. No conception of Him can be realized in
thought; it follows, therefore, that no revelation of such a being can be
made to the finite intellect of man, for if a revelation of Him could be
made, He cannot be unknowable. This being so, the person who attempts to
reason out the truth of Christianity is placed under a difficulty.
Christianity assumes the existence of a personal God, possessed of moral
attributes. This is the very truth, the evidence of which these systems
assert to be wanting. The Christian advocate, therefore, has only two
courses before him: First, To assume, in conformity with the all but
universal belief of mankind, that a personal God exists; and then to argue
for the truth of Christianity, and to answer the objections urged against
it. When we do this, objectors affirm that we beg the question. Or,
Secondly, To prove the existence of a personal God; and then to argue for
the truth of revelation. If he adopts the latter course, he is compelled
to adduce the proof on which the belief in theism rests, and to answer the
objections to it—or, in other words, to compose a bulky volume, before he
can get at the immediate subject of inquiry.
Now I affirm that the defender of Christianity is no more open to the
charge of begging the question when he assumes the existence of a personal
God as the foundation of his reasonings, than the author of a treatise on
trigonometry is, who takes for granted the truth of Euclid’s propositions.
The author of the work to which I have already referred does his utmost to
fasten on the modern defenders of Christianity the charge that they begin
and end in assumptions. I will not deny that much ambiguous language has
been used on this subject, but I trust I shall show that the charge is
utterly unfounded. I must briefly notice a few of his reasonings.
At page 68 he writes as follows: “Dr. Mozley is well aware that the
assumption of a ‘personal’ God is not susceptible of proof; indeed, this
is admitted in the statement that the definition is an assumption.”
An assumption, I ask, in what sense? Is it a simple assumption without
evidence, taken for granted for the bare purposes of argument; or is it
one which, though taken for granted in the present case, rests on a
substantial basis of evidence previously established, and which bears the
same relation to the question of miracles which the truths of Euclid do to
those of trigonometry? The latter is the fact though the mode in which the
writer puts it implies the former. Without referring to the authority of
any particular author, is he not fully aware that theists maintain that
their belief in a Personal God rests on a basis of proof which commends
itself to their reason? Have not numbers of men, endowed with the highest
powers of intellect, accepted it as satisfactory? Yet he seeks to imply
that, after all, it is an assumption. It is true that in the argument for
miracles we take it for granted; but we do so, because the proof has
commended itself to our highest reason.
I admit that Dr. Mozley has used, in speaking of this subject, language
which I cannot but think is wanting in precision. Still it does not bear
the meaning that this author seeks to fasten on it. “It is then to be
admitted,” says he, “that historically, and looking to the general actual
reception of it, this conception of God was derived from revelation. Not
from the first dawn of history to the spread of Christianity in the world
do we see in mankind at large any belief in such a Being.” The learned
author then states, at considerable length, the philosophic and vulgar
views entertained of God, and shows their inadequacy and imperfection, and
concludes as follows: “But although this conception of the Deity has been
received through the channel of the Bible, what communicates a truth is
one thing, what proves it is another.” He then proceeds to summarize the
general proof.
I cannot think this statement altogether free from ambiguity. Whatever may
have been the precise forms in which the ideas of the vulgar or the
philosopher were embodied, there is strong proof that a higher and better
conception of God, though indefinite and indistinct, underlay them all.
The most degraded polytheist has indistinct conceptions of a Supreme God
above all the degraded objects of his worship. It seems to me impossible
that such a conception of God can have been attained from revelation. It
may, in a certain sense, be said, looking at the precise form in which it
is embodied, that it has been derived by us historically from the Jewish
race. But it must have had a prior origin. St. Paul considered that the
material universe manifested His eternal power and Godhead. The primitive
form of all the great oriental religions contained in them the idea of
God. It is simply absurd to affirm that they derived it from the Bible. It
is true that the existence of a primitive revelation anterior to the Bible
has often been assumed to account for this knowledge, but this is a bare
assumption of which we have no proof, and whose only basis is conjecture.
Judaism and Christianity have been instrumental in widely spreading
correct conceptions of the Deity and dissipating false ones. Yet if the
conception had not existed in the mind at least implicitly, no formal
revelation could have put it there, for every such revelation must be
conveyed in language, and all language is meaningless, unless the mind can
realize its conceptions. The assertion, therefore, that the conception of
God has been first communicated through the channel of the Bible, and is
afterwards proved by reason, seems to me to be one not devoid of danger.
