the entire disadvantage of the allies. The close of the year 1792 had
seen the retirement of the allies from French soil, the battle of
Jemmappes, and the occupation of Belgium and Savoy. The accession of
England, Spain and Holland to the coalition so far invigorated it that
its members believed that a campaign of a few months would complete
their work; for dangers surrounded the French Convention on all sides.
Dumouriez, a member of the Girondin party, displeased with the conduct
of the Jacobin Convention, was meditating defection; the excesses of the
governing party in Paris had aroused all the slumbering loyalty of
France; La Vendée was in arms for constitutional monarchy and the
Catholic religion; and both at Lyons and Toulon the reaction was for the
moment triumphant. Dumouriez' treason had an immediate effect. Directly
upon the declaration of war he invaded Holland, but seeking rather
popularity with his army and the prestige of victory than the success of
the plans of Government, he turned aside from Holland, and risked a
battle at Neerwinden on the Gheet, in which he suffered a complete
defeat from the Prince of Saxe-Coburg; and thus as a defeated general,
and without his army, he gave himself up to the Austrians. His defeat
and defection allowed the allies to advance along the whole frontier.
But their movements were dilatory; instead of marching upon Paris they
wasted their time in taking Mayence, Condé, and Valenciennes; they even
committed the mistake of binding the captured troops to refrain from war
only against themselves; they were therefore available to suppress the
insurrection in La Vendée, and the troops hitherto employed there could
be sent to the eastern frontier. The same want of energy continually
marked the progress of the allies. The Prussians and Austrians were in
fact too jealous of each other, and too much bent upon their interests
nearer home to act with vigour. Time was again wasted in sieges. While
the Austrians sat down before Cambrai, the Duke of York with the English
troops besieged Dunkirk. Their communications were kept open by the
Dutch at Menin and Hoondschoote. But the French army, under the vigorous
management of the Jacobins, and guided by the military genius of Carnot,
was no longer to be trifled with; Houchard fell upon the weak position
of the Dutch, and York was driven to a disastrous defeat with the loss
of all his artillery. The success was indeed only momentary; a panic
seized the French troops, and they fell back to Lille, thus affording
the allies an opportunity of advancing to the attack of the fortress of
Maubeuge, which closed the road to Paris; but Jourdan, who had succeeded
Houchard, now put in practice Carnot's principles. Hastily gathering
50,000 men, he fell upon half that number of Austrians, and completely
defeated them at Wattigny. Success had also attended the French against
the Prussians on the Upper Rhine. There, too, the terrible rigour of the
new Government had restored the aspect of affairs. St. Just and Lebas
had appeared as conventional commissioners in Alsace, bringing terror
with them. The beaten armies were supplied and organized. Two young
generals of the revolutionary school, Hoche and Pichegru, were placed in
command, and the tide of victory was turned; the Prussians had to fall
back, compromising the advanced position of the Austrians, and before
the close of the year the French army, which had begun the campaign with
a series of disasters, found itself victorious along the whole frontier
line.
[Sidenote: and against the royalists in France.]
The Convention had also been successful in its wars in the interior of
France. After six weeks of bombardment, on the 9th of October, Lyons
yielded, without conditions, to be given up to the fearful cruelty of
Collot d'Herbois; and the victorious troops hurried southwards to
besiege Toulon, which had placed itself in the hands of the English, and
had admitted the allied fleet to its roadstead. The genius of Bonaparte
is said to have secured its capture. He saw that one fort called the
Equilette commanded the roadstead, and that its possession would oblige
the English, who were the soul of the defence, to withdraw. The capture
of the fort answered his expectation; Lord Hood, without making terms
for the inhabitants, collected such of the royalists as could crowd on
board his ships, and sailed away, having first set fire to all the
stores, and to forty ships of war which were in the harbour (Aug. 27,
1793). The insurrection of La Vendée had also been suppressed. Intrusted
at first to ignorant men, with no claim to command except the strength
of their revolutionary principles, the Convention troops had been
everywhere defeated. But when Kleber was put in practical command the
course of victory changed. Terribly defeated, and with all their chiefs
of importance mortally wounded, the insurgents determined to try the
fortune of war upon the other side of the Loire. They marched northwards
towards Laval, defeated their pursuers, and had they made common cause
with the Bretons might still have been successful. But trusting to help
from England, which never came, they undertook a fruitless assault upon
Granville in Normandy. Thinking themselves betrayed, and longing for
their homes, the ill-organized mass of peasants insisted on being led
southwards: even then there was some life in them. They defeated the
republican General Rossignol and threw him back upon Rennes; but failing
in an attack upon Angers, they marched pointlessly towards Le Mans. They
were there received with terrible slaughter by Westermann, Kleber and
Marçeau; 18,000 men, women and children were killed, and the rest fled,
pursued by the pitiless Westermann. The fugitives reached the Loire,
fought one final battle at Savenay near its mouth, where they were all,
with the exception of some eight or ten thousand men, either put to
death or captured.
