Before information to this effect came in, the conviction had been

reached in the Royal Head-quarter that at all events the main forces of

the enemy still remained before Metz; there was, however, a difference

of opinion as to the extension of the French front, which it was assumed

did not reach beyond Montigny. The Head-quarter of the IInd Army was

therefore instructed not to extend further northward, but to attack the

enemy's right wing with the IXth Corps, and push in the direction of

Batilly with the Guard and the XIIth Corps. The Ist Army was not to

begin its frontal attack until the IInd should be ready to co-operate.

In obedience to those instructions Prince Frederick Charles ordered the

IXth Corps to march towards Verneville, and, in case the French right

wing should be found there, to begin the action by promptly bringing a

large force of artillery into action. The Guard was to continue its

advance by way of Doncourt to support the IXth as soon as possible. The

XIIth was to remain at Jarny for the present.

A little later fresh reports came in, which indicated that the IXth

Corps, should it proceed in the manner ordered, would not strike the

enemy on his flank, but full on his front. The Prince, in the discretion

of his high position, therefore determined that the Corps should

postpone its attack till the Guard Corps should have been brought to

bear upon Amanvillers. At the same time the XIIth Corps was to push on

to Ste. Marie aux Chenes.

But while these orders were being expedited, there was heard from

Verneville at twelve o'clock the roar of the first cannon shots.

The two Corps of the left wing had, moreover, of their own accord, taken

an easterly direction, and the IIIrd Corps moved up in rear of the IXth

to the Caulre farm.

General von Manstein, the commander of the IXth Corps, had observed from

Verneville a French camp at Amanvillers, which apparently lay in

negligent repose. From his standpoint it could not be discerned that to

his left about St. Privat great masses of troops were in position.

Thinking that in this camp he had the enemy's right wing before him, he

determined to act on his original orders and at once take the foe by

surprise. Eight of his batteries at once opened fire.

But the French troops showed great alacrity in moving up into their

prepared positions. The isolated initiative of the single Corps

naturally drew upon it not only the fire of the troops opposite to it,

but also that of the hostile Corps to right and left.

In the effort to find a location affording something of shelter, the

Prussian batteries had taken position in a fold of the slope looking

towards Amanvillers, and facing to the south-east, where, however, they

were exposed from the north, on the flank and even in the rear, to the

fire of the enemy's artillery, as well as to the massed fire of his

infantry.

To meet this, it was necessary to send forward the infantry battalions

nearest at hand. They took possession of the eastern point of the Bois

de la Cusse on the left, and on the right seized the farmhouses of

L'Envie and Chantrenne, and forced their way into the Bois des Genivaux.

Thus the front of the 18th Division in action extended along a distance

of 4000 paces.

It had to endure very heavy loss from the circumstance that the French

with their long-range Chassepot rifles could afford to keep out of the

effective range of the needle-gun; the artillery suffered exceptionally

severely. One of the batteries had already lost forty-five gunners when

the enemy's sharpshooters swarmed forward on it. Infantry protection was

not available at the moment, and two guns were lost. By two o'clock the

batteries still remaining in position were almost unserviceable, and no

relief arrived till the Hessian Division reached Habonville, and

brought up on the left of the distressed batteries, five batteries on

either side of the railway, which diverted on themselves to a

considerable extent the concentrated fire of the enemy. The batteries of

the 18th Division, which had suffered most, could now be withdrawn in

succession, but even in the act of retreat they had to drive off the

pursuers by grape-shot.

The artillery of the IIIrd Corps and the Guard also came to the aid of

the IXth, and those of the damaged guns of the last, which were still at

all fit for service, were at once brought up again into the fighting

line. Thus there was formed in front of Verneville and as far as St. Ail

an artillery front of 130 pieces, whose fire now opposed the enemy's

artillery with conspicuous success. Now that the IIIrd Corps was

approaching Verneville and the 3rd Guard Brigade had reached Habonville,

it was no longer to be apprehended that the French would succeed in

piercing this line.

The main body of the Guard Corps reached St. Ail so early as two

o'clock. General von Pape (commanding Ist Guard Division) at once

recognized that by wheeling to the east he would not only not strike the

enemy on that right flank of his which had to be turned, but would

expose his own left flank to the hostile force occupying Ste. Marie aux

Chenes. This town-like village, in itself extremely strong, and also

strongly flanked by the main stronghold of the enemy's right, it was

necessary to gain before making any further advance; but, in obedience

to superior orders, the General had to await the co-operation of the

Saxon Corps.

The foremost troops of this Corps had already reached the vicinity of

Batilly, but it was still distant from Ste. Marie more than two miles,

so that its batteries could not be pushed forward into position west of

that place until three o'clock. But as the Guard had sent most of its

own artillery to the support of the IXth Corps the Saxon batteries were

of essential service. Ten batteries now directed their fire upon Ste.

Marie, and by the time its effect was discernible, the 47th Brigade of

the XIIth Corps came up. At half-past three the Prussian and Saxon

battalions hurled themselves on the town from the south, the west, and

the north, with loud hurrahs and without returning the fire of the

enemy. The French were driven from it with the loss of several hundred

men taken prisoners.

The Saxons eagerly followed up, and north of Ste. Marie there ensued a

lively infantry fight, which masked the fire of the artillery. The

brigade having obeyed the order to retire, the batteries immediately

re-opened fire, and the repeated efforts of the French to recover the

lost position were frustrated.

Soon afterwards the IXth Corps succeeded in storming and firmly holding

the farm of Champenois, but all further attempts by isolated battalions

or companies to force their way forward against the broad and compact

front of the French were then manifestly futile. Thus, towards five

o'clock, the infantry fire altogether died out, and the artillery fired

only an occasional shot. The exhaustion of both sides caused for the

time an almost total suspension of hostilities in this part of the

field.

The Royal Head-quarter had firmly maintained the resolution, that the

Ist Army should not commit itself to a serious offensive until the IInd

had grappled with the enemy. But when the day was half-spent and when

about noon heavy firing was heard from Vionville,[12] it was to be

assumed that the moment for action had arrived; still, for the present,

permission was only given to the Ist Army to engage in the artillery

preparation.

Sixteen batteries of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps accordingly drew up

right and left of Gravelotte on the highway passing through that

village. Their fire was ineffective, because they were too far distant

from the enemy; and furthermore they suffered from the fire of the

French tirailleurs nestling in the opposite woods. It became necessary

to drive those out, and thus there occurred here a premature infantry

fight. The French were cleared out from the eastern declivity of the

Mance ravine, and the artillery line, now increased to twenty batteries,

was able to advance closer up to the western brink and now direct the

strength of its fire against the main position of the enemy.

But the battalions of the 29th Brigade pushed the attack further. They

pressed on leftward into the southern section of the Bois des Genivaux,

but were unable to obtain touch of the IXth Corps in possession of the

northern portion of the forest, since the French firmly held the

intervening ground. On the right sundry detachments took possession of

the quarries and gravel-pits near St. Hubert.

The artillery meanwhile had gained the mastery over that of the enemy,

several of whose batteries were silenced, and others prevented from

coming into position. The French fire was in part directed on the

farm-steading of St. Hubert, to the vicinity of which portions of the

30th Brigade had spurted forward. These formidable premises close under

the face of the enemy's main position, and in spite of a very heavy fire

therefrom, were stormed at three o'clock. The 31st Brigade also now

promptly crossed the ravine, but a further advance against the farms of

Moscou and Leipzig, over a bare stretch of ground encompassed by the

enemy on its wooded edges, did not succeed, and resulted only in heavy

loss. On the extreme right, the 26th Brigade had taken possession of

Jussy, thus securing the connection of the German army towards Metz, but

found it impossible to cross the deep valley of Rozerieulles.

Everywhere the advanced positions of the French had been driven in, the

farms in their front were blazing, their artillery appeared to be

crushed, and, as the situation was viewed from Gravelotte, there needed

nothing but to follow up the success. General von Steinmetz therefore,

at four o'clock, ordered a renewed attack with fresh forces.

While the VIIth Corps occupied the border of the woodland, four

batteries, backed by the 1st Cavalry Division, moved at a trot through

the ravine, about 1500 paces across, which lies east of Gravelotte. But

as soon as the head of the deep column came in sight of the enemy he

redoubled his rifle and artillery fire, which had till now been kept

under. One battery lost in a twinkling the men serving four of its guns,

and it was only by an extreme effort that it was withdrawn to the border

of the wood; another never succeeded in deploying. On the other hand,

Hasse's battery remained in action, in spite of the loss of seventy-five

horses, and Gnuegge's battery stood fast near St. Hubert, regardless of

the return fire from the quarries.

The foremost regiment of cavalry bent to the right at a gallop on

leaving the hollow way, and advanced towards Point du Jour, but the

enemy, being completely under cover, offered no mark for an attack.

Clearly there was no field here for the utilization of this arm, so the

regiments withdrew across the Mance ravine under a heavy fire from all

sides.

The result of the ill-success of this attempt was that swarms of French

tirailleurs now poured down from Point du Jour, and drove the Prussian

detachments still remaining on the bare plateau backward to the skirts

of the wood. Chassepot bullets even reached the position of the Royal

Commander-in-Chief and his personal staff, and Prince Adalbert's horse

was shot under him.

Fresh forces pushed forward and drove the enemy back into his main

position. St. Hubert remained in German possession, though the gunners

of the battery in post there were equal to the service of but one gun.

But all partial attempts to advance over the exposed plateau proved a

failure; and here also at about five o'clock in the afternoon there

occurred a lull in the fighting, during which the weary troops on both

sides reorganized themselves and took breath.

About this time King William and his staff rode forward to the swell

south of Malmaison. But from there nothing could be discerned of the

situation of the left flank of the army, at a distance as it was of more

than four miles. The French artillery had almost entirely ceased along

the whole front from La Folie to Point du Jour; but to the northward the

thunder of the cannon fire roared louder than ever. It was six o'clock,

the day was nearly at an end, and it was imperative that the decisive

result should be precipitated. The King therefore ordered the Ist Army

to make a renewed advance in support of which he placed the IInd Corps,

just arrived after a long march, at the disposal of General von

Steinmetz.