On the contrary, our belief that God exists is the very pre‐condition of
our being able to believe that He has revealed Himself. This conception
revelation may modify, invest with a higher moral character, and import
into it definiteness and precision, but it cannot create it. It is on such
grounds that the author in question seeks to involve his reasoning and
that of all other defenders of Christianity in a vicious circle. I fully
admit that the conception of God has been elevated and purified by the
influence of Christianity, and that the teaching of Christianity on this
subject is in conformity with our highest reason. But it is absurd to
affirm that this is reasoning in a circle, and that the Christian argument
involves reasoning from Theism to Christianity and from Christianity back
to Theism.
The following passage, cited by Professor Mozley from Baden Powell, is
referred to by this author as a proof that all our reasonings on this
subject are a simple argument from reason to revelation, and from
revelation to reason. The passage itself is a clear statement of the
grounds of the charge, and requires our careful consideration. “Everybody
may collect from the order and harmony of the physical universe the
existence of a God; but in acknowledging a God, we do not thereby
acknowledge this peculiar or doctrinal conception of a God. We see in the
structure of nature a mind, a universal mind, but still a mind which only
operates and expresses itself by law. Nature only does and can inform us
of mind in nature; but in no other sense does nature witness to the
existence of an omnipotent Supreme Being. Of a universal mind out of
nature, nature says nothing; and of an omnipotence which does not possess
an inherent limit in nature, she says nothing either. And therefore that
conception of a supreme Being which represents Him as a spirit independent
of the physical universe, and able from a standing‐point external to
nature, to interrupt its order, is a conception of God for which we must
go elsewhere. That conception is attained from revelation, which is
asserted to be proved by miracles. But that being the case, this doctrine
of theism rests itself upon miracles, and therefore miracles cannot rest
on this doctrine of theism.”
It will be necessary carefully to point out the inaccurate reasoning of
this passage.
First: The author speaks of nature as another expression for the forces,
laws, and phenomena of the physical universe, and for these alone. To this
I have no objection, for it would greatly conduce to clearness if it was
always confined to this meaning. But while he uses it thus, he nowhere
tells us in what relation man, including his faculties, intellectual and
moral, and above all, his will, stands to nature. Are they included in, or
excluded from it? Do they, or do they not, form a part of it? If they are
included in nature, then there are other facts in nature bearing on the
being of a God, beyond those on which the author reasons. If they are
excluded, then the reasoning is inadequate to sustain his conclusion. Our
reasonings respecting God are founded not only on the forces and laws of
physical nature, but on man, his reason, his conscience, and his will.
What makes this fallacy the more plausible is that the term nature is very
frequently used to include man, as well as the forces and laws of the
material universe.
As far as the physical universe is concerned, the mind infers the
existence of a God from its order and its harmonies; that is to say,
having observed that order and harmony have been produced by intelligence
within the sphere of our own observation, and being deeply convinced on
other grounds of reasoning that they are incapable of resulting from any
other source, we infer that the results we behold in nature are due to a
similar principle which we experience in ourselves. Such an inference is
not due to simple observation of the order of the universe only, but
unites with it an act of reasoning founded on our own self‐conscious
being. But the intelligence which produces order, as far as we are
cognisant of it, is invariably united with will. We therefore infer from
the order and harmonies of nature, not simply the conception of a God,
such as the God of pantheism; but, if they are valid to prove anything at
all, of a God who is possessed of intelligence adequate to arrange the
order, and of purpose adequate for its production. If the inference of the
existence of a God from the works of nature is valid, it must be of a God
possessed of the attributes in question, for all our inferences on such a
subject derive their validity from applying to them the analogies of our
reason.
It is quite true that in the structure of the material universe we see
only the indications of a mind operating and expressing itself by law;
that is to say, we observe in the physical universe no instances of its
violation. But WE, that is the reasoning, rational beings, whether
existing in nature or outside it, have inferred from the structure of the
universe the existence of mind, and we know of no mind which is not
possessed of conscious intelligence and will. If our reasoning from the
order of the material universe is valid to prove the presence of mind,
which is a conception entirely derived from our consciousness of
ourselves, it must be equally so to prove the existence of purpose and
volition, for we know nothing of mind which is devoid of these attributes.