[Sidenote: Pitt's difficulty in keeping up the coalition.]
Thus revolutionary France had proved itself no contemptible enemy to the
united troops of Europe, and established its rule unquestioned in
France. It was plain that all hope of an easy subjugation of France was
over, and it was with the greatest difficulty that Pitt was able to keep
the coalition together; the eyes of Prussia were eagerly bent upon
Poland, an easier prey than France. Of increase of territory England had
no hope; the war had been forced on her, and was honestly a war of
opinion. But any cessation of her efforts would have placed her in a
worse position than when the war began, and Pitt and the upper classes
of England were not blind to the fact that the occupation of the
continental nations in the great war afforded England immense advantages
both at sea and in the colonies; it was worth making great efforts to
gain the undisputed mastery of the sea both in commerce and in arms. Nor
did the large sums of money, raised chiefly by way of loan, appear so
ruinous as they really were. The effect of large loans is to increase
the wealth of the capitalist at the expense of the working man; nor, as
the chief weight of the accumulating taxation falls on posterity, does
it become immediately evident. Thus supplied with almost unlimited
means, Pitt succeeded in keeping up the coalition, taking into English
pay, it is almost true to say, the whole of the Prussian army, and doing
nearly as much for the Austrians.
[Sidenote: Continued success of the French in 1794.]
[Sidenote: The French capture Amsterdam and the Dutch fleet. 1795.]
Pitt's energy was equalled by that of France, and the Convention had the
additional advantage of being free from constitutional rules. Vast
conscriptions filled their armies, forced requisitions supplied them
with arms and equipments. It was with the army of the North, 160,000
strong, under Pichegru, that the English had most to do. On each side
the armies were divided into three divisions, and the duty of marching
with 100,000 men on Paris was intrusted to Coburg. Defeated in the
centre, the French had met with unexpected success on the left,
Clairfait, the Austrian general, having been twice beaten at Moucron and
at Courtray. Upon this, Pichegru almost destroyed his centre to
strengthen his wings, and the threefold manœuvres became twofold. The
key of the campaign was the possession of the Sambre; the Austrians lay
in an advancing angle with their left upon that river from Mons to
Charleroi. If the French could cross the Sambre they would be virtually
in the rear of the Austrians. To this point, therefore, the
Commissioners of the Convention, St. Just and Lebas, repaired, and
attempted to inspire the troops with something of their own enthusiasm.
Again and again the French were driven back. But Carnot's plan of
massing troops was at length employed; the greater part of the army,
which under Jourdan had been facing the Prussians on the Moselle, was
turned northward, and Jourdan took command of 100,000, well known as the
army of the Sambre and Meuse, just as the Commissioners had been driven
back for the fifth time behind the river. After a sixth failure, the
Commissioners insisting upon a seventh effort, the river was
successfully crossed, and on the heights of Fleurus a battle was fought
in which, though it was not completed, the Austrians were practically
defeated. Step by step the English and the Austrians retired, the one
towards Holland, the other towards the Rhine. By July the English were
behind Breda, the Austrians beyond the Meuse. Want of supplies checked
the French advance for a few weeks, but by October the English were
driven into the corner between the Yssel and the Rhine, and the army of
the Sambre and Meuse had captured Cologne and Coblenz. The occupation of
Belgium by the French compelled the Prussians further south also to fall
behind the Rhine, the left bank of which was thus in possession of the
French army from Basle to the sea. Even south of that point successes
had been won. The Sardinian position of Saorgio had been turned, and the
passes of the Alps were opened to the French, who were thus in a
position to invade Italy on the one hand and Holland on the other. The
lateness of the season, and the wretched state of the equipment and
commissariat, might have induced the French to be satisfied with these
conquests, and few armies would have thought of facing an unusually
severe winter shoeless and in rags, for to such a plight had the bad
management of the Revolutionary Government brought them. But to this
army of enthusiasts the winter was but a useful ally for the conquest of
Holland, where a strong feeling in their favour already existed among
that large section of the people, who had seen with anger their
attempted Revolution of 1787 suppressed by the arms of Prussia, and to
whom the Government of the Stadtholder was very distasteful. The failure
of the preceding campaign had obliged Pitt to insist upon the recall of