The battalions of the VIIth Corps which were still serviceable, except

five which remained in reserve, were again sent across the Mance ravine,

and in support of them the battalions holding the Bois de Vaux advanced

in the direction of Point du Jour and the quarries.

The IInd Corps of the French Army thus assailed was now reinforced by

the Guard Voltigeur Division. All the reserves were hurried up into the

foremost line. The artillery burst into redoubled fire, and a crushing

musketry fire was concentrated on the advancing enemy. Then the French

themselves took the offensive with a huge swarm of tirailleurs, which

hurled backward upon the wood-fringes the small leaderless bodies of

German troops that had been lying in the shallow folds of the plateau.

There, however, the sally found its limit; and there still remained at

disposition a fresh Army Corps in full strength.

The IInd Corps, the last to come up by rail into the theatre of war,

had hitherto followed in the wake of the army by forced marches, and had

not been able to take part in any engagement. It had started from Pont a

Mousson at 2 a.m. and, taking the road by Buxieres and Rezonville,

arrived south of Gravelotte towards evening. The Pomeranians expressed

their eager desire to get at the enemy before the day should end.

It would have been more proper if the Chief of the General Staff of the

Army, who was personally on the spot at the time, had not permitted this

movement at so late an hour of the evening. A body of troops, still

completely intact, might have been of great value the next day; but it

could hardly be expected on this evening to effect a decisive reversal

of the situation.

Hurrying through Gravelotte, the foremost battalions of the IInd Corps

pushed forward to the quarries, and up to within a few hundred paces of

Point du Jour; but those following soon found themselves involved in the

throng of the broken detachments remaining under fire south of St.

Hubert, and the further advance towards Moscou was arrested. In the

growing darkness friend became indistinguishable from foe, and the

firing had to be broken off. Not, however, until ten o'clock did it

entirely cease.

It was, to be sure, an advantage that the fresh troops of the IInd Corps

were available to hold the foremost fighting-line for the night, behind

which the intermixed detachments of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps were

enabled to reorganize themselves.

The whole course of the struggle had conclusively proved that the French

left flank, almost impregnable as it was by nature and art, could not be

forced even by the most devoted bravery and the greatest sacrifices.

Both sides were now facing each other in threatening proximity, and both

in attitude to renew the battle on the following morning. The result of

the day turned on the events evolving themselves on the opposite flank.

The Prince of Wuertemberg,[13] then in St. Ail, had judged at a

quarter-past five that the moment was come for an attack on the French

right wing; but that wing extended considerably further north than the

front of the Guard Corps reached; further, indeed, than the French

Commander-in-Chief himself was aware. The Saxons had, indeed,

participated in the seizure of Ste. Marie aux Chenes, but after that

event the Crown Prince[14] deemed it necessary to assemble his Corps in

front of the Bois d'Auboue, before proceeding to attack the enemy in

flank. One of his brigades had to come up from Jarny, another from Ste.

Marie; and, since the Corps had been delayed in getting away from Mars

la Tour, its direct attack could not be expected at the earliest for an

hour to come.

The 4th Infantry Brigade of the Guard Corps, in accordance with orders

received, proceeded in the prescribed direction of Jerusalem,

immediately south of St. Privat. As soon as General von Manstein

observed this movement, he ordered the 3rd Guard Brigade, which had been

placed at his orders, immediately to advance from Habonville direct upon

Amanvillers. Between and abreast of these two brigades marched Hessian

battalions. It was not till half-an-hour later that the 1st Guard

Division leftward of the 2nd moved forward from Ste. Marie against St.

Privat. This combined offensive movement was directed against the broad

front of the French VIth and IVth Corps. Their respective strongholds of

St. Privat and Amanvillers had as yet hardly felt the fire of the German

batteries, which had hitherto found enough to do in combating the

enemy's artillery outside the villages.

In front of the French main position on the crown of the height had been

prepared on the slope behind the hedges and low walls, which rose

terrace-wise backward, tier on tier of shelter trenches. Behind these

defences towered the village named St. Privat, castle-like with its

massive houses, which were garrisoned to the very roofs. The bare slope

stretching in its front was thus exposed to an overwhelming storm of

projectiles.

The losses of the Guard Corps marching forward to attack a front so

formidable were simply enormous. In the course of half an hour five

battalions lost all, the others the greater part of their officers,

especially those of the higher grades. Thousands of dead and wounded

marked the track of the battalions pressing valiantly forward in spite

of their cruel losses. The ranks as fast as they were thinned constantly

closed up again, and their cohesion was not lost even under the

leadership of young lieutenants and ensigns. As they drew nearer to the

enemy the needle-gun came into full utility. The French were driven from

all their foremost positions, in which, for the most part, they did not

await the final struggle. By a quarter-past six the battalions had

advanced to within 600 to 800 paces of Amanvillers and St. Privat. The

troops, weary from the strained exertion, halted under the steeper

slopes offering some, though small, protection, and in the shelter

trenches abandoned by the enemy. Only four battalions now remained in

reserve at Ste. Marie, behind the line which now extended to a length of

4000 paces. Every charge of the French cavalry and of de Cissey's

Division had been steadily repelled with the aid of twelve batteries of

the Guard Corps which had hastened up; but detachments commingled under

stress of untold losses, had to show a resolute front against two French

Corps in close proximity for more than half-an-hour, before relief came

to them.

It was nearly seven o'clock when on the left of the Guard, two brigades

of Saxon infantry reached the scene of strife; the other two were still

assembling in the forest of Auboue; their artillery, however, had for a

considerable time been maintaining a lively fire on Roncourt.

When Bazaine received word that the Germans were stretching out in

constantly increasing extension with intent to outflank his right, he at

three p.m. ordered Picard's Guard Grenadier Division posted at

Plappeville, to march towards the threatened flank. Though the distance

to be covered was little more than four miles, this all-important

reinforcement, having diverged to rightward from the direct road through

the woodland, had not yet arrived; and Marshal Canrobert, who was

fending off with all his might the converging masses of Prussian

assailants, decided to concentrate his troops more closely about the

strong position of St. Privat. The retreat from Roncourt would be

adequately covered by a small rearguard, since the border of the Bois de

Jaumont was being held.

Thus it happened that the Saxons did not find the strong resistance at

Roncourt which they had expected, and after a slight skirmish entered

the village together with the companies of the extreme left of the

Guard; a body of Saxon infantry had previously been diverted to the

right from the road to Roncourt and marched direct on St. Privat to the

support of the Guard.

The fire of twenty-four batteries of the two German Corps wrought awful

havoc there. Many houses were set on fire, or crumbled under the

concentrated crash of the shells. But the French were determined to hold

to the last extremity this point, decisive as it was of the fate of the

day. The batteries of their right flank were hurried into position

between St. Privat and the Bois de Jaumont, whence their fire would

enfilade the further advance of the Saxons on the former place. Other

batteries went southward to confront the Prussians, and the simultaneous

final rush of the German battalions was met by a rattling fire from the

French riflemen under cover in their lines of shelter trenches.

All those obstacles were gradually overcome in the course of the

assault, although again with heavy loss; some detachments halting

occasionally for a moment to pour in a volley, others again never

firing a shot. By sundown the attack had swept up to within 300 paces of

St. Privat. Some detachments of the Xth Corps, which had reached St.

Ail, closed up, and now the final onset was made from every side at

once. The French still defended the burning houses and the church with

great obstinacy, till, finding themselves completely surrounded, they

surrendered at about eight o'clock. More than 2000 men were here taken

prisoners, and the wounded were rescued from the burning houses.

The defeated troops of the VIth French Corps hurriedly retired into the

valley of the Moselle, their retreat covered by the brigade holding the

Bois de Jaumont and by the cavalry. Only then did the Guard Grenadier

Division make its first appearance, and the Reserve Artillery of the

French Army deployed east of Amanvillers. The German batteries at once

took up the fight, which lasted till late in the night, and in the

course of which Amanvillers was burned.

In that quarter the retirement of the IVth French Corps had also already

commenced, masked, however, by repeated heavy attacks to the front. In

the course of these there occurred a hand-to-hand encounter with the

charging battalions of the right wing of the Guard and the left of the

IXth Corps. Amanvillers, however, remained in the hands of the French

for the night. Not until three o'clock on the morning of the 19th did

the IIIrd French Corps evacuate its position about Moscou; and the IInd

Corps held its ground until five o'clock, engaged in constant sharp

frays with the outposts of the Pomeranians, who on its withdrawal took

possession of the plateaus of Moscou and Point du Jour.

The results attained on the 18th of August had been made possible only

by the battles of the 14th and 16th.

The French estimate their losses at 13,000 men. In October 173,000 were

still in Metz, consequently it is certain that the enemy had at

disposition in the battle of the 18th of August more than 180,000 men.

The exact strength of the seven[15] German Corps on that day amounted to

178,818 men. Thus with the forces on either side of approximately equal

strength, the French had been driven out of a position of almost

unrivalled natural advantage.

Naturally the loss of the assailants was much heavier than that of the

defence; it amounted to 20,584 men, among them 899 officers.

Whereas by the war-establishment the average is one officer to every

forty men, in this battle one officer fell to every twenty-three men;

glorious testimony to the example set by their leaders to their brave

men, but also a loss which could not be restored during the course of

the war. Altogether the six battles fought in the first fourteen days of

August had cost the German army 50,000 men.[16] It was naturally

impossible immediately to call out at home a sufficient levy in

substitution for the losses; but reinforcements drawn from the

time-expired cadres were already bespoken.