The material universe proves that its order and harmony is the result of
the action of mind; but it cannot prove that the mind which produced this
order and harmony is unable to introduce a different one. But if our minds
form part of nature, then they are a proof that the author of nature has
produced something else in nature besides the order and harmonies of the
physical universe. If they are outside nature, then we have direct
evidence of the existence of beings outside and above nature, _i.e._ above
the physical forces of the universe. It follows that if finite beings
possessed of intelligence and will, exist within nature or without it, a
God who possesses similar powers may exist also.
In a narrow and restricted sense it may be quite true that nature, _i.e._
matter and its phenomena, only informs us of the presence of mind in
nature, the partner and correlative of organized matter. But let us here
guard against a latent fallacy in this mode of statement. We learn the
presence of mind, not from material nature, but by the application of our
own reason to the investigation of what its phenomena denote. This is
overlooked in the above argument. It is perfectly true that as a mere
matter of phenomenal appearance, we do not actually behold in natural
phenomena manifestations of mind acting outside nature. In fact we do not
see mind at all, but simply infer its presence from the phenomena before
us through the agency of our own reason; and this inference carries along
with it all the other attributes of mind.
The writer before me is one of those who affirm that the utmost our minds
can infer from the contemplation of nature, in which he includes every
species of vital organism, is the presence of order and harmony; and that
any inference that its phenomena testify to the presence of adaptation,
contrivance and design is invalid. I reply that this affirmation is only
valid on the assumption of a principle which altogether denies that from
natural phenomena we can infer the existence of mind. But we also observe
in natural phenomena, and above all in animal and vegetable structures,
that the results effected are produced, not by simple forces, but by the
careful adjustment of many, or by one counteracting and qualifying the
action of another, and by forces intersecting one another at precisely the
right time and place. Had any of these occurred otherwise, the result
would have been different. Throughout nature we observe innumerable
instances in which various forces have thus combined to produce a definite
result. This we usually designate by the word “adaptation.” Adaptation
implies intelligence and purpose. We are quite as much justified in
ascribing this purpose to the power manifested in nature, as any other
quality whatever, even the possession of mind.
I fully concede that natural phenomena and even the phenomena of the mind
of man, only testify directly to the existence of a power adequate to
their production, and that we cannot directly infer from them the presence
of omnipotence. But this is to quarrel about words. For the power
manifested in nature and in man is so great that the human mind can make
no distinction between it and omnipotence; or in other words, it justly
infers from its manifestations that the power which could originate this
universe and all things in it must be capable of effecting anything which
is possible. To this mind, whether in or out of nature, our reason
ascribes the attributes of intelligence and will. Such a power it is
incapable of conceiving as inherent in material forces; it therefore
assumes that this power exists outside nature, and is capable of
controlling it.
It follows therefore that the reasoning is fallacious, which asserts that
the conception of a supreme Being which represents Him as a spirit
independent of the physical universe, and able from a standing‐point
external to nature to interrupt its order, is a conception which we must
seek from revelation, and cannot be arrived at by any exertion of our
rational powers on the facts of nature and of man. Its apparent
plausibility has arisen solely from ignoring the presence of man, either
in nature or outside it, and neglecting to take the facts of human nature,
man’s reason, conscience and will, into consideration. To affirm that,
independently of man’s moral and intellectual being, physical nature, its
forces and laws, can prove nothing, is a simple platitude. We have not to
go to revelation for the principles on which we reason, but to man, and
the phenomena of his rational, self‐conscious, and voluntary agency. It
follows, therefore, that the affirmation that in conducting the Christian
argument we reason from God to miracles and from miracles to God, is
utterly disproved. Yet the writer before me has ventured to affirm that,
when we commence with the being of a personal God as the groundwork of our
reasonings, we begin and end with a bare assumption.
The philosophical writings of Dr. Mansel are also pressed into the service
for the purpose of discrediting the evidences of Christianity, and, I own,
with considerably greater reason. Mr. Herbert Spencer has also invoked
them in confirmation of his theory that God is unknown and unknowable. He
refers to them in the following words: “Here I cannot do better than avail
myself of the demonstration which Mr. Mansel, carrying out in detail the
doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, has given us in his ‘Limits of Religious
Thought.’ And I gladly do this, not only because his mode of presentation
cannot be improved, but because writing as he does in defence of current
theology, his reasonings will be more acceptable to the majority of
readers.”
