Prussians had been suddenly and unexpectedly checked. Dumouriez had
occupied the Passes of the Argonnes, Kellermann had fought the cannonade
of Valmy, and the Prussians, bargaining for a safe retreat, began to
hurry homeward with ignoble speed. From this time onward the character
of the war changed, and became really dangerous to Europe. A party more
energetic than the Girondins was now in power. Dumouriez had always
recommended the conquest of Belgium for political reasons; but war
assumed a different aspect now that it was in the hands of the Jacobins;
it went hand in hand with the propagation of revolutionary ideas. The
victory of Jemmappes opened the road to Belgium; in the South, Nice and
Savoy completed the desired frontier of the Alps; and the temper in
which these conquests had been achieved was rendered obvious when, a few
days after the battle of Jemmappes, the celebrated decree of the 19th of
November was issued, promising fraternity to all nations desirous of
liberty, and when, two days afterwards, Savoy was formed into a new
department as the Department of Mont Blanc. If further proof was needed
of the character of the war, it was afforded by the peremptory orders
which were issued to disregard all treaty obligations and to open the
navigation of the Scheldt, which treaty after treaty, guaranteed by
France and other countries, had closed, and the opening of which could
not but bring France directly into opposition both to Holland and to
England. The chief points to be remembered as affecting England are the
declaration of war with Austria, sought by the French, and upon old
fashioned principles; the fall of the Girondins, practically completed
on the 10th of August; the union of Austria and Prussia produced by the
war, but not contracted formally till after the death of Leopold; the
advance of the allies, the consequent establishment of the Jacobins; the
massacres of September; the summoning of the Convention; the check to
the allies at Valmy; the renewal of the war of aggression upon different
principles and with different success, those principles being
illustrated by the ordering of the opening of the Scheldt and the
appropriation of Savoy; while in Paris the completion of the second
stage of the Revolution was marked by the suspension and trial of the
King.
[Sidenote: Change of opinion in England as to the Revolution.]
It was thus, with an enlarged knowledge of the principles and inevitable
course of the French Revolution, that Pitt had to choose his conduct,
and that in the course of this year (1792) the English people finally
divided itself into parties, and in Parliament the old party names of
Whig and Tory, which had in fact since the Hanoverian succession lost
their significance, assumed a new meaning. The first movements of the
Revolution were generally hailed with enthusiasm in England. In the
grand march of the first days of the States-General and National
Assembly there was nothing at first obvious to shock English feeling. On
the surface it appeared only as if France had discovered, and was
determined to realize, the same truths which England had already
discovered; the people and the Crown appeared to be preparing to act
hand in hand against the monopoly of the privileged classes, against the
Divine right of kings, and for the establishment of that official
royalty which already existed among us. To the leaders of the Whigs, who
still erroneously believed that that party was the really Liberal party,
there was everything to excite enthusiasm in the movement of the people,
while Pitt himself could scarcely fail to recognize that the very same
process was being carried out to which he owed his own elevation. But,
by extraordinary mismanagement on the part of the French Court, and by
the sluggish, uncertain character of the King, it came to pass that the
cause of royalty became unfortunately and indissolubly connected with
the cause of the privileged classes. The direction of the Revolution was
shifted, and the assault was directed not only against them, but against
the Crown; and not only against the Crown, in the sense that hereditary
kingship was attacked, but also against all vigorous executive of which
the King, even in his official capacity, might be regarded as the
representative. Now Pitt's administration may be regarded as a popular
triumph due to the union of King and people. It was quite untrue in
England that the interests of the Crown and aristocracy were one; the
power of the Crown, in so far as it was antagonistic to the power of the
great families, was favourable to liberty. Nevertheless, the ideas of
the French Revolution did in fact receive considerable sympathy in
England, as was rendered more and more visible daily. The amount of that
sympathy assumed an exaggerated appearance under the influence of the
fear and horror created by the excesses in Paris, and the relation of
classes which had not existed in England, but which those who
sympathized with the Revolution chose to believe existed, did in fact
arise. The choice seemed again to be offered between people and King.
And all the privileged classes, and all the propertied classes,
recognizing that a strong executive meant order, and that a strong
executive was represented by the King, speedily made their choice, and
gathered round the King.
[Sidenote: Formation of a new Tory party.]
There was thus formed a new Tory party, having for its watchword, "The
Old Constitution," refusing to listen to any sound of reform or change,
regarding every measure in a popular direction as a preliminary to
popular excesses, the dominion of the uneducated, and the reign of
socialistic ideas. At the head of this party Pitt, of late so liberal,
placed himself, supported by Burke, the late Whig leader. Conscious of
the strength he had himself derived from the Crown, conscious of the
advances in liberty he had been able to obtain by means of his alliance
with it, and thoroughly shocked with the disorder and violence of
France, Pitt determined that of the two elements of the Constitution,
which seemed to be coming into opposition one with the other, it was the
Crown which at all hazards required the firmest support. To this new
Tory party, before long, the greater part of the Whigs gave in their
adhesion. But as a new Tory party was formed, so was a new Whig party.
