farmers were selling their corn at 112s., or even at 170s., the
quarter--while it paid to take in bits of open down land, get three
crops off it without manuring, and then pass on to the next piece,--the
wretched labourers were told that prices were so high that but little
could be given them for their wages. The misery was therefore
exceedingly great among them; and even worse than this, the Poor Law
stepped in and destroyed their characters. For the wages were so low
that they could not live on them, and they were forced to come upon the
parish; and the old Poor Law, in the hands of the farmer guardians,
enabled those very employers who kept the wages low to levy a rate upon
their parishes to support those people whom they were starving, and to
give outdoor relief in aid of wages. In other words, the employer had
the right to compel the country to give him the money to pay his
labourers enough to keep them alive. Selfish views, too, were mixed with
false political economy. Many labourers made cheap labour; many hands,
it was thought, made a strong country. So this strange grant in aid of
wages came to be apportioned according to the number of the family of
the recipient; and when the whole state of the nation pointed to the
necessity of a curtailed population, a premium was given for its
increase.
[Sidenote: Difficulties attending the settlement of Europe.]
The termination of a war so new in its character, and so universal as
that which for the last eleven years had been wasting Europe, brought
with it great difficulties. On the one hand arose the question of the
position to be taken up by the allies with regard to France; on the
other, the reconstitution of Europe, completely dislocated by the policy
of Napoleon. Both questions were rendered difficult of solution by the
various interests and mutual jealousies of the powers of the victorious
coalition. But,--while those European powers who had suffered most
severely from the French arms, and especially Prussia, on which the
vengeance of Napoleon had fallen most heavily, were desirous to treat
France as a conquered nation, so to curtail its dimensions as to render
it harmless for the future, and to lay such burdens upon it as might in
some degree recompense them for their losses,--England, which had never
felt the sword of the conqueror, and Russia, ruled by a Czar much
influenced by notions of chivalry and magnanimity, had already
determined upon an opposite course. Following the opinion of the founder
of their party, the Tory Government which had succeeded Pitt declared
its intention of acting towards France as towards a friendly power, and
of allowing it to retain the same frontiers as in 1790. There was not
much magnanimity in such conduct; the Tory party, the champions of
legitimacy, could scarcely avoid restoring the Bourbons; their view of
the balance of Europe rendered a powerful France almost a necessity;
they could look for no continental acquisitions for England, and took
care to secure the advantages they required for their maritime and
commercial superiority in other directions. But, while restoring the
Bourbons, the English Government found itself compelled by the temper of
the time, the course of circumstances, and the liberal views of the
Emperor of Russia, to restore them only upon conditions. A
constitutional government was granted to France, ratified by a charter
securing the chief personal and political rights of the people, such as
the maintenance of the public sales during the Revolution, freedom of
religion, and freedom of the press.
[Sidenote: Treaty of Paris. May 1814.]
A France thus reconstituted, and holding friendly relations with the
other powers of Europe, would naturally claim its share in the
arrangements of the forthcoming Congress. It would probably have been
wiser had the French Government postponed all definite settlements as to
its future limits till that Congress met; the jealousies which existed
between the allies and their conflicting claims would have afforded
opportunity for securing favourable terms, for by the Convention, by
which France had surrendered the territories held by her armies in
Europe, her troops had been allowed to withdraw unmolested, and a
powerful army could have been rapidly reconstituted. But the allies,
guided by Metternich, the Austrian minister, and determined to keep as
far as possible the management of the Congress in their own hands,
insisted on the immediate conclusion of the treaty with France. Eager to
gain popularity by the establishment of peace, the French Government
yielded, and in May the Treaty of Paris was concluded. It was upon the
whole more favourable than France, as a conquered nation, could have
expected. The frontier of 1790 was even slightly increased: towards the
north and towards the Rhine it was advanced so as to include several
important fortresses, especially the strong place of Landau, and towards
the Alps about half of Savoy was also included. The demands of Prussia
for a contribution towards the expenses of the war were rejected by the
influence of Austria and England, and the treasures of art collected by
Napoleon's armies were allowed to remain in Paris. The one great loss
sustained was the Isle of France. It was upon the sea and among the
colonies that England looked for its reward; it retained Malta, to
secure its influence in the Mediterranean, the Cape of Good Hope, which
it had won from the Dutch, and now, to complete its naval stations on
the road to India, it insisted on the surrender of the Isle of France.