Before referring to Dr. Mansel as an unquestionable authority on this
subject, it would only have been candid in both writers to have informed
their readers that not only have his principles been repudiated by a
considerable number of Christian writers as unsound, but they have been
carefully examined by that eminent atheistic philosopher, Mr. Mill, who
gives it as his deliberate opinion that they are founded on fallacious
principles. It is absurd to urge principles, though they have been
maintained by an eminent Christian writer, which an eminent unbeliever has
pronounced unsound, as a clear and conclusive argument against
Christianity.
The work of Dr. Mansel may be described as an attempt to prove the truth
of Christianity on the principles of the most sceptical philosophy. It may
be briefly stated thus: Reason is incapable of forming any idea of God as
He is, whether as the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause. All the
conceptions which we can frame on the subject are mutually self‐
destructive. On similar principles our conceptions of His moral attributes
are wholly inadequate to inform us of His real perfections. It by no means
follows that our human conception of benevolence or justice is a measure
of the divine benevolence, or of divine justice; and so of His other
attributes. It is affirmed that because they are the attributes of an
infinite Being, they lie beyond the possibility of being realized in human
thought. Consequently, holiness in God may admit of very different
manifestations from holiness in man. Upon these principles, which affirm
the inadequacy of the human intellect, even to conceive of anything as it
exists in God, it follows that our only possible conceptions of God are
relative; or, to use the word chosen by the author in relation to
Christianity, regulative; _i.e._ fitted to regulate our conduct, but not
to illuminate our understanding.
Upon the assumption that reason, when it attempts to analyse our ideas of
the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause, lands us in hopeless
contradictions, Dr. Mansel arrives at the conclusion that it is incapable
of forming any conception of God as he actually exists. It follows as a
necessary consequence from this, that even by revelation we are only
capable of attaining relative ideas of Him, and that these relative ideas
do not represent His real nature, but are only regulative of conduct,
_i.e._ we are to act upon them as if they were true. _E.g._ God is
revealed as holy. Our only conception of holiness is our human conception
of it. But we cannot know that this is an adequate measure of the divine
holiness. God is declared to be benevolent. We have no conception of
benevolence but that which is derived from the human mind. So likewise
with respect to justice. But benevolence and justice as they exist in God
may differ from these qualities as they exist in man. The same thing
follows as a necessary conclusion from Dr. Mansel’s premises with respect
to all the other attributes of God. Nothing will better illustrate the
position to which this argument reduces us than to apply it to the
truthfulness or veracity of God. All that we know about truthfulness is as
it exists in finite beings, that is, in men. But God is an infinite being.
It follows therefore that truthfulness in man is no adequate
representation of truthfulness as it exists in God, that is to say, that
the divine veracity may differ from our human conception of it. This is
certainly a very startling position.
If, therefore, these principles are correct, acquiescence on the part of
man in the divine character is impossible. It is impossible to love a
being who does not present to us the aspect of loveliness; or to reverence
one who does not present to us an aspect capable of exciting this emotion;
or to feel trust in a being of whose justice we have no certainty that it
resembles our conception of justice; or to rely on the promises of one
whose veracity may differ from our own. Such feelings cannot be made to
order. They can only be generated by the contemplation of a being who is
holy, benevolent, just, and true, in the ordinary acceptation of these
words. They cannot be excited by any merely regulative ideas. We love,
reverence, and trust, not ideas or conceptions, but persons, possessing
moral attributes. But on the principle of merely regulative ideas of God,
the assertion that “God is love,” loses all its value, if God is not what
I mean by love, but, because he is infinite, he may be something else, I
know not what; and thus the great precept of the moral law, “Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, mind, soul, and strength,”
becomes meaningless. Such devotion of our entire nature cannot be created
by the mere command to render it. It can only be rendered to a being whose
claims over us we both feel and know to be an absolute reality, and to
whom on the conviction of their reality we can offer ourselves up a
voluntary sacrifice. But if we cannot know Him as He is, how is the fire
of devotion to Him to be kindled in our hearts? How shall we trust in Him?
How shall we acquiesce in His character? How shall we worship Him, how
shall we adore Him, if it is true that the justice, benevolence, or
holiness of the divine character may not resemble our conception of them?
