THE WAR OF 1812
There were two different causes of the war with Great Britain in
1812, and it is necessary to examine each separately. These causes
were maritime rights and land hunger.
The general European upheaval from 1789 to 1815, known as the French
Revolution, soon developed into a war between Great Britain and
Napoleon. All Europe was divided into two camps, with Great Britain
and Napoleon as the leaders on their respective sides. Almost a
decade before 1812 Great Britain began issuing decrees known as
Orders in Council. These "Orders in Council," issued in the name of
the king, attempted to prohibit neutral nations from shipping goods
to France. In this manner, a blockade was proclaimed against France,
and ships attempting to get through the lines were subject to capture
and confiscation.
Napoleon issued similar decrees, known as the Berlin and Milan
Decrees, declaring that any ships en route to Great Britain would be
subject to capture, for France had also blockaded Great Britain. But
as neither blockade could be fully enforced, they were both to a
large degree disregarded. Both Great Britain and Napoleon were
attempting to cut off each other's trade and not primarily trying to
disregard the rights of neutrals. All goods attempting to run these
blockades were subject to capture.
The principal losers through these captures were the New England
traders, but they preferred losing occasional ships to joining in a
war which would involve them with their principal customer, Great
Britain. There had been no serious crisis since 1807, five years
before war was declared. Napoleon was then losing fast and it seemed
evident that it would be only a short while before the causes of
friction would be over. The flagrant disregard of the "rights" of
neutral trade had taken place before 1807. In 1812, the solution or
end of the problem was in sight. In 1810, our registered tonnage in
foreign trade was 981,019 tons, which high mark it was not to reach
again till 1847. Our foreign trade was not ruined, and the New
England merchants who sustained the loss wanted nothing done. They
were Federalists and would have preferred a war with France rather
than a war with England, because they regarded Napoleon as the real
cause of all the trouble. The Federalists were pro-British, while
the Democrat-Republicans were pro-French. Early in 1811 our
minister, William Pinkney, left London, and thus the United States
was cut off from a knowledge of the movements in England. England
was attempting to avoid war with America because such a war would
naturally hurt her foreign trade and domestic prosperity. By the
spring of 1812 England was ready to revoke the Orders in Council as
soon as it could be done with dignity, but this fact was unknown to
America. On June 23, 1812, the orders were revoked. But this was
five days after the war of 1812 had been declared. England did not
know war was declared when the orders were revoked, and the United
States did not know till a good while later in the season that the
orders had been revoked. Perhaps modern cable communication would
have prevented this war.
Another source of friction lay in the impressment of seamen and
sailors. During this period Great Britain was hard pressed for men
in her naval campaign against Napoleon. Many sailors deserted
English ships and came to America because of the higher wages paid by
the owners of American ships. Every British warship anchoring in
American waters would lose a good part of its crew, who would secure
positions on American ships. Great Britain demanded the return of
these deserters, who would often become naturalized citizens. Great
Britain, however, at that time regarded citizenship as a contract
between citizens and government which could not be broken without the
consent of both, disqualifying the sailor from citizenship in the
United States, without her consent. This European custom has now
disappeared, of course, and one can change citizenship at will.
When the United States refused to return these men, the British ships
would search American vessels on the high seas to see if any British
sailors were on board. This policy of impressment waned, however,
after 1805, because Napoleon had been defeated on the sea and Great
Britain was not in such great need of sailors. Impressment was not
made a cause of war until after the war had begun and President
Madison had learned that the Orders in Council had been revoked.
President Madison in 1812 estimated the number of impressments at
6,057, but the Massachusetts legislature appointed a committee to
investigate the situation, which reported that the Madison estimate
was "three or four times too large." Great Britain took the position
that the United States was acting as a harbor for her deserters from
the British navy and merchant ships, and that therefore the search
was warranted as a defensive measure.
The British "Orders in Council" prohibiting the trading of neutral
powers with France, and the British impressment of fugitive sailors
from English ships, were the maritime controversies which resulted in
the War of 1812. Both policies on the part of Great Britain were
adopted as necessary measures in her conflict with Napoleon.
The New England Federalists were the people principally concerned in
the United States, but they opposed the war. War was declared by a
vote of 79 to 49 in the House, and 19 to 13 in the Senate. There was
open discouragement of enlistment in New England. The Governors of
Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to honor President Madison's
call for the militia. Henry Adams estimated that the New England
bankers loaned more money to Great Britain than to the United States
for war purposes. Of the $17,000,000 in specie in the country in
1812, about $10,000,000 was in the hands of the New England
Federalists. They subscribed less than $3,000,000 to the United
States war loan. Thus, strangely, enough, the War of 1812 was fought
in spite of the protest of those for whom it was presumably fought.