Certain large-minded men, such as Grey, saw no reason why a panic should
check such obvious improvements as had already been set on foot. Certain
vehement party men, such as Fox and Sheridan, of large and warm hearts,
rejoiced when their feelings led them in the same direction as their
political opposition, and formed together a small but united band, to
whom the French Revolution was admirable, to whom war with France was
wicked, and every attempt at the repression of disorder a wanton act of
tyranny.
[Sidenote: Sympathy with the Revolution among the lower classes.]
[Sidenote: Revolutionary societies.]
It has been already pointed out that both the social and constitutional
condition of England afforded a good ground on which sympathy for the
Revolution might take root. Not only were the numbers of the labouring
classes largely increased, not only was the condition of the labouring
class changing for the worse, the relations between capital and labour
were in a much less satisfactory state than they now are, every form of
combination among workmen was regarded as a crime, the line between
class and class was very strongly drawn. Country people were
complaining, in England as in France, of the absenteeism of landlords,
the employment of harsh middlemen, and the general resort of all gentry
to London. The Test Act and the penal laws were regarded by those who
were affected by them as relics of persecution, all efforts to relax
them were generally met with scornful rejection, and, before all, the
representation was in a condition which, but for its evil effects, might
be regarded as simply ridiculous. The sympathy which might thus have
been naturally felt was not left without instruction or direction. Those
who most strongly felt its influence speedily formed themselves into
societies, by whose means, in conjunction it seems pretty certain with
assistance from the French themselves, writings and pamphlets, pointing
out every flaw in the condition of England, and often using language
which was certainly seditious, were spread broadcast among the people,
and even among the soldiers. Of these societies by far the most
respectable was one known by the name of the "Friends of the People."
Its object was to excite and keep alive an agitation for the removal of
the inequalities of the representation. It included many men of the
greatest respectability, numbering twenty-eight members of Parliament in
its lists, and such names as Lord John Russell, Grey, Sheridan, Erskine,
and Lord Lauderdale. Far more dangerous were two societies which arose
early in 1792, with branches in many of the chief towns of England.
These were the London Corresponding Society, numbering between 6000 and
7000 members, organized as a secret society, and governed by a small
secret committee of five, and a Society for Constitutional Information,
consisting of the more advanced and thoroughgoing educated men of the
time, and holding opinions of so dangerous a character that the Society
of the Friends of the People thought it necessary to disclaim all
connection with it. It was to check the action of these societies that
the two first retrograde actions of Pitt were directed.
[Sidenote: Rejection of Grey's motion for reform. April 1792.]
The outcome of the work of the Society of the Friends of the People was
a motion brought in by Grey for a general reform of the representation.
To this Pitt refused his support. Two things were necessary, he said, to
induce a man to support a measure--the possibility of carrying it, and
the possibility, when carried, of putting it into execution to the
advantage of the people; both these conditions were now absent, not only
did he believe that in the present state of feeling the Bill would
infallibly be rejected by the House, but also it could not now be
carried out without the greatest danger. The Bill was accordingly lost,
and all chance of carrying reform disappeared. Yet the necessity for it
was made very clear by a petition from the same society presented by
Grey in the following year, which exhibited in all its nakedness the
inefficiency of the representation, and proved that a decided majority
of the House was returned in fact by no more than 154 individuals.
[Sidenote: Proclamation against seditious writings. May 21.]
[Sidenote: Diplomacy of M. Chauvelin.]
But while the respectable reformers were carrying out their efforts by
parliamentary means, the two less scrupulous societies went on issuing
papers and pamphlets to such an extent, that at length it seemed good to
Government to issue a royal proclamation warning the people against
seditious writings, and then to proceed to take legal measures against
them. This proclamation was issued on the 21st of May, and the address
moved in Parliament to thank the King for issuing it may be regarded as
the exact point at which the new division of parties sprang into
existence, for it was supported by many of the chief leaders of the
Whigs, and though an effort made by Pitt to strengthen his party by a
coalition with the Whigs failed for personal reasons, the Duke of
Portland, Wyndham, Thomas Grenville, and others, came back to their
allegiance to the wisdom of Burke, and joined henceforward in the united
Conservative party. It is remarkable also for a second point which
connects it with the international aspect of the French Revolution. M.