Nay, more: the theory in question lays the axe to the root of the
Christian revelation itself. There is no affirmation of the New Testament
more decisive than that Jesus Christ in His divine and human personality
is the image of the invisible God, as far as His moral perfections are
concerned. Are the perfections of the character of Jesus Christ only
regulative, or are they real representations of these attributes as they
exist in God? Are the divine attributes of holiness, benevolence, or
justice, adequately represented by the manifestations of them, as made by
Jesus Christ? If we accept the testimony of St. John’s Gospel, our Lord
himself has expressly affirmed, “He that hath seen me hath seen the
Father” (John xiv. 9). But this is impossible if our conceptions of God’s
moral attributes are only regulative, and if the human idea of holiness is
no adequate representation of the divine.
However erroneous a system may be, yet if it has been elaborated by a
powerful mind, it has generally some foundation in reason, and I am far
from affirming that, with considerable qualifications, some important
elements of truth may not be found in that of Dr. Mansel. It is well that
we should be made to feel that there are limits of thought beyond which
the human mind cannot penetrate, and that there are profundities of
metaphysics which an imperfect measuring‐line cannot reach. But placing
the matter as he has, the Christian apologist may well feel indebted to
Mr. Mill for his crushing demolition of the dangerous portions of Dr.
Mansel’s system. When unbelievers quote the authority of Dr. Mansel, why
do they not also tell their readers that there was at least one unbeliever
of very high logical power, who wrote against the validity of his system.
It is one thing to affirm that we cannot penetrate to the depths of the
Deity, and that after we have raised our thoughts to the highest, there is
something higher still; and quite another to affirm that our highest
thoughts of him have no validity; or, to use the terms of a fashionable
philosophy, that God is unknown and unknowable, that no true conception of
Him can be formed in thought; in one word, that he is absolutely
unthinkable. The difficulties of this subject have arisen mainly from
discussing it in terms of pure abstractions, instead of embodying them in
a concrete form. It is impossible in this place to enter on the profound
depths involved in these questions; but a few observations will be
necessary for the purpose of clearing away the difficulties in which our
opponents seek to involve the subject of miracles. I shall confine myself
to our conceptions of the Infinite.
It is affirmed that no conception of the infinite can be framed in
thought; that it is therefore unthinkable, and transcends the limits of
human knowledge; that it is a negation; and that therefore our reason is
unable to affirm anything respecting it; that the idea of personality is
incompatible with that of infinity; and that therefore when we speak of
God as a person who possesses infinite perfections, we enter on a region
where human thought is invalid, and respecting which all affirmation
involves a contradiction.
But when we are told that the infinite transcends thought, we are entitled
to demand that we should not be kept playing with an abstraction, and to
ask, what is infinite? In what sense does it transcend thought? Does this
mean that it is absolutely unthinkable; or only partially so; or that our
conception of it is imperfect? Is it simply unknowable, or does it consist
of something which we know, _plus_ something that has not come within the
limits of our knowledge, but which something is of a similar character to
the known? It will be at once seen that the determination of these
questions is at the root of the whole controversy. If then by the infinite
we mean something known _plus_ something unknown, to speak of God as
unknowable and unthinkable is absurd. Our knowledge of Him may not be
full, but yet real so far as it goes. When it is affirmed that God is a
being who exists, but is unthinkable by man, the effect is to place Him
beyond the bounds of human knowledge, and thereby free us from all
necessity of troubling ourselves about Him. We know that He exists in the
profundities of the unknown; and that is all. For the purposes of thought
and of morality, He is thus made of less value than an algebraic _x_.
When it is affirmed that the infinite is unknowable, I again ask, what
infinite? The infinite as an abstract idea has no real existence; but
something that is infinite. The conception itself is an essentially
quantitative conception, and is only strictly applicable to number and
extension. When I speak therefore of an infinite number, what do I mean?
The only answer possible is, “The greatest number I can conceive, _plus_
all possible number without limit.” Does my adding on the latter factor
invalidate the reality of my conception of the former? Is that which is
added on anything else than number? Surely here I have a valid conception.
The same is true when we speak of the infinity of space. I mean by it the
greatest space I can conceive, _plus_ space without limit. Is the idea of
space rendered unthinkable, because I add the conception of space without
limit? Does it cease to be space? But space is conceivable. It follows
therefore that neither infinite number nor infinite extension is
absolutely unthinkable. We speak of the infinite divisibility of matter.
Does matter, because it goes on to be divided for ever, cease to be
matter?