First of all that same evening the earliest instalment of the trains and

the Field-Hospitals had to be brought up from the right bank of the

Moselle; and the ammunition had to be replenished throughout. In

Rezonville, thronged as it was with the wounded, it was with difficulty

that a little garret for the King and shelter for his General Staff

were found. Its members were engrossed throughout the night in preparing

the dispositions which the new phase of the situation created by the

victory rendered immediately necessary. This exertion enabled all those

orders to be laid before his Majesty for approval on the morning of the

19th.

FOOTNOTES:

[11] The XIIth Corps never stood on the right. It occupied its assigned

position on the extreme left, and the delay arose from the Guard Corps

having occupied a position other than that designed for it, and having

been allowed to remain there.

[12] Vionville in text seems a slip of the pen for Verneville.

[13] Commanding the Guard Corps.

[14] Of Saxony, commanding XIIth Corps.

[15] These figures represent only the infantry of the eight (not seven)

Corps engaged; they do not include the cavalry, 24,584; the artillery,

at least as strong; nor the officerhood of the two armies, numbering

several thousands. Inclusive of those items the German host "employed"

in the battle of Gravelotte--St. Privat numbered, in round figures,

232,000 combatants. Accepting Moltke's own estimate of ten defenders per

"Schrith" of front, there works out a total of 133,000 men, as the

strength of the French army "employed" in the battle.

[16] During the first fourteen days of August, the German troops were in

conflict with the enemy on five occasions: viz. Saarbruecken, 2nd, loss

79; Weissenburg, 4th, loss 1551; Woerth, 6th, loss 10,642; Spicheren,

6th, loss 4871; Borny, 14th, loss 5000. Total losses during the fourteen

days, 22,143.

NEW DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY.

The siege of Metz had formed no part of the original plan of campaign;

it had been intended to do no more than merely to maintain an

observation on the place when the main army should have passed it on the

advance towards Paris; and a Reserve Division, consisting of eighteen

battalions, sixteen squadrons, and thirty-six guns, detailed for that

duty, was now near at hand.

Under the altered conditions, however, the regular investment of Metz

was now necessary, and this involved a radical alteration of the

existing arrangements throughout the whole army.

A separate army under the command of Prince Frederick Charles,

consisting of the Ist, VIIth, and VIIIth Corps of the former Ist Army,

the IInd, IIIrd, IXth, and Xth Corps of the IInd Army, the Reserve

Division and the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, in all 150,000 men, was

assigned to the duty of investing Metz.

The Guard, IVth, and XIIth Corps and the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions

were formed into a separate army under the command of the Crown Prince

of Saxony; it was styled "The Army of the Meuse" and was 138,000

strong.[17] This and the IIIrd Army, which numbered 223,000 men, were

directed to advance against the new French army forming at Chalons.

Certainly the army investing Metz was left weaker than the blockaded

enemy. It was to be expected that the latter would renew his efforts to

break out to the westward. Prince Frederick Charles' main forces were

therefore to remain on the left bank of the Moselle.

All these orders received the approval of the King, and were dispatched

to the commanding officers by eleven o'clock on the morning of the 19th.

In accordance with the orders of Prince Frederick Charles, the Xth Corps

occupied the woodland districts of the lower Moselle as far as St.

Privat, while the IInd held the high ridge from that point to Moscou. To

the right of the IInd, the VIIIth and VIIth Corps followed on, the

latter positioned on both sides of the Upper Moselle. The Ist Corps

occupied the Pouilly upland to left and right of the Seille, specially

charged to protect the great magazines which were being established at

Remilly and Pont a Mousson. The 3rd Reserve Division moved to the

vicinity of Retonfay, north-east of Metz. The IXth and IIIrd Corps

cantoned at St. Marie and Verneville as reserve. All the troops

immediately set about the construction of earthworks, and of bridges

over the Moselle above and below the fortress.

Of the Corps now belonging to the Army of the Meuse, the XIIth assembled

at Conflans and the Guards at Mars la Tour; the IVth Corps, which had

not been ordered to Metz, had already reached Commercy.

The IIIrd Army, after crossing the Vosges range, and having left a

Bavarian brigade blockading Toul, was pressing forward in three

columns. Its foremost Corps had already reached the Meuse, but were

obliged to halt there for two days, so as to cross the river

approximately abreast of the Meuse army. Its cavalry meanwhile patrolled

three marches ahead as far as Chalons and Vitry, where, for the first

time since Woerth, it regained touch of the enemy. The French encountered

were only guarding posts on the Marne railway-line, which retired when

the traffic thereon ceased.

FOOTNOTE:

[17] These figures are erroneous. It is manifest that three Corps and

two Cavalry Divisions, most of which had been materially weakened by

casualties, could not furnish a strength of 138,000 men; nor could the

IIIrd Army, originally 130,000 strong, swelled by one Corps and

diminished by battle losses of 12,000, approximate a strength of

223,000. As a matter of fact, on August 22nd, the Meuse Army was 86,275

strong, and the IIIrd Army 137,622; the two armies together had a total

strength, in round numbers, of 224,000 men.

THE ARMY OF CHALONS.

Meanwhile at Chalons there had been formed a French army of 166

battalions, 100 squadrons, and 380 guns, consisting of the Ist, Vth,

VIIth, and XIIth Corps.

Of the last the Division which had been left behind on the Spanish

frontier formed the nucleus, to which was added a body of very superior

troops, consisting of four regiments of marines; later the two cavalry

divisions also joined. General Trochu, who had been made Governor of

Paris, had taken back with him thither eighteen battalions of

Gardes-Mobiles, they having already given such proofs of insubordination

that it was thought unsafe to confront them with the enemy.

The Emperor had arrived in Chalons and had placed Marshal MacMahon in

command of the newly-formed army. In the French Head-quarter it was not

unnaturally assumed that Marshal Bazaine was in retreat from Metz. By an

advance of the Army of Chalons merely to Verdun the armies could form a

junction with each other in the course of a few days, and so a fighting

force be formed which might make head against the hitherto victorious

enemy. On the other hand, MacMahon had to concern himself with the duty

of covering Paris, and that capital, no less than his own right flank,

was threatened by the appearance of the Crown Prince of Prussia's army

on the Meuse.

For the attainment of a decision between advancing and retiring, it was

beyond everything necessary to know the direction which Marshal Bazaine

might have taken.

On the 18th tidings had come from him, that he had maintained his

position in a battle about Rezonville, but that his troops had to be

supplied with ammunition and supplies before they could renew the march.

From this it seemed only too probable that the communications of the

Army of the Rhine were already threatened; and MacMahon determined to

march on Rheims, whence he could either reach Paris, though by a

somewhat circuitous route, or move in the direction of the other army.

But when it became known that the Crown Prince of Prussia's army had not

even been near Metz, and that Prussian cavalry had already appeared

before Vitry, the Marshal could not deceive himself as to the danger

involved in the latter alternative. With sound judgment, therefore, he

stood out against the order of the Empress and the Ministry to undertake

that enterprise; he determined against it, and announced his resolution

to march to Paris. Under its walls he could accept a battle with

advantage, since the fortifications, even in the event of defeat,

assured a safe retreat and precluded pursuit.

Further reports from Metz did not afford a clear insight into the

situation there. Also on the 18th, "the army had held its position," the

narrative ran--only the right wing had changed front. "The troops

required two or three days' rest," but the Marshal "counted still on

being able to move out in a northerly direction," and fight his way to

Chalons by the Montmedy--Ste. Menehould route, if this road was not

strongly held by the enemy. In that case, he would march on Sedan, and

even by Mezieres, in order to reach Chalons.

Bazaine might already have committed himself to the movement thus

indicated, and therefore Marshal MacMahon, who was not the man to leave

his fellow-soldier in the lurch, instead of marching on Paris, set forth

on the 23rd in the direction of Stenay.

The suddenness of this decision caused all the preparations for the

undertaking to be left unexecuted. At the end of the first day's march

the troops reached the Suippe late in the evening in pouring rain. They

lacked every necessary, and two Corps remained entirely without food.

The Marshal was therefore forced to move his army further northward to

Rethel, where large magazines of provisions had been established, and

where the railway facilitated the bringing up of stores. Even on the

third day's march the army had made little progress eastward. The left

wing remained at Rethel, the right reached the Aisne, near Vouziers. On

August 26th the main army was still standing between Attigny and Le

Chene on the Ardennes canal, while the VIIth Corps and a regiment of

Hussars lay in front of Vouziers for the protection of the right flank.

While the French army was thus marching eastward by a wide detour, the

German forces, which had been put in motion at the same time, were for

their part marching due westward.

According to orders issued from the supreme Head-quarter at Pont a

Mousson, the advance on the enemy, supposed to be at Chalons, was to be

effected in such manner that the IIIrd Army, marching on the left of the

Army of the Meuse, should have the start by a day's march, so that the

enemy, wherever he might stand halted, could be struck simultaneously in

front and on his right flank, and thus forced away northward from the

direction of Paris. The two armies were to converge as they advanced,

and to reach the line of Ste. Menehould--Vitry on the 26th.

On the first day's march, the armies still on a front some fifty-six

miles long, the Meuse was reached; on the second day, the 24th, they

advanced to the line St. Dizier--Bar le Duc--Verdun. The attempts to

take the latter place and Toul in the by-going proved unsuccessful.

So early as on that day the 4th Cavalry Division, which had pushed far

ahead, sent in important news. The Rhenish dragoons had found Chalons

and the camp at Mourmelon deserted, and notwithstanding the destruction

effected, there still remained in the latter considerable booty. An

intercepted letter written by a French officer, which intimated that the

relief of Metz was in prospect, and another which stated that Marshal

MacMahon was at Rheims with 150,000 men and was fortifying his position

there, were corroborated by the Paris newspapers.

On the 25th the Army of the Meuse formed a line from Sommeille to

Dombasle, while the heads of columns of the IIIrd Army were already

executing the march prescribed for the following day, on the Ste.