The bases for the forthcoming Treaty of Vienna were also roughly laid by
this peace. The published articles declared the independence of the
States of Germany, the augmentation of Holland under the rule of the
Prince of Orange, the independence of Switzerland and of the Italian
States outside the limits of the Austrian possessions. Secret articles
explained what these loose expressions meant. Belgium was to form the
promised increase of Holland, and thus form with it a kingdom absolutely
in the interest of England; the left bank of the Rhine was to supply
compensations for the German princes (which meant that it was to be
given to Bavaria in exchange for the Tyrol); the Po, the Ticino, and
Lago Maggiore were to form the boundaries of Austrian Italy, which thus
included the territory of Venice; and Sardinia was to receive Genoa in
exchange for the portion of Savoy ceded to France.
[Sidenote: Visit of the monarchs to England. Aug. 1814.]
The difficulties which were sure to attend the forthcoming Congress were
already felt, and it was thought that the solution would be rendered
easier by the establishment of personal relations between the powers of
the coalition. The great monarchs of Eastern Europe were therefore
invited to visit the Prince Regent in England. The Emperor of Austria
declined to come, but the Czar and the King of Prussia accepted the
invitation, and were received with great pomp and enthusiasm. Several
weeks were passed in universal gaiety, but the political object of the
visit was not attained. The Czar seemed more than ever to occupy the
first place among crowned heads; and the dread of Russian influence, and
the determination to oppose its claims in the Congress, were thus only
rendered stronger.
[Sidenote: Congress at Vienna. Sept. 1814.]
The meetings at Vienna, at first appointed for August, had been
postponed to September, and thither, after their visit to England, the
monarchs themselves, and the ministers who represented the various
countries of the Congress, betook themselves. The interests of England
were intrusted to Lord Castlereagh, a man of considerable firmness, but
of mediocre ability, without accurate knowledge or broad views of the
politics of Europe, and deficient in the conciliatory deportment so
necessary for a successful diplomatist. The negotiators approached their
difficult work in a spirit which promised no very good results. Almost
of necessity the character of the Congress, and of the treaty it
produced, belonged rather to the past than to the future. It was
rendered necessary by the changes created by the French Revolution, and
was in the hands of a coalition called into existence to oppose the
Revolution, and consisting chiefly of monarchs whose views were both
absolutist and dynastic. The Czar alone had certain liberal tendencies,
but they were so mixed with personal ambition as to excite mistrust
instead of co-operation among the assembled negotiators. The Congress
therefore assumed the form of an old European congress. It was occupied
with the personal and peculiar interest of each sovereign, the increase
of territory and influence of each nation, instead of attempting a
settlement of Europe in accordance with any enlarged or general theory
suitable to the great change and growth of ideas which had been at once
the cause and effect of the Revolution.
[Sidenote: The interests of the various countries at the Congress.]
As far as England was concerned, its interests had already been chiefly
secured by the Treaty of Paris. The new kingdom of the Netherlands, it
was thought, would be strong enough to hold the mouths of the great
rivers of that country, and thus prevent any revival of the Continental
System; the road to India was rendered safe by the possession of the
Cape of Good Hope and the Mauritius, while Malta guarded English
influence in the Mediterranean. The maintenance of the old European
balance was therefore the chief object which Castlereagh had now in
view, endangered chiefly by the overwhelming power of Russia,
threatening alike the countries of Europe and our own Asiatic dominions.