the Duke of York, much to the King's displeasure, and Pichegru now found
himself opposed to General Walmoden, the Hanoverian commander. But of
opposition there was really none. The lines of the three great rivers,
the Meuse, the Waal and the Lech, were abandoned without a fight, and
crossed by the French, either upon the ice or by means of pontoons; and
finally Walmoden left Holland to its fate, and retreated across the
Yssel and the Ems to embark his army safely in Bremen. The Stadtholder
had already fled from the Hague and taken refuge in England. Amsterdam
was occupied by the French without difficulty, the ragged regiments
waiting patiently in the bitter snow in the streets of the rich city
till their quarters were arranged for them without the least attempt at
disorder. A striking finish was put to the campaign by the capture of
the Dutch fleet in the Texel. The ships were ice-bound, and fell into
the hands of a regiment of cavalry, who galloped across the ice to
secure them. Holland was at once erected into a republic upon the French
model.
[Sidenote: Indirect advantages gained by England.]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the French fleet. June 1, 1794.]
But in spite of these continual reverses of the allies, in spite of the
perpetual failure of the British arms in the Low Countries, Pitt had not
been mistaken in the indirect advantages which the war would give him.
The conflagration at Toulon had inflicted an almost irreparable loss
upon the French fleet. In Corsica the veteran patriot Paoli had aroused
the feeling of his countrymen against France. Nelson and Hood, with 1000
British soldiers serving as marines in their ships, had taken Bastia,
which was regarded as almost impregnable, and the people of Corsica had
begged King George to accept their crown. While thus in the
Mediterranean English supremacy had been established, a still greater
success had attended her fleet off the coast of France. By immense
exertions a powerful and well-equipped fleet of twenty-six ships had
been assembled by Bon St. André and placed under the command of Villaret
Joyeuse. It left the harbour of Brest for the purpose of convoying a
large fleet laden with flour from America. The English Channel fleet,
under Lord Howe, sailed to meet it. In number of ships and weight of
metal the English fleet was somewhat inferior, but the Revolution had
stripped the French marine of its best officers, who had habitually been
supplied by Brittany, now royalist in its tendencies. Bon St. André,
originally a Calvinistic clergyman, had all the fearful energy belonging
to the Conventional Commissioners, but little of the skill of a seaman,
yet he frequently overruled the commands of Villaret Joyeuse. Thus, when
the fleets met upon the 1st of June, the French were unable to prevent
Admiral Howe from repeating Rodney's well-known manœuvre of breaking
the line. The defeat of the French was complete; several ships went
down, and five line of battle-ships remained as English prizes.
[Sidenote: Prussia, Spain and Holland leave the coalition.]
Upon the Continent, however, success had been wholly on the side of the
French; the campaign of 1794 and the winter of 1795 had added Belgium,
Holland, the left bank of the Rhine, part of Piedmont, Catalonia, and
Navarre, to their dominions. The coalition began at once to fall to
pieces. As it was plain that there was no further hope of a military
promenade to Paris or of territory to be gained at an easy price, the
King of Prussia, who had been only kept up to the mark by enormous
subsidies from England, made his peace with the French. It was the
pressure of England alone which had driven Spain and Holland into the
war. Although Pitt had procured a change of ministry in Spain in
accordance with his own views, and the substitution of Godoy for
Miranda, the Spanish Government now awoke to its true interests. All the
advantages of a maritime war of necessity fell to the lot of the
English, and Spain saw herself aiding in the destruction of the only
efficient rival to the English upon the sea, and thus in fact rendering
certain her own insignificance on that element. The Spanish Government
was therefore willing to treat. Holland, completely conquered, and with
half its population preferring the French rule to that of the Prince of
Orange, who had been forced upon the country, obtained peace by giving
up its chief fortresses, paying a large indemnity, and making an
offensive alliance with France against England, by which thirty ships of
war were placed at the disposal of the French. Many of the smaller
states both of Germany and Italy declared themselves neutral. England
was thus practically left without allies, with the single exception of
Austria, which was only induced to continue its engagements by a subsidy
of four millions and a half. This series of treaties was completed in
the course of the year 1795, chiefly by Barthélemy at Basle; the treaty
with Tuscany, Feb. 9; with Holland [at the Hague], May 15; with Prussia,
April 5; and with Spain, July 14.