Menehould--Vitry road. The small fortress of Vitry, a few hours after a

battalion of Mobiles had left the place, surrendered to the 4th Cavalry

Division. On its march to Ste. Menehould, thence to be forwarded by

train to Paris, this battalion, 1000 strong, fell into the hands of the

6th Cavalry Division as it was moving on Dampierre, and was carried away

captive.

The 5th Cavalry Division reached Ste. Menehould, and the 12th followed

on the same road as far as Clermont, patrolling the country up to

Varennes, within nine miles of the French outposts at Grand Pre, but

without learning anything as to the whereabouts of the French army.

The scouting service to any great distance on the right of the army was

hindered by the vicinity of the forest of Argonnes, which it was

difficult for the cavalry to penetrate without the assistance of

infantry. The inhabitants of the country began to show themselves

extremely hostile. The Government had provided them with arms, and

organized a general rising. The Germans, who hitherto had made war on

the Emperor alone, were now forced to use their arms against the

population. The franctireurs, though not affecting operations on a large

scale, were a source of much annoyance to the smaller undertakings, and

as it naturally embittered the soldiers to realize that they were no

longer safe either by day or night, the character of the war became more

stern, and the sufferings of the country were increased.

A Paris telegram, sent by way of London, reached this day (25th) the

Royal Head-quarter at Bar le Duc. It stated that MacMahon was at Rheims,

and sought to effect a junction with Bazaine.

It is always a serious matter to exchange, without the most pressing

necessity, a once-settled and well-devised plan for a new and unprepared

scheme. It would have been unwise and unskilful hastily to alter the

whole direction of the advance because of rumours and information which

might later probably turn out to be unfounded. Endless difficulties must

result from such a course; the arrangements for bringing up baggage and

reinforcements would have to be cancelled, and aimless marches might

impair the confidence of the troops in their commanders.

The orders for the following day, issued at eleven o'clock in the

morning, prescribed therefore for both armies merely a slight alteration

of direction; Rheims instead of Chalons was indicated as the objective.

The cavalry of the right wing, however, was explicitly ordered to

advance to Buzancy and Vouziers, where a thorough insight into the

situation could not but be obtained.

In war it is for the most part with probabilities only that the

strategist can reckon; and the probability, as a rule, is that the enemy

will do the right thing. Such a course could not be anticipated as that

the French army would uncover Paris and march along the Belgian frontier

to Metz. Such a move seemed strange, and indeed somewhat venturesome;

but nevertheless it was possible. The chief of the General Staff,

therefore, that same day worked out a tabular detail of marches, upon

which the three Corps of the Army of the Meuse, together with the two

Bavarian Corps which were nearest that army, could be brought together

in the vicinity of Damvillers, on the right bank of the Meuse, in three

not over-severe marches.

These forces, with the two Corps standing in reserve at Metz, which

could be brought up, would constitute a force of 150,000 men, which

might give battle in the specified vicinity, or compel the enemy to do

so on the march to Longuyon. Without employing this reserve, there was

every prospect that the advance of the French could be brought to a halt

on this side of the Meuse, and then another Corps of the IIIrd Army

could be brought up.

This march-table was soon to be brought into service. Fresh news arrived

in the course of the same afternoon. The newspapers revealed the secret

by publishing vehement speeches delivered in the National Assembly to

the effect "that the French general who should leave his comrade in the

lurch, deserved the execration of the country." It would be a disgrace,

it was protested, to the French nation if the brave Bazaine were left

unsuccoured: from all this, and considering the effect of such phrases

on the French, it was to be expected that military considerations would

give way to political. A telegram from London, quoting the Paris

_Temps_, stated that MacMahon had suddenly resolved to hasten to the

assistance of Bazaine, though the abandonment of the road to Paris

endangered the safety of France.

The King, before night, approved of the march to the right, and the

orders were dispatched that night direct to the respective Army Corps on

the march.

On the 26th his Majesty moved his head-quarter to Clermont. The Crown

Prince of Saxony had set out for Varennes early in the morning with the

XIIth Corps, and had ordered the Guards to Dombasle, the IVth Corps to

Fleury.

The cavalry, sent forward in every direction, found that the enemy had

evacuated the region of the Suippe valley and had not yet entered that

of the Meuse; that Buzancy and Grand Pre were in occupation of the

French, and that a large encampment of their VIIth Corps had been

specifically perceived on the height of Vouziers. The apparition of a

few handsful of cavalry, despatched thither on observation duty,

occasioned an almost unaccountable excitement. General Douay, quartered

at Vouziers, received the most exaggerated reports, and must have

thought that a general attack by the German army was imminent. The VIIth

Corps was kept under arms the entire night in pouring rain, and the

Marshal resolved to advance towards Vouziers and Buzancy with all his

forces on the following morning. Thus the march to the east received a

check as early as the 27th, but the untruthfulness of the reports very

soon became sufficiently apparent.

If the German chiefs were deeply interested in gaining an insight into

the enemy's movements, so on the French side this requisite was

certainly urgent in no less imperative degree. With judicious disposal

of their cavalry on the right flank, a surprise like that above

mentioned would have been impossible, but the 1st French Cavalry

Division was placed on the left flank, where there was no danger

whatever, and the 2nd was rearmost of everything. It seemed as though in

the French army less attention was paid to the repulse of an attack than

to the evasion of one, and to the unobserved attainment of Montmedy,

the point of rendezvous with the other army. When the movement of the

Germans from southward could no longer be doubted, it would certainly

have been best for the French to take the vigorous offensive in that

direction with intent to defeat them, or at least to sweep them out of

the vicinity of their own line of march. If they had failed in this they

would, at any rate, have readily learnt that their undertaking was

impracticable, and that its further prosecution must certainly result in

a catastrophe. It must, however, be admitted that the German cavalry

formed an almost impenetrable screen. The Marshal could not know that

his enemy was echeloned from Vitry to Varennes, a distance of more than

thirty-seven miles, and was not at all in form to attack him just then

in serious earnest.

_August 27th._--The Marshal had cleared up his misconception, and on the

27th he continued his march, at least with part of his troops. The VIIth

and Vth Corps covered the movement at Vouziers and Buzancy, the XIIth

advanced to Le Chene, and the 1st Cavalry Division to Beaumont, probably

to ascertain the whereabouts of Marshal Bazaine. The Ist Corps and the

2nd Cavalry Division remained behind on the Aisne.

The Saxon Corps, the furthest forward of the German Army, had received

direct orders to march to Dun on the 27th, and secure on the right bank

the passages over the Meuse, as far as Stenay. It reached Stenay at

three o'clock in the afternoon, and threw forward a post on the left

bank.

The cavalry clung closely to the enemy and followed his movements, often

engaging in petty skirmishes. The departure of the Vth French Corps from

Buzancy in the direction of Le Chene was at once detected, as also was

the march to Beaumont; and the Saxon Cavalry Division pushed forward

that evening to Nouart. The Bavarian Corps reached the Clermont-Verdun

road, the 5th Ste. Menehould; the other Corps of the IIIrd Army were

hurrying by forced marches in a northerly direction.

The prospect now seemed certain that the enemy would be overtaken on the

left bank of the Meuse. Word was sent to the blockading army before Metz

that the two Corps asked for were no longer required, but they had

already set out.

The latest dispositions made by Marshal MacMahon clearly betokened a

last effort on his part to persevere in the original direction. He was

echeloned along the northernmost of the roads by which he could reach

Metz, but had left a strong reserve on the Aisne on which he might fall

back. When he now learnt that nothing had been seen of the Army of the

Rhine at Montmedy, but that it actually was still at Metz, he resolved

on retreating, and, after giving orders to that effect for the following

morning, reported his intention to Paris.

From thence during the night came the most strenuous remonstrances. The

Minister of War telegraphed, "If you leave Bazaine in the lurch, the

revolution will break out," and the Council of Ministers issued a

peremptory order to relieve Metz. The troops in front of the Marshal, it

was urged, were nothing more than part of the army investing Metz; he

had the start of the Crown Prince of Prussia by several days' march; and

General Vinoy had already left Paris for Rheims with the newly-formed

XIIIth Corps as a reinforcement to him.

The Marshal silenced his military convictions and issued new orders. But

the troops had started in advance of the promulgation of them. The

change of route gave rise to much confusion; the roads were bad, and

quarters for the night were not reached until darkness had long set in;

the men were weary, wet to the skin, and depressed in spirits.

_August 28th._--Little more than nine miles' distance eastward was

attained. The XIIth Corps reached La Besace, the Ist was on the march

to Le Chene, the VIIth was halted at Boult aux Bois because of a false

report that two Prussian Corps were occupying Buzancy, further ahead. On

the strength of this report the Vth Corps moved toward that town by way

of Bar, but went on to Bois des Dames in the afternoon. Neither of these

movements was interfered with. The German cavalry had strict orders,

while watching the French as closely as possible, not in any way to

check or press them, and the Saxon cavalry evacuated Nouart on the

approach of the enemy. The Germans had to await the coming up of the

IIIrd Army, the rearmost Corps of which, the VIth, had only just reached

Ste. Menehould.

_August 29th._--For this day also a non-offensive attitude was

prescribed, and the bringing on of decisive operations was postponed

until the 30th.

The Marshal in his head-quarter at Stonne had been informed that the

Germans occupied Dun, and that the bridges over the Meuse had been

destroyed. He had no pontoon-train, and could cross the river only lower

down, at Mouzon and Villers. His XIIth Corps and 1st Cavalry Division

passed over to the right bank unhindered at these points; the Ist Corps

and the 2nd Cavalry Division proceeded to Raucourt. The VIIth Corps,

delayed on march by petty skirmishes on its right flank, did not reach

its destination at La Besace, but went into bivouac at Oches. The Vth

Corps was to have moved to Beaumont, but the staff officer carrying the

order fell into the hands of the Prussian cavalry together with his

escort. General de Failly therefore marched upon Stenay, according to

his original instructions.