The haste with which the Treaty of Paris had been concluded tied the
hands of France, which was represented by Talleyrand; and the very
moderate ambition of Louis XVIII. limited the claims of that country to
the completion of the downfall of the Napoleonic system by the removal
of Murat from the kingdom of Naples, and the establishment of the
Spanish Princess, the Queen of Etruria, in the Duchy of Parma, which had
been promised to Maria Louisa, Napoleon's wife. Louis was also anxious
to save if possible the kingdom of Saxony from annihilation. The really
important questions at issue regarded the settlement of the East of
Europe and the fate of Poland and Saxony, which appeared indissolubly
connected, so closely were the Courts of Russia and Prussia united. The
Emperor of Russia was a man of enthusiastic temperament and liberal
theories, and at the same time of great ambition. He found satisfaction
for both sides of his character in a plan for the reconstitution of the
kingdom of Poland, with a liberal constitution, either under his own
rule as king or under some prince of his house acknowledging his
supremacy. To complete this project he required the possession of the
whole of Poland, a reward which the overweening value he set on his own
services to the coalition induced him to regard as by no means more than
his due. Both Prussia and Austria would have been called upon to restore
certain portions of Poland which had fallen to their lot in the
different partition treaties, but he supposed that his own resignation
of certain portions would counterbalance these sacrifices, while Austria
would be well rewarded by the possession of Lombardy and Venice, and
Prussia by the whole of Saxony. The adhesion of the Saxon king to
Napoleon was thought to justify the sovereigns of the coalition in
confiscating his country, which, with the approbation of Russia, was
claimed in its entirety by the Prussian Government. It is plain that the
claims of Russia and Prussia could not but be in the last degree
objectionable to Austria. Absolutist in its tendencies, it cared nothing
for the freedom of Poland, while the possession of territory
conterminous with the hereditary states of Austria would render Russia a
most dangerous rival. At the same time, Prussia, the constant object of
Austrian jealousy, if Saxony passed into its hands, would at once lose
that broken and dislocated shape which had hitherto been its weakness,
and would acquire a position in Germany which Austria could scarcely
hope to equal. The policy of Austria was therefore clearly marked.
[Sidenote: The policy of England at the Congress.]
The position of England was not so obvious. It is possible to say now,
guided by the light of subsequent events, and led by the spirit of
freedom and nationality which has made such vast strides of late years,
that the Government of England, the home of free institutions and
avowedly the champion of national liberty, should have come forward even
then in that capacity, should have rejoiced at the reconstitution of
Poland, and have sought the unification of Germany by supporting the
power of Prussia, and should have objected to the establishment of
Austria in Italy, a country where her rule was certain to be disliked by
the population. But the English Government at the time was a Tory
Government, bent rather upon restraining than increasing popular
tendencies, and under the dominion of three overmastering
influences--the desire to secure England from any possibility of a
renewal of the Continental System, an extreme jealousy of the
pretensions and power of the Russian Emperor, and the wish to establish
for some years at all events the peace of Europe. Its policy was
therefore inconsistent and shortsighted, but sensible and practical; the
fear of the advance of Russia made the English ministry blind to its
duties towards Poland; the satisfaction and friendship of France were
more important than the rights of Genoa; the immediate balance of the
powers of Germany was more important than the national aspirations
either of Italy or of Germany.
[Sidenote: The policy of France.]
It so happened that the views of France were at this instant similar to
those of England. Before the formal opening of the Congress an attempt
had been made by the four great powers to get the management of it
entirely into their own hands. France would thus have been excluded from
the settlement of Europe; but Talleyrand was not a man to hear quietly
such an exclusion; he appeared as the champion of the smaller states,
and succeeded in thwarting the efforts of the great powers. This, with
other less important causes, had embroiled him with the Emperor of
Russia, whose objects he was thus bent on thwarting. The King of Saxony
was a friend and relative of Louis XVIII.; to save him and his country
from destruction was a part of the French programme. It therefore suited
Talleyrand to adopt the views of Castlereagh.