The campaign of the following year, 1795, was confined to the Rhine,
where Pichegru commanded the army of the Rhine and Moselle, Jourdan that
of the Sambre and Meuse. Pichegru was meditating treachery, and lay idle
opposite the Black Forest till the advance of Jourdan from the North to
co-operate with him for the purpose of retaking Mayence forced him into
action. He took Mannheim, and might have taken Heidelberg, but he
wilfully resigned this advantage, and fell back in disorder upon the
lines of Weissembourg, where he signed an armistice with the Austrians
preparatory to joining them. His retreat had compelled that of Jourdan
also.
[Sidenote: Insurrection of La Vendée.]
The English meanwhile had engaged in a lukewarm way in an expedition
which, had it been carried out with vigour, might have changed the face
of affairs. After the great destruction of the Vendéan army at Savenay,
the war continued to smoulder both in La Vendée itself and in Brittany.
But north of the Loire it assumed a somewhat different character; the
open, simple and heroic devotion of the Vendéan peasantry, who had
followed their priests, gentry, and leaders of their own rank to battle,
was wanting, and the hostilities of Brittany assumed rather the form of
brigandage than warfare. The country was infested with small bands, who
kept up connection with one another by means of private signals, but who
seldom appeared in large numbers, and worked chiefly by night-surprises
and by rapid and secret cutting off of detached posts. The chief man of
the Chouans, as the Breton insurgents were called, was Cormatin. But
certain men of higher rank were also among them; the chief of these was
Count Joseph de Puisaye, a man of considerable energy and ability, who
had been a member of the National Assembly. De Puisaye saw that
irregular warfare could produce but little effect, and desired to obtain
assistance from England, where the Government was supposed to be ready
to assist any endeavour against the French Republic; an impression kept
alive by the rumours, probably much exaggerated, spread by agents who
were constantly passing and repassing through the Channel Islands
between France and England.
[Sidenote: Expedition from England planned.]
[Sidenote: Destruction of the expedition to Quiberon.]
In the autumn of 1794 De Puisaye betook himself to England and laid his
plans before Pitt. It was suggested that 10,000 British troops should be
joined with the corps of emigrants, and should land in Brittany and
seize Rennes, and thence push forward at once over Normandy, Maine and
Poitou. It was thought advisable that a prince of the blood should
either accompany the expedition or shortly appear upon the scene, and
the Count of Artois was selected for the purpose. Lord Moira, favourably
known in the American War as Lord Rawdon, was to take command of the
English troops. But though speed and secresy were of the first
necessity, the expedition hung fire, and news of it reached the ears of
the French Government. The reason for this delay was partly jealousy and
disunion among the emigrants themselves, partly Pitt's mistrust of the
readiness of the French to join him, and his knowledge of the danger of
relying on the assertions of sanguine exiles, and partly the discovery
of the feeling existing among the royalists themselves in La Vendée and
Brittany against the introduction of any large foreign army; for the
belief seems to have been prevalent that Pitt's objects were selfish,
and that an English army would be rather a danger than an assistance. It
is at all events certain that the royalists in Paris, in their dislike
that the reaction should be brought about by any means but their own,
did their best to injure the expedition. The consequences of the delay
were serious. In spite of considerable sums of money sent from England,
and a good deal more much cheaper money, consisting of forged assignats,
which were exported largely, in the spring of 1795 the skill of Hoche
and Canclaux, the generals opposed to the insurgents, and the very
favourable terms offered by the Convention, induced the chiefs both of
the Vendéans and of the Chouans to accept an amnesty. The terms offered
were certainly unusually tempting. A large indemnity of several millions
of francs was to be given to the people to repay them for their losses;
the houses that had been burnt were to be rebuilt; ten millions were to
be given to the chiefs to take up the bonds that had been issued in
their names during the insurrection; Charette was to be allowed to keep
up 2000 men in the pay of the Government, freedom of religion was to be
granted, and there were to be no requisitions in La Vendée for five
years. The agreement was made as solemn as possible. The first to accept
it was Charette, with whom the treaty was signed with great pomp in the
city of Nantes in February. Subsequently, in April, Stofflet gave in his
adhesion to the same arrangement, and finally the Chouans did the same.