Chauvelin had lately been sent over to England, with his far abler
secretary Talleyrand, as minister accredited by the French King. But
Louis' authority was little more than a shadow, and M. Chauvelin already
thought fit to enter upon that peculiar course of foreign diplomacy
which was characteristic of the revolutionists; he drew up a strong
protest against the Proclamation, and demanded that it should be laid
before Parliament. Of course Grenville, the Foreign Minister, had no
alternative but to send back the letter, with a sharp rebuke, explaining
to him what he seemed to have forgotten, the true position of a foreign
minister. This was the beginning of that diplomatic squabble which ended
in M. Chauvelin being dismissed from England.
[Sidenote: Congratulatory addresses sent to France by the societies.
Sept.]
[Sidenote: Riots in Sheffield and Dundee. Nov.]
But before the breaking off of diplomatic intercourse, the open sympathy
expressed for the changes which had taken place in France had begun to
rouse the fear of the governing classes in England. The proclamation
against seditious writings had but little effect compared with the
exciting news of the 10th of August, the massacres of September, and the
retreat of the allies. The societies thought fit to send deputations
with addresses of sympathy to the National Convention. The Revolution
Society sent a present of a thousand pairs of shoes for the army, and
the Corresponding Society, with four or five others of a similar
character, sent a joint address, congratulating the French upon their
republican form of government, especially admiring the outrageous
conduct of the mob on the 10th of August, and even approving the sad
events of September. Nor was their energy confined to words. Riots broke
out in several towns both in England and Scotland. The most important
were those in Sheffield and Dundee. At Sheffield the disturbances took
the form of a regular revolutionary riot. It was on a day appointed for
rejoicing for the success of the French arms; a tree of Liberty was
planted, and the procession passed through the streets, headed by an
enormous picture of Dundas and Burke plunging their daggers into the
heart of Liberty. "They are as resolute and determined a set of villains
as ever I saw," writes an officer who was quartered in the place, "and
will gain their object if it is to be gained; they have debating
societies and correspondence with other towns; they have purchased
firearms, and are trying to corrupt the soldiers." At Dundee almost the
same events took place; again a tree of Liberty was planted, and the
cries of "Liberty," "Equality," "No excise," "No King," were soon
universally heard, though the ostensible cause of the riot had been the
high price of corn.
[Sidenote: The militia called out. Dec.]
This state of affairs--the seditious conduct of the societies, and the
obvious tendency to riot--induced Pitt, in the beginning of December, to
call out the militia. This he could only do legally by alleging
insurrection as the excuse, and it was a somewhat strained construction
of the word to apply it to these outbreaks. But Pitt had now made up his
mind not only for repression in England but for war abroad, and the
summoning of the militia was intended in fact as a first step in that
direction. It was under these circumstances that an autumnal Parliament
was summoned. The discussions naturally turned upon the conduct of the
Government in calling out the militia, but Fox was unable to collect
more than fifty votes to disapprove of the vigilance of the Government
in internal matters.
[Sidenote: Signs of approaching war with France.]
[Sidenote: The Alien Bill. Jan. 4, 1793.]
[Sidenote: Death of Louis XVI. Jan. 21, 1793.]
Much more really important were the indications of the near approach of
war, given by the stress laid by the Government upon the decree of
November, the opening of the Scheldt, and the irregular and
unsatisfactory character of our diplomatic relations with France. From
the beginning of 1793, although there was no declaration of war between
England and France, it was perfectly clear that war was inevitable. An
Alien Bill was introduced, rendered necessary it was urged by the great
assembly of foreigners in England, chiefly royalist emigrants, but also
in part emissaries from the Jacobin government. Foreigners were by this
Bill ordered to state the object of their visit to England, to enter
their names on a register, and to obtain passports for moving to and
fro. The Bill was at once asserted by the French to be an infringement
of Pitt's commercial treaty of 1787, which had promised freedom of
access to French citizens. It was followed by measures even more
stringent. The exportation of all materials of war, the introduction and
circulation of assignats, and the exportation of corn whether English or
foreign, to French ports, were prohibited. While affairs were in this
attitude, the catastrophe for which Europe had breathlessly waited took
place. Louis XVI. was guillotined on the 21st of January 1793. A thrill
of horror ran through all classes of society, nearly the whole of
London, and not the Court only, appeared in deep mourning, and orders
were almost immediately sent to M. Chauvelin to leave England within
eight days. The unofficial connections between him and Lord Grenville
had been kept up ever since the King's suspension, but M. Chauvelin
prided himself upon being in close connection with the Opposition rather
than with the Government, and persisted in separating in his papers the
interests of the Government and of the people. He had offered
explanations and produced a long letter for the same purpose from Le
Brun, the French Foreign Minister, with regard to the decree of the 19th
of November, but the explanation was of a character to increase the
irritation of the English. He had met every measure of the Government
with an angry protest: he justified the opening of the Scheldt; he
complained that he was obliged to enrol himself with the other aliens;
he declared that the prohibitory Bills were distinct breaches of the
treaty of 1787; and he was doubtless glad when the consummation he had
aimed at was reached and he was ordered to leave the country.