Up to this time, apart from the cavalry, the Saxon Corps alone had been

in contact with the enemy, but the Guard now came up to Buzancy in

parallel line, while the Saxon Corps crossed over to the left bank of

the Meuse at Dun. Its advanced guard at once took possession of the

wooded spur to the north-east of Nouart, drove out the French cavalry,

and pressed ahead to Champy, where it encountered a strong force in

Lespart's Division. The purpose of the reconnaissance having been

attained, the advanced guard was called in. The French Division, in

consequence of fresh orders received from the Marshal, withdrew

simultaneously in a northerly direction.

On the German side four Corps of the IIIrd Army were now within nine

miles rearward of the Army of the Meuse. The 5th Cavalry Division stood

at Attigny on the enemy's line of communication; the 6th was hanging on

the heels of the French columns of march, and, among other things, had

taken Boncq with a dismounted party. The Royal Head-quarter was now

advanced to Grand Pre, and, as the result of the various reports which

had poured in, the resolution was taken to attack the enemy on the

following day, before he should cross the Meuse. The Army of the Meuse

was to march towards Beaumont, the IIIrd Army to move forward between

that place and Le Chene. To bring both armies to a parallel front, the

right wing was not to move until ten o'clock, while the left[18] was to

start before six o'clock. Only the trains absolutely requisite for the

battle were to follow.

FOOTNOTE:

[18] The Army of the Meuse constituted the right wing; the IIIrd Army,

the left.

BATTLE OF BEAUMONT.

(August 30th.)

On the 30th of August, at ten o'clock, the King set out for Sommauthe by

way of Buzancy. Both the Bavarian Corps were on the march thither, the

Vth Corps advanced in the centre towards Oches, the XIth, together with

the Wuertemberg Division, was heading for Le Chene, the VIth for

Vouziers. The IVth Corps on the right was advancing by Belval, the XIIth

reached to the Meuse, while the Guard Corps followed in rear as a

reserve.

Marshal MacMahon had issued orders for the attainment of the object that

his entire army should on this day cross to the right bank of the Meuse;

only the baggage trains and sick were to remain behind.

His Ist Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division had left Raucourt so early as

seven; they crossed the river at Remilly, light bridges having been

thrown over for the infantry. The VIIth Corps at Oches had struck camp

still earlier at four o'clock, but as it took with it in the march all

its waggons, even the empty ones, the trains formed a column more than

nine miles in length, and seven of its battalions were forced to march

alongside the road in the capacity of baggage guard; so that the brigade

bringing up the rear was unable to start until ten o'clock. This long

procession soon came into contact with the Prussian cavalry, was fired

upon by artillery, and compelled to arrest its march. Not till one

o'clock could the movement on La Besace be resumed, and then, as heavy

firing was heard from Beaumont, General Douay conceived it right to

abandon the road to Mouzon and take that to Remilly.

To the Vth Corps had been precautionally assigned the duty of covering

the march of the other two. The troops had reached the vicinity of

Beaumont only at 4 a.m., and were thoroughly exhausted by fighting and

the night-march. General de Failly therefore determined to halt his

Corps for cooking and rest before pursuing the march. Precautionary

measures seem to have been altogether neglected, though it must have

been known that the enemy was now close at hand. While at half-past one

the officers and men were engaged in their meal, Prussian shells

suddenly burst among these heedless groups.

The two Corps of the German right wing had to move through a wooded

tract in four wholly independent columns, by ways sodden with rain. The

Crown Prince of Saxony therefore ordered that no single column should

attempt to enter on an attack before the neighbouring one was ready to

co-operate.

The IVth Corps had started very early, and after a short rest had

pursued its march at ten o'clock. When at noon the head of the 8th

Division emerged from the forest, it discerned from its elevated

position the enemy's camp about 800 paces distant, in the condition as

described. General Schoeler (commanding the Division) held that the

opportunity of so complete a surprise was not to be let pass; the

proximity of his force could not long remain undetected by the enemy. He

announced it by his cannon-fire.

The Division soon recognized that it had drawn upon itself an enemy of

immensely superior strength. The French rapidly got under arms, and

dense swarms of riflemen hurried to the front, whose long-range

Chassepots inflicted great losses, especially upon the artillerymen. The

main body of the 8th Division had meanwhile come up to the assistance of

its advanced guard, and ere long the 7th Division appeared on the right.

The French assailed it too with great impetuosity, and could only be

repulsed at the bayonet-point. Presently, however, the foremost

battalions of both Divisions made their way into the French camp in

front of Beaumont, into the town itself, and finally into a second camp

located northward of it. Seven guns, of which the teams were missing,

and which continued firing up to the last moment, a number of gunners,

waggons and horses, fell into the hands of the assailants.

Whilst now, about two o'clock, a pause occurred in the infantry fight,

fourteen batteries of the IVth Corps engaged in a contest with the

French artillery deployed on the stretch of heights north of Beaumont.

The German artillery mass was presently strengthened by the Saxon

artillery on the right, and by the Bavarian batteries on the left. This

formidable and commanding artillery line, constantly advancing in

echelon, promptly squandered the mitrailleuses, and at three o'clock the

remaining French batteries also were silenced.

The IInd Bavarian Corps, on the left of the Prussian IVth, was advancing

on La Thibaudine, when it was quite unexpectedly attacked from the west

by a strong force of the enemy.

These troops were Conseil Dumesnil's Division of the VIIth French Corps,

which was continuing in march to Mouzon in error, acting on its original

orders. Completely surprised as it was, and attacked in front and flank,

the Division gave up all hope of cutting its way through, and at about

four o'clock beat a hasty retreat northwards, leaving two guns behind.

The Bavarians had in the meantime taken possession of the farm of

Thibaudine, and the Prussians that of Harnoterie. The wooded hills

prevented a clear view of the surrounding country; the enemy had

completely disappeared.

General de Failly was making strenuous efforts to collect his scattered

forces in front of Mouzon, under cover of a rear-guard halted at La

Sartelle; and General Lebrun had left behind on the left side of the

Meuse an infantry and a cavalry brigade and three batteries belonging to

the XIIth Corps, to render him assistance.

At five o'clock the 8th Division, headed by the 13th Brigade, was

pushing toilsomely through the dense forest of Givodeau, on its way to

operate against this new defensive position. On emerging from the wood

the battalions, which had fallen into some confusion, were received by a

brisk fire at short range. The repeated efforts of the riflemen to

advance were unsuccessful, and the dense underwood hindered the clubbed

mass behind them from forming. By the time the Saxon Corps had succeeded

with extreme difficulty in extricating itself from the forest and swamps

of the Wamme stream, and had reached Letanne, the impracticability of

further progress in the Meuse valley became apparent, since numerous

French batteries, in unassailable positions on the opposite side of the

river, commanded all the low ground. The Corps therefore ascended the

plateau, moved in its turn through the Givodeau woods, and debouching

thence swelled the strength of the forces assembled on the northern

border, where, however, their development on a broader front was

impossible. So about six o'clock the infantry engagement came to a stand

for a time in this quarter.

On the left the 14th Brigade had come up into line with the 13th, and

this body (the 7th Division) was followed by the 8th Division in two

columns.

The 93rd Regiment had carried the height to the north-east of Yoncq, and

advanced in pursuit of the enemy as far as to the foot of Mont de Brune.

Four mitrailleuses and eight guns, some of them with their entire teams,

fell thus into the hands of the Anhalters.

When, at half-past five, the artillery had come up into position, and at

the same time the 27th Regiment was approaching, General Zychlinski

(commanding 14th Brigade) advanced to the enveloping attack.

The French occupied in strength the summit of the entirely isolated

hill; their batteries faced to eastward against the Bois de Givodeau,

whence an assault threatened; but they swiftly changed front to the

south and directed a heavy fire on the 93rd and the 2nd Battalion of the

27th, as they charged up on this face while the Fusilier battalion was

at the same time pressing forward from the west. Regardless of their

losses, the assailants eagerly scaled the ascent, the brigade and

regimental commanders at their head. Six French guns were seized while

in action, in spite of a brave resistance by the gunners and covering

troops, and the enemy was pursued as far as the Roman road. Here four

more guns, completely horsed, which had been abandoned by the

artillerymen, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

The three battalions[19] hurried on towards Mouzon, without waiting for

the support of the[20] 14th Brigade following in rear, but they suddenly

found themselves threatened by a cavalry-charge.

Marshal MacMahon had recognized the fact that the only thing left him

now to do was to effect as orderly an evacuation as possible of the left

bank of the Meuse; the reinforcements sent across from the right had

already been recalled. The 5th Cuirassier Regiment alone still remained.

When, a little to the north of the Faubourg de Mouzon, it was reached by

the fire of the advancing Prussians, the French regiment hurled itself

upon the enemy with a noble contempt for death.

The shock struck the 10th Company of the 27th Regiment. The soldiers,

without closing their ranks, waited for the word of command of their

leader, Captain Helmuth, and then fired a volley at close range, which

struck down eleven officers and 100 men, the brave commander of the band

of horsemen falling fifteen paces in front of his men. The survivors

rushed back towards the Meuse, and, as all the bridges had been removed,

they strove to gain the other side by swimming.

Considerable masses of the enemy were still in front of Mouzon, and upon

these the batteries of the IVth Corps, as one after another they came

into action, directed their fire. Two Bavarian batteries brought under

their fire the bridge at Villers, lower down the river, and prevented it

from being used. Then the suburb was carried after a fierce encounter,

and here too the bridge across the Meuse was taken and held. The enemy,

deprived of every way of retreat, received with a hot fire the 8th

Division emerging from the valley of the Yoncq, but was gradually driven

back towards the river. The French troops in front of the Bois de

Givodeau were also in a hopeless plight; they were assailed by the 7th

Division and XIIth Corps, and were dispersed after an obstinate

struggle. By nightfall the French had ceased their resistance on the

hither side of the Meuse. Many lagging stragglers were taken prisoners,

others hid themselves in the copses and farmhouses, or tried to escape

by swimming the river.