But in recent years another cause of the war and the chief cause has
been discovered. This was land hunger.
The United States entered the conflict at the insistence of the south
and west, despite the opposition of the northeastern states. The
inland section overruled the opposition of the maritime section. At
that time, there was an ardent expansionist sentiment along the whole
western and southern border looking towards the annexation of Canada
and Florida, with a vaguer idea of seizing all of the Spanish
possessions of North America. Spain then owned Florida. Spain and
Great Britain were allies against Napoleon, and a war with one was
looked upon as a war with both. The belief that the United States
would some day annex Canada had existed continuously since the
Revolution. Benjamin Franklin had advocated the buying of Canada by
the United States, since we failed to take it during the Revolution.
The Continental Congress made an effort to capture Canada, but our
armies were repulsed. Washington had objected to leaving Canada in
British hands. In 1803 Governor Morris of Pennsylvania wrote that at
the time of the Constitutional Convention he knew "that all North
America must at length be annexed to us--happy indeed if the lust of
dominion stop there." This idea, however, was a vague dream till
about 1810.
There had been friction in the northwest between the Americans and
British. The British retained trading posts in the northwest after
they had agreed to give them up by the treaty of 1783 recognizing the
independence of the United States. These were held to compensate the
Tories for their property confiscated during the Revolutionary War,
which had not been done. For this reason, the British held the
northwest posts until 1796, when they were given up by the Jay
Treaty. All the Indian trouble in that section was attributed to
British propaganda, which incited the Indians against the United
States. The Canadian traders made friends with the Indians to get
their trade while the Americans were aggressively pushing them back
from their land. The result was that the Indian was more friendly to
the British in Canada than to the United States.
The idea of annexing Canada was intensified after 1810 because of the
belief that the Indians were being turned against the United States
by the British. The south was almost unanimous in its demand for the
annexation of Florida, while the southwest was taking a lively
interest in Mexico. This land hunger was making its appearance
rapidly, but it was several years later that the phrase "manifest
destiny" was to come into general use.
President Madison and Secretary of State James Monroe were eager to
annex Florida. Thomas Jefferson was interested in the annexation of
Canada, Florida and Cuba. Jefferson considered the acquisition of
Canada only a "question of marching," with Florida and Cuba easy prey
from Spain. These expansionists were in favor of declaring war,
while the rest of the country opposed the idea.
When Congress met in 1811, Henry Clay was elected Speaker of the
House. He was leader of the war group known as "war hawks." Clay
was the first Speaker of the House of Representatives to recognize
the great power he could exercise over legislation through his
appointment of committees. He was the first "Czar" of the House. On
the Foreign Relations Committee, Clay appointed Peter B. Porter,
Chairman, Calhoun of South Carolina, Grundy of Tennessee, Harper of
New Hampshire, and Desha of Kentucky. All these were ardent
expansionists and reliable war men. They represented the frontier
section of 1812, and Clay had been chosen Speaker by the
representatives from that section. In December, 1812, while on the
Foreign Relations Committee, Porter said in discussing trouble with
Great Britain, "We could deprive her of her extensive provinces lying
along our border to the north." Grundy and Rhea, ardent
expansionists from Tennessee, agreed.
R. M. Johnson of Kentucky during the same session made the statement,
"I shall never die contented until I see her (Great Britain's)
expulsion from North America, and her territories incorporated with
the United States," and Harper of New Hampshire said in Congress: "To
me, sir, it appears that the Author of Nature has marked our limits
in the South by the Gulf of Mexico, and in the North by the regions
of eternal frost."
These statements were representative of the sentiments of the members
in Congress from the western section. The Federalist Party consisted
chiefly of the mercantile and financial interests of the coast towns.
They were solidly against expansion, which would give the economic
advantage to the western section of the country.
The winter of 1811-1812 saw a great expansionist wave sweep over the
west, clamoring for the annexation of Canada. Contemporary
newspapers were filled with editorials demanding annexation. The cry
came up from the whole frontier, New Hampshire to Kentucky, to expel
the British from Canada. At a Washington's birthday dinner given at
Lexington, Ky., on February 22, 1812, the toast proposed was "Canada
and our arms." Although the frontier claimed that the British were
inciting the Indians against the United States, L. M. Hacker in
"Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812" proves that the Indian
menace was greatly exaggerated, but that land hunger was the real
motive.