It seemed a proof of their sincerity that they gave up into the hands of
the Commissioner of the Convention nearly a million of forged assignats,
which they had received from the English fleet round the coast; but on
the part of the insurgents it appears that this treaty was illusory,
forced upon them by the delay of the English. It was used however as an
additional ground for refusing large assistance, and it was an army of
emigrants only, with a considerable quantity of stores and money, which
in July of 1795 at length set sail from England. Even then the plan of
De Puisaye was overruled for the worse. For the sake of a good roadstead
for the English fleet, it was arranged that the landing should be upon
the peninsula of Quiberon, close to Carnac, instead of in the north of
Brittany; and again, apparently in mistrust of De Puisaye's partisan
system of warfare, it was thought necessary to give him as second in
command a royalist emigrant of the name of D'Hervilly, a red tape
soldier, who had displayed considerable courage on the 10th of August,
but who was a very bad man for the present irregular warfare. It even
seemed doubtful whether his authority did not supersede De Puisaye's,
and after Quiberon was reached, it was thought necessary to send an
appeal to England to settle this weighty question. Meanwhile, after two
days of delay, the troops were landed at Carnac. They were received with
an enthusiasm so riotous and irregular, that the commander's love of
discipline received a severe shock, and he ceased to trust his wild
allies. However, in three days they were joined by some 10,000 men, and
De Puisaye was eager to rush forward and raise the whole of the
neighbouring country, but the answer from England had not yet been
received, and the troops waited on in inactivity. At length something
was done. A small fort called Port Penthièvre covers the little isthmus
which joins the peninsula of Quiberon to the shore. D'Hervilly proceeded
to bring up all his artillery, but before his operations were completed,
De Puisaye and a few hundred Chouans had gained possession of the place
without difficulty. With his regular troops in the peninsula and holding
the fort, and with his Chouans spread along the mainland, De Puisaye was
compelled to remain inactive. All the jealousies which existed among the
royalists burst out, and even worse than that, time was allowed for
General Hoche to increase his 5000 troops, which might easily have been
routed, to double that number. He suddenly attacked the invaders, and
drove the whole mass, Chouans, emigrants, and all, to the narrow
confined peninsula. Their efforts to break loose were unavailing; fresh
emigrant troops under Sombreuil came from England. De Puisaye's
authority was confirmed, but it was too late. Some republican troops
taken in Fort Penthièvre had been admitted to the emigrant ranks. They
entered into treacherous correspondence with Hoche's army, and by their
assistance the fort was recaptured. The exit from their peninsula was
thus entirely closed to them, the enemy's cannon was placed along the
corresponding shore, and swept the isthmus and the roadstead, while the
republican troops, advancing from the fort, drove the invaders backward
into the corner of the tongue of land. They were literally driven into
the sea. The scene was a fearful one. Many in despair threw themselves
upon their own swords, many tried to reach the boats of the fleet, and
were a ready mark for the republican musketry. Some thought themselves
fortunate in reaching fishing-boats which were hovering about the coast,
but in zeal for their own preservation the boatmen lopped off their
hands and suffered them to sink. Some 900, with De Puisaye at their
head, reached the English squadron and were saved. About 700, under De
Sombreuil, made, as they thought, terms with General Humbert, but the
conditions were only verbal, and included, as the French asserted
probably with truth, a reference to the Convention. The reactionaries in
power were glad of the chance of freeing themselves of the charge of
favouring the royalists. Orders were given that the law against
emigrants taken in arms should be carried out to the letter. The
prisoners were brought out in batches and shot upon the seashore till
700 of them had been killed. After this the fate of the insurgents was
sealed. In the following year (1796) the Count of Artois again appeared
upon the coast, and Charette and Stofflet were again in arms, but the
Count of Artois was content to remain in idleness at L'Ile Dieu, and
Hoche succeeded in the difficult work of at once conquering and
conciliating all that remained of the insurrection. Charette and
Stofflet were both captured and shot.
[Sidenote: Confidence of the English in Pitt.]