In the same manner we speak of God, and call Him infinite. It would be far
more correct to speak of Him as a Being who has infinite attributes. Here,
however, if accuracy of thought is to be preserved, a distinction must be
made. Some attributes of God may be viewed as quantitative; others cannot.
It is to the former only that the term infinite properly applies. A moral
attribute cannot have a quantitative measure applied to it. It is
therefore not infinite, but perfect.
When we speak of God as a being possessed of infinite power, what do we
mean? The thing intended is, that He is a being who possesses such power
as enabled Him to create the universe, and that He is capable of exerting
every other degree of power which is possible. We may call this, if we
like, power without limit; though there is always one limit to possible
power, viz., that of working contradictions. Of course we are ignorant of
what are the limits of possible power.
But when we make this addition to our finite conception, we mean by it
power similar to that exhibited in the universe—it and all other power
beyond it. Must such a conception be banished outside the limits of
rational thought? Is the idea of a being who possesses power sufficient to
build the universe, and all possible power besides, unthinkable? Again, we
speak of God as infinitely wise. What do we mean by it? We affirm that He
knows all things actual and possible. The knowledge is none the less
knowledge, because to the knowledge of the actual we add on the knowledge
of the possible. Such a being is certainly not unthinkable.
Again: God is often spoken of, not only as a being possessing infinite
attributes and perfections, but as the Infinite Being. Here the attempt is
made to entangle us in a puzzle. It is argued: if He be the infinite
Being, there can be no being beyond Him. He must therefore include all
being, both actual and possible. If this be so, He must also include the
finite, otherwise there would be a being which is not included in infinite
being—or in other words, being without limit would not include all being,
which is self‐contradictory. Several other self‐contradictions may be
easily adduced by reasoning on the same principles.
I reply that the term “Being” is used here in a sense so intensely
abstract, that we have removed it out of all those conceptions of which
quantity can legitimately be predicated. Of material being we can affirm
that it is quantitative, but of no other. The adding on the word
“infinite,” and calling God the infinite Being, is to use words which have
no validity as conceptions.
But it is also common to speak of God’s moral attributes as infinite, such
as His benevolence, holiness, justice and truth. This again is inaccurate,
and its result is to plunge us into hopeless confusion of thought. Such
attributes admit of no quantitative measures. They are perfect, not
infinite. To speak of God’s truthfulness as infinite is simply absurd. A
thing is true, or not true. A moral being is truthful or not truthful.
Benevolence may be perfect or imperfect; but it cannot be measured by
number or by line. These conceptions can only mean what we mean by them,
and nothing else, even when applied to God, or we are attempting to pass
off forged notes for genuine ones. The only possible additional idea which
we introduce when thus ascribing them to God, is that in Him they are
perfect, free from the imperfections with which they exist in us. To
affirm that when we say that God is perfectly benevolent, or perfectly
truthful, we introduce into the conception, as applied to Him, a new
factor, beyond the meaning of benevolence and truthfulness as used in
human language, and that this new factor can make the divine benevolence
different from our human conception of it, or can lead God to actions
which man can by no possibility view as benevolent or true; and then to
say that God is benevolent or true, is an abuse of language, or, to use
Mr. Mill’s words, an offensive flattery.
But it has been urged that the moral attributes of God, even if we view
them not as infinite but as perfect, must be beyond the limits of human
thought, and therefore may produce results different in character from the
corresponding principles in man, because they are the attributes of an
infinite being. I have already disposed of this objection. Benevolence,
holiness, and truth cannot be other than benevolence, holiness, and truth,
to whatever being we may attribute them.
It is therefore no necessary consequence, because we ascribe to God some
attributes which are infinite, and others which are perfect, that God must
therefore be unknowable or unthinkable. We may know much about Him,
without knowing all things. Our not knowing all about things does not
render them either unknowable or unthinkable. Our knowledge may be
imperfect; but as far as it goes it maybe real. If we were to affirm that
we only know that which we know perfectly, or were unable to reason on
imperfect knowledge, mental progress would be brought to a standstill. Nor
is it right to affirm that we are only reasoning in a circle when we
reason from His moral attributes as displayed in the government of the
world in favour of the probability of a revelation; or if because a
revelation which claims to be from God, bears the impress of His
character, we employ this fact as an evidence that it comes from Him. To
affirm that He is unknowable or unthinkable is to proclaim that man has no
concern with God, and that all revelation is impossible; therefore, the
objections urged against the evidence of supernatural religion on these
grounds are untenable.