[Sidenote: Efforts on the part of Pitt for the continuation of peace.]
Some slight pretence was still kept up on the part of the French of a
desire to keep the peace. M. Maret, well known afterwards as the Duc de
Bassano, was sent over to take M. Chauvelin's place. The object of his
mission is really unknown; he simply notified his arrival to Grenville,
held no communications with him, and very shortly returned to France to
find war already declared. At the same time another indirect offer of
negotiation arose, strangely enough in Belgium, where Dumouriez desired
an opportunity for a diplomatic meeting with Lord Auckland, our
ambassador. It speaks well for Pitt's real desire to treat if treating
were possible, that he at once accepted this proposition, holding that a
general in command of an army might treat, without any implied
recognition of the legitimacy or the stability of the Government which
employed him. But though the required leave was immediately sent to Lord
Auckland, it arrived too late, war had been already declared. It is a
further proof of Pitt's pacific tendencies, that when he agreed to
Dumouriez' proposal an embargo had already been laid upon English
shipping in the French ports, an act of war which he was willing to
overlook as long as any hope of negotiation remained.
[Sidenote: Determination of the French for war.]
But it may be fairly asserted, in spite of all that Fox and his friends
urged, that there was no real opportunity after the massacres of
September of treating with dignity with France. While M. Chauvelin was
attempting on the 27th of December to explain away the November decree,
on the 31st of the same month the Minister of the Marine wrote thus to
the seaports of France: "The Government of England is arming, and the
King of Spain, encouraged by this, is preparing to attack us. These two
tyrannical powers, after persecuting the patriots in their own
territories, think no doubt that they will be able to influence the
judgment about to be pronounced on the tyrant Louis. They hope to
frighten us. But no; a people that has made itself free, a people that
has driven out of the bosom of France the terrible army of the Prussians
and Austrians, this people will not suffer laws to be dictated to them
by a tyrant. The King and his Parliament mean to make war upon us. Will
the republicans of England permit this? Already these freemen show their
discontent, and the repugnance they have to bear arms against their
brothers the French; well, we will fly to their succour, we will make a
descent upon their island, we will lodge there 50,000 caps of liberty,
we will plant the sacred tree, and we will stretch out our arms to our
republican brethren; the tyranny of their government will be
immediately overthrown." In fact, as has more than once happened in our
history, the disturbance of a few reckless men, which our free
constitution permits to show itself without repression, was construed to
mean what it might mean in less free countries. Misinformed by their
emissary Chauvelin who saw but one party, willing to believe what they
liked to believe, and ignorant of the character of the English nation,
the French had persuaded themselves that there was a real division
between the Government and the people of England, and were eager for the
war.
[Sidenote: Reasons for the war.]
That war they declared on the 8th of February, and by thus forestalling
what must have been sooner or later the action of the English ministry,
saved them from much difficulty. For there was considerable difference
of opinion as to what should be the _casus belli_. England was pledged
to neutrality, and was bound to France by a close commercial treaty. The
only two grounds on which, technically, war could be declared, were the
opening of the Scheldt and the destruction of the balance of power by
the appropriation of Savoy. England being under distinct pledge not to
interfere with the internal condition of France, neither the massacres
of September, the establishment of the Republic, nor the death of the
King, could with any justice be alleged as a ground of war. The
appropriation of Savoy was an evident fact, but it was very plausibly
urged that England, being in a state of professed neutrality, had
entirely disregarded the invasion of France by the great Eastern powers,
and had allowed to pass, without observation, the second partition of
Poland. The opening of the Scheldt was no doubt contrary to treaties
with Holland which England had guaranteed, but it was very reasonably
urged that England was not called upon to plunge into a war unless
Holland requested her to do so, and Holland remained studiously quiet.
The guarantee of the treaty had been to save Holland from war; it might
well seem a distortion of duty to force Holland into war for the
preservation of the treaty. There can be no doubt that the Opposition
was right in asserting that the war was declared against opinion; the
point in which they were wrong was this, that they did not recognize the
fact that opinion grown to a religion, a religion become propagandist in
its nature, and that propagandist religion in arms was the greatest
social danger which could threaten the world. Pitt and Burke saw this;
the whole body of Tories and conservative Whigs dimly felt it. But the
trammels of ages of diplomacy were too strong to allow of the fact
being openly recognized. It was then with joy that the ministry found
themselves released from their difficulties by the French declaration of
war.
[Sidenote: French successes in the campaign of 1792-3, on the
Continent,]