Randolph, of Virginia, who was opposed to the war, said in 1812 on
the floor of Congress: "Ever since the report of the Committee on
Foreign Relations came into the House, we have heard but one
word--like the whippoorwill with but one eternal monotonous
tune--Canada! Canada! Canada!"
The south and southwest were interested in the annexation of Florida
and possibly Texas. To them, a war with Great Britain meant a war
with Spain also, since the British and Spain were then in alliance.
President Madison and Secretary of State Monroe, in their eagerness
to acquire Florida, had helped a General George Mathews to instigate
a revolution in Florida. In 1812 General Mathews took American
troops to Florida, with the co-operation of the War Department and
also the support of Governor Mitchell of Georgia. This territory was
held for a year, although Congress twice refused to authorize the
President to hold it. Finally Madison was forced to repudiate the
act because of the opposition of the Federalists and the northern
members of his own party. Senator Crawford, of Georgia, was active
in his support of southern expansion; Jefferson wished to annex Cuba
as a state, and Madison and Monroe were eager to annex Florida
although they were not concerned with the appropriation of Canada.
The interest of the southwest in Mexico was a spirited one. McCaleb,
in his book on "The Aaron Burr Conspiracy" points out that Burr
simply attempted to do in 1806 what the whole southwest was dreaming
of. He was conspiring against Spain in Mexico and not against the
United States as is usually supposed. "Lands, water-ways, and
Indians" was the cry of men desiring to drive out Spain.
In the Nashville _Clarion_ of April 28, 1812, there appeared a long
article advocating the annexation of all America, closing with the
statement: "Where is it written in the book of fate that the American
republic shall not stretch her limits from the capes of the
Chesapeake to Nootka Sound, from the Isthmus of Panama to Hudson
Bay?" The paper then editorially commended the article to its
readers and followed it up with a series of historical and
descriptive articles about Mexico.
The War of 1812 continued for two years. Troops were raised to
invade Canada but interest in the venture was slight. Many of the
militia refused to march out of American territory, as it was
understood then that the militia could not be ordered to foreign
soil. The expansionists could have united to declare war, but plans
of expansion collapsed. The northern states opposed the annexation
of Florida without Canada. The troops could never take Canada.
Madison and Monroe were interested in Florida, not Canada. The
British repulsed the troops from Canada. The south had no desire to
acquire northern territory.
The War of 1812, in fact, was a complete failure from every angle.
Our troops were defeated. General Winfield Scott declared that the
army officers were "generally sunk in either sloth, ignorance, or
habits of intemperate drinking," "swaggerers, dependents, decayed
gentlemen utterly unfit for any military purpose whatever."
Muzzey in "The United States of America through the Civil War," Vol.
I, page 253, says: "The War of 1812 was a blunder. It was
unnecessary, impolitic, untimely, and rash." It was primarily the
work of Henry Clay. If the United States had been in any condition
to fight, we should have been of great aid to Napoleon who at that
time was being defeated by Great Britain.
In the peace treaty of 1814, which brought the war to a close, the
causes of the war were not mentioned. The War of 1812 was a war of
paradoxes. It was waged ostensibly in defense of maritime commercial
interests, but the merchant states themselves threatened to secede so
as to stop it. The English Orders in Council, the alleged cause of
the war, were repealed five days after war was declared and before
news of its declaration reached England. The most important battle
of the war, the Battle of New Orleans, was fought after the treaty of
peace had been signed. The United States did not get any of the
desired territory; was defeated in nearly every campaign; and the
capitol was burned by the English. The land was not gained and the
rights on the sea were not granted. England never yielded the right
of impressment, which remained a diplomatic controversy as late as
1842.
In order to save its reputation, the Administration published an
"Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War," prepared by A.
J. Dallas, in which it was denied that the administration had ever
tried to acquire Canada. Madison was a great scholar but not a
strong executive, and it was the war hawks led by Clay who forced the
war upon him and the nation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Henry--_John Randolph_.
Hocker, L. M.--"Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812; A
Conjecture". _Mississippi Valley Historical Review_, Vol. X, pages
363-395.
Johnson, Allen--_Union and Democracy_. Chapter 11.
Lewis, H. J.--"A Re-analysis of the Causes of the War of 1812."
_American Historical Magazine_. Vol. VI, pages 306-316, 577-584.
Muzzey, D. S.--_The United States of America Through the Civil War_.
Vol. I, chapter 5.
Pratt, J. W.--_The Expansionists of 1812_.
Simons, A. M.--_Social Forces in American History_. Chapter 13.