In this battle, as in the preceding ones, the attack suffered far

heavier loss than the defence. The Army of the Meuse lost 3500

combatants, the preponderating loss falling on the IVth Corps. The

French estimated their loss at 1800; but in the course of the day and on

the following morning, 3000 prisoners, mostly unwounded, fell into the

hands of the victors, with 51 guns, 33 ammunition and many other

waggons, and a military chest containing 150,000 francs. And, what was

of supreme importance, by the result of this battle the French army had

been driven into an extremely unfavourable position.

While the IVth Corps had been chiefly sustaining the day's battle, the

Saxon Cavalry had pushed forward on the right bank of the Meuse, and had

reconnoitred towards Mouzon and Carignan. The Guard Corps reached

Beaumont, and General von der Tann with the 1st Bavarian Corps was at

Raucourt, having marched by way of La Besace with some slight

skirmishing on the way. The IInd Bavarian Corps was assembled at

Sommauthe, the Vth Corps had reached Stonne, the XIth, La Besace. Thus

seven Corps now stood in close concentration between the Meuse and the

Bar.

The King rode back to Buzancy after the battle, as all the villages in

the vicinity of the battle-field were crowded with the wounded. Here, as

previously at Clermont, was felt the great inconvenience of inadequate

lodging for hundreds of illustrious guests and their suites, when, for

once in a way for military reasons, head-quarters were established in a

small village, instead of in a large town. Shelter for those officers

whose duty it was to prepare the necessary orders for the morrow was

only found late at night, and with considerable difficulty.

These orders instructed that on the 31st two Corps of the Army of the

Meuse should cross over to the right bank of the river, to prevent the

possibility of further progress of the French to Metz by way of

Montmedy. Two Corps of the army besieging Metz were besides already

posted in that direction about Etain and Briey. The IIIrd Army was to

continue its movement in the northward direction.

As the situation had now developed itself, it already seemed within

sight that the Army of Chalons might be compelled to cross over into

neutral territory, and the Belgian Government was therefore asked

through diplomatic channels to concern itself with its disarmament in

that event. The German troops had orders at once to cross the Belgian

frontier, should the enemy not lay down his arms there.

While the Vth French Corps was still fighting about Beaumont, and when

the rest of the army had crossed the Meuse, General MacMahon had ordered

the concentration of his army on Sedan. He did not intend to offer

battle there, but it was indispensable to give his troops a short rest,

and provide them with food and ammunition. He then meant to continue the

retreat by way of Mezieres, which General Vinoy was just then

approaching with the newly-formed XIIIth Corps. The Ist Corps, which had

arrived at Carignan early in the afternoon, detached two of its

divisions to Douzy in the evening to check any further advance of the

Germans.

Though any pursuit immediately after the battle of Beaumont was

prevented by the intervening river, the retreat of the French soon

assumed the ominous character of a rout. The troops were utterly worn

out by their exertions by day and night, in continuous rain and with

but scanty supplies of food. The marching to and fro, to no visible

purpose, had undermined their confidence in their leaders, and a series

of luckless fights had shaken their self-reliance. Thousands of

fugitives, crying for bread, crowded round the waggons as they struggled

forward to reach the little fortress which had so unexpectedly become

the central rallying point of a great army.

The Emperor Napoleon arrived at Sedan from Carignan late in the evening

of the 30th; the VIIth Corps reached Floing during the night, but the

XIIth Corps did not arrive at Bazeilles until the following morning. The

Vth Corps mustered at the eastern suburb of Sedan in a fearfully

shattered state, followed in the afternoon of the 31st by the Ist,

which, after many rear-guard actions with the German cavalry, took up a

position behind the Givonne valley. To pursue the march to Mezieres on

that day was not to be thought of. The XIIth Corps had that same evening

to show a front at Bazeilles, where the thunder of their cannon already

heralded the arrival of the Germans. The destruction of the bridges

there and at Donchery was ordered, but the order remained unexecuted,

owing to the worn-out condition of the men.

_August 31st._--Of the army of the Meuse the Guard and 12th Cavalry

Divisions had crossed the Meuse at Pouilly, and by a pontoon bridge at

Letanne, and swept the country between the Meuse and the Chiers.

Following close upon the rear of the French and harassing them in

skirmishes till they reached their new position, they brought in as

prisoners numbers of stragglers. The Guard Corps then crossed the Chiers

at Carignan and halted at Sachy; the XIIth pushed on to about Douzy on

the Meuse,[21] while its advanced guard thrust ahead on the further side

(of the Chiers) as far as Francheval. The IVth Corps remained at Mouzon.

The 4th Cavalry Division of the IIIrd Army reconnoitred in the direction

of Sedan, drove back the French outposts from Wadelincourt and Frenois,

and, moving from the latter place, seized the railroad under the fire of

hostile artillery. The 6th Cavalry Division on the left flank proceeded

on the way to Mezieres as far as Poix.

When the Ist Bavarian Corps reached Remilly before noon, it came under

heavy fire from the opposite side of the river, and at once brought up

its batteries in position on the hither slope of the valley of the

Meuse. A sharp cannonade ensued, by the end of which sixty Bavarian guns

were engaged. It was only now that the French attempted to blow up the

railway bridge south of Bazeilles, but the vigorous fire of the 4th

Jaeger Battalion drove off the enemy with his engineers, the Jaegers threw

the powder-barrels into the river, and at midday crossed the bridge. The

battalion entered Bazeilles in the face of a storm of bullets, and

occupied the northern fringe of the straggling place. Thus the XIIth

French Corps was forced to move up into a position between Balan and

Moncelle, where, having been reinforced by batteries belonging to the

Ist Corps, it had to encounter, and that with considerable waste of

power, the daring little band of Germans.

General von der Tann[22] did not however hold it advisable to commit

himself on that day to a serious conflict on the further side of the

Meuse with a closely compacted enemy, while his own Corps was still

unconcentrated; and, since the weak detachment in Bazeilles had no hope

of being reinforced, it withdrew therefrom at about half-past three

without being pursued.

Meanwhile two pontoon bridges had been laid at Allicourt, without

molestation from the French. These and the railway bridge were

barricaded for the night, while eighty-four guns further secured them

from being crossed. The Ist Bavarian Corps went into bivouac at

Angecourt, the IInd at Hancourt.

To the left of the Bavarians the XIth Corps marched towards Donchery,

followed by the Vth. The advanced guard found the place unoccupied, and

extended itself on the further side of the river. By three o'clock two

other bridges were completed close below Donchery, whilst the railway

bridge above the place, also found unguarded, was destroyed.

On the extreme left the Wuertemberg and the 6th Cavalry Divisions came in

contact with the XIIIth French Corps, which had just arrived at

Mezieres.

The King removed his head-quarters to Vendresse.

In spite of a succession of occasionally very severe marches in bad

weather, and of being in regard to supplies chiefly beholden to

requisitioning, the Army of the Meuse advancing on the east, and the

IIIrd Army on the south, were now directly in face of the concentrated

French Army. Marshal MacMahon could scarcely have realized that the only

chance of safety for his army, or even for part of it, lay in the

immediate prosecution of his retreat on the 1st of September. It is true

that the Crown Prince of Prussia, in possession as he was of every

passage over the Meuse, would have promptly taken that movement in flank

in the narrow space, little more than four miles wide, which was bounded

on the north by the frontier. That nevertheless the attempt was not

risked was only to be explained by the actual condition of the exhausted

troops; for on this day the French Army was not yet capable of

undertaking a disciplined march involving fighting; it could only fight

where it stood.

On the German side it was still expected that the Marshal would strike

for Mezieres. The Army of the Meuse was ordered to attack the enemy's

positions with the object of detaining him in them; the IIIrd Army,

leaving only one Corps on the left bank, was to press forward on the

right side of the river.

The French position about Sedan was covered to rearward by the fortress.

The Meuse and the valleys of the Givonne and the Floing brooks offered

formidable obstructions, but it was imperative that those outmost lines

should be obstinately held. The Calvary height of Illy was a very

important point, strengthened as it was by the Bois de Garenne in its

rear, whence a high ridge stretching to Bazeilles afforded much cover in

its numerous dips and shoulders. In the event of a retreat into neutral

territory in the last extremity, the road thereto lay through Illy.

Bazeilles, on the other hand, locally a very strong point of support to

the Givonne front, constituted an acute salient, which, after the loss

of the bridges across the Meuse, was open to attack on two sides.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] Of 27th and 93rd Regiments.

[20] Read in "rest of the."

[21] Douzy is on the north bank of the Chiers.

[22] Commanding Ist Bavarian Corps.

BATTLE OF SEDAN.

(September 1st.)

In order, in co-operation with the Army of the Meuse, to hold fast the

enemy in his position, General von der Tann sent his Ist Brigade over

the pontoon-bridges against Bazeilles so early as four o'clock in a

thick morning mist. The troops attacked the place, but now found the

streets barricaded, and were fired on from every house. The leading

company pressed on as far as to the northern egress, suffering great

losses, but the others, while engaged in arduous street-fighting, were

driven out of the western part of Bazeilles by the arrival of the 2nd

Brigade of the French XIIth Corps. They however kept possession of the

buildings at the southern end, and from thence issued to repeated

assaults. As fresh troops were constantly coming up on both sides, the

French being reinforced to the extent even of a brigade of the Ist and

one of the Vth Corps, the murderous combat long swayed to and fro; in

particular the struggle for the possession of the Villa Beurmann,

situated in front of the exit, and commanding the main street throughout

its whole length, lasted for a stricken hour. The inhabitants took an

active part in the fighting, and so they inevitably drew fire upon

themselves.