But there are the difficulties about the Absolute and the First Cause. It
has been urged that the Absolute is that which is out of relation to every
thing else—perfectly independent in itself. It is argued, therefore, if
God be this Absolute, he cannot be the first Cause, because a cause can
only be a cause by its being in relation to that of which it is the cause.
For similar reasons, if he be the first Cause, He cannot be the Absolute.
But as He is both, He must therefore be unknowable and unthinkable.
It is impossible in a treatise like this to enter into such profound
metaphysical questions. For my present purpose, I can safely refer to Mr.
Mill’s discussion on this subject. As far as the views in question bear
adversely on Christian evidence, he has sufficiently refuted them. It is
not fair for unbelievers to put forth these positions as subversive of
Christianity, without answering the reasonings of so eminent an unbeliever
as Mr. Mill in proof of their inconclusiveness, or even alluding to the
fact that he has pronounced them untenable.
There is no point which reasoners of this class have laboured more
diligently to prove than that it is impossible for human reason to think
of God as a person. The assumption of the personality of God is the
foundation of the Christian argument, without which, even if the
occurrence of miracles could be proved as objective facts, they would have
no evidential value. It follows, therefore, that if our only mode of
attaining the knowledge of the personality of God be from revelation, we
are arguing in a vicious circle.
Briefly stated, the argument of unbelief is as follows: God is the
infinite Being. Personality is a conception which necessarily involves the
finite. Therefore it cannot be predicated of an infinite Being. It follows
therefore that to speak of God as infinite, and at the same time as a
person, involves a contradiction.
It is an unquestionable fact that the only beings whom we are directly
acquainted with as persons are finite beings, _i.e._ men. No less certain
is it that the only beings whom we know to be possessed of wisdom and
intelligence are finite beings, _i.e._ men, and those various classes of
animals by which the latter quality is manifested. The argument is equally
valid for proving that wisdom and intelligence can only belong to finite
beings; and consequently that the existence of wisdom and intelligence in
the first Cause of all things is inconceivable, and the assumption that He
is wise and intelligent is a contradiction. The same argument is no less
valid against ascribing any moral perfection to Him, or in fact any other,
for all our knowledge of such things is both in itself finite, and derived
from finite beings.
But it even goes further than this. If, as the positive philosophy lays
down, our real knowledge of things is confined to direct subjects of
cognition; as the only beings which we know to be possessed of wisdom and
intelligence are men and animals, it is quite contrary to sound reasoning
to infer that these qualities can be possessed by any other class of
finite beings. To do so is to transfer human conceptions to beings who are
not human. Equally valid would be the reasoning of an animal, if he could
reason on the subject, as for instance a horse or a dog, that the
existence of wisdom and intelligence beyond his own limited sphere was an
unwarrantable assumption. Pantheists have also propounded theories on the
assumption of the existence in nature of an unconscious wisdom and
intelligence. This assumption is open to the most formidable objections;
but even on their own principles it is utterly invalid; for if on the
grounds which they allege it is impossible to ascribe personality to God,
the same reasonings are equally valid against ascribing wisdom and
intelligence to unconscious nature.
I conclude, therefore, that it by no means follows because our direct
knowledge of personality is confined to human beings, and is derived from
them, that personality itself cannot be conceived of as a property
belonging to any other than human beings. It is absurd to maintain that
the qualities of things must be confined to those things from which we
learn their existence.
But it will be objected that the very essential notion of personality is
limitation; consequently that although it may be conceived of as belonging
to limited beings, it transcends the power of thought to conceive of it as
the attribute of a being who is unlimited or infinite; that is to say,
that although it lies within the power of thought to conceive of the Being
who had adequate power to build the universe as a Person, because the
power may be a limited power, yet when I ascribe to Him beyond this the
possession of all possible power, the conception of personality becomes
unthinkable. This is the real meaning of the affirmation, unless our
reasonings are to be confined within the region of abstractions. But we
have no assurance that such reasonings are valid, unless we can bring them
to the test of some concrete form of thought.