[Sidenote: Division of the Congress.]
[Sidenote: Compromise agreed to.]
Thus Austria, France, and England, in conjunction with the smaller
German powers, who looked with great dislike to the annihilation of one
of the chief among them, were thrown upon one side, in opposition to
Russia and Prussia. The arrogant and high-handed manner in which those
two powers proceeded to take temporary possession of the countries which
they claimed still further excited the anger of their opponents. So
severe did the dispute grow, so indissoluble did the knot appear, that
war between the powers themselves seemed threatening. The Treaty of
Ghent and the conclusion of the English war with America allowed
Castlereagh to act with more vigour, and in January a secret treaty was
entered into between France, Austria, and England, by which each country
agreed to supply troops to compel, if necessary, the adoption of their
combined policy. Although this treaty was kept a secret, the firm
attitude and the combination of the three powers were so evident that,
as neither party really wished for war, a compromise was discovered.
About half of Saxony, with a third of its population, was taken from the
King and given to Prussia, while the Czar, withdrawing from his extreme
demand with regard to Poland, allowed the Duchy of Posen to remain in
the hands of the Prussians, and a considerable portion of Gallicia,
together with the district of Tarnopol, to be retained by Austria, while
Krakow was to become a free and neutral republic. Poland was thus in
part reconstituted, but entirely in the hands of Russia. These great
questions being settled, the arrangements upon the minor points
proceeded with some rapidity; the left bank of the Rhine was given to
Bavaria; Genoa passed into the hands of Sardinia; the two houses of
Hesse were re-established; Luxemburg was given to the Low Countries;
Mayence became a Federal fortress; the Tyrol was restored to Austria;
Switzerland was reorganized chiefly in accordance with the arrangements
France had made there; the conduct of Murat, who began to show a
tendency towards Napoleonism, facilitated the restoration of the
Bourbons in Naples; Parma was given to Maria Louisa for her life; and
the Congress completed its work by two great declarations of principle,
one securing the freedom of the navigation of rivers, the other
expressing, what was very dear to Englishmen at the time, a universal
disapprobation of the slave trade.
[Sidenote: Escape of Napoleon from Elba.]
Before the conclusion of these questions Castlereagh had been compelled
by the meeting of Parliament to return to England, and the Duke of
Wellington had taken his place at Vienna. His work there was not
completed when the news arrived that Napoleon had broken loose from
Elba, and the Duke was wanted to take command of the allied army in
Belgium. The renewal of the common danger produced a temporary harmony
among the negotiators at Vienna. The chief questions were rapidly
settled, and a joint proclamation, issued by the eight powers which had
signed the Peace of Paris, declared Napoleon the public enemy of Europe.
The Congress continued its sittings, but military preparations for the
time absorbed all attention.
[Sidenote: Military preparations against Napoleon.]
It was agreed to act in accordance with the Treaty of Chaumont, each of
the four great powers supplying its quota of troops, or in the case of
England an equivalent in money. While the Prussians and the English with
their allies were to advance into France and the Netherlands, the other
powers were to pass the Rhine and join in a great advance upon Paris. It
was hoped that by the end of April 500,000 men would be ready for the
great movement. The French Court had taken refuge in the Netherlands,
and as the people of that country were already half inclined to join the
French, it seemed certain that that country would be the chief seat of
operations; the war there was intrusted to the Anglo-allies under
Wellington, and the Prussians under Prince Blücher. The hope of speedy
action was quickly seen to be vain. Since the peace many countries had
disbanded their troops, many of the best English regiments had been sent
to America, and in spite of its long experience, the English Government
showed its usual weakness in the war administration. Wellington was
convinced of the necessity of postponing the opening of the campaign
till June or July.
[Sidenote: Napoleon enters Belgium.]