The fire of the strong array of guns drawn up on the left slope of the

valley of the Meuse naturally could not be directed on the surging

strife in Bazeilles, which was now blazing in several places, but at

eight o'clock, on the arrival of the 8th Prussian Division at Remilly,

General von der Tann threw his last brigades into the fight. The walled

park of the chateau of Monvillers was stormed and an entrance won into

the Villa Beurmann. The artillery crossed the bridges at about nine

o'clock, and the 8th Division was requested to support the combat in

which the right wing of the Bavarians was also engaged southward of

Bazeilles about Moncelle.[23]

In this direction Prince George of Saxony[24] had so early as five

o'clock despatched an advanced guard of seven battalions from Douzy.

They drove the French from Moncelle, pressed ahead to Platinerie and the

bridge there, and, in spite of the enemy's heavy fire, took possession

of the houses bordering the further side of the Givonne brook, which

they immediately occupied for defensive purposes. Communication with the

Bavarians was now established, and the battery of the advanced guard

moved up quickly into action on the eastern slope; but a further

infantry support could not at first be afforded to this bold advance.

Marshal MacMahon had been struck by a splinter from a shell near

Moncelle at 6 a.m. He had named General Ducrot as his successor in the

chief command, passing over two senior Corps commanders. Apprized of

this promotion at seven o'clock, that General issued the necessary

orders for the prompt assemblage of the army at Illy, in preparation for

an immediate retreat on Mezieres. He had already despatched Lartigue's

Division of his own Corps to safeguard the crossing of the Givonne

ravine at Daigny; the Divisions of Lacretelle and Bassoigne were ordered

to take the offensive against the Saxons and Bavarians, to gain time for

the withdrawal of the rest of the troops. The divisions forming the

second line were to start immediately in a northerly direction.

But the Minister of War had appointed General de Wimpffen, recently

returned from Algiers, to the command of the Vth Corps in room of

General de Failly, and had at the same time given him a commission

empowering him to assume the command of the Army in case of the

disability of the Marshal.

General de Wimpffen knew the army of the Crown Prince to be in the

neighbourhood of Donchery. He regarded the retreat to Mezieres as

utterly impracticable, and was bent on the diametrically opposite course

of breaking out to Carignan, not doubting that he could drive aside the

Bavarians and Saxons, and so succeed in effecting a junction with

Marshal Bazaine. When he heard of the orders just issued by General

Ducrot, and at the same time observed that an assault on Moncelle seemed

to be taking an auspicious course, he produced--to his ruin--the

authoritative commission which had been bestowed on him.

General Ducrot submitted without any remonstrance; he might probably not

have been averse to be relieved of so heavy a responsibility. The

Divisions of the second line which were in the act of starting

immediately were recalled; and the further advance of the weak Bavarian

and Saxon detachments was soon hard pressed by the impact of the first

stroke of the enemy rushing on to the attack.

By seven in the morning, while one regiment of the Saxon advanced guard

had gone in upon Moncelle, the other on its right had to concern itself

with the threatening advance of Lartigue's Division. With that body it

soon became engaged in a heavy fire-fight. The regiment had laid down

its packs on the march, and had omitted to take out the cartridges

carried in them. Thus it soon ran short of ammunition, and the repeated

and violent onslaughts of the Zouaves, directed principally against its

unprotected right flank, had to be repulsed with the bayonet.

On the left in this quarter a strong artillery line had gradually been

formed, which by half-past eight o'clock amounted to twelve batteries.

But Lacretelle's Division was now approaching by the Givonne bottom, and

dense swarms of tirailleurs forced the German batteries to retire at

about nine o'clock. The guns, withdrawn into a position at a somewhat

greater distance, drove back with their fire the enemy in the hollow,

and presently returned to the position previously occupied.

The 4th Bavarian Brigade had meanwhile pushed forward into Moncelle, and

the 46th Saxon Brigade also came up, so that it was possible to check

the trifling progress made by Bassoigne's Division.

On the right flank of the Saxons, which had been hard pressed,

much-needed supports now arrived from the 24th Division, and at once

took the offensive. The French were driven back upon Daigny, with the

loss of five guns. Then in conjunction with the Bavarians, who were

pushing on through the valley to the northward, the village of Daigny,

the bridge and the farmstead of La Rapaille were carried after a bitter

fight.

About ten o'clock the Guard Corps reached the upper Givonne. Having

started in the night, the Corps was marching in two columns, when cannon

thunder from Bazeilles heard afar off caused the troops to quicken their

pace. In order to render assistance by the shortest road, the left

column would have had to traverse two deep ravines and the pathless wood

of Chevallier, so it took the longer route by Villers Cernay, which

place the head of the right column passed in ample time to take part

with the Saxons in the contest with Lartigue's Division, and to capture

two of its guns.

The Divisions ordered back by General Ducrot had already resumed their

former positions on the western slopes, and fourteen batteries of the

Guard Corps now opened fire upon them from the east.

At the same hour (ten o'clock) the 7th Division of the IVth Corps had

arrived near Lamecourt, and the 8th near Remilly, both places rearward

of Bazeilles; the head of the latter had reached the Remilly railway

station.

The first attempt of the French to break out eastward to Carignan proved

a failure, and their retreat westward to Mezieres was also already cut

off, for the Vth and XIth Corps of the IIIrd Army, together with the

Wuertemberg Division, had been detailed to move northward to the road

leading to that place. These troops had started early in the night, and

at six a.m. had crossed the Meuse at Donchery, and by the three pontoon

bridges further down the river. The advanced patrols found the Mezieres

road quite clear of the enemy, and the heavy cannonade heard from the

direction of Bazeilles made it appear probable that the French had

accepted battle in their position at Sedan. The Crown Prince, therefore,

ordered the two Corps, which already had reached the upland of Vrigne,

to swing to their right and advance on St. Menges; the Wuertembergers

were to remain behind to watch Mezieres. General von Kirchbach then

indicated Fleigneux to his advanced guard as the objective of the

further movement, which had for its purpose the barring of the escape of

the French into Belgium, and the establishment of a junction with the

right wing of the Army of the Meuse.

The narrow pass about 2000 paces long between the heights and the river

traversed by the road to St. Albert, was neither held nor watched by the

French. It was not till the advanced guard reached St. Menges that it

encountered a French detachment, which soon withdrew. The German advance

then deployed against Illy. Two companies moved to the right and took

possession of Floing, where they maintained themselves for the next two

hours without assistance against repeated attacks.

The earliest arriving Prussian batteries had to exert themselves to the

utmost to maintain themselves against the much superior strength of

French artillery in action about Illy. At first they had for their only

escort some cavalry and a few companies of infantry, and as these bodies

debouched from the defile of St. Albert, they found themselves an

enticing object of attack to Margueritte's Cavalry Division halted on

the aforesaid plateau of Illy. It was at nine o'clock that General

Galliffet rode down to the attack at the head of three regiments of

Chasseurs d'Afrique and two squadrons of Lancers formed in three lines.

The first fury of the charge fell upon two companies of the 87th

Regiment, which met it with a hail of bullets at sixty yards range. The

first line charged some horse-lengths further forward, then wheeled

outward to both flanks, and came under the fire of the supporting troops

occupying the broom copses. The Prussian batteries, too, showered their

shell fire into the throng of French horsemen, who finally went about in

confusion, and, having suffered great losses, sought refuge in the Bois

de Garenne.

At ten o'clock, the same hour at which the assaults of the French on

Bazeilles and about Daigny were being repulsed, fourteen batteries of

the XIth Corps were already in action on and near the ridge south-east

of St. Menges; to swell which mass presently came up those of the Vth

Corps. Powerful infantry columns were in march upon Fleigneux, and thus

the ring surrounding Sedan was already at this hour nearly closed. The

one Bavarian Corps and the artillery reserves on the left bank of the

Meuse were considered strong enough to repel any attempt of the French

to break through in that direction; five Corps were on the right bank,

ready for a concentric attack.

The Bavarians and Saxons, reinforced by the head of the IVth Corps,

issued from the burning Bazeilles and from Moncelle, and, in spite of a

stubborn resistance, drove the detachments of the French XIIth Corps in

position eastward of Balan back upon Fond de Givonne.

Once in possession of the southern spur of the ridge sloping down from

Illy, and while awaiting the renewed attacks of the French, the extreme

urgency was realized of reassembling the different Corps and of

re-forming the troops, which had fallen into great confusion.

As soon as this was done, the 5th Bavarian Brigade advanced on Balan.

The troops found but a feeble resistance in the village itself; but it

was only after a hard fight that they succeeded in occupying the park of

the chateau situated at its extreme end. From thence, soon after midday,

the foremost battalion extended close up to the walls of the fortress,

and exchanged shots with the garrison. There now ensued a stationary

musketry fight with the enemy once again firmly posted about Fond de

Givonne. At one o'clock the French, having evidently been reinforced,

took the offensive, after a preparatory cannonade and mitrailleuse fire.

The 5th Bavarian Brigade was driven back for some considerable distance,

but presently, supported by the 6th, regained its old position after an

hour's hard fighting.

Meanwhile the Saxon Corps had extended itself in the northern part of

the valley against Givonne. There also the foremost detachments of the

Guard Corps were already established, as well as in Haybes. The Prussian

artillery forced the French batteries to change their positions more

than once, and had already caused several of them to go out of action.

To gain breathing space here, the French repeatedly tried to send

forward large bodies of tirailleurs, and ten guns were brought up into

the still occupied Givonne, but these were taken before they could

unlimber. The Prussian shells also fell with some effect among the

French troops massed in the Bois de Garenne, though fired from a long

distance.

After the Franctireurs de Paris had been driven out of Chapelle, the

Guard-cavalry dashed through Givonne and up the valley, and at noon the

Hussars had succeeded in establishing direct contact with the left flank

of the IIIrd Army.

The 41st Brigade of that army had left Fleigneux and was descending the

upper valley of the Givonne, and the retreat of the French from Illy in

a southern direction had already begun. The 87th Regiment seized eight

guns which were in action, and captured thirty baggage waggons with

their teams, as well as hundreds of cavalry horses wandering riderless.