Next: It by no means follows because our conception of personality is
derived from finite beings, that it is necessarily limited to them; and
that it cannot be thought of in connection with a being, some of whose
attributes are infinite and others perfect; in other words, that the idea
of finiteness is necessarily involved in that of personality. What are the
conceptions that make up the idea of our own personality? I reply, the
power to affirm “I” of one’s own being—the possession of will—the power of
self‐consciousness, and these in union with rationality. These conceptions
we undoubtedly derive from the contemplation of our own finite being, but
there is nothing in them which is necessarily limited to the finite. If
the conception of an infinite being is possible (and the fact that it is
so constantly introduced into this controversy proves that it is
possible), then there is no reason why these conceptions, which certainly
contain in them nothing quantitative, should not be applicable to such a
being. The real fact is, these conceptions are not inherently finite,
because they have nothing in them of a quantitative character,—they are
only derived from a being whose manifestation in space we conceive of
under the form of limitation, and whose attributes are neither infinite
nor perfect.
I must call attention to the remark already made that the correct
representation of God in thought is not that of a pure abstraction, the
infinite Being, but of a being who possesses attributes, some of which are
infinite and others perfect. To affirm that such a being is a person, is
not to attempt to think that which is unthinkable. When we affirm that God
possesses the power adequate to build the universe, and all possible power
beside, we do not ascribe to Him that of which it is impossible to
predicate the possession of will or self‐consciousness. When we affirm
that such a being exists now, that he has existed in all past known times,
and that no limits in point of time are conceivable of him, there is
nothing contradictory in ascribing to such a Being personality. It is
quite thinkable that an ultimate particle may never have had a beginning
and never will have an end; no less so is it that such a particle may be
possessed of personality, for it is finite. Surely therefore there is
nothing in the ascription to God of existence without beginning and
without end, which destroys the idea of His personality.
It has been necessary to enter thus far into this subject, because in
reasoning on the Christian revelation we must assume the existence of a
personal God, unless all such treatises, in addition to their own proper
subject‐matter, must likewise contain an elaborate work on the principles
of theism, and a refutation of those of pantheism and atheism. The
defender of Christianity is charged with reasoning in a circle, as though
he first assumed the existence of a personal God, and then derived the
idea of his existence from revelation. This charge would undoubtedly be
true if the idea of God being a person is unthinkable. I am at a loss to
conceive how it becomes one atom more thinkable if communicated by a
revelation. Much obscurity has undoubtedly been thrown on this subject by
Christian writers who have fancied that the more they can invalidate our
reason the greater gain accrues to Revelation. This is not only unwise but
irrational. Our reason doubtless is but an imperfect light, but its
extinction is to leave us to grope in darkness. I affirm therefore that
the assumption of the divine personality as the groundwork of our argument
involves no _petitio principii_, or reasoning in a circle.
One more remark and I will bring this portion of the subject to a close.
The affirmation made by this philosophy that certain things are
unthinkable is fallacious. What do we mean by “unthinkable”? It may mean
many things; first, that the subject cannot be made in any sense an object
of thought. This, in fact, is the only legitimate use of the word. But in
this sense the affirmation cannot be true of even Mr. Herbert Spencer’s
unknown and unknowable God, for it is evident that he does manage to
reason and think about him somehow. It may mean a being respecting whom we
may know much and attain a knowledge continually progressing, but
respecting whom there is much which is unknown. This unknown is called
unthinkable. But it is not unthinkable. It has only not yet become the
subject of our knowledge, and is no more unthinkable than any other
unknown truth. Or that may be pronounced to be unthinkable respecting
which our conceptions are wanting in definiteness and precision. But to
designate such things as unthinkable is an abuse of language. Or that may
be designated as unthinkable of which our conceptions fail fully to
represent the reality. As far as they go, they may be true, but there may
be something beyond of a similar kind, which they do not embrace. This is
the only sense in which it can be affirmed that God is unthinkable, but
the assertion is altogether misleading. The only correct meaning of the
expression is when some particular thing is affirmed to exist and at the
same time contradictions co‐exist in it. The actual co‐existence of these
two contradictions is unthinkable, but nothing more. Thus the existence of
a round square is unthinkable, so would the affirmation that the divine
power was at the same time both limited and unlimited. But in no other
sense is a conception unthinkable. To affirm that the cause of all things
is unthinkable because our conceptions of Him do not measure the entire
depths of His being is simply misleading.
I have gone into this question because it is evident that if God is
unthinkable a revelation of Him is impossible, and if a revelation of Him
is impossible, all miracles affirmed to have been wrought in attestation
of one must be delusions.