This delay gave Napoleon an opportunity of striking the first blow, and
although he could immediately dispose of not more than 125,000 men, and
although the English and Prussian armies amounted to 220,000, the
arrangement of the allied troops gave him much hope of a successful
campaign. Bent upon covering Brussels, uncertain where the blow which he
felt sure would soon be struck would fall and in order to facilitate the
subsistence of his troops, Wellington had spread his army over a long
line of frontier, from the neighbourhood of Charleroi to Antwerp and
Ostend. In like manner the Prussian corps were spread eastward from
Charleroi to Liège. Trusting to the wide dissemination of the allied
troops to render concentration difficult, Napoleon thought to push
between the English and Prussian armies, and to crush them one after the
other. With all his old skill, he rapidly collected his army on the
Sambre, issued on the 14th June a stirring general order, and on the
15th attacked the Prussians at Charleroi, passed the Sambre, and drove
them back along the Namur road to a position near Sombreffe, which
Blücher had already appointed as a point of concentration should he be
attacked from Charleroi. At the same time the left of the French army
under Ney was sent directly northward along the road to Brussels, to
clear it of English and prevent the junction of the allies.
[Sidenote: Battle of Ligny.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Quatre Bras.]
[Sidenote: Retreat of Blücher's army.]
Up to this point Napoleon's plans seemed thoroughly successful. He had
already rendered any immediate junction of the armies difficult, if not
impossible; with one part of his army he had already reached the chosen
ground of the Prussians, and found it occupied by one only out of their
four corps; with his left he had advanced to the position of Quatre Bras
against the English, where as yet no considerable portion of the allies
had arrived. But a strange slowness marks his course in this campaign.
Instead of bringing up all his troops for an attack in both directions,
in the early morning of the 16th, he allowed his main body to pass the
night on the Sambre, while there was an interval of twelve miles between
Ney's position and that of his rear. Consequently all the morning was
passed in bringing up these troops, and it was past noon before either
at Quatre Bras or Ligny any formidable attacks were made on the enemy.
During that time two more Prussian corps had arrived at Ligny, and
Wellington's troops were hastening to support the small force at Quatre
Bras. Napoleon therefore, instead of being able to destroy a single
Prussian corps, found himself involved in a bloody and hard-contested
battle. He was indeed victorious, but the victory was not of that
crushing and decisive character which his precarious position rendered
necessary for him. At Quatre Bras, instead of a brief skirmish which
would have enabled him to give assistance to Napoleon at Ligny, Ney
found it necessary to fight a battle, and that not a successful one. The
Allies, who in the morning were scarcely 8000 strong, made good their
position till reinforcements arrived. When evening closed their
preponderance was such that Ney was compelled to withdraw his troops to
Frasnes. So hard had he been pressed that he had found it necessary to
summon to his aid the corps of D'Erlon, which almost at the same time
received orders from Napoleon to fall on the Prussian right flank, and
thus complete the victory of Ligny. Confused by these contradictory
orders, D'Erlon's corps of 20,000 men passed the day, without striking a
blow, between the two battlefields, in either of which his presence
might have had a decisive effect. As it was, Napoleon overrated the
success against the Prussians, and fell into a fatal error with regard
to the line of their retreat. Convinced that they would fall back
towards Namur and Liège, he detached Marshal Grouchy with 30,000 men to
follow them in that direction, while he himself brought his main body to
join Ney, with the intention of following and destroying the English,
who were compelled by Blücher's defeat to fall back towards Brussels.
But the Prussian generals, Blücher and Gneisenau, the chief of his
staff, were not so easily shaken off. Determined still to afford
assistance to their allies, they withdrew northwards towards Wavre,
while Grouchy and his troops were in vain seeking them towards the east.
From Wavre, which was reached late in the evening of the 17th, Blücher
was enabled to assure Wellington of his approach, and to promise the
assistance not of two divisions only, for which the English general had
asked, but of his whole army. Relying on this promise, Wellington
determined to fight.
[Illustration: Battle of Waterloo.]
[Sidenote: Position of Waterloo.]