The cavalry of the advanced guard of the Vth Corps also made prisoners

of General Brahaut and his staff, besides a great number of dispersed

infantrymen and 150 draught-horses, together with forty ammunition and

baggage waggons.

In the direction of Floing there was also an attempt on the part of the

French to break through; but the originally very weak infantry posts at

that point had gradually been strengthened, and the French were driven

from the locality as quickly as they had entered. And now twenty-six

batteries of the Army of the Meuse[25] crossed their fire with that of

the Guard batteries, in position on the eastern slope of the Givonne

valley. The effect was overwhelming. The French batteries were shattered

and many ammunition waggons exploded.

General de Wimpffen at first took the advance of the Germans from the

north for nothing more than a demonstration, but toward midday became

completely convinced that it was a real attack. He therefore ordered

that the two Divisions of the Ist Corps halted in second line behind the

Givonne front, should now return to the Illy height in support of

General Douay. On rejoining the XIIth Corps he found it in full retreat

on Sedan, and now urgently requested General Douay to despatch

assistance in the direction of Bazeilles. Maussion's Brigade did

actually go thither, followed by Dumont's Division, which latter was

relieved in the foremost line by Conseil Dumesnil's Division. All this

marching and counter-marching was executed in the space south of the

Bois de Garenne dominated by the cross fire of the German artillery. The

recoil of the cavalry heightened the confusion, and several battalions

drew back into the insecure protection of the forest. General Douay, it

is true, reinforced by portions of the Vth Corps, retook the Calvary (of

Illy), but was forced to abandon it by two o'clock; and the forest (of

Garenne) behind it was then shelled by sixty guns of the Guard

artillery.

Liebert's Division alone had up to now maintained its very strong

position on the heights north of Casal. The amassing at Floing of a

sufficient strength from the German Vth and XIth Corps could only be

effected very gradually. After one o'clock, however, detachments began

to climb the steep hill immediately in its front, while others went

round to the south towards Gaulier and Casal, and yet others came down

from Fleigneux. The complete intermixture of the troops prevented any

unity of command; and a bloody contest was carried on for a long time

with varying fortunes. The French Division, attacked on both flanks and

also heavily shelled, at last had its power of resistance undermined;

and the reserves of the VIIth Corps having already been called off to

other parts of the battle-field, the French cavalry once more devotedly

struck in to maintain the fight.

General Margueritte, with five regiments of light horse, and two of

Lancers, charged to the rescue out of the Bois de Garenne. Almost at

the outset he fell severely wounded, and General Galliffet took his

place. The advance was over very treacherous ground, and even before the

actual charge was delivered the cohesion of the ranks was broken by the

heavy flanking fire of the Prussian batteries. Still, with thinned ranks

but with unflinching resolution, the individual squadrons charged on the

troops of the 43rd Infantry Brigade, partly lying in cover, partly

standing out on the bare slope in swarms and groups; and also on the

reinforcements hurrying from Fleigneux. The first line of the former was

pierced at several points, and a band of these brave troopers dashed

from Casal through the intervals between eight guns blazing into them

with case-shot, but the companies beyond stopped their further progress.

Cuirassiers issuing from Gaulier fell on the hostile rear, but

encountering the Prussian Hussars in the Meuse valley, galloped off

northward. Other detachments cut their way through the infantry as far

as the narrow pass of St. Albert, where they were met by the battalions

debouching therefrom. Others again entered Floing only to succumb to the

5th Jaegers, who had to form front back to back. These attacks were

repeated by the French again and again in the shape of detached fights,

and the murderous turmoil lasted for half an hour with steadily

diminishing fortune for the French. The volleys of the German infantry

delivered steadily at a short range strewed the whole field with dead

and wounded horsemen. Many fell into the quarries or down the steep

declivities, a few may have escaped by swimming the Meuse; and scarcely

more than half of these brave troops returned to the protection of the

forest.

But this magnificent sacrifice and glorious effort of the French cavalry

could not change the fate of the day. The Prussian infantry had lost but

little in the cut-and-thrust encounters, and at once resumed the attack

against Liebert's Division. But in this onslaught they sustained heavy

losses; for instance, all three battalions of the 6th Regiment had to

be commanded by lieutenants. But when Casal had been stormed, the

French, after a spirited resistance, withdrew at about three o'clock to

their last refuge in the Bois de Garenne.

When between one and two o'clock the fighting in Bazeilles had at first

taken a favourable turn, General de Wimpffen reverted to his original

plan of driving from the village the Bavarians, now exhausted by a long

struggle, and of breaking a way through to Carignan with the Ist, Vth,

and XIIth Corps; while the VIIth Corps was to cover the rear of this

movement. But the orders issued to that effect in part never reached the

Corps; in part did so so late that circumstances forbade their being

carried out.

In consequence of previously mentioned orders, besides Bassoigne's

Division, the Divisions of Goze and Grandchamp were still available.

Now, at about three in the afternoon, the two last-named advanced from

Fond de Givonne, over the ridge to the eastward, and the 23rd Saxon

Division, which was marching up the valley on the left bank of the

Givonne, found itself suddenly attacked by closed battalions accompanied

by batteries. With the support of the left wing of the Guard Corps and

of the artillery fire from the eastern slope, it soon succeeded in

repulsing the hostile masses, and indeed drove them across the valley

back to Fond de Givonne. The energy of the French appeared to be by this

time exhausted, for they allowed themselves to be taken prisoners by

hundreds. As soon as a firm footing had been gained on the heights west

of the Givonne, the German artillery established itself there, and by

three o'clock an artillery line of twenty-one batteries stretching from

Bazeilles to Haybes was in action.

The Bois de Garenne, in which many broken bands of all Corps and of all

arms were straggling in search of refuge, still remained to be gained.

After a short cannonade the 1st Guard-Division climbed the heights from

Givonne, and were joined by Saxon battalions, the left wing of the IIIrd

army at the same time coming on from Illy. A wild turmoil ensued, in

which isolated bands offered violent resistance, while others

surrendered by thousands; nor was it until five o'clock that the Germans

had complete possession of the forest.

Meanwhile long columns of French could be seen pouring down on Sedan

from the surrounding heights. Disordered bodies of troops huddled closer

and closer in and up to the fortress, and shells from the German

batteries on both sides of the Meuse were constantly exploding in the

midst of the chaos. Pillars of fire were soon rising from the city, and

the Bavarian riflemen, who had pushed forward through Torcy, were

preparing to climb the palisades at the gate when, at about half-past

four, the white flags were visible on the towers.

The Emperor Napoleon had declined to follow General de Wimpffen in his

attempt to break through the German lines; he had, on the contrary,

ordered him to enter into negotiations with the enemy. In consequence of

the renewal of the order to that effect the French suddenly ceased

firing.

General Reille now made his appearance in the presence of the King, who

had watched the action since early morning from the hill south of

Frenois. He was the bearer of an autograph letter from the Emperor,

whose presence in Sedan was till then unknown. He placed his sword in

the hand of the King, but as this was clearly only an act of personal

surrender, the answer stipulated that an officer should be commissioned

with full powers to treat with General von Moltke as to the surrender of

the French Army.

This painful duty was imposed on General de Wimpffen, who was in no way

responsible for the desperate straits into which the French army had

been brought.

The negotiations were held at Donchery in the night between the 1st and

2nd September. On the part of the Germans it had to be insisted on that

they durst not forego the advantages gained over so powerful an enemy as

France. Since the French had regarded the victory of German arms over

other nationalities in the light of an offence to France, any untimely

generosity might cause them to forget their own defeat. The only course

to pursue was to insist upon the disarmament and captivity of their

entire army, with the exception that the officers were to be free on

parole.

General de Wimpffen declared it impossible to accept conditions so hard,

the negotiations were broken off, and the French officers returned to

Sedan at one o'clock on the morning of the 2nd. Before their departure

they were given to understand that unless the offered terms were

accepted by nine o'clock that morning the artillery would reopen fire.

The capitulation was signed by General de Wimpffen on the morning of the

2nd, further resistance being obviously impossible.

Marshal MacMahon was very fortunate in having been disabled so early in

the battle, else on him would have inevitably devolved the duty of

signing the capitulation; and though he had only carried out the orders

forced upon him by the Paris authorities, he could hardly have sat in

judgment, as he afterwards did, on the comrade he had failed to relieve.

It is difficult to understand why we Germans celebrate the 2nd of

September--a day on which nothing memorable happened, but what was the

inevitable result of the previous day's work; the day on which the army

really crowned itself with glory was the 1st of September.

The splendid victory of that day had cost the Germans 460 officers and

8500 men. The French losses were far greater; they amounted to 17,000

men, and were chiefly wrought because of the full development of the

fire of the German artillery.

During the battle there

were taken prisoners 21,000

By the Capitulation 83,000

------

A total of 104,000 sent into captivity.

The prisoners for the present were assembled on the peninsula of Iges

formed by the Meuse. As supplies for them were entirely lacking, the

Commandant of Mezieres permitted the unrestricted transport of

provisions by the railway as far as Donchery. Two Army Corps were

assigned to the duty of guarding and escorting the convoys of prisoners,

who were sent off in successive bodies 2000 strong by two roads, one to

Etain, and the other by Clermont to Pont a Mousson, where the prisoners

were taken over by the army investing Metz, and forwarded to various

parts of Germany.

On Belgian territory 3000 men had been disarmed.

The spoils of war taken at Sedan consisted of three standards, 419

field-pieces, 139 fortress guns, 66,000 rifles, over 1000 waggons, and

6000 serviceable horses.

With the entire nullification of this army fell the Empire in France.

FOOTNOTES:

[23] Moncelle is northward of Bazeilles.

[24] Now commanding XIIth Corps, since his elder brother's appointment

to command of the Army of the Meuse.

[25] Sense and accuracy alike indicate that "Army of the Meuse" in text

should be "Third Army," _vide_ Staff History, part I. 2nd vol. pp. 361,

367, and 370.--Clarke's authorized Trs.